Bridget Williams v. The Salvation Army et al, No. 2:2014cv06138 - Document 16 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS 11 WITH LEAVE TO AMEND by Judge Otis D. Wright, II. (lc). Modified on 12/4/2014 (lc).
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Bridget Williams v. The Salvation Army et al Doc. 16 O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 United States District Court Central District of California 8 9 10 11 Plaintiff, 12 13 Case 2:14-cv-06138-ODW(PJWx) BRIDGET WILLIAMS, v. ORDER GRANTING 14 THE SALVATION ARMY; SHERRY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 15 MCWHORTER; DONNA MARSHALL; DISMISS [11] 16 DOES 1-10, inclusive, Defendants. 17 I. 18 INTRODUCTION 19 Plaintiff Bridget Williams brings this wrongful termination case against 20 Defendants The Salvation Army (“TSA”), Sherry McWhorter, and Donna Marshall 21 (collectively, “Defendants”). 22 in retaliation for taking medical leave and asking for medical accommodations. In 23 addition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants published defamatory statements that 24 Plaintiff violated company policy and/or the law, engaged in misconduct, and is 25 incompetent. 26 defamation claim. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Plaintiff alleges that TSA terminated her employment Before this Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 27 28 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Motion to Dismiss.1 (ECF No. 11.) II. 2 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 3 Plaintiff, a resident of Los Angeles, California, was employed by TSA from 4 February 1992 to February 28, 2014. (Compl. ¶¶ 3-4.) On January 7, 2013, Plaintiff 5 told Defendants of her cancer. (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff alleges that she was “berated” by 6 Defendants over her request to see her oncologist in early February 2013. (Id. ¶ 16.) 7 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant McWhorter said to her, “do you even have 8 cancer?” (Id. ¶¶ 3-4.) 9 In May 2013, Plaintiff began her chemotherapy, working throughout, until 10 November. (Id. ¶ 19.) From November 22, 2013 until December 30, 2013, Plaintiff 11 had to use leave for her cancer treatment. (Id. ¶ 20.) On January 9, 2014, Plaintiff 12 received a negative performance review. 13 complaining that her review was based on false statements and retaliation, Plaintiff 14 was fired on February 28, 2014. (Id. ¶ 22.) She alleges that after On August 5, 2014, Plaintiff brought this wrongful termination case against 15 16 Defendants. (See Compl. ¶¶ 5-7.) The Complaint alleges that TSA terminated 17 Plaintiff’s employment in February 2014 in retaliation for Plaintiff taking medical 18 leave and asking for medical accommodations. (Id. ¶¶ 14-27.) Plaintiff also claims 19 that Defendants defamed her through “expressed and implied accusations that Plaintiff 20 violated company policy and/or the law, engaged in misconduct, and expressly and 21 impliedly accusing Plaintiff of being incompetent.” (Id. ¶ 48.) 22 On October 14, 2014, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss the Fourth 23 Cause of Action (i.e. defamation claim). (ECF No. 11.) An Opposition and Reply 24 were timely filed. (ECF Nos. 13, 14.) That Motion is now before this Court for 25 consideration. 26 27 28 1 After carefully considering the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the Motion, the Court deems the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. 2 III. 1 LEGAL STANDARD 2 A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of a cognizable 3 legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to support an otherwise cognizable legal 4 theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To 5 survive a dismissal motion, a complaint need only satisfy the minimal notice pleading 6 requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)—a short and plain statement of the claim. Porter v. 7 Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). The factual “allegations must be enough to 8 raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 9 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). That is, the complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, 10 accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. 11 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 12 The determination whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a 13 “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 14 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. A court is generally limited to the 15 pleadings and must construe all “factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as 16 true and . . . in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 17 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). But a court need not blindly accept conclusory allegations, 18 unwarranted deductions of fact, and unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. Golden 19 State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 20 As a general rule, a court should freely give leave to amend a complaint that has 21 been dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). But a court may deny leave to amend when 22 “the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged 23 pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well 24 Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir.1986); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 25 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). 