Pamela J Robbins v. Carolyn W Colvin, No. 2:2013cv07307 - Document 16 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM AND OPINION by Magistrate Judge Alka Sagar. For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms the decision of the Administrative Law Judge. (See Order for complete details) (afe)
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Pamela J Robbins v. Carolyn W Colvin Doc. 16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 ) No. CV 13-7307-AS ) )MEMORANDUM AND OPINION Plaintiff, ) v. ) ) CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ) Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, ) ) ) Defendant. ) ) PAMELA J. ROBBINS, 17 PROCEEDINGS 18 19 20 Plaintiff Pamela J. Robbins (“Plaintiff”), a former proof 21 machine operator at a bank, asserts disability since February 1, 22 2007, based on alleged physical and mental impairments. 23 135.) 24 heard testimony from Plaintiff and a vocational expert (“VE”) on 25 March 28, 2012. 26 a written decision. 27 of the ALJ’s decision. (A.R. 129— The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) examined the record and (A.R. 26—30.) The ALJ denied Plaintiff benefits in (A.R. 11—22.) The Appeals Council denied review (A.R. 1—3.) 28 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 On October 9, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Complaint, pursuant to 42 2 U.S.C. Social Security 3 Administration erred in denying her disability benefits. (Docket 4 Entry No. 3.) 5 Complaint, and the Certified Administrative Record (“A.R.”). (Docket 6 Entry Nos. 13, 14.) 7 United States Magistrate Judge. 8 30, 9 setting 10 §§ 405(g) 2014, and 1383(c), alleging that the On February 7, 2014, Defendant filed an Answer to the the forth The parties have consented to proceed before a parties their filed (Docket Entry Nos. 9, 10.) a Joint respective Stipulation positions on On April (“Joint Plaintiff’s Stip.”) claim. (Docket Entry No. 15.) 11 THE FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 12 13 “Social Security disability benefits claimants have the burden 14 15 of proving disability.” 16 F.3d 1380, 1380 (9th Cir. 1985). 17 the 18 reason 19 impairment...which 20 continuous 21 § 22 disabled, ALJs follow a five-step process set forth in 20 C.F.R. 23 § 404.1520(a)(4). 24 one through four.” 25 2007). “inability of to any period 423(d)(1)(A). Bellamy v. Sec’y Health & Human Serv., 755 engage in A claimant is disabled if she has any substantial medically determinable has or of In lasted not less order to can than be physical expected 12 determine gainful to months.” whether a activity by or mental last for 42 a U.S.C. claimant is “The claimant bears the burden of proving steps Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 26 27 At step one, the ALJ must determine whether or not the claimant 28 is actually engaged in any “substantial gainful activity,” as defined 2 1 by 2 evaluation continues to step two. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572. If claimant is not so engaged, the See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). 3 At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimed physical or 4 5 mental impairments are severe. 6 determining severity, “the ALJ must consider the combined effect of 7 all of the claimant’s impairments on her ability to function, without 8 regard to whether each alone was sufficiently severe.” Smolen v. 9 Chater, 42 80 F.3d 1273, 423(d)(2)(B)). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). 1290 (9th evidence “establishes a slight abnormality that has ‘no more than a 12 minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work.’” 13 (quoting Yuckert v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1988)). 14 the ALJ concludes that the claimant does have a medically severe 15 impairment, the ALJ proceeds to the next step in the sequence.” 16 v. 17 § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). 683, 686 (9th Cir. severe U.S.C 11 F.3d considered (citing § 433 are 1996) 10 Barnhart, Impairments Cir. When 2005); unless the Id. at 1290 see 20 “[I]f Webb C.F.R. 18 19 At step three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s severe 20 impairments are disabling. 21 claimant is considered disabled if her purported conditions meet or 22 are medically equivalent to a listing found in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 23 Subpart P, Appendix 1. 24 Cir. 2005). 25 impairment in appendix 1 if it is at least equal in severity and 26 duration 27 404.1526. 28 rather to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). The Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th “[An] impairment is medically equivalent to a listed the criteria of any listed impairment.” 20 C.F.R. “Medical equivalence must be based on medical findings[]” than “[a] generalized assertion” 3 or opinion testimony 1 regarding “functional problems.” 2 1100 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526). Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 3 4 If the ALJ concludes that claimant is not disabled at step 5 three, the ALJ moves to step four and considers whether the claimant 6 can return to her past relevant work. 7 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). 8 claimant’s 9 § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). Residual despite Burch, 400 F.3d at 679; See 20 In order to do so, the ALJ determines Functional Capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. A claimant’s RFC is “what [claimant] can still 10 do [claimant’s] limitations,” and is “based on 11 relevant medical and other evidence in [the] case record.” 12 416.945(a)(1). 13 her past relevant work, she is not considered disabled. 14 all the F.3d at 679. 