Ivan Rubtsov et al v. Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services et al, No. 2:2014cv01839 - Document 18 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT 12 Any amended complaint must be filed on or before July 14, 2014 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson . (lc) .Modified on 6/30/2014 (lc).
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Ivan Rubtsov et al v. Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services et al Doc. 18 1 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 IVAN RUBTSOV, ANA TZUBERY, and V.R., a minor, by and through her Guardian Ad Litem, Nick Rubtsov, 13 Plaintiffs, 14 v. 15 16 17 18 LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, MICHAEL WATROBSKI, Defendants. ___________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 14-01839 DDP (JCx) ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT [DKT. NO. 12] 19 20 Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss 21 Plaintiffs’ complaint (the “Motion”). (Docket No. 12.) For the 22 reasons stated in this Order, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART and 23 DENIED IN PART. 24 I. Background 25 Plaintiffs Ivan Rubtsov (“Rubtsov”), Ana Tzubery (“Tzubery”), 26 and V.R. (“V.R.”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this action 27 against the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family 28 Services (the “County”), County employee Michael Watrobski Dockets.Justia.com 1 (“Watrobski”), and Does 1-20, alleging violations of law resulting 2 from the inclusion of Plaintiffs’ personal information in statewide 3 databases for child abuse allegations. 4 Rubtsov has been married to Tzubery since some time in 2013. 5 (Complaint ¶ 20.) V.R., a 14 year old, is the biological daughter 6 of Rubtsov and resides with Rubtsov and Tzubery. (Id. ¶ 18.) 7 Rubtsov was previously married to V.R.’s biological mother, Ulyana 8 Rubtsova (“Ulyana”), but they are now divorced and Rubtsov was 9 given legal and physical custody of V.R. in 2011; Ulyana has 10 11 custody of their other two children. (Id. ¶¶ 18-19.) Plaintiffs allege that in 2008, Rubtsov made allegations to 12 the County against Ulyana for physical abuse and neglect of their 13 three children. (Id. ¶ 21.) Shortly thereafter, Ulyana made 14 allegations against Rubtsov. (Id.) A total of 11 referrals resulted 15 against Plaintiffs, all of which were ultimately closed as either 16 “unfounded” or “inconclusive.” (Id.) Plaintiffs allege, however, 17 that after the referrals were closed, Watrobski changed the 18 dispositions to “conclusive” or “founded” without Plaintiffs’ prior 19 knowledge or consent. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that Rubtsov was 20 notified in May 2013 that the County “might have suddenly 21 substantiated an allegation of child abuse or neglect against him” 22 and that, as a result, he would be included in the Child Abuse 23 Central Index (“CACI”) by the California Department of Justice 24 (“DOJ”). (Id. ¶ 24.) Plaintiffs allege that all allegations made 25 against them have since been determined to be false. (Id.) 26 In 2012, Rubtsov and Tzubery applied to Penny Lane Foster 27 Family Agency (the “Agency”) to be foster parents and were 28 approved. (Id. ¶ 28.) In May 2013, a 3 month old child was placed 2 1 in their home. (Id.) However, after three days, the Agency informed 2 Plaintiffs that all three of them were included in CACI and that 3 the Agency had been ordered by the County to remove the child from 4 their care. (Id.) Plaintiffs also found out that their information 5 was listed on many other state databases. (Id. ¶ 29.) Plaintiffs 6 were told that “unless and until these matters were cleared, no 7 children could be placed in their home, they were not approved to 8 adopt and/or obtain guardianship of children.” (Id. ¶ 30.) 9 In May 2013, Rubtsov requested information related to all 10 referrals and demanded an appeal of Plaintiffs’ inclusion in CACI 11 and all other state databases. (Id. ¶ 32.) Rubtsov requested an 12 administrative hearing and filed a request for disclosure of the 13 documents regarding the referrals pursuant to Welfare and 14 Institutions Code § 827. (Id. ¶¶ 33-34.) He was first told that a 15 hearing was denied because he was not in the CACI database. (Id. ¶ 16 35.) However, in August 2013, the County notified Rubtsov that only 17 he could have a hearing, that Tzubery and V.R. were not entitled to 18 one, and that “he would have to waive his rights.”1 (Id. ¶ 36.) 19 Plaintiffs claim that the County “failed to provide them with an 20 opportunity to offer live testimony, call witnesses or examine 21 those witnesses whose statements were considered by Defendants when 22 they placed their personal information in the ... databases.” (Id. 23 ¶ 37.) Defendants told Rubtsov that there was no appeal mechanism 24 for inclusion in databases other than CACI. (Id. ¶¶ 36-38.) V.R. 25 was told by Defendants that there was no appeal mechanism or right 26 to a hearing for a minor’s removal from the databases. (Id. ¶ 39.) 27 1 28 It is unclear what “rights” Plaintiffs allege would have to be waived. 