Gail Takahashi v. Carolyn W Colvin, No. 2:2013cv04905 - Document 23 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. IT IS ORDERED that judgment be entered REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner and REMANDING this matter for further proceedings consistent with this decision. (mr)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Gail Takahashi v. Carolyn W Colvin Doc. 23 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GAIL TAKAHASHI, Case No. CV 13-4905 SS Plaintiff, 12 v. 13 MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 14 15 CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration Defendant. 16 17 18 19 I. 20 INTRODUCTION 21 22 Gail Takahashi (“Plaintiff”) seeks of Commissioner of review of the final 23 decision 24 Administration (the “Commissioner” or the “Agency”) denying her 25 application for a period of disability and Disability Insurance 26 Benefits. 27 to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate 28 \\ the the Social Security The parties consented, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Dockets.Justia.com 1 Judge. 2 Commissioner is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings. For the reasons stated below, the decision of the 3 4 II. 5 PROCEDURAL HISTORY 6 7 On July 9, 2010, Plaintiff filed an application for 8 Insurance Benefits, claiming that she became disabled on May 14, 9 2007. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 145-47). The Agency denied 10 Plaintiff’s 11 determination that Plaintiff’s condition was “not severe enough 12 to keep [her] from working” and that she could still perform her 13 former job as a computer operator. 14 2010, 15 agency, on the basis that she was “totally disabled due to [her] 16 physical and emotional condition.” 17 reconsideration on July 22, 2011. application Plaintiff filed a on October request 15, 2010, (AR 92). for based a On December 2, reconsideration (AR 95). on with the The Agency denied (AR 96-100). 18 19 Plaintiff requested a hearing, which was held before 20 Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Sally Reason on April 30, 2012 21 (“ALJ 22 Vocational Expert (“VE”) also testified. 23 May 15, 2012, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. 24 Plaintiff sought review before the Appeals Council (AR 18), which 25 the Council denied on June 7, 2013. 26 determination made the ALJ’s decision final. 27 filed the instant action on July 9, 2013. 28 \\ Hearing”). (AR 48-72). 2 Elizabeth Brown-Ramos, (AR 67-71, 128). (AR 11-13). a On (AR 19). The Council’s (AR 11). Plaintiff 1 II. 2 THE FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 3 4 To 5 demonstrate 6 impairment that prevents her from engaging in substantial gainful 7 activity and that is expected to result in death or to last for a 8 continuous period of at least twelve months. 9 157 F.3d qualify a for disability medically 715, 721 benefits, determinable (9th Cir. 1998) a claimant physical or must mental Reddick v. Chater, (citing 42 U.S.C. § 10 423(d)(1)(A)). 11 of performing the work she previously performed and incapable of 12 performing any other substantial gainful employment that exists 13 in the national economy. 14 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)). The impairment must render the claimant incapable Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 15 16 To decide if a claimant is entitled to benefits, an ALJ 17 conducts a five-step inquiry. 18 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The steps are: 19 20 (1) Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial 21 gainful activity? 22 not disabled. 23 (2) If so, the claimant is found If not, proceed to step two. Is the claimant’s impairment severe? 24 claimant is found not disabled. 25 If not, the to step three. 26 (3) If so, proceed Does the claimant’s impairment meet or equal one 27 of 28 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1? the specific impairments 3 described in 20 If so, 1 the claimant is found disabled. 2 to step four. 3 (4) If not, proceed Is the claimant capable of performing his past 4 work? 5 If not, proceed to step five. 6 (5) If so, the claimant is found not disabled. Is the claimant able to do any other work? 7 not, the claimant is found disabled. 8 If If so, the claimant is found not disabled. 9 10 Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99; see also Bustamante v. Massanari, 11 262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); 20 12 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b)-(g)(1) & 416.920(b)-(g)(1). 13 14 The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through 15 four, and the Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five. 16 Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 953-54. 17 affirmative duty to assist the claimant in developing the record 18 at every step of the inquiry. 19 claimant meets her burden of establishing an inability to perform 20 past 21 perform some other work that exists in “significant numbers” in 22 the national economy, taking into account the claimant’s residual 23 functional capacity (“RFC”), age, education, and work experience. 