20 C.F.R. If the claimant’s RFC dictates that she can return to Burch, 400 15 16 If the claimant proves in step four that she cannot return to 17 her past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to step five. 18 § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). 19 Secretary to show that the claimant can do other kinds of work.” 20 Embrey v. Bowden, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988). 21 ALJs “can call upon a vocational expert to testify as to: (1) what 22 jobs the claimant, given his or her [RFC], would be able to do; and 23 (2) the availability of such jobs in the national economy.” 24 180 F.3d at 1101. If claimant does not have the RFC to work in any 25 available she 26 § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). jobs, 20 C.F.R. At step five “the burden of proof shifts to the is considered 27 28 4 disabled. At this point, 20 Tackett, C.F.R. 1 BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION 2 In applying for disability insurance benefits, Plaintiff alleged 3 4 the 5 disk 6 pressure. 7 on March 28, 2012, Plaintiff testified that she has pain in her left 8 knee and in her back. 9 result of her depression, she would lay down throughout the day and 10 following disabling disease, severe depression, (A.R. 130.) impairments: scoliosis, anxiety, arthritis, degenerative and high blood Additionally, at the hearing before the ALJ (A.R. 37—38.) not socialize with friends. Plaintiff claimed that as a (A.R. 41.) 11 The ALJ applied the five-step evaluation process to determine 12 13 whether Plaintiff was disabled. (A.R. 13—21.) 14 determined not 15 gainful activity.” 16 Plaintiff suffers from the following severe impairments: degenerative 17 disk 18 disorder, 19 determined that Plaintiff’s severe impairments did not meet or equal 20 a medical listing found in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 21 (A.R. 13—14.) that disease and Plaintiff of was (A.R. 13.) the mood lumbar in any “substantially At step two, the ALJ found that spine disorder. engaged At step one, the ALJ with (Id.) radiculopathy, At step depressive three, the ALJ 22 23 Next, before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that 24 Plaintiff had the RFC to perform unskilled, light work with the 25 following limitations: 26 27 28 lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and frequently, stand/walk 1/2 an hour at a time for 4 hours in an 8-hour workday, sit 1/2 an hour at a total of 4 hours in an 8-hour workday, 5 10 pounds a total of a time for occasional 1 stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling and, mentally, she is limited to unskilled work with no contact with the general public and can only perform work in solitary and not in coordination with others. 2 3 4 (A.R. 15.) The ALJ based the finding of Plaintiff’s RFC on the 5 opinions of: Dr. Hoang, an orthopedic consultant; Dr. El-Khoury, a 6 pain management doctor; Dr. Bagner, III, a psychiatric consultant; 7 and Dr. Xie, a neurologist. (A.R. 15—19.) 8 9 At step four, the ALJ concluded, based on the testimony of the 10 vocational expert (“VE”), that Plaintiff could no longer work as a 11 proof machine operator and had no transferable skills from that job. 12 (A.R. 20.) 13 14 At step five, the ALJ summarized the VE’s testimony, stating 15 that the VE had found that Plaintiff could perform the following jobs 16 identified in the Dictionary of Occupational 17 inspector/hand packager (DOT No. 559.687—074); (2) marker II (DOT No. 18 920.687-126); or (3) assembler of small products II (DOT No. 379.687- 19 030). 20 with 21 conclude 22 adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the 23 national 24 Plaintiff was “not disabled.” 25 / / 26 / / 27 / / 28 / / (A.R. 21.) Plaintiff’s that (1) The ALJ then relied on the VE’s testimony, along age, “the economy.” Titles (“DOT”): education, claimant (See is work capable id.) experience, of Accordingly, (Id.) 6 making the and a ALJ RFC, to successful found that 1 STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 3 This court reviews the Administration’s decision to determine 4 if: (1) the Administration’s findings are supported by substantial 5 evidence; and (2) The Administration used proper legal standards. 6 Smolen, 80 F.3d 7 scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” 8 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). 9 evidence supports a finding, “a court must consider [] the record as whole, at 1279. weighing a Andrews v. Shalala, 53 To determine whether substantial 10 a 11 detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.” 12 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). 13 reasonably 14 conclusion, [a] court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 15 ALJ.” 16 Cir. 2004). support both “Substantial evidence is more than evidence either that supports and evidence that Reddick v. Chater, As a result, “[i]f evidence can affirming or reversing the ALJ’s Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th 17 PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTION 18 19 Plaintiff contends that there is an inconsistency between the 20 21 ALJ’s RFC assessment, which 22 “solitary and not in coordination with others,” (A.R. 15), and the 23 ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff can perform the jobs identified by the 24 VE. 25 citing to the DOT, which indicates that each of the jobs identified 26 by the VE requires some degree of interaction with people (e.g., 27 taking instructions from, or helping, other people). 28 7.) (Joint Stip. 2—8.) limits Plaintiff to work that is Plaintiff explains the inconsistency by 7 (Joint Stip. 4— 1 DISCUSSION 2 After consideration of the record as a whole, the Court finds 3 4 that the Commissioner’s findings are supported 5 by substantial evidence and are free from material1 legal error. 