Marian Trulik v. Carolyn W Colvin, No. 2:2013cv05666 - Document 22 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING THE COMMISSIONER by Magistrate Judge Jean P. Rosenbluth. IT IS ORDERED that judgment be entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner and dismissing this action with prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk serve copies of this Order and the Judgment on counsel for both parties. (kl)
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Marian Trulik v. Carolyn W Colvin Doc. 22 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 MARIAN TRULIK,1 10 Plaintiff, 11 vs. 12 13 CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 14 Defendant. 15 ) Case No. CV 13-5666-JPR ) ) ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ) AFFIRMING THE COMMISSIONER ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 16 17 I. PROCEEDINGS 18 Plaintiff seeks review of the Commissioner’s final decision 19 denying his application for Social Security disability insurance 20 benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income benefits 21 (“SSI”). The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the 22 undersigned U.S. Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). This 23 matter is before the Court on the parties’ Joint Stipulation, 24 filed August 22, 2014, which the Court has taken under submission 25 without oral argument. For the reasons discussed below, the 26 27 28 1 The Complaint was filed under the name Marian Turlick, but on August 20, 2014, Plaintiff filed notice that his last name is actually “Trulik.” 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Commissioner’s decision is affirmed and judgment is entered in 2 her favor. 3 II. BACKGROUND 4 Plaintiff was born on September 27, 1950. 5 Record (“AR”) 179.) 6 (AR 221.) He completed four or more years of college. He worked full time from 1996 to 2007 doing body work 7 and repair on automobiles. 8 9 SSI. (Administrative (AR 22-23, 218-19.) On August 15, 2008, Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and (AR 179-86.) In disability reports submitted the same day, 10 he alleged that he had been unable to work since January 30, 11 2007, because of right-eye blindness, left-eye double vision, and 12 a hernia in his lower abdomen. (AR 218.) After Plaintiff’s 13 applications were denied initially and on reconsideration, he 14 requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. (AR 15 112.) 16 A hearing was held on April 14, 2010. (See AR 68.) 17 Plaintiff did not appear, however, and the ALJ subsequently 18 dismissed Plaintiff’s request for another hearing. (AR 68-69.) 19 On May 3, 2010, Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review. 20 136.) (AR On April 28, 2011, the Appeals Council granted review, 21 vacated the dismissal, and ordered that the case be remanded for 22 a hearing. 23 2012. (AR 62-64.) (AR 17.) That hearing was held on January 30, This time, Plaintiff appeared and was 24 represented by counsel. 25 a vocational expert. (AR 17-18.) (AR 15-48.) Plaintiff testified, as did In a written decision issued 26 March 9, 2012, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not 27 disabled. (AR 73-81.) 28 Appeals Council review. On March 22, 2012, Plaintiff requested (AR 13-14.) 2 On May 7, 2013, the council 1 denied the request. (AR 86-91.) This action followed. 2 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 3 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the 4 Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. The ALJ’s findings and 5 decision should be upheld if they are free of legal error and 6 supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole. 7 Id.; Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Parra v. 8 Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence 9 means such evidence as a reasonable person might accept as 10 adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; 11 Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). It 12 is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. 13 Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035. To determine whether substantial 14 evidence supports a finding, the reviewing court “must review the 15 administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that 16 supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s 17 conclusion.” 18 1996). Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. “If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming 19 or reversing,” the reviewing court “may not substitute its 20 judgment” for that of the Commissioner. Id. at 720-21. 21 IV. THE EVALUATION OF DISABILITY 22 People are “disabled” for purposes of receiving Social 23 Security benefits if they are unable to engage in any substantial 24 gainful activity owing to a physical or mental impairment that is 25 expected to result in death or has lasted, or is expected to 26 last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 27 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 28 (9th Cir. 1992). 3 1 A. 2 The ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process in The Five-Step Evaluation Process 3 assessing whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. 