Timothy A Murphy v. Montebello Teachers Association, No. 2:2013cv07951 - Document 47 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 19 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. (lc). Modified on 11/13/2014. (lc).
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Timothy A Murphy v. Montebello Teachers Association Doc. 47 1 2 O 3 4 NO JS-6 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TIMOTHY A. MURPHY, 12 13 14 15 16 Plaintiff, v. MONTEBELLO TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, a California corporation, Defendant. ___________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 13-07951 DDP (AGRx) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 19] 17 18 Presently before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary 19 judgment (the “Motion”). (Docket No. 19.) For the reasons stated in 20 this order, the Motion is GRANTED. 21 I. Background1 22 Plaintiff Timothy A. Murphy (“Plaintiff”) was an employee of 23 the Montebello Unified School District for 36 years, beginning in 24 1977. (Docket No. 32, ¶ 1.) In 1983, Plaintiff became the Athletic 25 Director at Montebello High School, at which time he stopped paying 26 dues to Defendant Montebello Teachers Association (“MTA” or 27 1 28 The Court recites the facts here largely as Plaintiff describes them, since the Court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party on a motion for summary judgment. Dockets.Justia.com 1 “Defendant”), presumably because he was no longer a teacher. (Id.) 2 However, in December 2009, MTA began deducting $98.302 for union 3 dues from Plaintiff’s paychecks. (Id. ¶ 2.) When Plaintiff called 4 MTA to ask why the money was now being deducted, he was told that 5 after an audit MTA had determined that Plaintiff should be a dues 6 paying member of MTA. (Id.) 7 In October 2010, Plaintiff requested information as to what it 8 would cost for him to join the medical trust (the “Plan”), an 9 optional benefit for MTA members. (Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff received a 10 response in November 2010, but he never followed up to join the 11 Plan because he believed the costs to be prohibitive. (Id.; Docket 12 No. 21, Exh. 1.) However, in April 2011, MTA began deducting 13 $200.50 from Plaintiff’s paychecks. (Docket No. 32, ¶ 4 & Exhs.) 14 This larger amount represents both dues and a contribution to the 15 Plan. (Id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff claims he never authorized this 16 additional deduction, nor signed up to participate in the voluntary 17 Plan. (Id.) 18 Plaintiff again contacted MTA and told them that he did not 19 wish to participate in the Plan unless they could offer him more 20 favorable terms. (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff states that he was offered a 21 better plan by MTA employee Alonso Ibanez, which required Plaintiff 22 to pay $1,500 in back payments dating to June 2009, pay monthly 23 $100 contributions until he retired, and then make additional 24 monthly contributions until May 2021, with the amount varying 25 depending on the age at which he retired. (Id. ¶ 7 & Exhs.) After 26 accepting this alleged offer, Plaintiff paid the $1,500 back 27 2 28 It appears that this amount may have been raised to $100.50 sometime between 2009 and 2011. 2 1 payment and the monthly contributions until his retirement in June 2 2013. (Docket No. 21, Exh. 4.) Despite his participation, Plaintiff 3 alleges that at no time was he provided with a written acceptance 4 into the Plan. (Docket No. 32, ¶ 9.) 5 Plaintiff retired from the Montebello Unified School District 6 effective July 1, 2013. (Docket No. 19-2, ¶ 10.) At that time, 7 Plaintiff did not have enough contributions to be eligible for 8 benefits under the Plan. (Id. ¶ 11.) Around the time of his 9 retirement, Plaintiff requested a “refund of the $1,500 that was 10 used to buy in to the medical trust along with all additional 11 monthly payments to the trust that [he] ha[d] made.” (Id. ¶ 12; 12 Docket No. 21, Exh. 3.) The request was considered by the trustees 13 of the Plan, who notified Plaintiff on June 6, 2013 that “at such 14 time as [Plaintiff] no longer [is] a member of the bargaining unit 15 represented by the Association, [Plaintiff] will be eligible to 16 receive a refund of contributions up to $1,500 from the 17 Association.” (Docket No. 21, Exh. 5.) MTA argues that Plaintiff 18 did not properly apply for this offered refund, nor appeal the 19 decision of the trustees not to refund more than $1,500, instead 20 filing this action in small claims court. (Docket No. 19-2, ¶ 14.) 21 Nevertheless, on October 11, 2013, MTA issued a discretionary 22 $1,500 refund to Plaintiff, who deposited the refund on January 8, 23 2014. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff continues to seek a refund of the 24 balance of the contributions he made to the Plan. 25 Plaintiff originally filed this action in small claims court. 26 (See Docket No. 1.) Defendant removed the action on the basis that 27 the action is covered by ERISA. (Id.) Defendant now seeks summary 28 judgment. (Docket No. 20.) 