United States of America v. The Zaken Corp et al, No. 2:2012cv09631 - Document 64 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 52 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson : Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, on all counts. The court awards restitution of $25,406,781 and finds injunctive relief warranted in the form proposed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff is ordered to file a proposed judgment and injunction in accordance with this Order within ten days of the issuance of this Order. (lc). Modified on 9/18/2014. (lc).
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United States of America v. The Zaken Corp et al Doc. 64 1 2 O 3 4 5 NO JS-6 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 15 16 17 v. THE ZAKEN CORP., a California corporation also d/b/a The Zaken Corproation, QuickSell and QuickSell and TIRAN ZAKEN, individually and as an officer of The Zaken Corp., 18 19 Defendants. ___________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 12-09631 DDP (MANx) ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Dkt. No. 52] Presently before the court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 20 21 Judgment. 22 court is inclined to grant the motion and adopt the following 23 order. 24 I. 25 Having considered the submissions of the parties, the Background Defendants (collectively, “Zaken”) offer a “Wealth Building 26 Home Business Plan” to consumers.1 27 D at 44.) (Declaration of Dani Stagg, Ex. For $148.00, plus shipping, purchasers become Associates 28 1 This order uses the term “consumer” and “purchaser” interchangeably. Dockets.Justia.com 1 of QuikSell Liquidations and receive a “kit” including instructions 2 on how to locate excess inventories, “‘[i]nsider’ secret 3 techniques,” “powerful and proven strategies,” “a simple seven-word 4 phrase that instantly pays [purchasers] cash profits,” and other 5 information. 6 additional “tools” for an additional charge. 7 at 85-86.) 8 9 (Id. at 57-58, 97.) Zaken also offers purchasers (Stagg Dec., Ex. E. Under Zaken’s plan, consumers identify businesses seeking to liquidate excess inventory. Consumers then notify Zaken, which may 10 proceed to negotiate an acquisition of the excess merchandise. 11 Zaken is successful in 1) buying the products identified by the 12 consumer and 2) reselling the products at a profit, then Zaken pays 13 purchasers fifty percent of the net proceeds. 14 Zaken advertises a “realistic ballpark figure” estimate that “2 to 15 4 hours a week working this business will earn [participants] an 16 average of $3,000 to $6,0000.” If (Id. at 52-53.) (Stagg Dec. Ex. D. at 61.) 17 Effective March 1, 2012, the Federal Trade Commission 18 broadened the scope of its “Business Opportunity Rule,” 16 CFR § 19 437.0 et seq., the earliest form of which was first promulgated in 20 1978. 21 imposed certain disclosure requirements upon the sale of business 22 opportunities, but only those costing over $500. 23 2012 revision eliminated this monetary threshold. 24 The 2012 changes also seek “to address the sale of deceptive work- 25 at home schemes, where unfair and deceptive practices have been 26 both prevalent and persistent.” 27 that “[s]ellers of fraudulent work-at-home opportunities deceive 28 their victims with promises of an ongoing relationship in which the 76 FR 76816. Prior versions of the rule regulated and 76 FR 76826. 2 76 FR 76818. The 76 FR 76821. The FTC elaborated 1 seller will buy the output that business opportunity purchasers 2 produce, often misrepresenting to purchasers that there is a market 3 for the purchasers’ goods and services,” and that these schemes 4 “frequently dupe consumers with false earnings claims.” 5 Id. On November 9, 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint against 6 Defendants for violations of the FTC’s Business Opportunity Rule 7 and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 8 45(a). 9 II. 10 Legal Standard Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, 11 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 12 together with the affidavits, if any, show “that there is no 13 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 14 to judgment as a matter of law.” 15 seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the 16 court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions 17 of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the 18 absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 19 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 20 the evidence must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. 