24 Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098, 1100; Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721; 20 25 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(g)(1). 26 so by the testimony of a vocational expert or by reference to the 27 Medical-Vocational Guidelines appearing in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 28 Subpart P, Appendix 2 (commonly known as “the Grids”). work, the Commissioner Additionally, the ALJ has an Id. at 954. must 4 show If, at step four, the that the claimant can The Commissioner may do Osenbrock 1 v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001). 2 has 3 limitations, the Grids are inapplicable and the ALJ must take the 4 testimony of a vocational expert. 5 869 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 6 1340 (9th Cir. 1988)). both exertional (strength-related) When a claimant and non-exertional Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 7 8 III. 9 THE ALJ’S DECISION 10 11 The 12 process. 13 engaged in substantial gainful employment since her alleged onset 14 date of May 14, 2007. 15 Plaintiff had severe physical impairments, but opined that the 16 evidence was insufficient to establish that Plaintiff had “any 17 significantly limiting mental impairment(s).” 1 18 made note of records from Plaintiff’s treating physician showing 19 “subjective 20 report” 21 Fukushima, 22 social anxiety over twenty-five years. 23 ALJ concluded that neither report showed “any limitation in the 24 ability 25 Plaintiff had worked for years despite her history of depression 26 27 28 ALJ employed the five-step sequential evaluation At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not complaints from to (AR 24). of Plaintiff’s detailing perform At step two, the ALJ found that depression,” treating Plaintiff’s basic mental 1 (AR 24). and of a psychiatrist, treatment work for (AR 24). The ALJ “narrative Dr. Susan depression and However, the activities,” and that The ALJ found severe physical impairments related to Plaintiff’s history of carpal tunnel syndrome, cervical degenerative disc disease, and right shoulder impingement. (AR 24). 5 1 and anxiety. (AR 24-25). 2 not mental 3 disability benefits. mention The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff did health problems when she applied for (AR 25). 4 5 At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s 6 impairments, either singly or in combination, did not meet or 7 equal the requirements of any impairment listed at 20 C.F.R. Part 8 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 9 found that Plaintiff retained (AR 27). an At step four, the ALJ RFC to perform light work, 10 though with certain physical limitations. 11 determined that Plaintiff could not perform any past relevant 12 work. 13 on Plaintiff’s age, educational background, work experience, and 14 RFC, she could perform a number of jobs available in significant 15 numbers in the national economy. 16 as 17 Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. 18 (AR 34). (AR 33). a (AR 27). The ALJ also Finally, at step five, the ALJ found that based receptionist or data (AR 34). entry These included work secretary. (AR 34). 19 20 IV. 21 STANDARD OF REVIEW 22 23 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the 24 Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. The court may set the 25 decision aside when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error 26 or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a 27 whole. 28 (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) 6 1 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 2 601 (9th Cir. 1989)). 3 4 “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less 5 than a preponderance.” 6 v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997)). 7 evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to 8 support a conclusion.” Id. (citing Jamerson, 112 F.3d at 1066; 9 Smolen, 80 F.3d at Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720 (citing Jamerson 1279). To determine It is “relevant whether substantial 10 evidence supports a finding, the court must “‘consider the record 11 as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence 12 that detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.’” 13 257 F.3d at 1035 (quoting Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th 14 Cir. 15 affirming 16 substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. 17 157 F.3d at 720-21 (citing Flaten v. Sec’y, 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 18 (9th Cir. 1995)). 1993)). or If the evidence reversing that can reasonably conclusion, the Aukland, support court either may not Reddick, 19 20 V. 21 DISCUSSION 22 23 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred when she rejected the 24 opinions of Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist and physician, 25 finding no significant mental impairment, and when she rejected 26 Plaintiff’s testimony without providing legally adequate reasons. 