3 1 2 II. Legal Standard Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, 3 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 4 together with the affidavits, if any, show “that there is no 5 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 6 to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party 7 seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the 8 court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions 9 of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the 10 absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. 11 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). All reasonable inferences from 12 the evidence must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See 13 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242 (1986). If the 14 moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it is 15 entitled to summary judgment if it can demonstrate that “there is 16 an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” 17 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 18 Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to 19 the nonmoving party opposing the motion, who must “set forth 20 specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 21 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Summary judgment is warranted if a party 22 “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of 23 an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party 24 will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 25 A genuine issue exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable 26 jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” and material 27 facts are those “that might affect the outcome of the suit under 28 the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. There is no genuine 4 1 issue of fact “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a 2 rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” 3 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 4 587 (1986). 5 It is not the court’s task “to scour the record in search of a 6 genuine issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1278 7 (9th Cir. 1996). Counsel has an obligation to lay out their support 8 clearly. Carmen v. San Francisco Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 9 (9th Cir. 2001). The court “need not examine the entire file for 10 evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the evidence 11 is not set forth in the opposition papers with adequate references 12 so that it could conveniently be found.” Id. 13 III. Discussion 14 Taking all of Plaintiff’s contentions and evidence in the 15 light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff 16 has not demonstrated an entitlement to the return of any funds 17 beyond the $1,500 he has already received. Plaintiff alleges that 18 he was offered a particular “deal” whereby he would make a back 19 payment of $1,500 to purchase months of contributions into the 20 Plan, pay $100 per month for the remainder of his employment prior 21 to retirement, and then continue to make monthly contributions to 22 the Plan until May 2021, with the monthly amount varying depending 23 on the age at which he retired. MTA disputes that any such 24 arrangement was ever made and argues that Plaintiff cannot submit 25 extrinsic evidence to contradict the terms of the written ERISA 26 Plan document. Assuming for purposes of this discussion that all of 27 Plaintiff’s allegations are true, regardless of whether there is 28 sufficient admissible supporting evidence to prove that this is 5 1 what occurred, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to 2 summary judgment. 3 Plaintiff is not pursuing recovery of benefits under the Plan, 4 nor is he attempting to continue paying contributions following his 5 retirement. Plaintiff and Defendant agree that Plaintiff paid some 6 money into the Plan under some (disputed) terms. Even assuming 7 Plaintiff obtained the claimed “special deal” by way of an oral 8 agreement, he is not entitled to the remedy of a refund of all 9 monies contributed. Instead, he would be entitled to the benefit of 10 his purported bargain - the opportunity to pay into the medical 11 trust under the terms of his agreement with MTA until 2021 in order 12 to obtain vested benefits. In the alternative, the Plan provides 13 that “[a] former bargaining unit member who leaves the bargaining 14 unit may request a reimbursement of contributions up to a maximum 15 of $1,500 from the Association.” Though MTA contends that Plaintiff 16 did not submit a proper formal request for this refund, MTA has now 17 construed Plaintiff’s actions as requesting this maximum refund and 18 issued him the refund. Allowing Plaintiff to recover any further 19 contributions is contrary to the purpose of this type of trust 20 arrangement, which relies on the fact that some individuals will 21 contribute money but never end up using it, either because they do 22 not need the benefits offered or because they do not contribute 23 enough for the benefits to vest. See Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas 24 Pension Fund v. Gerber Truck Serv., Inc., 870 F.2d 1148, 1151-56 25 (7th Cir. 1989). Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not 26 entitled to recover his contributions beyond the $1,500 he has 27 already received. 28 /// 6 1 2 IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is GRANTED. 3 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 6 7 Dated: November 12, 2014 DEAN D. PREGERSON United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7
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