Terry Williams-IIunga v. Andrea Gonzalez et al, No. 2:2012cv08592 - Document 56 (C.D. Cal. 2013)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS 36 , 40 AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO STRIKE, DISQUALIFY COUNSEL, AND RECONSIDER ORDER DENYING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 45 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson .( MD JS-6. Case Terminated ). (lc) Modified on 2/13/2013 (lc).
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Terry Williams-IIunga v. Andrea Gonzalez et al Doc. 56 1 JS-6 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TERRY WILLIAMS-ILUNGA, 12 13 14 15 16 17 Plaintiff, v. ANDREA GONZALEZ; ANA TROUBWISNEV; PRODUCER-WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA PENSION PLAN; TRUSTEES OF THE PRODUCER-WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA; WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA WEST; WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA EAST, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 12-08592 DDP (AJWx) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE, DISQUALIFY COUNSEL, AND RECONSIDER ORDER DENYING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION [Dkt. Nos. 36, 40, & 45] 18 19 Defendants. ___________________________ 20 Presently before the court are Defendants Writers Guild of 21 America, West, Inc., and Writers Guild of America East, Inc. 22 (collectively “Union Defendants”)’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 23 36), Defendants Producer-Writers Guild of America Pension Plan 24 (“the Plan”), Andrea Gonzalez, and Ana M. Troub-Wisnev’s Motion to 25 Dismiss (Dkt. No. 40), and Plaintiff Terry Williams-Ilunga 26 (Williams)’s Motion to Strike Defendants’ Coordinated Motions to 27 Dismiss, to Disqualify Counsel and for Reconsideration of Order 28 Denying Plaintiff’s Request for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction Dockets.Justia.com 1 (Dkt. No. 45). Having considered the parties’ submissions, the 2 court adopts the following order. 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 Williams is the wife of Ilunga Adell (“Adell”), a beneficiary 5 of Defendant Producer-Writers Guild of America Pension Plan (“the 6 Plan”), an employee pension benefit plan as defined by ERISA §3(2), 7 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2). 8 entitlement to pension benefits. 9 Williams seeks benefits otherwise payable to Adell to satisfy Adell has satisfied the conditions for (FAC at 36, Exh. 4 at ¶ 7.) 10 Adell’s child support obligations ordered by the Los Angeles 11 Superior Court in the couple’s ongoing divorce proceedings. 12 at 38, Exh. 4 at ¶ 15.) 13 recover benefits in satisfaction of child support obligations if 14 the spouse possesses a valid Qualified Domestic Relations Order 15 (“QDRO”). 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A)-(B). 16 (Id. Under ERISA, a spouse or former spouse can In July 2011, the Plan received a “Notice of Lien” and “Writ 17 of Execution” for the state court’s judgment that Adell owed 18 Williams $114,592.69 in unpaid child support. 19 ¶¶ 28-29; Ex Parte App. for Temporary Restraining Order, Decl. of 20 Robert A. Pool (“Pool Decl.”) ¶ 11; Opp. to App. for Temporary 21 Restraining Order, Decl. of Ana Wisnev (“Wisnev Decl.”) ¶ 19.) 22 Plan did not award Williams the benefits she was seeking, asserting 23 that she did not have a valid QDRO. 24 Decl. ¶ 12; Wisnev Decl. ¶ 19.) 25 (FAC at 40, Exh. 4 The (FAC at 41, Exh. 4 ¶ 30; Pool Previously, separate state court proceedings had been 26 initiated in 1998 to dissolve Adell’s marriage to his former 27 spouse, Rosalyn Willis (“Willis”), and award her spousal support. 28 (Wisnev Decl. ¶ 12.) Willis submitted a QDRO on September 12, 2 1 2012, and payments began to her on November 1, 2012. 2 Exh. 4 ¶ 37.; Pool Decl. ¶ 14; Wisnev Decl. ¶¶ 14-15.) 3 (FAC at 42, Williams brought a series of motions in the Divorce 4 Proceedings to obtain a QDRO and/or injunctive relief to prevent 5 the Plan from paying benefits to Adell and/or Willis. [(Wisnev 6 Decl. ¶¶ 10, 23, 28; see also FAC at 3, 42, Exh. 4 ¶ 33; Pool Decl. 7 ¶ 18]. Those applications were denied. (Wisnev Decl. ¶¶ 23, 30; 8 Opp. to Ex Parte App. for TRO, Decl. of Neelam Chandna [“Chandna 9 Decl.”] ¶¶ 5-7 & 14.) Most recently, Williams sought emergency 10 relief in the Divorce Proceedings via an “Ex Parte Application for 11 Nunc Pro Tunc Relief or Alternatively to Shorten Time,” which 12 sought to enjoin the Plan from paying any other benefits (precisely 13 the relief she later sought from this Court). (Wisnev Decl. ¶¶ 14 30-32; Chandna Decl. ¶¶ 5, 14.) The state court first denied 15 Williams’ request at a hearing on October 5. 16 Chandna Decl. 14.) 17 (Wisnev Decl. ¶ 30; However, the state court has been considering the propriety of 18 entering a QDRO for the immediate recovery of the child support 19 payments Williams seeks. Toward that end, the court directed 20 Williams to meet and confer with the Plan to draft a QDRO that 21 would entitle her to this relief, consistently with ERISA, and has 22 also appointed an expert to recommend an appropriate QDRO for 23 Williams. (Wisnev Decl. ¶¶ 21-28, 30; Chandna Decl. ¶¶ 5-6, 14]. 