Kevin G Gray v. Michael J Astrue, No. 2:2012cv10915 - Document 18 (C.D. Cal. 2013)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY by Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott 1 . IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Judgment be entered affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security and dismissing this case with prejudice. (san)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 11 12 KEVIN G. GRAY, Plaintiff, 13 v. 14 CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 15 Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 16 Defendant. 17 18 19 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 12-10915-JEM MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY PROCEEDINGS On January 3, 2013, Kevin G. Gray ( Plaintiff or Claimant ) filed a complaint seeking 20 review of the decision by the Commissioner of Social Security ( Commissioner ) denying 21 Plaintiff s application for Supplemental Security Income benefits. The Commissioner filed an 22 Answer on May 2, 2013. On September 12, 2013, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation ( JS ). 23 The matter is now ready for decision. 24 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), both parties consented to proceed before this Magistrate 25 Judge. After reviewing the pleadings, transcripts, and administrative record ( AR ), the Court 26 concludes that the Commissioner s decision must be affirmed and this case dismissed with 27 prejudice. 28 BACKGROUND 1 2 Plaintiff is a 54-year-old male who applied for Supplemental Security Income benefits on 3 November 13, 2007. (AR 15, 98.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not engaged in 4 substantial gainful activity since November 13, 2007, the application date. (AR 18.) 5 Plaintiff s claim was denied initially on March 25, 2008 and on reconsideration on July 6 17, 2008. (AR 15.) Plaintiff filed a timely request for hearing, which was held before 7 Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ ) Alexander Weir III on September 14, 2009, in Los Angeles, 8 California. (AR 15, 98.) Claimant appeared and testified at the hearing and was represented 9 by counsel. (AR 15.) Vocational expert ( VE ) Sandra Schneider also appeared and testified at 10 the hearing. (AR 15, 98.) 11 The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on February 3, 2010. (AR 15, 98-105.) 12 Claimant filed a request for review with the Appeals Council on March 30, 2010. (AR 15.) On 13 March 6, 2011, the Appeals Council granted review and issued an order of remand, vacating 14 the ALJ s decision and directing further proceedings in this case. In its remand order, the 15 Appeals Council directed the ALJ to further evaluate Claimant s mental impairment, give further 16 consideration to Claimant s maximal residual functional capacity during the entire period at 17 issue and provide a rationale with specific references to evidence of record in support of 18 assessed limitations, further evaluate Claimant s subjective complaints, provide a rationale in 19 accordance with the disability regulations pertaining to evaluation of symptoms, further evaluate 20 whether Claimant s past work qualifies as past relevant work, and obtain supplemental 21 evidence from a vocational expert to clarify the effect of the assessed limitation on Claimant s 22 occupational base. (AR 15, 110-114.) 23 Claimant appeared and testified at the second hearing held before ALJ Alexander Weir 24 III on January 30, 2012, in Los Angeles, California. (AR 15.) Claimant was represented by 25 counsel. (AR 15.) Medical expert ( ME ) David B. Peterson, Ph.D. and vocational expert ( VE ) 26 Kristan Cicero also appeared and testified at the hearing. (AR 15.) 27 The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on March 19, 2012. The Appeals Council 28 denied review on November 02, 2012. (AR 1-3.) 2 1 DISPUTED ISSUES 2 As reflected in the Joint Stipulation, Plaintiff raises the following disputed issues as 3 grounds for reversal and remand: 4 1. Whether the ALJ properly considered the medical evidence as contained in the 5 treating opinion of Sharon Jablon, Ph.D. and in the opinion of the testifying 6 medical expert, David Peterson, Ph.D. 7 2. Whether the ALJ properly considered the testimony of Kevin Gray. STANDARD OF REVIEW 8 9 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the ALJ s decision to determine whether 10 the ALJ s findings are supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. Smolen v. 11 Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996); see also DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 846 12 (9th Cir. 1991) (ALJ s disability determination must be supported by substantial evidence and 13 based on the proper legal standards). 14 Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a 15 preponderance. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richardson v. 16 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a 17 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 18 401 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 19 This Court must review the record as a whole and consider adverse as well as 20 supporting evidence. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). Where 21 evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ s decision must be 22 upheld. Morgan v. Comm r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). 23 However, a reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm 24 simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882 25 (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989)); see also Orn v. Astrue, 495 26 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). 