4 §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 5 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (as amended Apr. 9, 1996). In the first 6 step, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is 7 currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; if so, the 8 claimant is not disabled and the claim must be denied. 9 §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). 10 If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful 11 activity, the second step requires the Commissioner to determine 12 whether the claimant has a “severe” impairment or combination of 13 impairments significantly limiting his ability to do basic work 14 activities; if not, a finding of not disabled is made and the 15 claim must be denied. 16 §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant has a “severe” impairment or combination of 17 impairments, the third step requires the Commissioner to 18 determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments 19 meets or equals an impairment in the Listing of Impairments 20 (“Listing”) set forth at 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 21 1; if so, disability is conclusively presumed and benefits are 22 awarded. 23 §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments 24 does not meet or equal an impairment in the Listing, the fourth 25 step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant 26 has sufficient residual functional capacity (“RFC”)2 to perform 27 28 2 RFC is what a claimant can do despite existing exertional 4 1 his past work; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim 2 must be denied. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). The 3 claimant has the burden of proving he is unable to perform past 4 relevant work. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. If the claimant meets 5 that burden, a prima facie case of disability is established. 6 Id. 7 If that happens or if the claimant has no past relevant 8 work, the Commissioner then bears the burden of establishing that 9 the claimant is not disabled because he can perform other 10 substantial gainful work available in the national economy. 11 §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). That determination 12 comprises the fifth and final step in the sequential analysis. 13 §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Lester, 81 F.3d at 828 n.5; Drouin, 966 14 F.2d at 1257. 15 B. 16 At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in The ALJ’s Application of the Five-Step Process 17 any substantial gainful activity since January 30, 2007, his 18 alleged onset date. (AR 76.) At step two, he found that 19 Plaintiff had the severe impairments of right-eye blindness and 20 hernia. (Id.) At step three, he determined that Plaintiff’s 21 impairments did not meet or equal any of the impairments in the 22 Listing. (AR 77.) At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 23 had the RFC to perform medium work “with additional non24 exertional limitations due to his vision loss.” (AR 79.) 25 Specifically, Plaintiff had “reduced depth perception and no 26 peripheral vision on the right side.” (AR 77.) Based on the 27 and nonexertional limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945; see 28 Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989). 5 1 VE’s testimony, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was unable to 2 perform his past relevant work as an automotive body repairer. 3 (AR 79.) At step five, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could 4 perform jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national 5 economy. (AR 80.) Accordingly, he found Plaintiff not disabled. 6 (AR 81.) 7 V. DISCUSSION 8 Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred in assessing his 9 credibility. (J. Stip. at 4-5.) Remand is not warranted because 10 the ALJ made specific findings and gave clear and convincing 11 reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony. 12 A. 13 An ALJ’s assessment of symptom severity and claimant Applicable Law 14 credibility is entitled to “great weight.” See Weetman v. 15 Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1989); Nyman v. Heckler, 779 16 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1986). “[T]he ALJ is not required to 17 believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else disability 18 benefits would be available for the asking, a result plainly 19 contrary to 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A).” Molina v. Astrue, 674 20 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks 21 omitted). 22 In evaluating a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony, the 23 ALJ engages in a two-step analysis. 24 at 1035-36. See Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant 25 has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying 26 impairment [that] could reasonably be expected to produce the 27 pain or other symptoms alleged.” 28 marks omitted). Id. at 1036 (internal quotation If such objective medical evidence exists, the 6 1 ALJ may not reject a claimant’s testimony “simply because there 2 is no showing that the impairment can reasonably produce the 3 degree of symptom alleged.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 4 (9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original). 5 Second, if the claimant meets the first test, the ALJ may 6 discredit the claimant’s subjective symptom testimony only if he 7 makes specific findings that support the conclusion. 