24 Additionally, the court ordered Williams to notify Willis that 25 Williams was seeking a QDRO. It also suggested that Williams move 26 for the proceedings involving her and Willis to be consolidated so 27 that a single judge could adjudicate their competing claims to 28 3 1 Adell’s pension benefits, but Williams refused to do so. (Wisnev 2 Decl. ¶ 14; Chandna Decl. ¶¶ 7-8.) 3 On the morning of October 30, 2012, the parties appeared in 4 the Divorce Proceedings, at which time the court denied Williams’ 5 renewed request for injunctive relief. [Wisnev Decl. ¶ 31; Chandna 6 Decl. ¶ 14]. Instead, the court set a hearing for December 11, 2012 7 to consider the expert’s recommendation on a QDRO to enable 8 Williams to recover Plan benefits. (Wisnev Decl. ¶ 31; Chandna 9 Decl. ¶ 14.) On November 15, 2012, Williams filed a notice of 10 appeal of the state court’s September 24, 2012, ruling that, inter 11 alia, refused to enter the QDRO Williams sought at that time. 12 On October 5, 2012, the same day that the state court first 13 denied her request for emergency relief (Wisnev Decl. ¶ 30), 14 Williams filed her original complaint in this lawsuit. 15 applications filed in state court, the Complaint sought to compel 16 the Plan to recognize her child support orders, and asserted four 17 causes of action relating to her efforts to obtain child support 18 payments from the Plan. (Id.) On October 30, immediately after 19 losing a motion for interim relief in the Divorce Proceedings, 20 Williams filed an ex parte application without notice to 21 Defendants, seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and 22 preliminary injunction to prevent the Plan from distributing 23 benefits—essentially the same relief the state court denied earlier 24 the same day in the Divorce Proceedings. (Ex Parte App. for TRO; 25 Wisnev Decl. ¶ 31; Chandna Decl. ¶¶ 14-15.) On October 31, this 26 Court granted Williams’ request for a TRO and set a preliminary 27 injunction hearing for November 7. (Order Granting Ex Parte App. 28 4 Like the 1 for TRO.) At the November 7 hearing, this Court denied Williams’ 2 request for a preliminary injunction. 3 II. LEGAL STANDARD 4 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint is 5 subject to dismissal when the plaintiff's allegations fail to state 6 a claim upon which relief can be granted. 7 whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 8 allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the 9 light most favorable to the plaintiff.” 10 11 “When determining Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009), the Supreme 12 Court explained that a court considering a 12(b)(6) motion should 13 first “identify[] pleadings that, because they are no more than 14 conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” 15 Next, the court should identify the complaint’s “well-pleaded 16 factual allegations, . . . assume their veracity and then determine 17 whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 18 Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th 19 Cir. 2009) (“In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to 20 dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable 21 inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a 22 claim entitling the plaintiff to relief”) (internal quotation marks 23 omitted). 24 III. DISCUSSION 25 26 27 28 Id. A. Motions to Dismiss and Strike i. State Court Proceedings All Defendants move to dismiss on several grounds pertaining to the concurrent state proceedings, namely, res judicata, the 5 1 Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and Younger abstention. Defendants Writers 2 Guild of America, West, Inc. and Writers Guild of America, East, 3 Inc. (collectively, “Union Defendants”) also move to dismiss on the 4 grounds that the FAC contains no factual allegations with respect 5 to them and does not state the purported basis for their liability. 6 Ms. Williams did not file an opposition to the Motions to Dismiss. 7 She did file a Motion to Strike Defendants’ Coordinated Motions to 8 Dismiss (“Motion to Strike”). Because Ms. Williams filed no formal 9 opposition to the Motions to Dismiss, the court construes her 10 11 Motion to Strike as an opposition so far as it is able.1 Defendants invoke important doctrines of judicial economy and 12 of federalism. Res judicata prevents a waste of judicial 13 resources, providing that “when there is a final judgment on the 14 merits, further claims by the parties or their privies based upon 15 the same cause of action are barred.” 16 Carpenters Pension Trust Fund For Northern California v. Reyes, 688 17 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1982). 18 prevents duplicative judgments so as to protect the jurisdictional 19 authority of state courts. 