Lorenzo Pryor et al v. Wyclef Jean et al, No. 2:2013cv02867 - Document 48 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. For the reasons stated above, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. The First and Second claims for relief are DISMISSED, with prejudice. IT IS SO ORDERED. (See attached document for details.) (lom)
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Lorenzo Pryor et al v. Wyclef Jean et al Doc. 48 1 2 O 3 4 NO JS-6 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LORENZO PRYOR, TRENA STEWARD; KARLA RAY, 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. 14 15 16 17 18 WYCLE JEAN; SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT, INC.; SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA, INC.; SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT (JAPAN), INC., et al., Defendants. ___________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 13-02867 DDP (AJWx) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT [Dkt. No. 36] 19 20 Presently before the court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 21 Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”). 22 the submissions of the parties and heard oral argument, the court 23 GRANTS the Motion and adopts the following order. 24 I. 25 (Dkt. No. 36). Having considered Background As described in this court’s earlier order, in 1974, David 26 Pryor (“Pryor”) wrote a musical composition to a song called 27 “Bumpin’ Bus Stop.” 28 and, along with his band, “The Play Boys,” recorded “Bumpin’ Bus (TAC ¶ 9.) That same year, Pryor produced Dockets.Justia.com 1 Stop” at Gold Future Recording Studio. 2 copies of the recording (hereinafter, “the Gold Future record”) and 3 sent them to radio stations and distributors. 4 Pryor did not register a copyright in the Gold Future record. 5 (TAC ¶ 10.) Pryor made (Id. ¶¶ 10-11) In 1975, Pryor desired to promote and distribute the Gold 6 Future record on a wider scale. 7 (“Private Stock”) expressed an interest in “Bumpin’ Bus Stop.” 8 (Id.) 9 Future record, shortened the length of the Gold Future Record, (TAC ¶ 12.) Private Stock Records With Pryor’s consent, Private Stock re-mastered the Gold 10 changed the name of Pryor’s band to “Thunder and Lightning,” and 11 placed its own label on a re-mastered recording of “Bumpin’ Bus 12 Stop.”1 13 the Private Stock record and the musical composition embodied 14 therein. (Id.) Private Stock obtained copyright registrations for (Id. ¶ 15.) 15 In early 2004, Pryor was admitted to a skilled nursing 16 facility with numerous ailments, including senile dementia, and a 17 conservator was appointed. 18 (Id.) (TAC ¶ 19.) Pryor died in May 2006. Plaintiffs here are Pryor’s heirs (Id. ¶¶ 4-6, 9, 21.) 19 In July 2006, Private Stock’s successor in interest, Douglas 20 Uttal (“Uttal”) granted Defendant Zomba Recording LLC (“Zomba”) a 21 limited license to sample a portion of the Private Stock record for 22 use in a single and/or film soundtrack entitled “Step Up.” 23 27.) 24 ownership rights in “Bumpin’ Bus Stop.” 25 Defendants Zomba, Sony Music Entertainment Inc., and Jean (TAC ¶ Uttal explicitly refused to warrant that he actually had any (Id.) In August 2006, 26 27 28 1 Despite these changes, the TAC alleges that the Private Stock version (the “Private Stock record”) is a literal copy of the Gold Future record. (TAC ¶ 13.) 2 1 “produced, copied, distributed, and/or released” a musical 2 recording and music video for “Step Up,” which sampled “Bumpin’ Bus 3 Stop.” 4 the same name, which Defendants Disney, Buena Vista, and Summit 5 Entertainment “created, produced, copied, distributed, and/or 6 released” around the same time. 7 8 9 (TAC ¶ 34.) The “Step Up” song was featured in a film of (Id.) In October 2012, Private Stock assigned all of its rights in “Bumpin’ Bus Stop” to Plaintiffs. (TAC ¶ 25.) In April 2013, Plaintiffs filed this infringement action 10 against fourteen different defendants. 11 allegations related to “Step Up,” the SAC alleges that several 12 other combinations of Defendants infringed upon Plaintiffs’ 13 copyright in “Bumpin’ Bus Stop” in a variety of ways, such as 14 sampling it in other songs unrelated to “Step Up” and using songs 15 containing unauthorized samples in other movies and television 16 shows unrelated to “Step Up.” 17 In addition to the On October 25, 2013, this court granted Defendants’ Motion to 18 Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, with leave to amend, because, 19 though Plaintiffs alleged infringement of the Gold Future Record, 20 neither Plaintiffs nor Pryor ever registered a copyright in the 21 Gold Future record. 22 Plaintiffs filed the TAC on November 12, 2013. The TAC alleges that Plaintiffs filed proper copyright 23 registration forms for the Gold Future record and underlying 24 musical composition in April 2012. 25 acknowledge that this allegation is not true. 26 Motion at 3.) 27 application until December 23, 2013, after the filing of the 28 instant Motion. (TAC ¶ 24.) Plaintiffs now (Opposition to Plaintiffs did not submit a proper copyright (Reply at 3; Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial 3 1 Notice, Ex. 1.) 2 record has now issued, effective as of that date. 3 RJN, Ex. 1.) 