Andre Abrams et al v. City of Los Angeles et al, No. 2:2014cv05646 - Document 19 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO DISMISS ALL INDIVIDUALLY NAMED PLAINTIFFS EXCEPT ANDRE ABRAMS 10 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II: The Court GRANTS the Citys Motion to Strike and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE all named Plaintif fs except Andre Abrams and STRIKES paragraphs 5, 16, 18, and 21 from the Complaint. Mr. Abrams shall file an amended complaint by no later than December 1, 2014 removing allegations supporting a collective action. (lc). Modified on 11/18/2014. (lc).
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Andre Abrams et al v. City of Los Angeles et al Doc. 19 O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 United States District Court Central District of California 8 9 10 11 Case 2:14-cv-05646-ODW(SHx) ANDRE A. ABRAMS, et al., Plaintiff, 12 v. 13 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 14 CITY OF LOS ANGELES and DOES 1- STRIKE, OR IN THE 15 10, inclusive, ALTERNATIVE, TO DISMISS ALL Defendants. 16 INDIVIDUALLY NAMED 17 PLAINTIFFS EXCEPT ANDRE 18 ABRAMS [10] I. 19 INTRODUCTION 20 Before the Court is Defendant City of Los Angeles’s (“the City”) Motion to 21 Strike Portions of Complaint, or in the alternative, to Dismiss All Individually Named 22 Plaintiffs Except Andre Abrams. 23 violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 28 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. The Court 24 finds that Plaintiffs have not established that joinder is proper and for the reasons 25 discussed below, the Court GRANTS the Motion and DISMISSES all Plaintiffs 26 except for Andre Abrams from the action.1 (ECF No. 10.) Plaintiffs allege that the City 27 28 1 After carefully considering the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the Motion, the Court deems the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. Dockets.Justia.com II. 1 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2 The FLSA provides that “no employer shall employ any of his employees . . . 3 for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation 4 for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one 5 and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 6 “[A]ny one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other 7 employees similarly situated” may bring an action for unpaid overtime compensation 8 against an employer who is alleged to have violated the FLSA. 9 Employees wishing to join the suit must “opt-in” by filing a written consent with the 10 Id. § 216(b). court. Id. 11 Plaintiffs were previously part of two opt-in FLSA collective action lawsuits in 12 front of Judge Feess. See Alaniz v. City of Los Angeles, No. 04-cv-8592 GAF (AJWx) 13 and Mata v. City of Los Angeles, No. 07-cv-6782 GAF (AJWx). In those cases 14 approximately 2,500 officers of the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) alleged 15 that the City violated the overtime policy and instead adhered to a purported unwritten 16 rule that officers are not to claim overtime of less than one hour (“off-the-clock 17 claims”). The officers contended that they performed pre-shift and post-shift work 18 off-the clock, and that they were not provided a full meal break during their shifts. 19 On January 30, 2014, the City filed Motions to Decertify Collective Action in 20 Alaniz and Mata on the grounds that the plaintiffs’ off-the-clock claims were too 21 individualized to proceed collectively under applicable law. 22 On May 21, 2014, Judge Feess granted both motions holding that “the record 23 reflects that the litigants were not similarly situated with respect to the off-the-clock 24 claims, particularly in view of the LAPD’s clear and unambiguous policy to the 25 contrary.” Alaniz, No. 04-cv-8592, ECF No. 2961 at 2, Mata, No. 07-cv-6782, ECF. 26 No. 363 (collectively referred to herein as “Decertification Order”). Judge Feess 27 further held that the City’s defenses to each plaintiff in Alaniz and Mata were 28 “inherently individualized” because they required an inquiry into whether each 2 1 plaintiff’s supervisors acted in good faith, an examination of off-the-clock activities, 2 and an inquiry as to whether any such work falls into a de minimus exception to the 3 FLSA. Id. In his Decertification Order, Judge Feess expressly tolled the statute of 4 limitations for 60 days so the former opt-in plaintiffs could have “an opportunity to 5 pursue their individual claims.” Id. at 13. 6 On July 21, 2014, the individual opt-in plaintiffs that were dismissed in Alaniz 7 and Mata, refiled their claims in twenty-eight lawsuits based upon their work 8 divisions and/or bureaus.2 This case is one of those twenty-eight lawsuits where 9 Plaintiffs are purporting to group themselves by virtue of their assignment to the West 10 Valley Division. As previously in the related refiled cases, the City brings this motion to dismiss 11 12 all but the first named plaintiff for misjoinder. III. 13 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(1) provides that plaintiffs may join 14 15 LEGAL STANDARD together in one case if: 16 (A) they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative 17 with respect to or arising out of the same transactions or occurrences; and 18 (B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the 19 action. 