27 28 3 THE SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION 1 2 The Social Security Act defines disability as the inability to engage in any substantial 3 gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which 4 can be expected to result in death or . . . can be expected to last for a continuous period of not 5 less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Commissioner has 6 established a five-step sequential process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 7 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. 8 The first step is to determine whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial 9 gainful activity. Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). If the claimant is engaging 10 in substantial gainful activity, disability benefits will be denied. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 11 140 (1987). Second, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment or 12 combination of impairments. Parra, 481 F.3d at 746. An impairment is not severe if it does not 13 significantly limit the claimant s ability to work. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290. Third, the ALJ must 14 determine whether the impairment is listed, or equivalent to an impairment listed, in 20 C.F.R. 15 Pt. 404, Subpt. P, Appendix I of the regulations. Parra, 481 F.3d at 746. If the impairment 16 meets or equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is presumptively disabled. Bowen 17 v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141. Fourth, the ALJ must determine whether the impairment prevents 18 the claimant from doing past relevant work. Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844-45 (9th Cir. 19 2001). 20 Before making the step four determination, the ALJ first must determine the claimant s 21 residual functional capacity ( RFC ). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). Residual functional capacity 22 ( RFC ) is the most [one] can still do despite [his or her] limitations and represents an 23 assessment based on all the relevant evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). 24 The RFC must consider all of the claimant s impairments, including those that are not severe. 25 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(e), 416.945(a)(2); Social Security Ruling ( SSR ) 96-8p. 26 If the claimant cannot perform his or her past relevant work or has no past relevant work, 27 the ALJ proceeds to the fifth step and must determine whether the impairment prevents the 28 claimant from performing any other substantial gainful activity. Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 4 1 869 (9th Cir. 2000). The claimant bears the burden of proving steps one through four, 2 consistent with the general rule that at all times the burden is on the claimant to establish his or 3 her entitlement to benefits. Parra, 481 F.3d at 746. Once this prima facie case is established 4 by the claimant, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant may perform 5 other gainful activity. Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006). To support 6 a finding that a claimant is not disabled at step five, the Commissioner must provide evidence 7 demonstrating that other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that the 8 claimant can do, given his or her RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. 9 § 416.912(g). If the Commissioner cannot meet this burden, then the claimant is disabled and 10 entitled to benefits. Id. THE ALJ DECISION 11 12 In this case, the ALJ determined at step one of the sequential process that Plaintiff has 13 not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 13, 2007, the application date. (AR 14 18.) 15 At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the following combination of medically 16 determinable severe impairments: a mood disorder (dysthemia) and an anxiety disorder. (AR 17 18-19.) 18 At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or 19 combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments. (AR 20 19-21.) 21 The ALJ then found that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform a full range of work at all 22 exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: 23 Claimant cannot perform detailed or complex tasks; he has mild limitations in 24 simple tasks; he has moderate limitations in dealing with co-workers and 25 supervisors; he is precluded from having more than occasional contact with 26 the general public; and he has moderate limitations in maintaining attention 27 and concentration ( moderate is defined as more than mild and less than 28 severe, significant enough to be noticeable, considered moderate on general 5 1 observation as the term moderate is considered in normal English, and not 2 precluding the specific function area listed). 3 (AR 21-27.) In determining this RFC, the ALJ made an adverse credibility determination. (AR 4 22-23.) 5 At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work as a 6 janitor. (AR 27.) At step five, the ALJ found that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers 7 in the national economy that Claimant can perform, including laundry worker and cleaner. (AR 8 27-28.) 9 Consequently, the ALJ found Claimant not disabled within the meaning of the Social 10 Security Act. (AR 28.) DISCUSSION 11 12 The ALJ decision must be affirmed. The ALJ properly considered the medical evidence. 13 The ALJ properly discounted Plaintiff s credibility. 