Animal Legal Defense Fund et al v. United States Department of Agriculture et al, No. 2:2012cv04028 - Document 80 (C.D. Cal. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 67 AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 61 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II . (lc) . Modified on 12/14/2016 (lc).
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Animal Legal Defense Fund et al v. United States Department of Agriculture et al Doc. 80 O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 United States District Court Central District of California 8 9 10 11 12 13 ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND; SARAH EVANS; MICHELLE SCHURIG; CAROLINE LEE; FARM SANCTUARY; COMPASSION OVER KILLING; ANIMAL PROTECTION AND RESCUE LEAGUE, 14 Plaintiffs, 15 16 17 18 19 Case 2:12-cv-04028-ODW(PJWx) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [67] AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [61] v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; TOM VILSACK, Secretary of Agriculture; FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICES; and ALFRED V. ALMANZA, Deputy Under Secretary for Food Safety, 20 Defendants. 21 I. 22 This is an action for judicial review of a final agency decision under the 23 24 25 26 27 28 INTRODUCTION Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). In 2009, the Food Safety and Inspection Services (“FSIS”)—which administers the Poultry Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 451–72 (“PPIA”)—denied a rulemaking petition aimed at banning force-fed foie gras1 from the food supply. Plaintiffs, comprised of four animal rights organizations 1 That is, foie gras derived from the livers of force-fed poultry. Dockets.Justia.com 1 and three individuals, allege that FSIS’s denial of the petition was arbitrary, 2 capricious, and contrary to law because force-fed foie gras is clearly unfit for human 3 consumption. Defendants respond that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing, that the 4 PPIA does not protect the interests asserted by the animal rights organizations, and 5 that in any event FSIS acted within its discretion in denying the petition. Both parties 6 now move for summary judgment. 7 concludes that the animal rights organizations have standing to bring this action and 8 that their interests fall within the “zone” of interests protected by the PPIA, but that 9 Defendants did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary to law in denying the For the reasons discussed below, the Court 10 petition. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary 11 Judgment, and DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 61, 12 67.) II. 13 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 14 Foie gras is a luxury food product made from the liver of a duck or goose. 15 (Administrative Record (“AR”) at 138, ECF No. 18.) Before slaughter, the bird is 16 force-fed a special mix of food using a feeding tube (a process also known as gavage). 17 (AR at 143–45.) This causes a large buildup of fat in the bird’s liver, which gives the 18 product its signature taste. (Id.) 19 A. The Petition 20 On November 28, 2007, several individuals and animal rights organizations 21 (including some of the Plaintiffs in this action) petitioned FSIS to initiate rulemaking 22 “to exclude force-fed foie gras from the food supply as an adulterated and diseased 23 product that is ‘unsound, unhealthful, unwholesome, or otherwise unfit for human 24 food.’” (AR at 5 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 453(g)(3)).) The petitioners argued that (1) the 25 force-feeding process causes hepatic lipidosis in ducks and geese, rendering the birds 26 “unhealthful” under the PPIA, and (2) the consumption of force-fed foie gras may 27 trigger the onset of secondary amyloidosis in humans. (AR at 10–23.) The petitioners 28 state that hepatic lipidosis also causes “various secondary infections and illnesses” in 2 1 poultry, but they did not develop those points further. (AR at 17, 20, 21.) The 2 petition was accompanied by 65 exhibits, totaling 1150 pages. (AR at 32–1150.) On August 27, 2009, FSIS denied the petition. 3 (AR at 1547–48.) FSIS 4 acknowledged that one could characterize the livers of force-fed birds as affected by 5 hepatic lipidosis due to the buildup of excess fat in the liver. (AR at 1547.) However, 6 FSIS reasoned, unlike fat buildup resulting from disease, fat buildup resulting from a 7 “physiologic condition, i.e. the [purposeful] overwhelming of the hepatocyte’s ability 8 to process and export fat,” does not render the liver unsafe to consume. (Id.) FSIS 9 also found that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate a connection between 10 the consumption of force-fed foie gras and the onset of secondary amyloidosis in 11 humans. (AR at 1548.) FSIS explained that the one scientific study on which the 12 petitioners relied concerned only “the administration of amyloid to genetically 13 susceptible mice under experimental conditions,” and that “additional scientific study” 14 was required to show “the potential effect on human health of consuming amyloid.” 