21 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242 (1986). 22 If the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it 23 is entitled to summary judgment if it can demonstrate that “there 24 is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” 25 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party See Celotex Corp. v. All reasonable inferences from See Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to 27 the nonmoving party opposing the motion, who must “set forth 28 specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 3 1 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Summary judgment is warranted if a 2 party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 3 existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on 4 which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” 5 477 U.S. at 322. 6 that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 7 party,” and material facts are those “that might affect the outcome 8 of the suit under the governing law.” 9 There is no genuine issue of fact “[w]here the record taken as a Celotex, A genuine issue exists if “the evidence is such Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 10 whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non- 11 moving party.” 12 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 13 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., It is not the court’s task “to scour the record in search of a 14 genuine issue of triable fact.” 15 1278 (9th Cir. 1996). Counsel has an obligation to lay out their 16 support clearly. 17 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001). 18 file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the 19 evidence is not set forth in the opposition papers with adequate 20 references so that it could conveniently be found." 21 III. Discussion Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, Carmen v. San Francisco Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d The court “need not examine the entire Id. 22 A. 23 Section 5(a) of the FTC Act prohibits unfair or deceptive acts Section 5(a) of the FTC Act 24 or practices in or affecting commerce, and provides for injunctive 25 and equitable relief against violators. 26 v. Network Servs. Depot, Inc., 617 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2010). 27 A practice or representation is deceptive if it is likely to 28 mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and is 4 15 U.S.C. § 45(a); F.T.C. 1 material. 2 Courts look to the overall impression conveyed by a representation, 3 and not merely to literal truth. 4 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2006). 5 F.T.C. v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 928 (9th Cir. 2009). F.T.C. v. Cyberspace.Com LLC, 453 While Zaken disputes that it violated Section 5(a) of the FTC 6 Act, it provides no argument, authority, or evidence to support 7 that position. 8 in which Zaken directly or indirectly represented that purchasers 9 of Defendants’ business opportunity would earn substantial income. Plaintiff, in contrast, cites to numerous instances 10 Defendants, for example, explicitly guaranteed that the “entire 11 good-faith deposit of $148 will be sent right back” if consumers 12 “haven’t made at least $4,000" and they “return the kit” in the 13 first thirty days of purchase. (Pl.’s Ex. 11, Attach. F.) 14 Defendants suggested that such an outcome was unlikely, 15 representing, for example, that “the average commission check 16 [associates] get . . . will be approximately $4,280!” and 17 presenting a “realistic ballpark figure” estimate that “2 to 4 18 hours a week working this business will earn [participants] an 19 average of $3,000 to $6,0000” 20 Stagg Decl., Ex. D. at 61.) 21 (Pl.’s Ex. 12 at 67:15-15;) In truth, purchasers of Defendants’ business opportunity have 22 not earned a substantial income. (Pl.’s Ex. 29, Attach. A.) 23 the 24 basic QuikSell kit for $148. 25 earned any income at all. 26 approximately $260,000 in sales commission payments, based on 27 available records and testimonials. (Pl.’s Ex. 29, Attach. A.) 28 2011 and 2013, not a single consumer made any income using Over business’s ten-year history, over 100,000 consumers bought the Fewer than 1% of consumers ever Consumers collectively earned 5 In 1 QuikSell. (Id.) 2 QuikSell purchasers, and those commissions were a fraction of the 3 amounts Zaken claimed consumers would earn. (Pl.’s Ex. 29, Attach. 