Mark Leidenheimer v. O'Reilly Automotive Stores Inc et al, No. 2:2013cv09568 - Document 151 (C.D. Cal. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR (1) ENTRY OF JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF; OR, ALTERNATIVELY, (2) A PARTIAL NEW TRIAL 140 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson . (lc) Modified on 4/13/2016 (lc).
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Mark Leidenheimer v. O&#039;Reilly Automotive Stores Inc et al Doc. 151 1 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARK LEIDENHEIMER, an individual, 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. 14 15 16 O’REILLY AUTOMOTIVE STORES, INC., a Missouri corporation; and CSK AUTO, INC., an Arizona corporation; 17 18 Defendants. ___________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 13-09568 DDP (VBKx) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR (1) ENTRY OF JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF; OR, ALTERNATIVELY, (2) A PARTIAL NEW TRIAL [Dkt. No. 140] 19 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for (1) Entry 20 of Judgment on the Verdict in Favor of Plaintiff; or, Alternatively 21 (2) A Partial New Trial. (Dkt. No. 140.) After considering the 22 parties’ submissions and hearing oral argument, the Court adopts 23 the following Order. 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 The facts of this case are well-known to the parties and the 26 Court. The jury trial in this case began on February 16, 2016. 27 (Dkt. No. 122.) On February 22, 2016, the day before trial ended, 28 the Court held a status conference on jury instructions. (Dkt. No. Dockets.Justia.com 1 128.) 2 February 23, 2016. 3 counsel made a motion for judgment as a matter of law on certain 4 issues. 5 February 24, 2016, the jury deliberated almost the entire day 6 before returning a verdict. 7 (Unredacted Special Verdict).) 8 9 Closing arguments were made on the fifth day of trial, (Dkt. No. 129.) (See id.; Dkt. No. 130.)1 Before closing, Defense On the sixth day of trial, (Dkt. No. 130 (Minutes); Dkt. No. 139 On March 10, 2016, Plaintiff filed this Motion. 140.) (Dkt. No. The next day, Plaintiff filed an objection to Defendant’s 10 Proposed Judgment in Defendant’s favor. 11 of Court entered Judgment that same day, ordering: “The plaintiff 12 recover nothing, the action be dismissed on the merits, and each 13 party bear its own costs.” 14 II. 15 (Dkt. No. 141.) The Clerk (Dkt. No. 142.) LEGAL STANDARD Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Judgment on the Verdict in its 16 Favor is not a typical post-trial motion. 17 motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 50 for 18 judgment as a matter of law because Plaintiff claims that judgment 19 in its favor under a California Family Rights Act (“CFRA”) 20 interference cause of action is proper as a matter of law based on 21 the verdict the jury returned. 22 motion for judgment as a matter of law is based on a court finding 23 that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient It is similar to a (See generally Mot.) The Rule 50 24 1 25 26 27 28 The Court notes that the clerk’s minutes of trial show that a “motion to dismiss” was denied on February 24, 2016, the sixth day of trial when only jury deliberation occurred. This appears to be a mistake. The reporter’s transcript, the declaration of defense counsel, and Plaintiff’s counsel’s supplemental declaration show that Defendant made an oral motion for judgment on certain issues on February 23, 2016, before closing arguments. The Court denied this motion. 2 1 evidentiary basis to find for a party on an issue. 2 50(a). 3 is, the party must make a pre-verdict Rule 50(a) motion to be 4 eligible to make a motion under Rule 50(b). 5 Fed. R. Civ. P. A Rule 50(b) motion after trial is a renewal motion; that A motion for a new trial or altering a judgment is governed by 6 FRCP 59. A new jury trial can be granted “for any reason for which 7 a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in 8 federal court.” 9 new trials where the jury reached a verdict ‘contrary to the clear Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). “Courts have ordered 10 weight of the evidence’ and which is therefore a ‘miscarriage of 11 justice.’” 12 CV 92-4698 JGD, CV 92-3891 JGD, 1995 WL 491434, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 13 Mar. 7, 1995) (quoting Murphy v. City of Long Beach, 914 F.2d 183, 14 187 (9th Cir. 1990)). 15 III. DISCUSSION Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc., Nos. 16 A. 17 Plaintiff argues that the Court should find that the jury’s Motion for Verdict in Favor of Plaintiff 18 verdict supports a cause of action for CFRA interference. 19 3, 5-11.) 20 necessary for a CFRA interference claim. 