15 (Id.) 16 C. The Plaintiffs 17 1. Animal Rights Organizations 18 The four organizations bringing this action are Animal Legal Defense Fund 19 (“ALDF”), Farm Sanctuary, Compassion Over Killing, and Animal Protection and 20 Rescue League. ALDF “has spent over three decades focusing on issues involving 21 animals and the law,” and “its main focus is preventing animal cruelty and advancing 22 the protection of the interests of animals through the legal system.” (Wells Decl. ¶ 3, 23 ECF No. 61-1.) To this end, “ALDF advocates concerning the health consequences of 24 consuming animal products because the practices that exacerbate the harmful health 25 effects of consuming animal products are the same practices that greatly contribute to 26 animal cruelty in animal farming.” (Id. ¶ 5.) ALDF has spent resources “raising 27 awareness about the health effects on ducks being raised for foie gras and the human 28 health consequences of the force-feeding process,” including issuing press releases, 3 1 initiating letter-writing campaigns, and petitioning administrative agencies. (Id. ¶ 8; 2 see also id. ¶¶ 6, 7, 9–11.) According to ALDF, “had [it] not diverted these resources 3 to combat force-fed foie gras, it would have suffered a loss of credibility, support, and 4 organizational goodwill among its donors, its peers, and the legal community.” (Id. 5 ¶ 12.) The parties generally agree that Farm Sanctuary, Compassion Over Killing, 6 and Animal Protection and Rescue League are similarly situated to ALDF for standing 7 purposes. (See generally Defs.’ Opp’n at 12, 14 n.10, ECF No. 67; Pls.’ Stmt. of 8 Undisputed Facts 98, 101, ECF No. 61-6; Friedrich Decl., ECF No. 22-3 (Farm 9 Sanctuary); Meier Decl., ECF No. 61-3 (Compassion Over Killing); Pease Decl., ECF 10 No. 22-7 (Animal Protection and Rescue League).) 11 2. Individual Plaintiffs 12 The individual Plaintiffs in this action are Sarah Evans, Caroline Lee, and 13 Michelle Schurig. Evans previously consumed force-fed foie gras, but now “avoid[s]” 14 doing so “due to the cruelty involved in the force-feeding process and the nature of the 15 resulting diseased product.” (Evans Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 61-3.) Evans continues to 16 consume other types of duck and goose dishes, however, and is concerned that 17 restaurants may inadvertently serve her force-fed foie gras. (Id. ¶¶ 6–9.) Lee, like 18 Evans, also “avoid[s]” eating force-fed foie gras, and is likewise concerned about the 19 possibility of eating force-fed foie gras unknowingly; however, unlike Evans, it does 20 not appear that Lee has ever consumed foie gras. (Lee Decl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 61-4.) In 21 addition, Lee contends that she is genetically susceptible to developing secondary 22 amyloidosis,2 and is therefore worried that any inadvertent consumption of force-fed 23 foie gras “could increase [her] risk” of developing the disease. (Id. ¶¶ 5–9.) Finally, 24 Schurig, who previously ate force-fed foie gras but who is now a vegan, asserts that 25 she too is concerned that she will inadvertently consume foie gras at social events 26 “because [she is] not always fully informed about the ingredients of the dishes [she is] 27 28 2 Lee’s son was diagnosed with secondary amyloidosis. (Lee Decl. ¶ 5.) 4 1 served.” (Schurig Decl. ¶¶ 2, 6, ECF No. 61-5.) 2 D. Procedural History 3 In May 2012, Plaintiffs filed this action. (ECF No. 1.) In March 2013, the 4 Court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that an 5 agency’s decision not to initiate rulemaking was not subject to judicial review under 6 the APA. (ECF No. 45.) Plaintiffs appealed from the ensuing judgment. (ECF Nos. 7 46, 49.) In December 2015, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the denial of a 8 petition to initiate rulemaking is reviewable under the APA. Animal Legal Def. Fund 9 v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 632 F. App’x 905, 908 (9th Cir. 2015). Defendants argued on 10 appeal that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring this action, but the panel declined to 11 consider those arguments in the first instance. Id. Judge Chhabria, however, issued a 12 concurring opinion expressing skepticism that the animal rights organizations could 13 establish standing based solely on their “choice to spend money to counteract 14 challenged conduct germane to [their] mission.” 