8 v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010). See Berry Absent a finding 9 or affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ must provide 10 “clear and convincing” reasons for rejecting the claimant’s 11 testimony.3 Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036; Lester, 81 F.3d at 12 834.4 13 In assessing a claimant’s credibility, the ALJ may consider 14 (1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the 15 claimant’s reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements, 16 17 3 Defendant objects to the clear-and-convincing standard 18 (J. Stip. at 16-17 & n.5), but it is clearly the law in the Ninth Circuit. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014-15 & n.18 (9th 19 Cir. 2014). 20 4 In Ghanim v. Colvin, the Ninth Circuit noted that its precedent was inconsistent on whether the “clear and convincing” 21 standard does not apply only when an ALJ makes an “actual finding 22 of malingering” or also when the record merely contains “evidence of malingering.” 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 n.9 (9th Cir. 2014). The 23 Ninth Circuit declined to decide the issue, however. Id. Here, Plaintiff alleges that there is no evidence of malingering in the 24 record. (J. Stip. at 13.) In fact, a consultative eye examiner 25 found that Plaintiff’s “pathology” did not “account for the 26 27 28 patient’s constricted visual field nor visual acuity at 20/70 in the patient’s left eye” and that he would “expect [Plaintiff’s] vision to be 20/40 or better in that eye and for him to have normal visual field.” (AR 258.) Nonetheless, as discussed below, the ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s credibility. 7 1 and other testimony by the claimant that appears less than 2 candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek 3 treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment; (3) the 4 claimant’s daily activities; (4) the claimant’s work record; and 5 (5) testimony from physicians and third parties. Thomas v. 6 Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002); Smolen, 80 F.3d 7 at 1284. If the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by 8 substantial evidence in the record, the reviewing court “may not 9 engage in second-guessing.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959. 10 B. 11 Plaintiff testified that he lost all vision in his right eye Relevant Background 12 15 years before the hearing. (AR 32.) He continued working as 13 an automotive body repairer while his left-eye vision 14 deteriorated but shifted from fabricating metal to managing and 15 restocking. (AR 23.) 16 before the hearing.5 He continued to work until “three years” (AR 23-24.) The last time he saw an eye 17 doctor was a year before the hearing. (AR 32.) The doctor told 18 him to be careful and prescribed glasses for reading. 19 33.) Plaintiff had a driver’s license with a restriction for 20 corrective lenses. 21 (AR 32- (AR 33.) Plaintiff testified that he had knee problems that made it 22 difficult to walk or stand. (AR 24-25.) He could walk only two 23 blocks before needing to stop and sit,6 and he could stand for a 24 25 26 27 28 5 Three years before the hearing was mid-2009; Plaintiff’s alleged onset date was more than two years before that. 6 In an August 2008 “Exertion Questionnaire,” Plaintiff stated that he could walk “1.Mil” to the store and other places and that he felt “God. OK” afterward. (AR 223.) 8 1 maximum of 15 to 30 minutes at a time. (Id.) Plaintiff 2 testified that he occasionally had back pain and suffered from 3 cramps in his hands and legs during cold weather. 4 (AR 25.) Plaintiff testified that his room and board were provided by 5 a family he knew, at no cost to him. 6 himself and drove to the store. (AR 25, 28.) (AR 29.) He cooked for Plaintiff took care of 7 the 85-year-old father and went grocery shopping for him. 8 26.) He also took care of the son, who weighed 500 pounds. 9 28-29.) (AR Plaintiff could not lift the son but watched him and 10 cooked meals for him. 11 (AR (AR 34.) About once or twice a week, Plaintiff worked at a local 12 motorcycle and “hotrod” repair shop by answering phones, giving 13 advice, and cleaning oil. (AR 30-31, 38-39.) He had helped the 14 shop owner modify hotrods until about a year before the hearing. 15 (AR 30-31.) At times, the owner compensated Plaintiff by giving 16 him “pocket money” or paying for his car insurance, which cost 17 about $300 a year. (AR 35-36.) 18 C. 19 The ALJ discredited Plaintiff’s symptom testimony because he Analysis 20 found that the objective medical evidence, Plaintiff’s daily 21 activities, and his work record did not support the alleged 22 intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of Plaintiff’s 23 symptoms. (AR 77-79.) Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by 24 improperly applying Lingenfelter’s two-step analysis and failing 25 to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting his 26 testimony. (J. Stip. at 7.) On the contrary, as discussed 27 below, the ALJ’s findings were specific, his reasons were clear 28 and convincing, and substantial evidence in the record supported 9 1 his determination. 