Daniel Lopez v. James J. Chung et al, No. 2:2014cv06853 - Document 46 (C.D. Cal. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 27 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. For the reasons stated above, on the record before the Court, no rational trier of fact could find for Defendant. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. MD JS-6. Case Terminated. (lom)
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Daniel Lopez v. James J. Chung et al Doc. 46 1 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DANIEL LOPEZ, 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 v. JAMES J. CHUNG; IL HOON CHUNG, 15 Defendants. 16 17 ___________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 14-06853 DDP (FFMx) ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Dkt. 27] Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Daniel Lopez’s Motion 18 19 for Summary Judgment. 20 parties and heard oral argument, the Court grants the motion and 21 adopts the following Order. 22 I. 23 Having considered the submissions of the Background Plaintiff is a paraplegic, and uses a wheelchair for mobility. 24 (Declaration of Daniel Lopez in Support of Motion (Dkt. 27-5), ¶ 25 2.) In October 2013, Plaintiff went to Defendant’s store, “Frank’s 26 Market” (“the market”), to buy drinks, but found there was no 27 accessible entrance. (Decl. Lopez, ¶ 4-5.) 28 market had two steps, which were too high for Plaintiff to navigate The entrance to the Dockets.Justia.com 1 in his wheelchair. (Decl. Lopez, ¶ 4-5.; Declaration of Victor 2 Garcia in Support of Motion (Dkt. 27-6) ¶ 4; Exhibit 4 in Support 3 of Motion (Dkt. 27-7).) 4 the owner to assist him to get the drinks. (Decl. Lopez, ¶ 5-7.) 5 The owner selected drinks in sizes larger than Plaintiff wanted and 6 charged Plaintiff for unwanted items. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff 7 alleges that he has been deterred from visiting the market because 8 it is not accessible to him. (Id., at ¶ 11.) 9 Plaintiff asked a person he believed to be Plaintiff’s complaint alleges causes of action under the 10 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and California’s Unruh Civil 11 Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (b)(2)(A)(iv); Cal. Civ. Code § 51 12 (f). 13 Order from the Court requiring Defendant to provide an accessible 14 entrance to the market; and 2) judgment in favor of Plaintiff for 15 statutory damages of $4,000, plus attorneys’ fees. 16 II. Legal Standard 17 Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment and seeks (1) an Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, 18 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 19 together with the affidavits, if any, show “that there is no 20 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 21 to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party 22 seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the 23 court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions 24 of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the 25 absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. 26 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). All reasonable inferences from 27 the evidence must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See 28 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242 (1986). 2 If the 1 moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it is 2 entitled to summary judgment if it can demonstrate that “there is 3 an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” 4 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 5 Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to 6 the nonmoving party opposing the motion, who must “set forth 7 specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 8 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. 9 party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the Summary judgment is warranted if a 10 existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on 11 which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 12 477 U.S. at 322. A genuine issue exists if “the evidence is such 13 that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 14 party,” and material facts are those “that might affect the outcome 15 of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 16 There is no genuine issue of fact “[w]here the record taken as a 17 whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 18 nonmoving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 19 Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 20 It is not the court’s task “to scour the record in search of a 21 genuine issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1278 22 (9th Cir.1996). Counsel has an obligation to lay out their support 23 clearly. Carmen v. San Francisco Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 24 (9th Cir.2001). 25 evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the evidence 26 is not set forth in the opposition papers with adequate references 27 so that it could conveniently be found.” Id. The court “need not examine the entire file for 28 3 1 III. Discussion 2 Plaintiff argues that the lack of a wheelchair ramp at 3 Defendant’s market constitutes a barrier, and that Defendant’s 4 failure to remove that barrier violates Plaintiff’s rights to full 5 and equal access under the ADA and California’s Unruh Civil Rights 6 Act. 7 A failure to remove architectural barriers in existing public 8 accommodation facilities is discriminatory if such removal is 9 readily achievable. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). Barrier 10 removal is readily achievable when it is “easily accomplishable and 11 able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense.” 42 12 U.S.C. § 12181(9). If barrier removal is not readily achievable, 13 the ADA specifies that the public accommodation must “make such 14 goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or 15 accommodations available through alternative methods, if such 16 methods are readily achievable.” Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(v). 17 Plaintiff has submitted photographs of the market showing the 18 two steps up from the sidewalk to the entrance to the market. 19 (Mot., Ex. 4 (Dkt. 27-7).) 20 market had inaccessible steps on the date of Plaintiff’s visit, nor 21 that removal of that barrier was readily achievable. 22 Defendant’s Response to Interrogatory #10, which Defendant attaches 23 to his Opposition, but does not discuss, admits that the steps have 24 since been replaced by a ramp.1 25 26 Defendant does not dispute that the Indeed, Defendant, proceeding pro se, instead argues that he has not received any notice from Plaintiff of the need to provide disabled 27 1 28 Having heard oral argument, it is unclear to the court whether this is, in fact, the case. 4 1 access. 2 pre-suit notice to defendants.” Skaff v. Meridien North America 3 Beverly Hills, 506 F.3d 832, 845 (9th Cir. 2007). 4 Plaintiff never informed Defendant of the alleged ADA violation, 5 therefore, is not a defense to Plaintiff’s claim. 6 However, “ADA plaintiffs are not required to provide The fact that Defendant also argues that the market was built in the mid 7 19th century, and thus falls within the ADA’s “Grandfather Clause.” 8 Defendant has submitted a copy of a property report indicating that 9 the subject property was built in 1924. (Opposition to Summary 10 Judgment, Ex. 1.) 11 distinct systems for regulating building accessibility: one to 12 apply to existing facilities (those designed and constructed for 13 occupancy before January 26, 1993) and another to apply to 14 later-constructed facilities. The grandfathered facilities must 15 remove barriers to accessibility only to the extent that such 16 removal is readily achievable.” 17 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1) and 18 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)) (internal citations omitted). 19 though Defendant has provided evidence that the market falls 20 withing the definition of “grandfathered facilities” under the ADA, 21 that fact alone has no bearing on whether the removal of the 22 entrance steps was readily achievable. 23 in the record indicates that the steps were removable without much 24 difficulty or expense, there is no triable issue regarding a safe 25 harbor under the ADA’s grandfather clause. 26 “In enacting the ADA, Congress adopted two Long v. Coast Resorts, Inc., 267 However, even Because the only evidence Lastly, Defendant argues that Plaintiff is intentionally and 27 willfully filing a large amount of ADA claims for the purpose of 28 enrichment. Even if true, Plaintiff’s motivations are not relevant 5 1 to this matter. 2 F.3d 1047, 1062 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[M]ost ADA suits are brought by a 3 small number of private plaintiffs who view themselves as champions 4 of the disabled. 5 litigation as vexatious as a matter of course.”). 6 IV. Conclusion 7 See, e.g. Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 District courts should not condemn such serial ] For the reasons stated above, on the record before the Court, 8 no rational trier of fact could find for Defendant. 9 Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Accordingly, 10 11 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 14 15 Dated: August 1, 2016 DEAN D. PREGERSON United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6
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