15 (emphasis in original). 16 judgment. (ECF Nos. 61, 67.) Those motions are now before the Court for decision. 17 Id. (Chhabria, J., concurring) Following remand, both parties moved for summary III. LEGAL STANDARD 18 A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 19 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 20 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Courts must view the facts and draw reasonable 21 inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 22 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). A disputed fact is “material” where the resolution of that fact 23 might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and the dispute is 24 “genuine” where “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 25 the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1968). 26 The district court “is not required to resolve any facts in a review of an 27 administrative proceeding”; rather, “the function of the district court is to determine 28 whether or not as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted 5 1 the agency to make the decision it did.” Occidental Eng’g Co. v. I.N.S., 753 F.2d 766, 2 769 (9th Cir. 1985). As a result, summary judgment is an appropriate vehicle for 3 deciding APA cases. Id. IV. 4 DISCUSSION 5 As previously noted, the parties raise three issues: (1) whether Plaintiffs have 6 Article III standing; (2) whether the interests of the animal rights organizations fall 7 within the zone of interests that the PPIA protects; and (3) whether the denial of the 8 petition was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. 9 A. Standing 10 Defendants argue that the organizational Plaintiffs assert only a generalized 11 grievance—i.e., general concern for animal welfare—and thus have not suffered a 12 cognizable injury. (Defs.’ Opp’n at 12–15, ECF No. 67.) Defendants also argue that 13 the individual Plaintiffs assert only speculative and hypothetical injuries, and thus 14 similarly lack standing. (Id. at 6–12.) The Court concludes that the organizations’ 15 injuries are sufficient to confer standing, but the individual Plaintiffs’ injuries are not. 16 The “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing is comprised of three 17 elements: (1) injury in fact; (2) causation; and (3) redressability. Lujan v. Defs. of 18 Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). “To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must 19 show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is 20 ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or 21 hypothetical.’” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (quoting Lujan, 22 504 U.S. at 560). For an injury to be “particularized,” it must have “affected the 23 plaintiff in a ‘personal and individualized way.’” Preminger v. Peake, 552 F.3d 757, 24 763 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Generalized grievances, which are harms of 25 an “abstract and indefinite nature,” do not provide a basis for standing. Novak v. 26 United States, 795 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2015). 27 particularized, however, the injury can be “minimal.” Preminger, 552 F.3d at 763. 28 “[A]n ‘identifiable trifle is enough to fight out a question of principle; the trifle is the 6 As long as the injury is 1 basis for standing and the principle provides the motivation.’” Council of Ins. Agents 2 & Brokers v. Molasky-Arman, 522 F.3d 925, 932 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United 3 States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 4 (1973)). “The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing 5 these elements.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 6 1. Animal Rights Organizations 7 An organization can assert standing under two theories: (1) in a representative 8 capacity, where there has been an injury to one or more of its members, Friends of the 9 Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000); or (2) on 10 its own behalf, where there has been an injury to the organization itself, Comite de 11 Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 943 (9th Cir. 12 2011) (en banc). The organizational Plaintiffs here assert only the second type of 13 standing. 14 An organization has standing on its own behalf if it can show (1) that the 15 defendant’s actions have frustrated its mission; and (2) that it has spent resources 16 counteracting that frustration. Id.; Fair Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 905 17 (9th Cir. 2002) (organization must show “a drain on its resources from both a 18 diversion of its resources and frustration of its mission”); El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. 