20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1). Under Rule 20(a), the court must determine whether 21 plaintiff’s claims arise from the same transaction or occurrence, meaning that the 22 plaintiffs’ claims share a similar factual background. See Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 23 F.3d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1997). If misjoinder is apparent, the Court is authorized to 24 “drop” a misjoined party from the case, or “sever” any claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 (“On 25 2 26 27 28 Judges in this district that have been assigned to one or several of these 28 lawsuits have ruled in favor of the City in identical or substantially similar motions. For example, Judge King and Judge Anderson have both found improper joinder after issuing Orders to Show Cause why all but the first named plaintiff should not be dismissed. See Acevedo, et al. v. City of Los Angeles et al., Case No. CV 14-5661 GHK (PJWx), ECF No. 21; Abner, et al. v. City of Los Angeles et al., Case No. CV 145655 PA, (MRWx), ECF No. 20. This Court agrees with their decisions and reasoning. 3 1 motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. 2 The court may also sever any claim against a party.”). IV. 3 DISCUSSION 4 Plaintiffs argue that because they all worked at the West Valley Division their 5 claims arise from the same occurrence and are therefore properly joined. In particular, 6 Plaintiffs contend: (1) they were all subject to the terms set forth in the collective 7 bargaining agreement between Defendant and the Los Angeles Police Protective 8 League (“LAPPL”); (2) they were all subject to the LAPD’s policy regarding meal 9 periods and off-the-clock work; and (3) all Plaintiffs would have reported to and been 10 supervised by the same deputy chiefs and commanders at the Bureau level and would 11 have been further supervised by the same Captain III at the division level. (Opp’n 7- 12 8.) 13 The Court disagrees. As an initial matter, in Alaniz and Mata, the court found 14 the plaintiffs to have failed to meet the “similarly situated” standard for certification 15 of a collective action under the FLSA, which is “more elastic and less stringent” than 16 that for permissive joinder under Rule 20(a). See Wynn v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 234 F. 17 Supp. 2d 1067, 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (quoting Grayson v. K-Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 18 1089, 1096 (11th Cir. 1996)). Therefore, if plaintiffs in Alaniz and Mata were not 19 certified under the less stringent standard, Plaintiffs here must be dismissed for 20 misjoinder under Rules 20 and 21 if the concerns and reasoning underlying those 21 concerns articulated in the Decertification Order are not addressed in this Complaint. 22 See Bedwell v. Amdocs, Inc., No. C 13-5565 SI, 2014 WL 3670550, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 23 July 24, 2014) (denying joinder of three plaintiffs after court decertified a FLSA 24 collective action). The Court is not persuaded that bringing a lawsuit based on 25 Plaintiffs’ employment in the West Valley Division sufficiently addresses the fact that 26 their claims remain individualized due to variances in assignments, duties, 27 supervisors, and location. (See Decertification Order at 5-13 (Mot. Exs. 1-2).) While 28 Plaintiffs may have all worked at the same at some point, Plaintiffs frequently 4 1 transferred to different work sites. (Id. at 13.) Therefore, for at least that reason, 2 grouping by the same work division does not ensure that Plaintiffs’ claims “aris[e] out 3 of the same transactions or occurrences.” 4 Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argue that their claims arise out of the same occurrence 5 and transaction because they were all supervised by the same deputy chief and by the 6 same Captain III. (Opp’n 7:28-8:3.) They include testimony from Assistant Chief 7 Paysinger, of LAPD’s Office of Operations, proving that “sign-ins were handled 8 station by station” and that when he was commander of the South Bureau he “was 9 responsible for the [sic] ensuring all of the officers under him were in compliance with 10 the LAPD’s compensation policies.” (Opp’n 8:13-20 (citations omitted).) Plaintiffs 11 also contend that Chief Parks, who served as LAPD Chief of Police from 1997 to 12 2002, “confirms that the local supervisors and captains are responsible for the 13 application of the FLSA in their particular divisions or locations.” (Opp’n 8:21-9:3.) 14 However, “[t]he deployment of officers is such that different supervisors may be on 15 duty at the beginning and end of any officer’s shift.” (Decertification Order at 6.) 