14 The ALJ s RFC is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ s nondisability 15 determination is supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. 16 I. THE ALJ PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE 17 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not properly consider the medical opinions of 18 Dr. Jablon and Dr. Peterson. The Court disagrees. 19 A. Relevant Federal Law 20 A RFC is not a medical determination but an administrative finding or legal decision 21 reserved to the Commissioner based on consideration of all the relevant evidence, including 22 medical evidence, lay witnesses, and subjective symptoms. See SSR 96-5p; 20 C.F.R. 23 § 1527(e). In determining a claimant s RFC, an ALJ must consider all relevant evidence in the 24 record, including medical records, lay evidence, and the effects of symptoms, including pain 25 reasonably attributable to the medical condition. Robbins, 446 F.3d at 883. 26 In evaluating medical opinions, the case law and regulations distinguish among the 27 opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) 28 those who examine but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who 6 1 neither examine nor treat the claimant (non-examining, or consulting, physicians). See 20 2 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927; see also Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). In 3 general, an ALJ must accord special weight to a treating physician s opinion because a treating 4 physician is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient 5 as an individual. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). If 6 a treating source s opinion on the issues of the nature and severity of a claimant s impairments 7 is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and is 8 not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the case record, the ALJ must give it 9 controlling weight. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2). 10 Where a treating doctor s opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it may be 11 rejected only for clear and convincing reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. However, if the 12 treating physician s opinion is contradicted by another doctor, such as an examining physician, 13 the ALJ may reject the treating physician s opinion by providing specific, legitimate reasons, 14 supported by substantial evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31; see also Orn, 495 15 F.3d at 632; Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). Where a treating 16 physician's opinion is contradicted by an examining professional s opinion, the Commissioner 17 may resolve the conflict by relying on the examining physician s opinion if the examining 18 physician s opinion is supported by different, independent clinical findings. See Andrews v. 19 Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995); Orn, 495 F.3d at 632. Similarly, to reject an 20 uncontradicted opinion of an examining physician, an ALJ must provide clear and convincing 21 reasons. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). If an examining physician s 22 opinion is contradicted by another physician s opinion, an ALJ must provide specific and 23 legitimate reasons to reject it. Id. However, [t]he opinion of a non-examining physician cannot 24 by itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an 25 examining physician or a treating physician ; such an opinion may serve as substantial 26 evidence only when it is consistent with and supported by other independent evidence in the 27 record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31; Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600. 28 7 1 B. Analysis 2 The ALJ found that Claimant has a mood disorder and anxiety disorder which result in a 3 mild limitation in daily activities, moderate difficulties in social functioning and moderate 4 limitations in his ability to maintain concentration, persistence and pace. (AR 19, 20.) 5 Accordingly, the ALJ s RFC provides that Plaintiff can perform a full range of exertional work 6 subject to the non-exertional limitations of no detailed or complex tasks, mild limitations in 7 simple tasks, moderate limitations in dealing with others and moderate limitations in maintaining 8 attention and concentration. (AR 21.) 9 The ALJ s RFC is supported by the February 28, 2008 opinion of consulting 10 psychological examiner, Dr. Rosa Colonna, Ph.D. (AR 24, 435-39.) Dr. Colonna diagnosed 11 Claimant with a mood disorder not otherwise specified and a personality disorder. (AR 24, 12 438.) She opined Claimant would be able to understand, remember and carry out short, 13 simplistic instructions without difficulty, and can make simplistic work-related decisions without 14 special supervision. (AR 24, 439.) She assessed Mr. Gray with mild inability to interact with 15 others. (AR 24-25, 439.) The ALJ gave this opinion great weight. (AR 25.) The ALJ also 16 gave weight to the March 12, 2008 opinion of State reviewing psychiatrist Dr. Greta Johnson 17 who diagnosed Claimant with a mood disorder and personality disorder. (AR 25, 525-538.) 18 She assessed Mr. Gray with mild limitations in daily activities and social functioning and 19 moderate limitations in maintaining concentration, persistence and pace. (AR 533.) 20 Dr. Johnson opined that Mr. Gray has the ability to perform simple routine tasks. (AR 25.) 21 Plaintiff does not discuss or even mention the opinions of Dr. Colonna and Dr. Johnson. 