20 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010) (The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “stands for 21 the relatively straightforward principle that federal district 22 courts do not have jurisdiction to hear de facto appeals from state Board of Trustees of The Rooker-Feldman doctrine also See e.g. Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 Typically, a motion to strike can be used only to strike portions of pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P 12(f) (“Motion to Strike. The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. The court may act: (1) on its own; or (2) on motion made by a party either before responding to the pleading or, if a response is not allowed, within 21 days after being served with the pleading.”) 6 1 court judgments.”). 2 abstention doctrine “forbids federal courts from staying or 3 enjoining pending state court proceedings.” 4 Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007), quoting 5 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971)(internal quotation marks 6 and modifications omitted). 7 Similarly but separately, the Younger AmerisourceBergen Defendants have demonstrated that many if not all of the same 8 questions are at issue in state court, by Plaintiff’s own 9 admissions in the Complaint. They point out that all nine causes 10 of action in the FAC relate to Ms. Williams efforts to obtain child 11 support payments from the Plan. 12 Plan’s response to a subpoena in April 2011, presumably issued with 13 respect to the Divorce Proceedings, seeking information about 14 Adell’s benefits [e.g. Comp. ¶ 14]; Count II alleges a ‘Wrongful 15 Denial of Benefits for the Plan’s failure to pay benefits to 16 satisfy her child support order [e.g. Comp. ¶ 27]; Count III 17 alleges a breach of fiduciary duty based on the Plan’s allegedly 18 wrongful denial of benefits [e.g. Comp. ¶ 34]; and Counts IV 19 through IX similarly complain that the Plan ‘rejected payment of 20 pension assets for child support’ [Comp. ¶ 39]. 21 Williams alleges that she is being ‘force[d] to relitigate matters 22 previously adjudicated by the Los Angeles Superior Court.’ [Comp. ¶ 23 41].” 24 “Count I complains about the Elsewhere, Ms. (Plan Mot. at 7.) Ms. Williams did not directly address the substance of 25 Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss regarding the ongoing state 26 proceedings. 27 preliminary injunction, Defendants misled the court “to believe 28 that all was being taken care of in State Court.” She stated only that at the hearing on the 7 (Williams Mot. 1 at 12.) 2 court proceedings with no commentary, apparently to inform this 3 court of the deficiencies in state court proceedings. 4 direction from Ms. Williams, however, it is impossible for this 5 court to discern what the state court is or is not addressing in 6 this complex, long-running divorce and child support case based 7 solely on a portion of the transcript of one hearing. 8 Williams has apparently not challenged any of the overlap, the 9 court has no choice but to find that Ms. Williams concedes these 10 Without any Because Ms. points to Defendants.2 ii. Union Defendants’ Grounds to Dismiss 11 12 Ms. Williams copied eight pages of transcript from state Likewise, Ms. Williams did not challenge the Union Defendants’ 13 claim that the FAC makes no factual allegations against them. 14 court finds that the FAC apparently does not make any such 15 allegations beyond mentioning them in the caption. 16 Ms. Williams lack of opposition on this point, the court finds for 17 the Union Defendants on this point as well. Combined with iii. Ms. Williams’ Grounds of OPposition 18 19 The Through her Motion to Strike, Ms. Williams appears to oppose 20 the Motions to Dismiss based on Defendants’ failure to have a 21 conference prior to the filing of the Motions, as required by local 22 rules. 23 exempt in L.R. 16-12, . . . counsel contemplating the filing of any Local Rule 7-3 provides that “In all cases not listed as 24 25 26 27 28 2 Defendants have not shown conclusively that there is a total overlap between all the issues, nor have they separated out which issues have been subject to final judgment and which are still pending. However, because Ms. Williams has failed to oppose any of these grounds, the court must assume that she concedes that all issues have either already been adjudicated or are pending before state court. 8 1 motion shall first contact opposing counsel to discuss thoroughly, 2 preferably in person, the substance of the contemplated motion and 3 any potential resolution.” 4 obligated to confer with Plaintiff because she is pro se and falls 5 in the exemption under L.R. 16-12. 6 Local Rule 16-12 exempts conferences only where pro se litigants 7 are in custody (“(c) Any case in which the plaintiff is appearing 8 pro se, is in custody, and is not an attorney”). 9 court does not find this without more to be a reason to deny the 10 Motions to Dismiss. The court expects strict compliance with all 11 federal and local rules but finds that Ms. Williams has not alleged 12 that she was not prejudiced by the lack of conference. 