16 Therefore, even within the same office, other supervisors in addition to the deputy 17 chief or Captain III supervised Plaintiffs throughout their employment at the West 18 Valley Division. (See Opp’n Ex. B, Deputy Chief Mark Perez Decl. ¶¶ 9, 11 (“Perez 19 Decl.”) (“Underneath a Captain I are the ranks of Lieutenant, Sergeant and Police 20 Officer, and depending on the shift in question a Lieutenant or Sergeant may be the 21 highest ranking officer on duty at an area/station at a given point in time” and “[t]he 22 ranks of Lieutenant and Sergeant are considered and commonly called 23 ‘supervisors.’”).) 24 Furthermore, the Complaint highlights that Plaintiffs were not similarly situated 25 with respect to the different tasks for which they were allegedly uncompensated. For 26 example, Plaintiffs allege that Sergeants were not compensated for “roll call 27 preparation,” but it is unclear whether all Plaintiffs held the rank of Sergeants at the 28 West Valley Division during the statutory period. (See Compl. ¶ 16.) Plaintiffs also 5 1 assert that “Plaintiffs who, in addition to their normal assignments and obligation, 2 worked specialty details such as SWAT, canine, motorcycle traffic officers and other 3 duties which require donning and doffing at the worksite, are entitled to be 4 compensated under the law for their time in connection with such activities.” (Compl. 5 ¶ 21.) Joinder is inappropriate because Plaintiffs had varying uncompensated tasks for 6 which they claim FLSA violations and therefore have not shown a common 7 transaction or occurrence. See Coughlin, 1304 F.3d at 1350 (finding that a common 8 allegation of delay did not create a common transaction or occurrence because delays 9 varied in some instances from case to case). 10 Plaintiffs also argue that dismissing all but the first-named plaintiff will lead to 11 judicial inefficiency. (Opp’n 9:15-16.) Specifically, they claim that joinder is 12 warranted because “the vast majority of discovery for each of the plaintiffs . . . will be 13 substantially the same as they all worked in the same division, performed the same 14 type of job duties and reported to the same set of supervisors.” (Opp’n 10:7-10.) But, 15 as explained earlier, Plaintiffs have not shown that all the Plaintiffs had the same type 16 of job duties and reported to the same supervisors. (See Mot. 15:12-20.) 17 In this case, joining Plaintiffs would cause judicial inefficiency and frustrate the 18 purposes of Rule 20(a) because of the individualized circumstances of each Plaintiff. 19 Coughlin, 130 F.3d at 1351; see League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 20 Agency, 558 F. 2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1977) (“The primary purpose [of Rule 20(a)] is 21 to promote trial convenience and to prevent multiple lawsuits.”). In addition to the 22 varying factual circumstances described above, the following defenses available to the 23 City would be litigated on an individual basis: (1) whether supervisors were aware of 24 a particular Plaintiff’s off-the-clock work; (2) whether particular activities were 25 compensable; (3) whether time spent on these activities was de minimus; and 26 (4) whether particular supervisors acted in good faith. See Smith v. T-Mobile USA, 27 Inc., No. CV 05-5274 ABC (SSx), 2007 WL 2385131, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 28 2007). 6 1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, misjoinder of parties “is not a 2 ground for dismissing an action.” Instead, “[o]n motion or on its own, the court may 3 at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. Where there is a 4 misjoinder, “the court can generally dismiss all but the first named plaintiff without 5 prejudice to the institution of new, separate lawsuits by the dropped plaintiffs.” 6 Coughlin, 130 F.3d at 1350. Accordingly, the Court dismisses all but the first named 7 Plaintiff from this action. 8 The City also moves to strike paragraphs five, sixteen, eighteen, and twenty-one 9 from the Complaint. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that “the court 10 may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, 11 immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Because Mr. Abrams is the only 12 remaining Plaintiff, the Court GRANTS the City’s Motion to Strike to the extent 13 necessary to reflect this new posture in this case. 14 sixteen, eighteen, and twenty-one of the operative Complaint seem immaterial as a 15 result of this Order. Accordingly, Mr. Abrams shall file an amended complaint by no 16 later than December 1, 2014 removing allegations supporting a collective action. V. 17 Particularly, paragraphs five, CONCLUSION 18 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS the City’s Motion to 19 Strike and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE all named Plaintiffs except Andre 20 Abrams and STRIKES paragraphs 5, 16, 18, and 21 from the Complaint. (ECF No. 21 10.) 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 24 November 17, 2014 25 26 27 ____________________________________ OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28 7
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