4 in both the Gold Future Record and the underlying musical 5 composition, the substantive allegations at issue here refer only 6 to a copyright in the Gold Future record, and not the “Bumpin’ Bus 7 Stop” musical composition. 8 registration provided to the court pertains to a sound recording. 9 (Plaintiffs’ RJN, Ex. 1). 10 A certificate of registration for the Gold Future (Plaintiffs’ Though Plaintiffs’ TAC and Reply refer to copyrights Similarly, the only certificate of Defendants now move to dismiss the TAC’s First and Second 11 claims for relief, which pertain solely to the Gold Future record 12 copyright. 13 II. 14 Legal Standard A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it contains 15 “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to 16 relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 17 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 18 570 (2007)). 19 “accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe 20 those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick 21 v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). 22 need not include “detailed factual allegations,” it must offer 23 “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 24 accusation.” 25 allegations that are no more than a statement of a legal conclusion 26 “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679. 27 other words, a pleading that merely offers “labels and 28 conclusions,” a “formulaic recitation of the elements,” or “naked When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 4 Although a complaint Conclusory allegations or In 1 assertions” will not be sufficient to state a claim upon which 2 relief can be granted. 3 quotation marks omitted). 4 Id. at 678 (citations and internal “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should 5 assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly 6 give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Id. at 679. 7 must allege “plausible grounds to infer” that their claims rise 8 “above the speculative level.” 9 “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for Plaintiffs Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 10 relief” is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing 11 court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 12 556 U.S. at 679. 13 III. Discussion Iqbal, 14 A. 15 At the outset, the court notes that as early as October 2012, Registration of the Gold Future Copyright 16 well before the filing of this action, let alone the TAC, the 17 Copyright Office informed Plaintiff Steward that her copyright 18 application was deficient. 19 Plaintiffs’ counsel was apprised no later than September 17, 2013 20 that Plaintiffs’ application remained deficient. 21 Plaintiffs and their counsel therefore knew at the time the TAC was 22 filed that the TAC’s allegations regarding Plaintiffs’ copyright 23 application were false. 24 reiterated those allegations during the court-mandated conference 25 of counsel pursuant to Local Rule 7-3 in connection with this 26 Motion, those representations, too, were false. 27 did not cure the deficiencies in their application until after that 28 conference of counsel, and after Defendants highlighted some of the (Defendants’ Supplemental RJN, Ex. 6.) (Id., Ex. 7.) To the extent Plaintiffs’ counsel 5 Indeed, Plaintiffs 1 application’s likely shortcomings in the instant Motion. (Id.) 2 While the pleading deficiencies resulting from this questionable 3 conduct could themselves justify dismissal of the TAC, 17 U.S.C. § 4 411(a), the court concludes that, Plaintiffs having since perfected 5 their registration, efficiency is best served by proceeding to the 6 merits without requiring Plaintiffs to first re-allege registration 7 in accordance with 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). 8 B. 9 As an initial matter, Plaintiffs’ TAC and Opposition to the Infringement of the Gold Future record 10 instant Motion somewhat confusingly conflate the Private Stock 11 record and the Gold Future record. 12 internally inconsistent. 13 Stock record “literally copies” the Gold Future record, the TAC 14 also acknowledges that the separately copyrighted Private Stock 15 record is a “re-master” of the Gold Future record, with a truncated 16 playing length and other “minor technical adjustments.” 17 12-13.) 18 Future record and the Private Stock remaster) is important, as the 19 substantive allegations at issue here refer only to copyright to 20 the Gold Future record, and not to the “Bumpin’ Bus Stop” musical 21 composition featured in both the Gold Future record and the Private 22 Stock record. 23 Furthermore, the TAC is While Plaintiffs allege that the Private (TAC ¶¶ The existence of two separate sound recordings (the Gold A “sound recording copyright does not attach to the underlying 24 [musical] work per se, but only to the aural version of such work 25 as fixed on [a] material object.” 26 2.10[A][2]. 27 scope of exclusive rights as for other types of copyrighted works.” 1-2 Nimmer on Copyright § “Copyright in a sound recording does not give the same 28 6 1 Griffin v. J-Records, 398 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1142 (E.D. Wash 2005); 2 17 U.S.C. § 114(a). 