4 A.) 5 In 2012, Zaken paid commissions to only five Consumers spent an additional $10,130,433 total on other 6 QuikSell “upsell” tools. (Pl.’s Ex. 30, Attach. A.) 7 were encouraged to “spend [an additional] $2,300" to purchase one 8 such tool if they were “serious about this business and . . . 9 really want[ed] to make the kind of money others have made.”(Yee Some consumers 10 Dep., Pl.’s Ex. 14 at 105:21-23) . 11 consisted of largely outdated telephone numbers of companies who 12 were out of business. (Yee Dep., Pl.’s Ex. 14 at 108:15-21.) 13 It was reasonable for consumers to rely on Zaken’s This particular tool, however, 14 representations. The Government need not prove that each individual 15 consumer relied on the deceptive acts or practices. FTC. v. 16 Commerce Planet, Inc., 878 F.Supp.2d 1048, 1072 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 17 Here, reliance is shown by the undisputed fact that more than 18 110,000 consumers bought Zaken’s products. FTC v. Figgie Int’l, 19 Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 605-6 (9th Cir. 1993). Further, it was 20 reasonable for consumers to believe that Defendants’ statements of 21 earnings potential represented typical or average earnings. FTC v. 22 Medicor LLC, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1053-54 (C.D. Cal. 2002); FTC v. 23 Data Med. Capital, Inc., No. SA CV 99-1266 AHS, 2010 WL 1049977 at 24 * 27 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2010). 25 Defendants’ misrepresentations were material. A misleading 26 impression is material if it “involves information that is 27 important to consumers and, hence, likely to affect their choice 28 of, or conduct regarding, a product.” Commerce Planet, Inc., 878 6 1 F.Supp.2d at 1063 (citing FTC v. Cyberspace.com, LLC, 453 F.3d 2 1196, 1201 (9th Cir.2006)). Express claims concerning the earnings 3 potential of business opportunities are presumed to be material, as 4 the potential to earn a profit is an essential consideration for 5 anyone considering purchasing a business opportunity. FTC v. Febre, 6 1996 WL 396117 at *2 (N.D. Cal. 1996.) Defendants’ 7 misrepresentations of potentially large earnings in exchange for 8 very little work were explicitly presented to consumers in 9 advertisements, with titles like “Start Locating lots of deals and 10 Make BIG MONEY mailing out this Postcard.”(Pl.’s Ex. 24, Attach. 11 B.) 12 QuikSell associates, an essential consideration for anyone 13 considering purchasing this program. As such, these 14 misrepresentations were material. 15 Defendants violated Section 5. These express claims concerned the earnings potential of Plaintiffs have established that 16 B. 17 As described in this court’s earlier order, effective March 1, Business Opportunity Rule 18 2012, the Federal Trade Commission broadened the scope of its 19 “Business Opportunity Rule,” 16 CFR § 437.0 et seq., the earliest 20 form of which was first promulgated in 1978. 21 versions of the rule regulated and imposed certain disclosure 22 requirements upon the sale of business opportunities, but only 23 those costing over $500. 24 eliminated this monetary threshold. 25 also seek “to address the sale of deceptive work-at home schemes, 26 where unfair and deceptive practices have been both prevalent and 27 persistent.” 28 fraudulent work-at-home opportunities deceive their victims with 76 FR 76818. 76 FR 76826. 76 FR 76816. Prior The 2012 revision 76 FR 76821. The 2012 changes The FTC elaborated that “[s]ellers of 7 1 promises of an ongoing relationship in which the seller will buy 2 the output that business opportunity purchasers produce, often 3 misrepresenting to purchasers that there is a market for the 4 purchasers’ goods and services,” and that these schemes “frequently 5 dupe consumers with false earnings claims.” 