19 v. Exec. Office of Immigration Review, 959 F.2d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The 20 allegation that the [defendant’s] policy frustrates [the organizations’] goals and 21 requires the organizations to expend resources [that] they otherwise would spend in 22 other ways is enough to establish standing.”). 23 established independent of the lawsuit filed by the plaintiff.” Comite de Jornaleros de 24 Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d at 943 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 25 Moreover, “[a]n organization ‘cannot manufacture the injury by . . . simply choosing 26 to spend money fixing a problem that otherwise would not affect the organization at 27 all. It must instead show that it would have suffered some other injury if it had not 28 diverted resources to counteracting the problem.’” Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 7 However, “standing must be 1 F.3d 1006, 1018 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting La Asociacion de Trabajadores de Lake 2 Forest v. City of Lake Forest, 624 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2010)). 3 The Court concludes that ALDF meets both requirements. ALDF’s mission is 4 to prevent animal cruelty, which includes eradicating the practice of force-feeding 5 poultry. (Wells Decl. ¶¶ 3, 8.) FSIS frustrated ALDF’s mission by declining to 6 initiate rulemaking that would ban force-fed foie gras from the food supply in the 7 United States, which in turn would have dramatically reduced the market for force-fed 8 poultry. 9 practice, including writing press releases and initiating letter-writing campaigns to 10 educate the public about the danger to both human and animal health of force-feeding 11 poultry, and filing other administrative petitions aimed at banning the practice. (See 12 Wells Decl. ¶¶ 6–11.) This forced ALDF to continue expending resources to counteract the 13 Defendants make two main counterarguments. First, Defendants contend that 14 the denial of the petition did not “force” ALDF to expend resources taking on the 15 force-fed foie gras industry; rather, ALDF simply chose to spend money to combat a 16 problem that would otherwise not affect it in a personalized way. (Defs.’ Opp’n at 17 13–15.) However, as both the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have made clear, the 18 frustration of an organization’s mission is the personalized injury that “forces” the 19 organization to spend money to alleviate the frustration; an organization is only 20 “choosing” to spend money if the defendant’s conduct “does not affect the 21 organization at all.” See Valle del Sol, 732 F.3d at 1018; see also, e.g., Havens Realty 22 Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378–79 (1982) (organization whose purpose was to 23 ensure equal housing opportunity had standing to sue the owner of an apartment 24 complex for racial steering, because the steering practices “frustrated [the 25 organization’s] efforts to [provide] counseling and referral services” to prospective 26 tenants and required it to “devote significant resources to identify and counteract the 27 defendant’s racially discriminatory steering practices”); Valle del Sol, 732 F.3d at 28 1018 (organization offering transportation to undocumented immigrants had standing 8 1 to challenge a law that criminalized such conduct, because the law would deter its 2 volunteers and because it had diverted resources to educate its members about the 3 law); Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d at 943 (organization that 4 supported day laborers had standing to challenge a law banning the congregation of 5 day laborers in the street, because the law frustrated the organization’s mission to 6 make known laborers’ availability to work and because it spent resources educating 7 laborers about the law); Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. 8 Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 2012) (organization whose 9 purpose was to combat illegal housing discrimination had standing to sue for housing 10 discrimination, because discrimination frustrated the organization’s goal and thus 11 forced it to spend resources on an education and outreach campaign to counteract the 12 defendant’s discriminatory conduct); Fair Hous. of Marin, 285 F.3d at 905 (same). 13 While the “loss of credibility, support and organizational goodwill”3 that ALDF 14 purportedly would suffer if it decided not to expend such resources may supply 15 additional reasons why ALDF was “forced” to do so, the frustration of its mission is 16 alone sufficient to show that it was not a choice. 