2 As an initial matter, the ALJ noted the required two-step 3 analysis (AR 77) and properly applied it, finding at step one 4 that Plaintiff had two severe impairments (AR 76) but concluding 5 at step two that Plaintiff’s symptom testimony was not credible 6 for various reasons. (AR 77-78.) Thus, the ALJ did not err in 7 applying the law. 8 The ALJ began his factual assessment with the objective 9 medical evidence, finding that it did not support Plaintiff’s 10 testimony of disabling vision and knee problems. He first noted 11 that Plaintiff’s treatment history was “sparse and conservative” 12 and that “there appear[ed] to be no complications from a history 13 of hernia repair.” (AR 78.) Indeed, Plaintiff acknowledged that 14 he had not sought any kind of medical treatment for his allegedly 15 disabling conditions. (Id.) Although Plaintiff claimed that was 16 because he couldn’t afford it (AR 25), the ALJ properly rejected 17 that excuse given that Plaintiff’s living expenses were paid for 18 and he acknowledged that he was occasionally compensated for his 19 work. (AR 78); see Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 20 1989) (ALJ’s finding that claimant’s proffered reason for failing 21 to seek treatment was not believable sufficient to discredit 22 claimant’s testimony). Similarly, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff 23 “was not taking medication when he was examined by the 24 consultative examining physician.” (AR 78; see AR 260 (Plaintiff 25 could relieve joint pain with medication yet was not currently 26 taking medication); see Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112 (ALJ may 27 properly rely on unexplained or inadequately explained failure to 28 seek treatment or to follow prescribed course of treatment); 10 1 Parra, 481 F.3d at 751 (“[E]vidence of ‘conservative treatment’ 2 is sufficient to discount a claimant’s testimony regarding 3 severity of an impairment.”); cf. Fair, 885 F.2d at 602 (ALJ may 4 not rely on claimant’s failure to take pain medication when 5 evidence suggests that claimant had good reason for not taking 6 it). Although Plaintiff had “some cervical, lumbar, knee, and 7 right foot tenderness” during the consultative physician’s 8 examination, his “[r]ange of motion [was] grossly within normal 9 limits in his upper and lower extremities and he walked 10 normally.” (AR 78; see AR 262.) This evidence, the ALJ properly 11 found, “undermine[d] [Plaintiff’s] allegations.” 12 (Id.) The ALJ also found inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s 13 testimony and the clinical opinion evidence, quoting extensively 14 from the report prepared by consultative physician Concepcion 15 Enriquez, who specialized in internal medicine. 16 260-63.) (AR 78; see AR On September 11, 2008, Dr. Enriquez completed an 17 internal-medicine examination of Plaintiff. (AR 260.) She 18 readily observed Plaintiff’s right-eye visual impairment as well 19 as tenderness in his knees and right foot. (AR 261, 263.) She 20 did not, however, observe any limitations in the range of motion 21 of Plaintiff’s joints. (See AR 260-63.) In her functional 22 assessment, she opined that 23 [Plaintiff] can occasionally lift and/or carry 50 pounds 24 and frequently lift and/or carry 25 pounds. 25 can stand and/or walk with normal breaks for six hours in 26 an eight-hour workday. 27 breaks for six hours in an eight-hour workday. 28 still do frequent squatting, crouching and kneeling. [Plaintiff] [Plaintiff] can sit with normal 11 He can 1 (AR 263; see AR 78 (quoting Dr. Enriquez).) About one month 2 later, Dr. C. Scott, the state agency’s consultative physician,7 3 reached the same conclusions regarding Plaintiff’s ability to 4 stand, walk, and lift and carry loads. (AR 266-67; see AR 78.) 5 The ALJ properly relied on these opinions in rejecting 6 Plaintiff’s testimony. Thompson v. Astrue, 458 F. App’x 632, 634 7 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming ALJ’s discrediting of claimant’s 8 testimony because it was “out of proportion to the objective 9 clinical findings of limited functional restrictions”). Indeed, 10 Plaintiff presented no medical or other evidence in support of 11 his claims of disability besides his own testimony and 12 allegations. Even had the ALJ found him credible, an award of 13 benefits would not be appropriate. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) 14 (“An individual’s statement as to pain or other symptoms shall 15 not alone be conclusive evidence of disability . . . .”); see 16 also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), 416.929(a). 17 It is true, as Plaintiff notes, that an ALJ may not 18 disregard a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony solely 19 because it is not substantiated by objective medical evidence. 20 (See J. Stip. at 8-9 (citing Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 21 346-47 (9th Cir. 1991)).) The ALJ may, however, use 22 inconsistencies with the medical evidence in the record as one 23 factor in the evaluation. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 24 25 26 27 28 7 Dr. Scott’s electronic signature includes a medical specialty code of 15, indicating gynecology. (AR 270); see Program Operations Manual System (POMS) DI 26510.089, U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin. (Oct. 25, 2011), http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0426510089; POMS DI 26510.090, U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin. (Aug. 29, 2012), http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0426510090. 