6 7 Id. The Rule defines a business opportunity as a commercial arrangement in which: 8 9 (1) A seller solicits a prospective purchaser to enter into a new business; and 10 (2) The prospective purchaser makes a required payment; and 11 (3) The seller, expressly or by implication, orally or in writing, represents that the seller or one or more designated persons will: 12 13 (i) Provide locations for the use or operation of equipment, displays, vending machines, or similar devices, owned, leased, controlled, or paid for by the purchaser; or 14 15 (ii) Provide outlets, accounts, or customers, including, but not limited to, Internet outlets, accounts, or customers, for the purchaser’s goods or services; or 16 17 (iii) Buy back any or all of the goods or services that the purchaser makes, produces, fabricates, grows, breeds, modifies, or provides, including but not limited to providing payment for such services as, for example, stuffing envelopes from the purchaser’s home. 18 19 20 21 16 C.F.R. § 437.1(c). 22 23 24 The first two elements of the Rule’s inquiry are clearly met here. As to third prong, Plaintiff contends that sub-prongs (ii) and 25 (iii), the “outlet” and “buy back” provisions, apply to Zaken’s 26 QuikSell program. 27 28 “Providing outlets, accounts, or customers means furnishing the prospective purchaser with existing or potential locations, 8 1 outlets, accounts, or customers . . . or otherwise assisting the 2 prospective purchaser in obtaining his or her own locations, 3 outlets, accounts or customers . . . .” 4 16 C.F.R. § 437.1(m). At the preliminary injunction stage, it was unclear from the 5 record presented whether Zaken represented to consumers that it 6 would take certain actions, or, alternatively, only that it might 7 take those actions. 8 court is satisfied that Zaken represented that it would act. 9 mailing, for example, claimed that Zaken’s product and method would 10 yield “deals that WILL sell fast and WILL produce commission checks 11 for [consumers]!” 12 guarantee[d]” consumers’ “success.” 13 these statements is the representation that Zaken would take the 14 steps necessary for consumers to earn commissions. Now, after the completion of discovery, the (Ex. 11G.) One Indeed, Zaken “absolutely (Ex. 1 at 4.) Implicit in 15 The question remains whether those steps constitute the 16 furnishing of “customers” or “outlets” to consumers, or assistance 17 in finding customers or outlets. 18 term, a court should construe that term in accordance with its 19 ‘ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.’” 20 Los Angeles, 420 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting San Jose 21 Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th 22 Cir. 2004).). 23 determine the “plain meaning” of a term. 24 is “one that purchases a commodity or service.” 25 Online Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, Inc., 26 www.merriam-webster.com (June 2014). 27 commodity.” “When a statute does not define a Cleveland v. City of Courts may look to dictionary definitions to Id. 28 9 Id. at 1034. A customer Merriam-Webster http:// An outlet is “a market for a 1 Plaintiff’s argument is slightly inconsistent. Plaintiff 2 argues that “Zaken was the sole customer who bought the service 3 offered by [consumers],” but also that Zaken “would provide outlets 4 for [consumers’] services – i.e., third-party buyers of liquidated 5 merchandise.” 6 however, did not comprise the market for consumers’ services. 7 Rather, as suggested by Plaintiff, Zaken itself made up the 8 entirety of that market. 9 (Mot. at 17.) Third-party buyers of merchandise, At the preliminary injunction phase, this court noted that it 10 was unclear whether consumers could or did provide information to 11 entities other than Zaken. 12 and Zaken does not dispute, that consumers “could only earn money 13 from Zaken.” 14 promise to pay consumers a portion of any realized profits 15 constituted a “purchase” of information, Zaken was consumers’ 16 customer. 17 appears that Zaken was also the sole outlet for consumers’ 18 services. 19 provide “lead finding” information to anyone other than Zaken 20 itself. 21 (Mot. at 16.) On summary judgment, Plaintiff asserts, To the extent that Zaken’s conditional Even putting aside that question aside, however, it There is no evidence that consumers did, or could, To summarize, Zaken was the only market for consumers’ 22 services. Consumers could only receive commissions if Zaken made 23 use of those services. 24 receive commission checks. 25 implicitly represented to consumers that it would provide them with 26 an outlet for their services, namely, Zaken itself. Zaken guaranteed that consumers would Thus, at the very least, Zaken 27 28 10 Zaken’s 1 QuikSell program therefore falls within the ambit of the Business 2 Opportunity Rule.2 3 C. Scope of Relief 4 Almost the entirety of Zaken’s opposition to the instant 5 motion is directed at the relief sought by Plaintiff. 