17 Second, Defendants argue that the denial of the petition does not truly 18 “frustrate” ALDF’s mission, because the practice of force-feeding poultry is only one 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 Loss of donor support is unquestionably an Article III injury. See ACLU of Idaho, Inc. v. City of Boise, 998 F. Supp. 2d 908, 914 (D. Idaho 2014). Moreover, despite Defendants’ argument to the contrary, it appears that reputational loss can also constitute an Article III injury. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 475 (1987) (“[T]he need to take such affirmative steps to avoid the risk of harm to his reputation constitutes a cognizable injury in the course of his communication with the public.”); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014) (“Lexmark does not deny that Static Control’s allegations of lost sales and damage to its business reputation give it standing under Article III to press its false-advertising claim, and we are satisfied that they do.”); Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 1124 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001); Foretich v. United States, 351 F.3d 1198, 1211–12 (D.C. Cir. 2003); but see Jackson v. Cal. Dep’t of Mental Health, 399 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005). And even if it is not certain that these harms would actually and immediately befall ALDF, the Court need not necessarily discount them entirely. See Hall v. Norton, 266 F.3d 969, 976 (9th Cir. 2001) (where a plaintiff is asserting “procedural rights, our inquiry into the imminence of the threatened harm is less demanding”). 9 1 of the myriad animal welfare threats that ALDF seeks to eradicate. (Defs.’ Reply at 2 5–6.) 3 substantial part of ALDF’s mission; indeed, ALDF has spent “over a decade . . . 4 pursu[ing] petitions, campaigns, lawsuits, and outreach efforts to address force-fed 5 foie gras.” (Wells Decl. ¶ 6.) Thus, any substantial setback to ALDF’s goal of 6 eliminating force-fed foie gras—which, as discussed, FSIS’s denial of the petition 7 is—is fairly characterized as “frustrating” its mission, even if that is only one of 8 several goals pursued by ALDF. The Court disagrees. Fighting force-fed foie gras clearly constitutes a 9 Finally, as both parties generally agree, Farm Sanctuary, Compassion Over 10 Killing, and Animal Protection and Rescue League are similarly situated to ALDF in 11 all material respects. (Friedrich Decl. ¶¶ 3–9, 11, 12 (Farm Sanctuary); Meier Decl. 12 ¶¶ 3–8 (Compassion Over Killing); Pease Decl. ¶¶ 2–10 (Animal Protection and 13 Rescue League).) For these reasons, the organizational Plaintiffs have standing to 14 bring this action. 15 2. Individual Plaintiffs 16 The individual Plaintiffs, however, do not have standing. The Supreme Court 17 has held that where, like here, a plaintiff relies only on threatened future injury (as 18 opposed to a past or present injury), the “‘threatened injury must be certainly 19 impending to constitute injury in fact.’” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 20 1138, 1147 (2013) (citations omitted). “‘Allegations of possible future injury,’” on 21 the other hand, are insufficient. Id. (citations omitted). Here, the individual Plaintiffs’ 22 assertions of possible future injury are far too remote and speculative to confer 23 standing. There is no evidence before the Court that consuming force-fed foie gras 24 causes immediate injury to the consumer, and there is little, if any, evidence that it 25 appreciably increases one’s chance of developing disease over time. Even if the Court 26 credited the conclusions in the Solomon Study (see infra Section IV.C.3.ii), that study 27 found at most that repeated consumption of foie gras over time may increase the risk 28 of triggering secondary amyloidosis in genetically susceptible persons. Neither Evans 10 1 nor Schurig are genetically predisposed to developing secondary amyloidosis, and 2 thus the Court is at a loss as to what injury could befall them from eating force-fed 3 foie gras. And while Lee may have more reason to be concerned given her genetic 4 susceptibility, there is still no concrete evidence that foie gras will “certainly” increase 5 her risk of developing secondary amyloidosis. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147. On top of 6 this, each of them now actively avoids eating foie gras, thus greatly reducing (if not 7 eliminating) the likelihood that any of them will ever consume the product again. 