21 is, the jury found that Leidenheimer did not voluntarily resign 22 from his employment with O’Reilly, that he was eligible for a 23 medical leave of absence, and that he provided reasonable notice of 24 his need for a medical leave to O’Reilly. 25 Decl. Pico, Ex. A (Special Verdict).) 26 Plaintiff argues, is for an employee to be entitled to leave and 27 for the employer to interfere with or deny that right to leave. 28 (Id. at 5 (citing Faust v. Cal. Portland Cement Co., 150 Cal. App. (Mot. at Plaintiff claims that the jury found all the facts 3 (Id. at 4-5, 8.) That (Id. at 4-5 (citing All that is needed, 1 4th 864, 879 (2007)).) Thus, Plaintiff claims the jury’s finding 2 supports its cause of action for CFRA interference because 3 Plaintiff was entitled to leave and Defendant involuntarily 4 discharged Plaintiff instead of granting him leave. 5 Plaintiff further claims that the reason why the CFRA 6 interference cause of action did not go to the jury is that the 7 Court ordered Plaintiff to remove the cause of action. 8 3-5; Supp. Decl. Pico ISO Pl. Mot. at 2-4.)2 (Reply at Based on the Court’s review of the record, the Court never 9 10 ordered Plaintiff to remove the CFRA interference cause of action. 11 The court reporter’s transcript that Plaintiff attached to the Pico 12 Declaration is dispositive on this point. 13 A.) 14 outside the presence of the jury. 15 pagination).) 16 agents for punitive damages purposes with the parties. 17 15.) 18 his theories: the reasonable accommodation cause of action and the 19 failure to engage in the interactive process cause of action. 20 at 15.) 21 matter of law that insufficient evidence was before the jury to 22 support the CFRA interference cause of action. 23 Defense counsel also made a motion for judgment on both the section 24 1102.5 cause of action and the managing agent issue based on a lack 25 of evidence. (Supp. Decl. Pico, Ex. At the close of evidence, the Court held a status conference (Id. at 2 (using the ECF The Court first discussed the matter of managing (Id. at 2- Then, counsel clarified that Plaintiff had withdrawn two of (Id. Defense counsel then made a motion for judgment as a (Id. at 16-18.) (Id. at 18-19.) 26 2 27 28 Plaintiff did not raise this claim in its Motion, but only in response to Defendant’s argument that it voluntarily withdrew the cause of action and thus waived any current argument under FRCP 49(a)(3). (See generally Mot.; Opp’n at 8-9.) 4 1 The Court then took up the interference cause of action 2 argument. The Court was initially “inclined to agree” with defense 3 counsel, but Plaintiff’s counsel made arguments defending the cause 4 of action. 5 theory” that should go to the jury. (Id. at 19-20.) Plaintiff argued it was “a viable (Id. at 20.) 6 The Court ultimately agreed with Plaintiff’s counsel and 7 allowed the cause of action to go forward, but using the defense’s 8 jury instruction: 9 10 11 12 13 14 THE COURT: Well, let’s take up the interference issue. You know, I’m inclined to agree. I don’t -- I don’t really -I don’t see that as a viable theory. I see the retribution retaliation theory is a viable theory; but the interference theory, I don’t see it. [Plaintiff’s Counsel] MR. MARKSON: Your Honor, I think that it is -- I think it is a viable theory. I think it is something for a jury to determine -THE COURT: What are you going to say to the jury? What’s the argument? 15 16 17 18 MR. MARKSON: Well I think that Mr. Corona should -- he was given the job of advising Mr. – Mr. Leidenheimer about his rights -- about his right to a leave of absence under the family medical leave -- leave of absence policy; not necessarily under FEMLA but under their own policy. And the information that he should have provided, he should have disclosed to him that he would have -- 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 THE COURT: But -- but I don’t know that O’Reilly’s right requirement was triggered to provide the yes, no, or maybe. MR. MARKSON: Well, I think that it -- I think that that’s something that -- for a jury to determine then. I mean, certainly, you’ve got a man who is in the hospital who has the evidence -- some of the evidence has shown that he has disclosed to not only his store but also to others in the store that he was in the hospital. Being in the hospital alone, is a serious health condition under O’Reilly’s own policies which would trigger the family medical leave of absence. And that’s something that he would have been entitled to. I think that Mr. Corona discouraged Mr. -- I’m sorry -- Mr. Leidenheimer at best discouraged -- there’s testimony that he didn’t – 27 THE COURT: Why did he do that? 28 5 1 MR. MARKSON: Leidenheimer. Because he wanted to get rid of Mr. 2 THE COURT: So isn’t that the retaliation case? 3 4 MR. MARKSON: I think there is some overlap. I think that it’s -- it’s interference. And I think that it’s restraint of -- of -- of -- to keep Mr. Leidenheimer -- 5 6 7 8 9 THE COURT: Well, I’m inclined