6 Specifically, Zaken argues that (1) the proposed lifetime ban on 7 Tiran Zaken’s involvement in marketing work-at-home business 8 opportunities is overbroad and punitive and (2) the proposed $25 9 million judgment lacks evidentiary support, particularly with 10 respect to Tiran Zaken’s scienter. 1. 11 12 (Opp. at 2.) Injunctive Relief In “proper cases,” the FTC may seek a permanent injunction. 13 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). 14 facts of the particular case, and should be tailored to prevent 15 future violations. 16 888 F.Supp.2d 1006, 1012 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 17 act “must expect some ‘fencing in.’” Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. 18 F.T.C., 676 F.2d 385, 391 (9th Cir. 1982). 19 include the degree of scienter, frequency of violative acts, the 20 defendant's ability to commit future violations, the degree of harm 21 consumers suffered, and the defendant's recognition of his own 22 culpability. 23 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 24 25 The scope of injunctive relief depends on the See F.T.C. v. John Beck Amazing Profits LLC, Violators of the FTC Relevant factors FTC v. Commerce Planet, Inc., 878 F.Supp.2d 1048, A lifetime ban is appropriate here. As president of The Zaken Corp., Tiran Zaken oversaw most Zaken departments, including 26 27 28 2 Having so concluded, the court need not address whether the QuikSell program also constitutes a “buy back” under 16 C.F.R. § 437.1(c)(3)(iii). 11 1 QuikSell. (Id. at 52, 53, 56.) He approved the advertising of 2 QuikSell and reviewed all of the Zaken Corp.’s marketing materials 3 prior to their disbursement. (Zaken Dep., Pl.’s Ex. 12 at 54-55.) 4 Though it is somewhat unclear from the record when Zaken’s 5 misrepresentations began, Plaintiff has submitted a plethora of 6 examples of misrepresentations made in direct mailings, 7 advertisements, and product materials. 8 sold the QuikSell program to over 110,000 consumers. 9 evidence submitted indicates that over 99.8% never earned any Over a ten year span, Zaken Of those, the 10 commissions whatsoever. 11 refunds of the $148 purchase price. 12 were taken in by Zaken’s exhortations to “invest” additional money, 13 sometimes thousands of dollars, in additional QuikSell “tools.” 14 (E.g., Ex. 14 at 105:21-23.) 15 Fewer than 9,000 consumers received Furthermore, many consumers Nor does Zaken appear contrite about his decade of deceptive 16 conduct. To the contrary, Zaken firmly stands behind the marketing 17 tactics of his “legitimate” business opportunity, and has insisted 18 that at no time did he ever believe consumers were misled by 19 QuikSell's advertisements. (Zaken Dep., Pl.’s Ex. 12 at 65:21-22.) 20 The risk of future misconduct is high. 21 “is out of the distressed merchandise business for good,” (Zaken 22 Decl. 2 ¶¶ 2, 4), he appears to intend to, if permitted, continue 23 marketing work-at-home business opportunities. 24 misrepresentations had less to do with “the distressed merchandise 25 business” than with the illusory benefits of a work-at-home 26 business “opportunity” of precisely the type Zaken intends to keep 27 marketing. 28 replace the lifetime ban with essentially a “follow the law” Though Zaken claims that he Here, his Zaken’s proposed alternative injunction, which would 12 1 injunction forbidding him from violating the Business Opportunity 2 Rule, would be wholly inadequate to protect consumers in the 3 future.3 4 2. 5 6 Restitution i. Individual Liability Courts may award equitable monetary relief in the form of 7 restitution or disgorgement. 8 1088-89. 9 however, “if (1) he participated directly in the deceptive acts or Commerce Planet, 878 F.Supp.2d at Tiran Zaken may only be held individually liable, 10 had the authority to control them and (2) he had knowledge of the 11 misrepresentations, was recklessly indifferent to the truth or 12 falsity of the misrepresentation, or was aware of a high 13 probability of fraud along with an intentional avoidance of the 14 truth.” 15 Stefanchik, 559 F.3d at 931. Tiran Zaken does not dispute that, as president of the Zaken 16 Corp., he had authority to control the misrepresentations about the 17 QuikSell program. 18 did not intentionally or recklessly deceive consumers. 