Bahram Gholizadeh et al v. Wells Fargo Bank et al, No. 2:2014cv07575 - Document 20 (C.D. Cal. 2015)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT WELLS FARGOS MOTION TO DISMISS 16 . This case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE by Judge Otis D. Wright, II. (MD JS-6. Case Terminated). (lc) Modified on 12/18/2015 (lc).
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Bahram Gholizadeh et al v. Wells Fargo Bank et al Doc. 20 O JS-6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 BAHRAM GHOLIZADEH and FARIDEH GHOLIZADEH, 13 v. 14 15 Case No. 2:14-CV-07575-ODW-AGR ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT WELLS FARGO’S MOTION TO DISMISS [16] Plaintiffs, WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. and DOES 1 to 100, 16 Defendants. 17 I. 18 On December 3, 2014, the Court dismissed the Complaint filed by Plaintiffs 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 INTRODUCTION Bahram Gholizadeh and Farideh Gholizadeh, granting leave to amend two claims. After Plaintiffs failed to file a First Amended Complaint by November 12, 2015, Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with this Court’s order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). In their Opposition, Plaintiffs fail to provide any excuse for the ten-month delay. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss and accordingly DISMISSES this action with prejudice. (ECF No. 16.) 1 /// 1 After carefully considering the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the Motion, the Court deems the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. Dockets.Justia.com 1 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2 On August 26, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Los Angeles County 3 Superior Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged violations of 4 California Civil Codes § 2923.5 and § 2923.6 and the Unfair Competition Law, 5 breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and promissory 6 estoppel. (See Not. of Removal, Ex. A.) Wells Fargo subsequently removed the case 7 to federal court. (ECF No. 1.) On October 21, 2014, Wells Fargo filed a Motion to 8 Dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) and 12(b). 9 (ECF No. 9.) On December 3, 2014, after receiving no opposition from Plaintiffs, the 10 Court dismissed with prejudice the allegations based on California Civil Code § 11 2923.5 and § 2923.6 and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 12 and dismissed without prejudice the remaining two claims. (ECF No. 12.) In a later 13 order, the Court gave the Plaintiffs until January 5, 2015 to file a First Amended 14 Complaint, following Well Fargo’s request for a deadline. (ECF Nos. 13, 15.) 15 This case lay dormant until November 12, 2015, when Wells Fargo again filed a 16 Motion to Dismiss, this time pursuant to Rule 41(b). (ECF No. 16.) Plaintiffs timely 17 opposed, and Wells Fargo timely replied. (ECF Nos. 17, 18.) 18 III. DISCUSSION 19 Under Rule 41(b), a district court has authority to sua sponte dismiss an action 20 for failure to prosecute or failure to comply with court orders. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); 21 see also Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 629–31 (1962); Hells Canyon Pres. 22 Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005). A court must weigh 23 five factors when determining whether to dismiss a case under Rule 41(b): “(1) the 24 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage 25 its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring 26 disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 27 alternatives.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 (9th Cir. 1992). “[The 28 Ninth Circuit] may affirm a dismissal where at least four factors support dismissal, ... 2 1 or where at least three factors “strongly” support dismissal.” Yourish v. California 2 Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted). As set 3 forth below, the Court finds that four of the five factors weigh in favor of dismissal. 4 A. Public’s Interest in Expeditious Resolution of Litigation The Ninth Circuit has explained that “the public’s interest in expeditious 5 6 resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.” Id. Furthermore, the fact that 7 Plaintiffs completely deserted this case for ten months (by failing to either file a First 8 Amended Complaint or ask for an extension of the deadline) adds even more weight 9 to this factor. See Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting 10 the plaintiff’s failure to pursue the case for almost four months as a consideration for 11 this factor.) Accordingly, this factor strongly weighs in favor of dismissal. 12 B. Court’s Need to Manage Its Docket 13 Courts next consider whether the delay in a particular case interferes with its 14 ability to manage its docket efficiently. See id. Here, the Court has already dismissed 15 the Complaint once, with leave to amend two claims. (See ECF No. 12.) Since that 16 dismissal, the Court has heard nothing from Plaintiffs. Indeed, in their Opposition to 17 Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs propose no new deadline for submission 18 of a First Amended Complaint. From this dearth of information, the Court assumes 19 that Plaintiffs intend to continue drawing this case out, consuming even more of the 20 Court’s schedule, and further allowing Plaintiffs, not the Court, to control the schedule 21 of this case. See Jara v. San Bernardino Sheriff’s Dept., 2015 WL 127885, at *3 22 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2015) (finding that “[p]laintiff’s inaction hinders the Court’s ability 23 to move this case toward disposition and indicates that Plaintiff does not intend to 24 litigate this action diligently.”) 25 strongly favors dismissal. 26 C. Because of this, the Court finds that this factor Risk of Prejudice to Wells Fargo 27 When determining whether a plaintiff’s delay poses a risk of prejudice to the 28 defendant, courts look to whether the plaintiff’s actions “impair[] [the] defendant’s 3 1 ability to proceed to trial or threaten[] to interfere with the rightful decision of the 2 case.” Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642. A delayed lawsuit, in and of itself, is not 3 prejudicial enough to warrant dismissal because delays are the “realities of the system 4 that have to be expected.” Id. However, when the delays are unreasonable, courts 5 presume that the defendant is prejudiced. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prods. 6 Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1227 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The law also presumes prejudice 7 from unreasonable delay.”). The plaintiff may rebut this presumption by showing that 8 the defendant suffered no actual prejudice. Id. Additionally, if the plaintiff is able to 9 offer some viable excuse for the delay, the burden of production shifts to the 10 defendant to show actual prejudice. Id. 11 Here, Plaintiffs offer no excuse for their failure to file a First Amended 12 Complaint by the Court’s deadline. Furthermore, Plaintiffs offer no explanation as to 13 why they abandoned this case for ten months. The Court therefore finds Plaintiffs’ 14 delay unreasonable and presumptively prejudicial. Because Plaintiffs do not suggest 15 that Wells Fargo has not suffered any actual prejudice, the presumption is not 16 rebutted. This factor therefore weighs strongly in favor of dismissal. 17 D. Public Policy Favoring Disposition on the Merits 18 Generally, the public policy favoring disposition of a case on its merits weighs 19 against dismissal. See Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 643. However, when a case is stalled 20 or unreasonably delayed because of a party’s failure to comply with deadlines, this 21 factor “lends little support” to that party. In re Phenylpropanolamine Prods. Liab. 22 Litig., 460 F.3d at 1228. Here, Plaintiffs bore the responsibility of moving the case 23 forward after the Complaint was dismissed. But Plaintiffs did not discharge this duty. 24 See Morris v. Morgan Stanly & Co., 942 F.2d 648, 652 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Although 25 there is indeed a policy favoring disposition on the merits, it is the responsibility of 26 the moving party to move towards that disposition at a reasonable pace. . . .”) 27 Therefore, although this factor weighs against dismissal, it ultimately lends little 28 support to Plaintiffs. 4 1 E. Availability of Less Drastic Alternatives 2 The Ninth Circuit has explained that a “district court need not exhaust every 3 sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible 4 and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 5 1986). A district court may satisfy the requirement of exploring alternative sanctions 6 by explicitly explaining why the alternatives would be inadequate. See Malone v. U.S. 7 Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 132 (9th Cir. 1987). 8 Wells Fargo argues that the Court already employed a less drastic sanction on 9 Plaintiffs by dismissing their claims with leave to amend. (Mot. 3.) This argument is 10 erroneous because dismissing the Complaint with leave to amend “was not a sanction 11 in response to Plaintiffs’ failure to obey a court order.” Yourish, 191 F.3d at 992. 12 Dismissing the case with prejudice would be a sanction for Plaintiff’s failure to obey 13 the Court’s order regarding the First Amended Complaint.2 Id. 14 Instead, the Court believes that any lesser sanctions would be inadequate and 15 ineffective in this case. First, Plaintiffs never requested an extension to the deadline 16 set by the Court for submitting a First Amended Complaint. Requesting an extension 17 would show the Court that Plaintiffs had some ongoing concern in the case. Second, 18 Plaintiffs did not communicate with the Court in any way for almost ten months, 19 further showing that they seem to have forgotten about the pending case. Finally, in 20 their Opposition to the present motion, Plaintiffs do not apologize for failing to submit 21 a timely First Amended Complaint, request an extension of the deadline to submit a 22 First Amended Complaint, or offer any hint of an explanation as to why they ignored 23 the Court’s Order. The only mention of a First Amended Complaint occurs when 24 Plaintiffs request that the Court allow them to “amend the Complaint according to the 25 26 27 28 2 Plaintiffs also seem to make this argument in their Opposition, arguing that the Court should have analyzed the Rule 41(b) factors in its Order dismissing the case with leave to amend. (Opp’n 3–4.) Analyzing the factors at that point would have been inappropriate as the Court was not actually sanctioning Plaintiffs for anything at that time as Plaintiffs had, thus far, complied with the Court’s orders. 5 1 original order.” (Opp’n 4.) This request is confusing as the original Order required 2 Plaintiffs to submit a First Amended Complaint by January 5, 2015. (ECF No. 15.) 3 Plaintiffs seem to have lost interest in this case, meaning an extension of the deadline 4 for submitting a First Amended Complaint would likely be ignored as well, making it 5 an ineffective sanction. See Croaker v. Arias, No. CV 15-1237-AG (AS), 2015 WL 6 5829876, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2015) (“[T]he Court finds that Plaintiff has lost 7 interest in his own lawsuit. Therefore, the Court concludes that less drastic alternatives 8 would be inadequate at remedying Plaintiff's failure to prosecute and obey court 9 orders.”). Because lesser sanctions would be ineffective and inadequate, the Court 10 finds that this factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 11 Four of the Rule 41(b) dismissal factors weigh in favor of dismissal, and only 12 one factor slightly weighs against dismissal. Accordingly, dismissal of the action with 13 prejudice is appropriate. IV. 14 15 16 CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 17 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 20 December 17, 2015 21 22 23 ____________________________________ OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28 6
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