12 1 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Although lack of medical evidence cannot 2 form the sole basis for discounting pain testimony, it is a 3 factor that the ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis.”). 4 In Plaintiff’s case, the ALJ based his determination on more than 5 just the inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s testimony and the 6 objective medical evidence. He also based it on inconsistencies 7 between Plaintiff’s allegations and his daily activities and work 8 record. 9 In particular, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s recent 10 international travel to Austria was “inconsistent with 11 [Plaintiff’s] claimed pain and limitations.” (AR 78; see AR 198 12 (stating that Plaintiff was unable to attend hearing because he 13 “had to leave the country” “due to family emergency”).) The ALJ 14 also noted that Plaintiff “worked after his alleged onset of 15 disability for cash ‘under the table.’” (AR 78.) The Ninth 16 Circuit has consistently held that an ALJ properly rejects a 17 claimant’s testimony when the claimant is able to travel or work 18 after the alleged onset of disability. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 19 533 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008) (claimant traveled to 20 Venezuela for extended time); Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 21 972 (9th Cir. 2006) (claimant did carpentry work “under the 22 table” after date last insured); Carter v. Astrue, 472 F. App’x 23 550, 552 (9th Cir. 2012) (claimant worked part time for “nearly 24 another year” after onset of disability); Beck v. Astrue, 303 F. 25 App’x 455, 458 (9th Cir. 2008) (claimant traveled out of state). 26 Plaintiff’s case is no different. 27 Finally, the ALJ also based his assessment of Plaintiff’s 28 credibility on Plaintiff’s “criminal history,” noting “a history 13 1 of incarceration for his involvement in drugs” and his parole 2 violations. (AR 77-78.) Although this reason is clear, it is 3 not convincing because it is not supported by any evidence in the 4 record. (See AR 26-28 (claimant’s only prior criminal conviction 5 was one DUI).)8 Nevertheless, transcription or similar errors 6 are harmless if, notwithstanding the error, the ALJ gave adequate 7 explanation of his findings elsewhere in his decision. See, 8 e.g., Wright v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 386 F. App’x 105, 109 (3d 9 Cir. 2010) (Tashima, J., sitting by designation) (ALJ’s 10 misstatements in written decision harmless error when regardless 11 of them “ALJ gave an adequate explanation supported by 12 substantial evidence in the record”); Castel v. Comm’r of Soc. 13 Sec., 355 F. App’x 260, 265-66 (11th Cir. 2009) (ALJ’s erroneous 14 reference to wrong medical reports harmless when he referred to 15 reports “in two sentences” but “dedicate[d] two paragraphs” to 16 correct reports, and decision conformed to medical evidence); 17 Taylor v. Astrue, No. 4:07–CV–160–FL, 2009 WL 50156, at *10 18 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 7, 2009) (ALJ’s misstatement of claimant’s RFC in 19 one sentence of decision “akin to a typographical error and 20 constitutes harmless error” given that ALJ correctly stated RFC 21 elsewhere in opinion and it was “overwhelmingly supported by 22 substantial evidence”). 23 On appellate review, this Court is limited to determining 24 whether the ALJ properly identified reasons for discrediting 25 26 8 It appears that the ALJ mistakenly inserted one paragraph 27 concerning another claimant altogether into his decision, which was otherwise properly focused on Plaintiff’s background and 28 circumstances. 14 1 Plaintiff’s credibility. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. The 2 inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s allegations and the medical 3 evidence, his daily activities, and his work record were 4 sufficiently specific bases for discounting his testimony, and 5 the ALJ’s reasoning was clear and convincing. See Tommasetti, 6 533 F.3d at 1039-40; Houghton v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 493 F. 7 App’x 843, 845 (9th Cir. 2012). Because the ALJ’s findings were 8 supported by substantial evidence, this Court may not engage in 9 second-guessing. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959. 10 Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to remand. 11 VI. CONCLUSION 12 Consistent with the foregoing, and pursuant to sentence four 13 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),9 IT IS ORDERED that judgment be entered 14 AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner and dismissing this 15 action with prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk 16 serve copies of this Order and the Judgment on counsel for both 17 parties. 18 19 20 DATED: November 17, 2014 21 ______________________________ JEAN ROSENBLUTH U.S. Magistrate Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9 This sentence provides: “The [district] court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 15
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