27 (Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Complaint (“Complaint”) at 28 2, 8, 11). Plaintiff also contends that the VE’s testimony 7 1 “cannot support a denial of benefits” and that the Court should 2 award 3 proceedings. 4 Plaintiff’s 5 weight to the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist and 6 to provide legally adequate reasons, at step two of her analysis, 7 for 8 impairment. 9 this action remanded for further proceedings. benefits finding rather than remanding this (Complaint at 16, 18). contention that that Plaintiff the ALJ did case for further The Court agrees with failed not to suffer accord a severe proper mental Therefore, the ALJ’s decision should be reversed and 10 11 By its own terms, the evaluation at step two is a de minimis 12 test intended to weed out the most minor of impairments. 13 Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987)(O’Connor, J., concurring); 14 Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2005) (step two is 15 “de 16 quotations and citations omitted). 17 mental impairment that prevents a claimant from working, however, 18 the 19 process with additional inquiries. Maier v. Comm’r, 154 F.3d 20 913, 20 21 curiam). minimis Agency 914-15 threshold”); supplements (9th Cir. Smolen, the 80 F.3d at 1290 See (internal Where there is evidence of a five-step 1998)(citing sequential C.F.R. § evaluation 416.920a)(per 22 23 First, the ALJ must determine the presence or absence of 24 certain medical findings relevant to the claimant’s ability to 25 work. 26 establishes these medical findings, the ALJ must rate the degree 27 of functional loss resulting from the impairment by considering 28 four 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(b)(1). areas of function: (a) Second, when the claimant activities 8 of daily living; (b) 1 social functioning; (c) concentration, persistence, or pace; and 2 (d) episodes of decompensation. 3 Third, after rating the degree of loss, the ALJ must determine 4 whether the claimant has a severe mental impairment. 5 416.920a(d). 6 severe, the ALJ must determine if it meets or equals a listing in 7 20 8 416.920a(d)(2). 9 assess C.F.R. the 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(c)(2)-(4). 20 C.F.R. § Fourth, when a mental impairment is found to be Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. § Finally, if a listing is not met, the ALJ must claimant’s RFC, and the ALJ’s decision “must 10 incorporate the pertinent findings and conclusions” regarding the 11 claimant’s mental impairment, including “a specific finding as to 12 the 13 described in [§ 416.920a(c)(3)].” 14 (e)(2). degree of limitation in each of the functional 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(d)(3), 15 16 The regulations describe an impairment as follows: 17 18 A 19 anatomical, physiological, 20 abnormalities which 21 acceptable clinical 22 techniques. A physical or mental impairment must be 23 established by medical evidence consisting of signs, 24 symptoms, 25 plaintiff’s] statements of symptoms. physical or and mental impairment can be and laboratory 27 must 20 C.F.R. § 416.908. 28 9 result or from psychological shown by laboratory findings, 26 areas not medically diagnostic only by [a 1 Here, the 2 depression and 3 uncritically 4 submitted her findings on an “attorney-generated form” completed 5 a week before the hearing, and formed an opinion “at odds with 6 her own treatment records.” 7 probative weight” to Dr. Fukushima’s report and instead credited 8 assessments by an Agency consulting physician and a state agency 9 non-examining 10 ALJ rejected anxiety on accepted Dr. the Fukushima’s basis psychiatric of the psychiatrist subjective Plaintiff’s that diagnosis complaints, (AR 25-26). consultant, significant limiting mental impairment. The ALJ gave “little both of whom found no of Dr. (AR 25-26)). 11 12 However, the ALJ’s decision omits discussion 13 Fukushima’s 14 nearly five years of psychiatric examinations, from May 24, 2007 15 through February 23, 2012. 2 16 Fukushima’s five-page “narrative report” dated March 7, 2011, and 17 her notes on the “attorney-generated form,” as the only evidence 18 submitted by Dr. Fukushima. 19 (“Narrative 20 Questionnaire”)). 21 or absence of certain medical findings relevant to the claimant’s 22 ability 23 reviewed evidence of Plaintiff’s mental health. 24 416.920a(b)(1). to treatment notes, Report”); whose forty-seven (AR 681-727). AR pages document The ALJ cited Dr. (AR 24, 26; see also AR 578-82 728-33 (“Mental Impairment The ALJ failed to fully consider “the presence work,” as Agency regulations require, when she 20 C.F.R. § As a result, the ALJ has not yet completed the 25 26 27 28 2 The ALJ failed to discuss Dr. Fukushima’s treatment notes even though the Agency received them the same day it received the “attorney-generated form,” which the ALJ did discuss in detail. (See Complaint, Ex. 1 (Agency’s record of receiving treatment notes and attorney-generated “Mental Impairment Questionnaire”)). 