26 IV. DISCUSSION 27 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s defamation claim is legally insufficient 28 because (1) the Complaint makes clear that the alleged defamatory statements are 3 1 truthful and constitute non-actionable opinion; (2) Plaintiff has not adequately alleged 2 unprivileged communications to an identified third party; and (3) the defamation 3 claim is barred against McWhorter and Marshall by the doctrine of agents’ immunity.2 4 (Mot. 2.) Plaintiff argues that the following allegations show that her defamation 5 claim was sufficiently pleaded: “. . . Defendants . . . cause[d] excessive and 6 unsolicited internal and external publications . . . of and concerning Plaintiff to third 7 persons and to the community.” (Opp’n 3 (quoting Compl. ¶ 47.)) This Court agrees 8 with Defendants that Plaintiff relies on only conclusory, boilerplate legal contentions 9 rather than factual allegations. (Reply 4.) 10 To state a claim for defamation, plaintiffs must demonstrate that defendants 11 made a false and unprivileged publication to a third person that had a tendency to 12 injure her with respect to her occupation, office, profession, trade or business. See 13 Cal. Civ. Code § 44-47; Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal. 4th 683, 720 (2007). 14 conclusory terms to allege that she was defamed by Defendants. (See Compl. ¶ 46- 15 61.) In fact, in the over four pages of allegations regarding her defamation claim 16 alone, the only specific statement Plaintiff references is one by Defendant McWhorter, 17 who in a meeting said to Plaintiff, “do you even have cancer?” 18 Additionally, as Defendants point out, this single statement is both opinion and truth, 19 and thus is not defamatory. See Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers, Inc., 74 Cal. App. 20 4th 1359, 1383 (1999) (“Under the common law privilege of fair comment, an honest 21 expression of opinion on matters of public interest is privileged.”) Plaintiff admits in 22 the Complaint that she did have cancer and therefore McWhorter’s statement was true. 23 See Ringler Assocs. Inc. v. Md. Cas. Co., 80 Cal. App. 4th 1165, 1180 (2000) (“In all 24 cases of alleged defamation, whether libel or slander, the truth of the offensive 25 statements or communication is a complete defense against civil liability, regardless of 26 bad faith or malicious purpose.”) (quotations and citations omitted). 27 2 28 Plaintiff uses (Id. ¶ 17.) Defendants have filed a Request for Judicial Notice in relation to this Motion. (ECF No. 11-3). The Court DENIES the Request because the documents are already part of the record in this case and the Court may refer to docket entries in this case without taking judicial notice. 4 1 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants’ publications included statements that 2 Plaintiff “violated Defendant SA’s policy, engaged in misconduct, and potentially 3 violated the law. . . . Defendants . . . expressly and impliedly published that Plaintiff 4 was incompetent, engaged in potential criminal activity, and was a poor employee.” 5 (Compl. ¶¶ 51-52.) Plaintiff merely describes these statements but never provides the 6 actual statements that were made. See Dutson v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, No. 93- 7 35205, slip op. at *5 (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 1994) (“Plaintiff’s complaint did not set out the 8 actual words plaintiff alleges were published to other agents, subjecting his allegations 9 of the defamation to dismissal.”) Without more specifically alleged facts, Plaintiff’s 10 defamation claim is not sufficiently pleaded to show that a false statement was made. 11 See Mayfield v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. 674 F.3d 369, 378 (4th 12 Cir. 2012) (upholding the District Court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s defamation claim 13 on the grounds that it was replete with legal conclusions but failed to set forth 14 sufficient factual allegations to proceed). 15 Further, Plaintiff does not adequately allege unprivileged communications as 16 required for a defamation claim. Employers possess a qualified privilege to discuss 17 concerns regarding employees with other employees in the employer’s organization. 18 See Sherrill v. G&K Servs., Inc., No. 14-CV-7337-PSG (Ex), 2014 WL 6670064, at 19 *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2014) (citing Manguso v. Oceanside Unified School Dist. 153 20 Cal. App. 3d 574, 580 (1984)). The privilege applies only if reasonably calculated to 21 advance or protect the interests of the communicator or the person to whom the 22 communication is made on a matter of “common interest.” See Johnson v. Wells 23 Fargo & Co., Inc., No. 14-CV-06708-MMM (JCx), 2014 WL 6475128, at *9 (C.D. 24 Cal. Nov. 19, 2014). Because an employer and its employees have a common interest 25 in preserving morale and job efficiency, an employer’s statements regarding the 26 reasons for termination of another employee generally are privileged. King v. United 27 Parcel Serv., Inc. 152 Cal. App. 4th, 426, 440 (2007). 28 /// 5 1 To defeat the privilege, plaintiff bears the burden of alleging specific facts 2 showing a statement was made with malice. Taus, 40 Cal. 4th at 721; see also 3 Robomatic, Inc. v. Vetco Offshore, 225 Cal. App. 3d 270, 276 (1990) (“A general 4 allegation of malice will not suffice; plaintiff must allege detailed facts showing 5 defendant's ill will towards him.”). Here, Plaintiff only makes conclusory, boilerplate 6 statements and has not alleged any specific facts. Plaintiff argues that the Court must 7 assume the truth of the facts as alleged. (Opp’n 4.) The Court agrees, but Plaintiff has 8 failed to allege any facts; instead Plaintiff makes blank allegations that the statements 9 were made with malice. (Id. at 6.) 10 V. 11 12 CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with leave to amend. (ECF No. 11.) 13 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 16 December 4, 2014 17 18 19 ____________________________________ OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6
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