6 The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s function report, dated May 18, 7 8 2011, indicated 9 friends, neighbors, or others, and she has never been fired or laid 10 off from a job because of problems getting along with other people. 11 (A.R. 19, 180, 181.) 12 performed 13 February 5, 2011, he stated that “Plaintiff would have no limitations 14 interacting with supervisors, peers and the public.” a she had no problem getting along with family, Moreover, the ALJ noted that when Dr. Bagner psychiatric consultative evaluation of Plaintiff on (A.R. 16.) 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 During the hearing on March 28, 2012, Plaintiff testified that as a result of pain in her back and depression, she lays down a lot during the day and avoids socializing. (A.R. 38—39, 41, 42.) also anxiety” testified nervous a lot.” that she had (A.R. “extreme 32.) Accordingly, the and ALJ “fe[lt] She very presented a hypothetical to the VE that included all of Plaintiff’s physical and mental limitations, including limitations involving social interactions (i.e., contact with the general public and coordination with other individuals). (A.R. 47—49.) 1 The ALJ explained to the VE The harmless error rule applies to the review of administrative decisions regarding disability. See McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 886-88 (9th Cir. 2011); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that an ALJ’s decision will not be reversed for errors that are harmless). 8 1 2 the limitation with regard to Plaintiff’s social interactions as follows: 3 I’m going to limit contact with people and make that--I’m, I’m just going to eliminate contact with the, the general public. 4 5 6 And the work should be solitary, not in coordination with other individuals, although can certainly be around other individuals. It’s just the work doesn’t, doesn’t – should not require the Claimant to finish one part of work, someone else can start the next part, and have a requirement of communication between the two parties. 7 8 9 10 11 (A.R. 49 (emphasis added).) 12 hypothetical 13 various 14 inspector/hand packager, marker II, and assembler of small products 15 II. person unskilled, with light The VE Plaintiff’s exertional then testified limitations jobs, that could including a perform that of an (A.R. 50—51.) 16 17 After considering Plaintiff’s testimony at the hearing that she 18 is very anxious and nervous, the ALJ gave Plaintiff “the benefit of 19 doubt” 20 limitation: “no contact with the general public and can only perform 21 work in solitary and not in coordination with others.” 22 The ALJ then found, based on the VE’s response to his hypothetical at 23 the hearing, that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in 24 the national economy that the Plaintiff can perform. and determined that her RFC should contain the following (A.R. 15.) (A.R. 21.) 25 26 Plaintiff incorrectly characterizes her RFC, stating that the 27 limitation requires her to work in “complete isolation” and “avoid 28 all contact with coworkers.” (Joint Stip. 4.) 9 However, as the ALJ 1 explained 2 Plaintiff from being around other people. 3 that the job not involve communication between Plaintiff and another 4 party in order to finish their work. in the hearing, the RFC limitation does not preclude Rather, it merely requires 5 Plaintiff contends that an ALJ cannot rely on expert testimony 6 7 that contradicts 8 evidence to support the decision. 9 Social Security Administration, 119 F.3d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 1997)).) 10 However, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that any actual or apparent 11 conflict exists between the VE’s testimony and the DOT. 12 notes herself, the DOT assumes that “every job requires a worker to 13 function, to some degree, in relation to Data, People, and Things.” 14 See DOT, Appendix B, Explanation of Data, People, and Things (4th ed. 15 Rev. 16 signifying the degree of interaction required for each of the three 17 categories. 18 identified by the VE as requiring a level eight ability to function 19 in relation to people. 20 possible for interacting with 21 instructions or helping other people. 22 consistent with the VE’s testimony that a hypothetical person with 23 Plaintiff’s social limitations can perform those jobs. 1991). DOT the job (See id.) DOT unless the record contains persuasive (Joint Stip. 3 (citing Light v. descriptions are assigned a As Plaintiff numeric code The DOT describes each of the three jobs (Id.) Level eight is the lowest rating people, and merely requires taking (Id.) This definition is 24 25 Moreover, the ALJ properly relied on the VE’s testimony because 26 the hypothetical presented to the VE considered all of the claimant’s 27 limitations 28 Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (considering VE testimony that were supported by 10 the record. See Thomas v. 1 reliable 2 functional limitations, both physical and mental supported by the 3 record); Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A 4 VE’s recognized expertise provides the necessary foundation for his 5 or her testimony”). if the hypothetical posed includes all of claimant’s 6 CONCLUSION 7 8 9 There is no inconsistency between the ALJ’s RFC assessment and 10 finding that Plaintiff can perform the jobs identified by the VE. 11 Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence 12 in the record. 13 ORDER 14 15 16 17 For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms decision of the Administrative Law Judge. 18 19 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 20 21 22 23 Dated: December 11, 2014. ____________/s/_______________ ALKA SAGAR UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28 11 the
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