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 As 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) states: The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under clause (1) of section 106 is limited to the right to duplicate the sound recording in the form of phonorecords or copies that directly or indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in the recording. The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under clause (2) of section 106 is limited to the right to prepare a derivative work in which the actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or quality. The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under clauses (1) and (2) of section 106 do not extend to the making or duplication of another sound recording that consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording. 11 12 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (emphases added). 13 owner of a sound recording copyright is largely limited to 14 proceeding against the tape or record ‘pirate’ who without 15 permission makes a reproduction of the actual sounds in a protected 16 recording.” 17 “Thus, the remedy of the Griffin, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1142. Defendants concede that the separately-copyrighted Private 18 Stock record is a derivative work. 19 not appear to contest the validity of the Private Stock record 20 copyright registration. 21 22 23 (Reply at 4.) Plaintiffs do As a leading treatise explains: In some cases, the editing of a previously recorded work may in itself involve such originality as to command copyright, as where it involves such acts as equalizing, changing the highs and lows, providing more bass and treble, adding echo, or abridging by making discretionary and not obvious internal cuts. . . . 24 25 26 27 [I]t is difficult to envisage a situation that will not involve at least the recorder’s minimal originality in selecting the particular sound to be recorded, at a particular point in time, with a particular sound volume, and physical distance and angle between microphone and subject. 28 7 1 Nimmer, § 2.10[A][2][b] (internal quotations omitted). 2 Of course, “copyright in a derivative work does not extend to any 3 part of the work in which pre-existing material has been used 4 unlawfully.” 5 that Private Stock’s re-mastering was in any way unlawful. 6 the TAC itself alleges that Pryor and Private Stock agreed that 7 Private Stock would re-master the Gold Future record and distribute 8 copies of the newly-engineered Private Stock record. 9 Nimmer, § 2.10[A]. Plaintiffs do not, however, argue Indeed, (TAC ¶ 12.) Instead, Plaintiffs appear to argue that Zomba infringed the 10 Gold Future sound recording copyright by sampling a portion of the 11 Private Stock record “and, in turn, the Gold Future [r]ecord,” 12 presumably because of the Private Stock record’s “literal copying” 13 of the Gold Future record. 14 In other words, Plaintiffs suggest that because the Private Stock 15 record is a derivative work, and because Private Stock had no right 16 to license the Gold Future record, Defendants’ use of the Private 17 Stock record constitutes infringement of the original Gold Future 18 record. 19 (Opposition at 17 (emphasis added).) (Opp. at 15-17.) Defendants argue that issues regarding derivative works and 20 licenses are irrelevant because, as a matter of law, copyright in a 21 sound recording extends only to the actual sounds fixed in a 22 recording. 23 Private Stock could or did license the Gold Future record to 24 Defendants because Defendants never sampled anything from the Gold 25 Future record.2 Thus, Defendants contend, it does not matter whether The court agrees. Under 17 U.S.C. § 114(b), 26 2 27 28 To the extent Defendants suggest that Pryor’s actions with respect to Private Stock necessarily demonstrate an intent to grant Private Stock an implied license “to take any action consistent (continued...) 8 1 Plaintiffs have the exclusive right to duplicate, rearrange, or re- 2 mix the “actual sounds” of the Gold Future record. 3 not do anything with those “actual sounds.” 4 used licensed “actual sounds” from the Private Stock record. 5 Because the TAC’s First and Second claims for relief are premised 6 solely upon infringement of the Gold Future sound recording 7 copyright, those claims are DISMISSED, with prejudice.3 8 IV. 9 Defendants did Rather, Defendants Conclusion For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is 10 GRANTED. 11 with prejudice. The First and Second claims for relief are DISMISSED, 12 13 14 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 17 18 Dated: October 8, 2014 DEAN D. PREGERSON United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 2 24 25 26 27 28 (...continued) with copyright ownership,” the court disagrees. The scope of any such license, however, is not relevant, for the reasons discussed above. 3 Defendants’ Motion and oral argument made passing references to Plaintiffs’ Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action. Those references appear to have been based on Plaintiffs’ failure to register a copyright in the Gold Future record. As discussed above, Plaintiffs have since remedied that deficiency. 9
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