8 Plaintiffs’ concern that they may one day inadvertently consume foie gras—despite 9 their attempts to avoid it—is plainly insufficient to convert their feared future injury 10 from “remote and speculative” to “certainly impending.” Id. 11 B. Zone of Interest Test 12 Defendants contend that the PPIA is concerned solely with human welfare, and 13 thus the organizational Plaintiffs’ concern for animal welfare falls outside the zone of 14 interests that the PPIA protects. (Defs.’ Opp’n at 15–17.) Defendants also argue that 15 the Court should discount any tangential concern those organizations may have for 16 human welfare, which derives solely from their concern for animal welfare. (Id.) The 17 Court is unpersuaded. 18 The Supreme Court has held that “a person suing under the APA must satisfy 19 not only Article III’s standing requirements, but an additional test: [t]he interest he 20 asserts must be ‘arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by 21 the statute’ that he says was violated.” 22 Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (2012) (quoting Ass’n of Data 23 Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)).4 “That question 24 requires [the court] to determine the meaning of the congressionally enacted provision 25 26 27 28 4 Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Defendants erroneously label this test as a “prudential standing” inquiry. Lexmark Int’l, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 (“‘[P]rudential standing’ is a misnomer as applied to the zone-of-interests analysis, which asks whether ‘this particular class of persons has a right to sue under this substantive statute.’” (quoting Ass’n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.3d 667, 675–76 (2013) (Silberman, J., concurring))). 11 1 creating a cause of action. In doing so, [the court] appl[ies] traditional principles of 2 statutory interpretation.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 3 S. Ct. 1377, 1388 (2014). 4 As the word “arguably” indicates, the inquiry “‘is not meant to be especially 5 demanding.’” Id. (quoting Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987)). 6 “[T]here does not have to be an ‘indication of congressional purpose to benefit the 7 would-be plaintiff.’” Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 522 8 U.S. 479, 492 (1998) (quoting Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399). Rather, “[t]he test forecloses 9 suit only when a plaintiff’s ‘interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with 10 the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress 11 intended to permit the suit.’” Pottawatomi Indians, 132 S. Ct. at 2210. The test is 12 particularly lenient in APA cases, where there is a “presumption in favor of judicial 13 review of agency action.” Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399; Lexmark Int’l, 134 S. Ct. at 1389; 14 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997) (“[W]hat comes within the zone of 15 interests of a statute for purposes of obtaining judicial review of administrative action 16 under the ‘generous review provisions’ of the APA may not do so for other 17 purposes.”). As a result, “the benefit of any doubt goes to the plaintiff.” Pottawatomi 18 Indians, 132 S. Ct. at 2210. 19 Defendants are correct that the PPIA is primarily concerned with the effect of 20 “adulterated” and improperly labeled poultry products on human welfare and the 21 poultry production industry. 22 misbranded poultry products impair the effective regulation of poultry products in 23 interstate or foreign commerce, are injurious to the public welfare, destroy markets for 24 wholesome, not adulterated, and properly labeled and packaged poultry products, and 25 result in sundry losses to poultry producers and processors of poultry and poultry 26 products, as well as injury to consumers.”); id. § 452 (the PPIA aims “to prevent the 27 movement or sale in interstate or foreign commerce of, or the burdening of such 28 commerce by, poultry products which are adulterated or misbranded”). But even FSIS 29 U.S.C. § 451 (“Unwholesome, adulterated, or 12 1 has recognized that animal welfare is a relevant concern under the PPIA, for an animal 2 that is unfit for human consumption is often itself unhealthy or has been treated 3 inhumanely. See Treatment of Live Poultry Before Slaughter, 70 Fed. Reg. 56,624- 4 01, 56,624 (Sept. 28, 2005) (“The Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) is 5 reminding all poultry slaughter establishments that, under the Poultry Products 6 Inspection Act (PPIA) and Agency regulations, live poultry must be handled in a 7 manner that is consistent with good commercial practices, which means they should 8 be treated humanely. . . . [U]nder the PPIA, poultry products