19 his contention, Zaken cites testimonials from “high earner” 20 QuikSell consumers, Mr. Zaken’s own success “using the principles 21 of the QuikSell program,” and substantial earnings consumers made 22 “on their own after learning the QuickSell program.” 23 24 (Opp. at 17.) Zaken contends, however, that he To support (Id.) As an initial matter, Zaken points to no evidence to support the assertion that some people went on to make money after learning 25 26 27 28 3 Nor is the court persuaded that a lifetime ban would inordinately burden Zaken or prevent him from earning a livelihood. As Zaken himself states, he earned between $100,000 and $200,000 per year in the distressed merchandise industry before ever entering the work-at-home marketing industry. 13 1 QuikSell. Second, Zaken’s own personal experience making $100,000 2 to $200,000 in the distressed merchandise industry has little 3 bearing on the experiences of over 110,000 consumers, whose paltry 4 earnings figures were readily available to Zaken. 5 supposed reliance on testimonials from “high earners” appears to be 6 based on one of his own advertisements, which includes 14 short 7 quotes from supposed QuikSell associates. 8 the quotes are attributed to named individuals, all are unsworn, 9 and some are as short as four words. Lastly, Zaken’s (Ex 11 at 42.) While Even crediting each of these 10 14 testimonials as true, Zaken’s reliance on them, in the face of 11 dozens of consumer complaints and the fact that the overwhelming 12 majority of QuikSell associates never saw a dime from the program, 13 constitutes intentional avoidance of the truth, at best. 14 15 iii. Amount of Restitution “Consumer loss is calculated by ‘the amount of money paid by 16 the consumers, less any refunds made.” 17 F.Supp.2d. at 1088. 18 reasonable estimate of the appropriate monetary relief. 19 burden then shifts to Defendant to show that the FTC’s calculations 20 are inaccurate. 21 Commerce Planet, 878 The FTC bears the burden of providing a Id. The Id. The FTC calculates consumer losses of $25,666,437. Zaken sold 22 Quiksell to 113,596 consumers at $148 per kit, and issued 8,623 23 refunds, for a net total of $15,536,004. 24 $10,130,433 of upsell tools, for a grand total of $25,666,437. Zaken sold another 25 Zaken first argues that the FTC’s figure is not a reasonable 26 approximation because it is based on all of Zaken’s sales between 27 2003 and 2013, even though the record only contains evidence of 28 misrepresentations from 2010-2013. 14 The FTC replies that Zaken 1 represented that it produced all documents relating to its 2 marketing of QuikSell, from 2003 to the present. 3 testified at his deposition that he could not identify the year in 4 which advertisements were used because, “I mean, like, they’re all 5 similar.” 6 approximation of consumers’ losses resulting from Zaken’s 7 misrepresentations. 8 9 (Ex. 36.) Tiran Zaken The FTC’s estimate is a reasonable Zaken next posits that amounts paid to consumers as commissions, and chargebacks, should be deducted from the FTC’s 10 estimate. 11 occurred, let alone the amount of such chargebacks, and has thus 12 failed to carry its burden with respect to those amounts. 13 has, however, provided evidence that it paid out $259,656 in 14 commissions. 15 different in nature, consumer losses were mitigated, to some small 16 degree, by these payments. 17 of commissions paid is warranted. 18 restitution of $25,406,781 for consumer redress.4 19 IV. 20 Zaken points to no evidence that any chargebacks (Ex. 29A.) Zaken Though commissions and refunds are Accordingly, a reduction in the amount The court therefore awards Conclusion For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 21 Judgment is GRANTED, on all counts. 22 of $25,406,781 and finds injunctive relief warranted in the form 23 proposed by Plaintiff. The court awards restitution Plaintiff is ordered to file a proposed 24 25 26 27 28 4 Defendants’ opposition focuses almost entirely on the argument that the FTC has not met its initial burden to reasonably approximate the appropriate amount of monetary relief. (Opp. at 21-23.) The commissions figure, discussed above, is the only quantified inaccuracy identified by Defendants. 15 1 judgment and injunction in accordance with this Order within ten 2 days of the issuance of this Order. 3 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 7 8 Dated: September 18, 2014 9 DEAN D. PREGERSON 10 United States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 16
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