3 1 Plaintiffs assert three causes of action arising out of these 2 facts, each of which Plaintiffs bring against all Defendants: (1) 3 42 U.S.C. § 1983 constitutional violations (due process and right 4 to privacy) for unlawful policies, customs, and habits; (2) civil 5 conspiracy; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress 6 (“IIED”). (Id. ¶¶ 50-65.) Defendants now seek dismissal of these 7 causes of action under Rule 12(b)(6). (Docket No. 12.) 8 II. Legal Standard 9 A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it contains 10 “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to 11 relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 12 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 13 570 (2007)). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must 14 “accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe 15 those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick 16 v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). Although a complaint 17 need not include “detailed factual allegations,” it must offer 18 “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 19 accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Conclusory allegations or 20 allegations that are no more than a statement of a legal conclusion 21 “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679. In other 22 words, a pleading that merely offers “labels and conclusions,” a 23 “formulaic recitation of the elements,” or “naked assertions” will 24 not be sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be 25 granted. Id. at 678 (citations and internal quotation marks 26 omitted). 27 28 “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they 4 1 plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Id. at 679. 2 Plaintiffs must allege “plausible grounds to infer” that their 3 claims rise “above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 4 555. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 5 relief” is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing 6 court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 7 556 U.S. at 679. 8 III. Discussion 9 A. Civil Rights Claims Against County 10 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to state claims 11 against the County because they have not alleged facts supporting 12 municipal liability under Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 13 U.S. 658 (1978). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to 14 plead facts supporting any unlawful policy or practice of the 15 County. 16 In order to survive a motion to dismiss a claim for municipal 17 liability under Monell, a plaintiff must identify the practices and 18 policies that he alleges are deficient, explain how such policy or 19 practice is deficient, and explain how the deficiency caused harm 20 to the plaintiff. Young v. City of Visalia, 687 F.Supp.2d 1141, 21 1149-50 (E.D. Cal. 2009). In other words, a plaintiff must allege 22 “specific facts giving rise to a plausible Monell claim” instead of 23 “formulaic recitations of the existence of unlawful policies, 24 customs, or habits.” Warner v. County of San Diego, 2011 WL 662993 25 (S.D. Cal. 2011). 26 Here, Plaintiffs allege that the County had “woefully 27 inadequate policies and procedures for review of conclusive 28 allegations of child abuse in [databases].” (Complaint ¶ 51.) In 5 1 the context of the factual allegations, it is clear that the policy 2 or practice to which Plaintiffs refer is the failure to offer a 3 review procedure that would allow Plaintiffs the opportunity to 4 challenge their inclusion in the CWS/CMS database and other state 5 databases. Plaintiffs allege that they were told that there were no 6 procedures for challenging inclusion in databases other than CACI, 7 and that Tzubery and V.R. were told that they could not even 8 challenge their inclusion in CACI. (Id. ¶¶ 36-39.) Under 9 California’s statutory scheme for investigating and reporting child 10 abuse allegations, due process requires that those individuals 11 reported for inclusion in CACI be afforded a hearing to contest 12 their inclusion in CACI and the evidence supporting that inclusion. 13 Burt v. County of Orange, 120 Cal.App.4th 273, 285-86 (2004). The 14 absence of any sort of process gives rise to a claim against the 15 reporting municipal entity for failing to provide such process. Id. 16 This right has also been found to apply to an individual’s 17 inclusion in CWS/CMS. Castillo v. County of Los Angeles, 959 18 F.Supp.2d 1255 (C.D. Cal. 2013). 19 Further, Defendants allude to an argument that Plaintiffs have 20 failed to allege any harm to their privacy interests because the 21 databases on which their information is listed are not publically 22 accessible. However, the inclusion of an individual’s name on a 23 child abuse registry may implicate privacy interests even where the 24 information is not available to the general public. See Burt, 120 25 Cal.App.4th at 284-85. While liability will ultimately be 26 determined by balancing the governmental interest in the intrusion 27 on privacy against Plaintiffs’ privacy rights, Plaintiffs’ claim is 28 plausibly pled for purposes of this Motion. See Castillo, 959 6 1 F.Supp.2d at 1263-64 (balancing privacy interests against 2 government interests). Therefore, Plaintiffs have stated a 3 plausible claim against the County for violation of their right to 4 due process and right to privacy. The Court DENIES the Motion as to 5 this cause of action. 