are more likely to be 9 adulterated if, among other circumstances, they are produced from birds that have not 10 been treated humanely . . . .”); AR at 1547 (FSIS noting that diseased bird livers may 11 be unfit for human consumption). Thus, the animal rights organizations’ concern for 12 animal welfare “arguably” falls within the zone interests that the PPIA protects, Ass’n 13 of Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153, at least to the extent that the animal welfare issue 14 impacts human health. Moreover, for the same reason, the Court cannot wholly 15 discount the organizations’ concern for human welfare just because it is driven by 16 concern for animal welfare—and there is no question that human welfare falls 17 squarely within the PPIA’s zone of interest. The organizations therefore satisfy the 18 zone of interest test. 19 C. Merits 20 1. Standard of Review 21 When a petitioner seeks judicial review of final agency action, “[t]he reviewing 22 court shall hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found 23 to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 24 law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). “To determine whether an agency violated the arbitrary 25 and capricious standard, this court must determine whether the agency articulated a 26 rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Arizona Cattle 27 Growers’ Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife, Bureau of Land Mgmt., 273 F.3d 1229, 1236 28 (9th Cir. 2001). The agency may not “rel[y] on factors which Congress has not 13 1 intended it to consider, entirely fail[] to consider an important aspect of the problem, 2 [or] offer[] an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the 3 agency[] or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the 4 product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm 5 Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Thus, the Court cannot “consider reasons 6 for agency action which were not before the agency.” Id. 7 That said, judicial review of an agency’s denial of a rulemaking petition is 8 “‘extremely limited’ and ‘highly deferential.’” Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 9 527–28 (2007) (quoting Nat’l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. 10 United States, 883 F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989)); Cellnet Commc’n, Inc. v. F.C.C., 11 965 F.2d 1106, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“[A]n agency’s refusal to initiate a rulemaking 12 is evaluated with a deference so broad as to make the process akin to non- 13 reviewability.”). There are two reasons for this, both of which apply here. First, the 14 decision whether to initiate rulemaking is inextricably intertwined with decisions on 15 agency priorities, Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n, Inc. v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987), 16 and an agency always “has broad discretion to choose how best to marshal its limited 17 resources and personnel to carry out its delegated responsibilities.” Massachusetts, 18 549 U.S. at 527 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 19 837, 842–45 (1984)). Second, the decision typically involves “a high level of agency 20 expertise,” Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n, 812 F.2d at 4, and a reviewing court must give 21 substantial deference to “scientific judgments and technical analyses [that are] within 22 the agency’s expertise.” Lands Council v. McNair, 629 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 23 2010); see also The Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir. 2008) (en 24 banc) (it is “not the proper role” of the court to “act as a panel of scientists that 25 instructs the [agency] how to validate its hypotheses” or “choose[] among scientific 26 studies,” or to “order[] the agency to explain every possible scientific uncertainty”). 27 “[A]n agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own 28 qualified experts even if, as an original matter, a court might find contrary views more 14 1 persuasive.” Marsh v. Oregon Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989). 2 2. The PPIA 3 The PPIA “provide[s] for the inspection of . . . and otherwise regulate[s] the 4 processing and distribution” of poultry and poultry products to prevent “adulterated or 5 misbranded” poultry from entering the food supply. See 21 U.S.C. § 452. The PPIA 6 prohibits the sale of “dead, dying, disabled, or diseased poultry,” id. § 460(d), and 7 requires any “poultry products found to be adulterated [to] be condemned,” id. 8 § 455(c). 