22 The ALJ also gave weight to the opinion of testifying medical expert Dr. David Peterson 23 who conducted a thorough review of the evidence. (AR 26.) He diagnosed dysthymic disorder, 24 anxiety disorder and personality disorder. (AR 26.) He opined that Plaintiff did not meet or 25 equal a Listing. (AR 26.) Dr. Peterson also opined that Claimant had moderate social 26 limitations and could only have occasional interaction with co-workers, supervisors and the 27 public. (AR 26.) Thus, considerable medical evidence supports the ALJ s RFC. 28 8 1 Plaintiff relies heavily on the findings and opinions of Dr. Sharon Jablon, Ph.D., who 2 observed Plaintiff in group psychotherapy sessions. (AR 24, 25-26, 378, 559-564.) In a 3 September 27, 2007 Medical Certification consisting of only one page, Dr. Jablon states 4 conclusively that Claimant has a disability described as a serious mental illness. (AR 378.) Dr. 5 Jablon, however, indicated that Plaintiff s mental illness does not substantially impede his ability 6 to live independently and would improve under more suitable housing conditions. (AR 378.) 7 Dr. Jablon also completed a Mental RFC Questionnaire on June 18, 2009, diagnosing Plaintiff 8 with generalized anxiety disorder, dysthymic disorder and a personality disorder. (AR 25, 5599 564.) Dr. Jablon found mild limitations in the ability to understand, remember and carry out 10 simple instructions. (AR 26, 562.) Dr. Jablon also found some marked and extreme 11 limitations in the ability to make simple work-related decisions, to maintain concentration and 12 attention, and the ability to get along with others. (AR 562-563.) Dr. Jablon states that 13 Claimant cannot work and would miss more than 4 days of work per month. (AR 563.) She 14 also found that Mr. Gray is easily confused and takes hours to complete simple tasks. (AR 25, 15 564.) 16 The ALJ gave minimal weight to Dr. Jablon s opinions for specific, legitimate reasons 17 supported by substantial evidence. (AR 26, 24.) The ALJ found that Dr. Jablon s opinion was 18 inconsistent with her treatment notes. (AR 26.) An ALJ may reject a treating physician s 19 opinion that conflicts with the physician s treatment notes. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 20 875 (9th Cir. 2003.) Claimant, for example, had the ability to engage in processing the material 21 in his counseling sessions without assistance. (AR 26.) Claimant was able to effectively 22 communicate with others and able to attend his sessions on a regular basis. (AR 26.) 23 Contrary to Dr. Jablon s opinion that Claimant was able to function outside a highly supportive 24 living environment, Dr. Jablon believed Mr. Gray would improve if he lived alone instead of in 25 his communal living arrangement. (AR 26.) Mr. Gray did move into his own home and 26 Dr. Jablon did not encourage or refer him to a more structured living arrangement. (AR 26.) As 27 for the Claimant being easily confused, the ALJ found that Claimant is able to complete 28 applications and interview successfully, and is able to utilize and communicate with the tools he 9 1 obtained during treatment. (AR 26.) The evidence also shows that Claimant actively 2 participated in group sessions, demonstrated insight into his behavior, and made appropriate 3 changes to deal with his problems and realized improvement. (AR 22.) The ALJ found that 4 Claimant s symptoms are controlled with the use of counseling, behavior modification 5 techniques, stress reduction techniques and medication. (AR 22.) Thus, the ALJ found Dr. 6 Jablon s opinion inconsistent with the evidence in the record as a whole, and gave it limited 7 weight. (AR 26-27.) 8 Plaintiff misstates the testimony of Dr. Peterson who Plaintiff claims found Claimant to 9 have marked limitations in the area of concentration, persistence and pace. Dr. Peterson noted 10 Dr. Jablon s finding that Claimant suffered marked limitations and even needed a highly 11 structured living arrangement but did not find objective evidence to support Dr. Jablon s 12 opinion. (AR 42.) Dr. Peterson also noted an inconsistency between Dr. Jablon s finding of a 13 mild limitation in the ability to understand, remember and carry out simple instructions and his 14 finding that Plaintiff had marked limitations in the ability to remember locations and work-like 15 procedures. (AR 43-44, 562.) He found evidence against the existence of disorganized 16 behavior. (AR 47.) He found Dr. Jablon s qualitative description of being easily confused and 17 slow to be in direct contradiction with her finding of only mild limitation in performing simple 18 tasks. (AR 47.) Dr. Peterson also found no evidence to support Dr. Jablon s opinion Claimant 19 needed a highly structured living arrangement. (AR 42.) As the Commissioner correctly 20 observes, Dr. Peterson never really offered an assessment of Claimant s ability to maintain 21 concentration, persistence and pace. The ALJ reasonably characterized Dr. Peterson s 22 testimony as being that Plaintiff had a limited ability to maintain concentration, persistence and 23 pace. Thus, the ALJ found that his RFC assessment of moderate limitations in maintaining 24 concentration and attention was largely consistent with the testimony of the medical expert and 25 the consultative examiners and is also consistent with the records of treatment. (AR 26.) 26 Plaintiff obviously disagrees with the ALJ s interpretation of the record but it is the ALJ 27 who is responsible for resolving conflicts in the medical evidence. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. 28 10 1 Where the ALJ s interpretation of the evidence is reasonable as it is here, it should not be 2 second-guessed. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ discounted Dr. Jablon s opinion for specific, legitimate reasons supported by 3 4 substantial evidence and reasonably interpreted Dr. Peterson s opinion as not including any 5 marked limitations in concentration, persistence and pace. Also, other medical evidence 6 supports the ALJ s assessment of moderate limitations in concentration, persistence and pace. 7 II. 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 THE ALJ PROPERLY DISCOUNTED PLAINTIFF S SUBJECTIVE SYMPTOM TESTIMONY Plaintiff contends that the ALJ s adverse credibility determination is not supported by substantial evidence. The Court disagrees. A. Relevant Federal Law The test for deciding whether to accept a claimant s subjective symptom testimony turns on whether the claimant produces medical evidence of an impairment that reasonably could be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281-82 esp. n.2. The Commissioner may not discredit a claimant s testimony on the severity of symptoms merely because they are unsupported by objective medical evidence. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722; Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 343, 345. If the ALJ finds the claimant s pain testimony not credible, the ALJ must specifically make findings which support this conclusion. Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345. The ALJ must set forth findings sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit claimant s testimony. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958; see also Rollins, 261 F.3d at 856-57; Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345-46. Unless there is evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant s testimony about the severity of a claimant s symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1283-84; see also Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722. The ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence discredits the testimony. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. 27 28 11 1 B. Analysis 2 The ALJ found that Plaintiff s statements regarding the intensity, duration and 3 functionally limiting effects of his impairments are not fully credible. (AR 22.) Because the ALJ 4 did not make an explicit finding of malingering, he was required to provide clear and convincing 5 reasons supported by substantial evidence to discount Plaintiff s credibility. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 6 1283-84. The ALJ did so. 7 The ALJ discounted Plaintiff s subjective symptoms because they are inconsistent with 8 the medical evidence and with his treatment or lack thereof. (AR 22, 26-27.) An ALJ is 9 entitled to consider whether there is a lack of medical evidence to corroborate a claimant s 10 alleged pain symptoms so long as it is not the only reason for discounting a claimant s 11 credibility. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2005); Thomas, 278 F.3d at 989. 12 Additionally, the ALJ found that the medical records indicate improvement (AR 22, 23) 13 and that Plaintiff s symptoms are controlled with the use of counseling, behavior modification 14 techniques, stress reduction techniques, and medication. (AR 22.) This is a valid basis for 15 rejecting Plaintiff s claims of disabling symptoms. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1040 16 (9th Cir. 2008) (responding favorably to conservative treatment undermines claim of disabling 17 symptoms); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (ability to control anxiety with 18 medication and other measures undermines credibility as to severity of symptoms); Warre v. 19 Commissioner of Social Sec. Adm., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (impairments 20 controlled effectively with medication are not disabling). 21 The ALJ also found that Plaintiff s claimed symptoms were inconsistent with his daily 22 activities. (AR 22.) The ALJ cited evidence that Claimant has the ability to perform household 23 chores, shop, use public transportation, pay bills, maintain a residence, self-groom, manage his 24 finances and medical care, engage in exercise and to live independently. (AR 22, 26.) 25 Inconsistent daily activities are a legitimate reason for discounting credibility. Bunnell, 947 F.2d 26 at 345-46. Plaintiff contends that these activities are not sufficient evidence that he can work 27 but they do suggest the alleged severity of his limitations was exaggerated. See Valentine v. 28 Comm r, 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009). 12 1 Plaintiff disputes the ALJ s interpretation of the evidence regarding Plaintiff s credibility 2 but again the ALJ is responsible for resolving ambiguities in the record. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 3 1039. Where the ALJ s interpretation of the record is reasonable as it is here, it should not be 4 second-guessed. Rollins, 261 F.3d a 857. 5 The ALJ discounted Plaintiff s credibility for clear and convincing reasons supported by 6 substantial evidence. *** 7 8 The ALJ s RFC is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ s nondisability 9 determination is supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. 10 ORDER 11 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Judgment be entered affirming the decision of the 12 Commissioner of Social Security and dismissing this case with prejudice. 13 14 DATED: December 3, 2013 15 /s/ John E. McDermott JOHN E. MCDERMOTT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13

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