13 Additionally, Ms. Williams herself appears not to have complied 14 with this rule in filing her Motion to Strike. 15 Mot. to Strike at 2 n.2.) 16 Defendants argue that they were not This appears to be incorrect.3 Nonetheless, the (See Plan Opp. to Ms. Williams’ final argument that could be construed as an 17 opposition to the motion to dismiss is that Defendants “direct[ed] 18 Plaintiff to request injunctive relief in Federal Court.” 19 (Williams Reply at 8.) This appears, however, to have been based 20 on a misunderstanding. Defendants indicate that “the Plan 21 explained that the state court lacked jurisdiction to enter 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 This notwithstanding Judge Wright’s Order in Spencer v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2012 WL 1865500 *3 (C.D.Cal. 2012), which does not mention the “in custody” requirement (“Local Rule 7–3 provides that “[i]n all cases not listed as exempt in L.R. 16–12, ... counsel FN2 contemplating the filing of any motion shall first contact opposing counsel to discuss thoroughly, preferably in person, the substance of the contemplated motion and any potential resolution.” Local Rule 16–12(c), however, exempts “[a]ny case in which the plaintiff is appearing pro se.” Therefore, Plaintiff's failure to meet and confer prior to filing his Motion for Summary Judgment is not grounds for denial of Plaintiff's Motion.”) 9 1 ‘restraining orders or injunctions’ against the Plan - not that 2 [the state court] lacked jurisdiction to enter qualified domestic 3 relations orders to adjudicate Williams’ claim for benefits.” 4 (Producer-Writers Guild Mot. at 5 n.3.) The problem is not that 5 this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the case but rather that the 6 same case is being heard in state court. B. Motion to Disqualify Counsel 7 8 9 Ms. Williams also moves to disqualify opposing counsel (apparently including Neelam Chandna, J. David Sackman, the law 10 firm of Reich, Adell & Cvitan, Jeremy M. Mittman, Kara L. Lincoln, 11 Myron D. Rumeld, and the law firm of Proskauer Rose, LLP) on the 12 ground of a conflict of interest. 13 argues that the Writers Guild of America owes duties to its 14 members, whereas the Producer-Writers Guild of America Pension Plan 15 owes duties to both Plan participants and their beneficiaries. 16 “The problem is that the Plan Directors . . . consist of ‘Employer 17 Directors and Union Directors collectively,’ all of which are 18 parties to the ‘collective bargaining agreement,’ whose primary 19 responsibilities are to Writers Guild or ‘Union’ members, not their 20 families.” 21 concurrent representation of both the Guilds and the Plan, have and 22 continue to operate under substantial conflict of interest in 23 attempting to represent the Guilds’ interests and incentives and 24 the Plan’s interests as fiduciaries owing the duty of disclosure 25 and preservation of pension benefits for Alternate Payees pursuant 26 to domestic relations orders. . . . Clearly, the interests of the 27 Guilds are divergent to those of the Plan. 28 juggle the interests of both the funding source of the pension plan (Williams Reply at 4.) 10 (Mot. to Strike at 3-5.) She “Counsel now claiming Counsel’s attempt to 1 and the Plan’s duties and responsibilities as fiduciaries, 2 constitutes a glaring conflict of interest.” 3 5.) (Williams Reply at 4- 4 Ms. Williams appears to be saying that Defendants have 5 conflicting interests and that the Plan, in particular, should be 6 representing her interests, rather than opposing them. 7 logic, however, it seems that there could be no case in which a 8 Plan beneficiary and a Plan were on opposing sides. 9 recognizes that Ms. Williams feels that the Plan is working against 10 her when it should be assisting her, but the court does not see any 11 grounds on which to disqualify Defendants’ counsel. By this The court 12 C. Motion for Reconsideration 13 The court has already rejected a preliminary injunction and 14 one motion for reconsideration, and Ms. Williams now presents no 15 previously unavailable facts or law. 16 to reconsider the Order Denying a Preliminary Injunction. 17 IV. CONCLUSION The court once again declines The court sympathizes with Ms. Williams in her long struggle 18 19 to obtain her child support payments. 20 parties’ submissions, the court must find that the state court 21 proceedings concern the same issues as those raised by Ms. Williams 22 in this court, that there is no basis to disqualify Defendants’ 23 counsel, and that there is no basis on which to reconsider the 24 denial of a preliminary injunction. 25 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 11 However, on the basis of the The court therefore GRANTS 1 Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motions. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 4 5 Dated: February 13, 2013 DEAN D. PREGERSON United States District Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12
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