6 B. Claims Against Watrobski 7 The only factual allegation against Defendant Watrobski, 8 specifically, states that “[a]fter the last referrals were closed, 9 the dispositions were changed by Defendant Watrobski to conclusive 10 or founded, without Plaintiffs’ prior knowledge or consent.”2 11 (Complaint ¶ 21.) Plaintiffs further state that Watrobski is “an 12 officer, agent, and employee of Defendant ... County of Los 13 Angeles.” (Id. ¶ 9.) No other information is contained in the 14 Complaint regarding Watrobski’s role as an employee of the County 15 or whether he was involved in any of the other alleged acts of 16 “Defendants.”3 17 This single alleged act, standing alone, is insufficient to 18 state a plausible claim for personal liability against Watrobski. 19 The complaint does not contain any allegations that Watrobski 20 personally denied Plaintiffs a hearing, nor any allegations that 21 Watrobski had no legitimate basis for changing the outcome of the 22 2 23 24 25 The complaint includes many allegations that refer to acts performed by “Defendants,” but it is unclear whether Plaintiffs intend to allege that Watrobski personally performed all of the alleged acts or whether Plaintiffs allege that another individual performed those acts on behalf of the County. 3 26 27 28 Plaintiffs include many more allegations regarding Watrobski’s actions and his role as an employee of the County in their opposition to the Motion. However, the Court does not consider these allegations in determining the resolution of this Motion, as the Court may properly consider only those allegations contained in the Complaint. 7 1 referrals against Plaintiffs. Further, this act alone does not 2 establish any conspiracy between Watrobski and any other 3 individual, nor does the act rise to the level of “extreme and 4 outrageous conduct” that is required for an IIED claim. Therefore, 5 the Court GRANTS the Motion and DISMISSES the claims against 6 Watrobski WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs may amend to clarify which 7 alleged acts were performed by Watrobski that support claims 8 against him personally. Further, any amended complaint should 9 clarify whether Plaintiffs allege that Watrobski was a policy maker 10 for the County or whether he was merely an employee. (See Reply, 11 Docket No. 15, p.4-5.) 12 Defendants also argue that Watrobski is entitled to qualified 13 immunity for the alleged act he performed, as public employees are 14 not liable for injuries resulting from an exercise of discretion. 15 Cal. Gov. Code § 820.2. However, under the facts as currently 16 alleged, it is unclear whether Watrobski performed any acts 17 involving “discretion” that might possibly entitle him to immunity 18 or whether he performed acts that clearly violated Plaintiffs’ 19 rights such that he may be held liable. Therefore, the Court finds 20 that Watrobski is not entitled to immunity at this point. Upon the 21 filing of an amended complaint that clarifies Watrobski’s 22 involvement in the alleged acts, the Court will be in a position to 23 determine whether any entitlement to immunity might exist. 24 C. Civil Conspiracy Claim 25 Plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy claim is insufficiently pled. To 26 establish liability for a civil conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must 27 plead facts supporting the existence of “an agreement or meeting of 28 the minds to violate constitutional rights.” Mendocino 8 1 Environmental Center v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1301 (9th 2 Cir. 1999) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Plaintiffs’ 3 complaint contains no clear allegations regarding who allegedly 4 participated in this conspiracy or what those individuals allegedly 5 agreed to do. Based on the complaint, the Court and the Defendants 6 are left to wonder: who purportedly conspired with who to achieve 7 what purpose? Therefore, Plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy claim is 8 DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Upon amendment, Plaintiffs should 9 clarify who allegedly participated in a conspiracy and what that 10 conspiracy allegedly agreed to do that violated Plaintiffs’ rights. 11 D. IIED Claim 12 Defendants do not directly challenge the sufficiency of 13 Plaintiffs’ IIED claim. The Court has determined that all claims 14 against Watrobski are insufficiently pled, and therefore the IIED 15 claim against Watrobski is dismissed without prejudice. However, as 16 Defendants offer no argument as to why Plaintiffs’ IIED claim is 17 insufficiently pled against the County, the Court does not decide 18 whether that claim is sufficient, and the cause of action remains 19 operative as filed. 20 IV. Conclusion 21 For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART and 22 DENIED IN PART. Any amended complaint must be filed on or before 23 July 14, 2014. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 Dated: June 30, 2014 DEAN D. PREGERSON United States District Judge 26 27 28 9
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