10 1 second through fifth steps of the Agency’s supplementary process 2 for assessing a mental impairment. 3 4 In the Mental Impairment Questionnaire, Dr. Fukushima 5 indicated that she had treated Plaintiff every two to three weeks 6 since 1986. 7 symptoms 8 energy, “reactive depression,” sleep problems, and panic attacks 9 that recurred “several times a week.” (AR 728). included She noted that Plaintiff’s signs and social withdrawal or isolation, decreased (AR 728-29). She rated 10 Plaintiff’s ability 11 interference of 12 Similarly, 13 described Plaintiff’s history of “chronic depression and social 14 anxiety,” and indicated that Plaintiff had been depressed and 15 anxious since the onset of her physical symptoms in 2007. 16 578). 17 feelings of worthlessness. 18 had “withdrawn from her family and friends” and was “overwhelmed 19 by any kind of decision.” 20 depressive 21 personality traits.” 22 Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) test, score of fifty- 23 five. 3 24 3 25 26 27 28 in to complete psychological the 2011 a full symptoms “Narrative as workday “fair.” Report,” without (AR Dr. 731). Fukushima (AR She described Plaintiff’s history of panic attacks and disorder” of (AR 579). She noted that Plaintiff (AR 580). social (AR 581). phobia, She diagnosed a “major as well as “avoidant Dr. Fukushima gave Plaintiff a (Id.). A GAF score between fifty-one and sixty indicates “Moderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks) OR moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g. few friends, conflicts with peers or coworkers). American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR), 34 (2000). See also Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2012) (GAF score of fifty-five 11 1 The treatment In records a support treatment observations diagnoses. 3 Plaintiff’s 4 diagnosed 5 chronic” and noted that Plaintiff had been taking prescription 6 Klonopin and Celexa at least since August 15, 2006. 4 7 Dr. Fukushima’s depression diagnosis did not vary in the nearly 8 five years of treatment notes included in the AR. 9 681 and AR 727). “Major onset date, Depressive written for ten example, days and 2 alleged note these after Fukushima Recurrent, Disorder, Dr. Moderate, (AR 681). (Compare AR Plaintiff’s prescriptions for depression and 10 panic attacks also remained unchanged. 11 entry, Dr. Fukushima noted that Plaintiff had not been going to 12 work and felt tired and sleepy. 13 was 14 Although Plaintiff’s mood at times improved (see, e.g., AR 685), 15 by 16 isolated,” had panic attacks, and remained depressed. 17 On May 15, 2008, Plaintiff’s mood was “continuing depression,” 18 but she told Dr. Fukushima she was hoping to “have examination 19 soon to see whether she can return to work.” 20 August 21 depression due to her physical pain, a diagnosis the psychiatrist 22 confirmed. 23 \\ “blunted” February 15, and and her March, 2006, mood 2008, however, (Id.). (AR 681-82). “moderately she had Plaintiff In the earliest Plaintiff’s affect depressed.” “become more (Id.) socially (AR 688). (AR 691). continued to By report (AR 699). 24 25 26 27 28 indicates “moderately severe social and occupational functioning”). 4 Klonopin is used to control panic attacks and Celexa is an antidepressant. See MEDLINEPLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/ medlineplus/druginfo/meds/ (locate “Browse by generic or brand name” and click drug name’s first letter)(last visited Nov. 12, 2014)). 12 1 Remand for further proceedings could remedy is appropriate defects in the where 2 additional proceedings Agency’s 3 decision. See Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 4 2000). 5 6 Upon remand, the ALJ must conduct the supplemental 7 evaluation of mental impairment evidence. 8 first 9 findings relevant to the plaintiff’s ability to work. determine the presence or Normally, the ALJ must absence of certain medical 20 C.F.R. 10 § 416.920a(b)(1). 11 is 12 mental impairment relevant to her ability to work. 13 need not address this question. 14 complete the remaining inquiries required in the supplemental 15 evaluation of mental impairment evidence. objective However, this Court has determined that there medical evidence that Plaintiff suffers from a Thus, the ALJ Accordingly, the ALJ must only 16 17 VI. 18 CONCLUSION 19 20 Consistent with the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that judgment 21 be entered REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner and 22 REMANDING this matter for further proceedings consistent with 23 this decision. 24 25 DATED: November 13, 2014 26 /S/ __________ SUZANNE H. SEGAL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 27 28 13 1 NOTICE 2 THIS DECISION IS NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION IN LEXIS/NEXIS, 3 WESTLAW OR ANY OTHER LEGAL DATABASE. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