to use the Defense jury instruction on this topic. And -- and -[Defendant’s Counsel] MR. PETERSON: And I think the problem, Your Honor, that you justified is that Defense instruction says that reasonable notice is required, and there’s no evidence that Mr. Leidenheimer ever told O’Reilly the expected duration of his leave. And that -- on that basis alone, this claim cannot go to the jury -- 10 THE COURT: I mean, that’s true. That’s true. 11 12 13 14 MR. PETERSON: -- and it cannot go to the jury because that element is lacking. MR. MARKSON: I believe that Mr. Leidenheimer had that he believed he’d be in the hospital for a weeks and that was the best that he could give. that that is -- that was the testimony from the testified couple of I believe stand. 15 THE COURT: You know, I don’t recall one way or the other. 16 MR. MARKSON: That is my memory, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: You know, my memory -18 MR. MARKSON: Two weeks. 19 20 21 THE COURT: That's fine. I'm going to use the Defense instruction on that particular topic, and you can argue it. The 1102.5 issue, do you want to say anything on that? 24 MR. MARKSON: Yes, Your Honor. I think that there is a -- a real issue about whether they retaliated as a result of Mr. Leidenheimer bringing up these issues of irregularities and improprieties with the -- the with meal break penalties. Yes, I mean, I don’t know -- 25 THE COURT: Even though he signed this release? 26 MR. MARKSON: He signed the release, but it wasn’t as if the issue had been resolved. I mean, the -- 22 23 27 28 THE COURT: Are you going to argue that to a jury? Under penalty of perjury, this is -- you know, this resolves 6 1 everything. You’re going to argue that it wasn’t resolved? 2 MR. MARKSON: He still had a class-action lawsuit pending against the company based on these very allegations. It’s -- it -- to me, it’s really troubling that he’s being asked to sign this document without the participation of his lawyer -- without the participation of the Court. And, you know, it seems that it was very opportunistic of O’Reilly to take advantage of Mr. Leidenheimer like that in spite of -- 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 THE COURT: Well, you know, I’m going to leave that claim in. That’s fine. I’m going to deal with the jury instructions as we discussed. I’m going use the model instruction that defines managing agent. And I don’t think there are any other outstanding jury instruction issues, therefore. Are there? 11 [Defendant’s Counsel] MR. BONISKE: Well, we had proposed a couple new ones, which I actually sent to him; but I had not electronically filed. 12 THE COURT: After our meeting yesterday? 13 MR. BONISKE: After the meeting yesterday. 14 THE COURT: So here’s what I think you should do . . . I think you should go get a snack for 20 minutes. You guys should meet and confer and see if you can put the jury instructions together in final form. Okay? Thank you. 10 15 16 MR. PETERSON: And is it -17 18 THE COURT: We’re going to look at the verdict. You’re going to need to look at the verdict form and simplify it, as well. 19 MR. PETERSON: We can go off the record. 20 21 THE REPORTER: No, the Court has to direct me; not you. 22 THE COURT: Yes. I delegate those instructions. 23 (End of transcript production.) 24 (Id. at 19-24.) 25 This transcript demonstrates that the Court never ordered 26 Plaintiff to remove the interference cause of action from its case, 27 the jury instructions, or the verdict form. 28 that the defense’s instruction on interference would be used. 7 Rather, the Court held The 1 defense’s instruction was the model jury instruction from the 2 Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions (“CACI”). 3 Plaintiff’s counsel was told that he could argue the interference 4 theory. 5 instructions or verdict form after this point. 6 incorrect for Plaintiff to state that the Court ordered him to 7 remove the interference cause of action.3 8 Plaintiff — for whatever reason — appears to have removed or 9 withdrawn the cause of action; therefore, the Court cannot consider 10 But Plaintiff did not include the theory in the jury Thus, it is This also means that it after the fact. 11 Further, there is no basis for the Court to find that the 12 verdict supports Plaintiff at all: the jury’s findings do not 13 support a CFRA interference cause of action, even assuming the 14 Court could examine the issue. 15 instruction, the elements of a CFRA interference cause of action 16 are: 17 18 19 According to the model jury [Name of plaintiff] claims that [name of defendant] [refused to grant [him/her] [family care/medical] leave] [refused to return [him/her] to the same or a comparable job when [his/her] [family care/medical] leave ended] [other violation of CFRA rights]. To establish this claim, [name of plaintiff] must prove all of the following: 20 21 1. That [name of plaintiff] was eligible for [family care/medical] leave; 22 2. That [name of plaintiff] [requested/took] leave [insert one of the following:] 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 The Court notes that — contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions in its Motion and Reply brief — the Court did not “direct” the jury to strike the damages awarded. The Court found an inconsistency in the verdict because the verdict’s instructions only directed the jury to award damages if it marked “yes” to certain questions that the jury did not mark “yes” to; thus, there was no basis for an award of damages. 8 1 2 [for the birth of [name of plaintiff]’s child or bonding with the child;] 3 [for the placement of a child with [name of plaintiff] for adoption or foster care;] 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 [to care for [name of plaintiff]’s [child/parent/spouse] who had a serious health condition;] [for [name of plaintiff]’s own serious health condition that made [him/her] unable to perform the functions of [his/her] job with [name of defendant];] 3. That [name of plaintiff] provided reasonable notice to [name of defendant] of [his/her] need for [family care/medical] leave, including its expected timing and length. [If [name of defendant] notified [his/her/its] employees that 30 days’ advance notice was required before the leave was to begin, then [name of plaintiff] must show that [he/she] gave that notice or, if 30 days’ notice was not reasonably possible under the circumstances, that [he/she] gave notice as soon as possible]; 15 4. That [name of defendant] [refused to grant [name of plaintiff]’s request for [family care/medical] leave/refused to return [name of plaintiff] to the same or a comparable job when [his/her] [family care/medical] leave ended/other violation of CFRA rights]; 16 5. That [name of plaintiff] was harmed; and 17 6. That [name of defendant]’s [decision/conduct] was a substantial factor in causing [name of plaintiff]’s harm. 14 18 CACI 2600 (Violation of CFRA Rights — Essential Factual Elements). 19 Here, the jury did not make the necessary factual findings to 20 support a CFRA interference cause of action based on the face of 21 the jury verdict or reasonable inferences drawn from it. The jury 22 found that Plaintiff had not voluntarily resigned from his 23 employment at O’Reilly, that Plaintiff was eligible for a medical 24 leave of absence, and that Plaintiff had provided reasonable notice 25 to O’Reilly of his need for medical leave. (Dkt. No. 139, 26 Unredacted Special Verdict.) However, the jury found that 27 Plaintiff’s request for a medical leave of absence was not a 28 9 1 substantial motivating reason for Defendant’s decision to discharge 2 him — essentially, the jury found no causal nexus between the 3 medical leave issue and the involuntary discharge of employment. 4 (Id.) 5 whether Plaintiff suffered harm as a result of the Defendant’s 6 actions, which is a required element of the CFRA retaliation and 7 interference causes of action. 8 several essential elements of a CFRA interference cause of action, 9 including that (1) Defendant violated Plaintiff’s CFRA rights by This means that the jury did not reach the questions of (Id.) Thus, the jury did not find 10 denying Plaintiff’s request or refusing to return Plaintiff to his 11 job or some other violation; (2) Plaintiff was harmed by that 12 action; and (3) Defendant was a substantial factor in causing that 13 harm. 14 Court cannot find that the verdict supports an award to Plaintiff 15 on that cause of action, even if the cause of action was not waived 16 or withdrawn by Plaintiff. Because the jury did not make those factual findings, the 17 B. 18 The Court has very limited bases to award a new trial. 19 Further, Plaintiff appears to seek a new trial purely for damages 20 assuming that it has shown that it succeeded on its CFRA 21 interference cause of action. 22 Motion for New Trial (Mot. at 4, 11-12; Reply at 10-11.) As discussed above, the jury’s verdict does not support a CFRA 23 interference cause of action and thus a new trial on the basis of 24 damages for that cause of action is not supported by any evidence 25 in the record. 26 that the trial resulted in a miscarriage of justice or a verdict 27 contrary to the weight of evidence. 28 the motion for a new trial. Further, there is no argument or evidence to show 10 Therefore, the Court denies 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 For all the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES 3 Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Verdict in its Favor and 4 DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial. 5 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 8 Dated: April 12, 2016 9 DEAN D. PREGERSON 10 United States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