9 “adulterated,” including “if it consists in whole or in part of any filthy, putrid, or 10 decomposed substance or is for any other reason unsound, unhealthful, unwholesome, 11 or otherwise unfit for human food.” 12 products must be “supported by scientific fact, information, or criteria.” Id. § 452. 13 The Secretary of Agriculture has the authority to promulgate rules and regulations “as 14 are necessary to carry out the provisions of [the PPIA],” id. § 463(b), which the 15 Secretary has in turn delegated to FSIS, 9 C.F.R. § 300.2(a), (b)(2). There are several grounds on which a poultry product is considered Id. § 453(g)(3). Condemnation of poultry 16 3. 17 Plaintiffs challenge FSIS’s decision on three grounds: (1) its explanation for 18 why hepatic lipidosis does not render the liver unfit for human consumption is 19 “nonsensical and irrational”; (2) its conclusion that there was insufficient evidence of 20 a connection between consumption of force-fed foie gras and the onset of secondary 21 amyloidosis in humans “ran counter to the evidence before it”; and (3) FSIS entirely 22 failed to consider other bases purportedly included in the petition that support a 23 finding that foie gras is unfit for human consumption.5 24 25 26 27 28 Analysis 5 Plaintiffs object to portions of two declarations that Defendants submit in support of their motion for summary judgment, on the basis that judicial review under the APA is generally limited to the administrative record. Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1450 (9th Cir. 1996). Defendants contend that the declarations simply explain technical terms and complex subject matter, and thus are admissible. Id.; cf. Pub. Citizen v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 573 F.3d 916, 928 (9th Cir. 2009) (an agency “‘may act not only on the basis of the comments received in response to its notice of rule making, but also upon the basis of information available in its own files, and upon the knowledge and expertise of the agency’” (quoting Siegel v. 15 i. 1 Hepatic Lipidosis 2 Plaintiffs argue that FSIS gives a “nonsensical and irrational” explanation for 3 why fatty livers caused by disease are unfit for human consumption, but livers 4 fattened through force-feeding are not. (Pls.’ Mot. at 19–21, 23–25, ECF No. 61.) 5 First, they contend that the logic behind FSIS’s reasoning is scientifically unsound. 6 (Id.) 7 distinguish between the causes of particular physiologic states (such as hepatic 8 lipidosis). (Id.) The Court disagrees. Second, they contend that neither the PPIA nor the relevant regulations 9 As noted above, the Court must defer to an agency’s scientific judgments. FSIS 10 reasoned that although force-fed livers contain excess fat and thus could be 11 characterized as affected by hepatic lipidosis, it is not a diseased or otherwise 12 dangerous product because liver fattening is the normal and expected physiologic 13 response to force-feeding.6 (AR at 1547; Thaler Decl. ¶¶ 26, 38–40, ECF No. 26-1.) 14 FSIS contrasted this with hepatic lipidosis resulting from a disease process, which 15 often causes—in addition to fat build up—inflammation, hemorrhaging, and a buildup 16 of fibrin in the liver tissue, and which FSIS concedes would be a basis for condemning 17 the bird. (AR at 1547; Thaler Decl. ¶¶ 25, 26.) This explanation appears eminently 18 reasonable, not “nonsensical and irrational,” and is supported by both the 19 administrative record and the agency’s own scientists. (See also AR at 1154–59, 20 1540–41.) While Plaintiffs strenuously argue that this is not a scientifically valid 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Atomic Energy Comm’n, 400 F.2d 778, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1968))). As to Thaler’s declaration, the Court holds that the testimony relating to septicemia and toxemia does not merely explain the scientific background behind the reasons in the denial, but attempts to provide entirely new grounds for denying the petition. Thus, the Court sustains the objection to this testimony. However, the Court overrules Plaintiffs’ remaining objections to the Thaler declaration. As to Hafner’s declaration, the Court holds that it simply explains the science behind FSIS’s analysis of the Solomon Study, and shows that the agency adequately considered the scientific issues presented by the study. The Court thus overrules Plaintiffs’ objections to his declaration. 6 The bird is typically slaughtered before the fat deposits overwhelm the liver’s ability to function. (Thaler Decl. ¶ 40.) 16 1 distinction, the Court is required to credit the agency’s scientific conclusions over 2 Plaintiffs’ where, like here, the agency’s reasoning is not totally implausible. 3 Plaintiffs’ argument that the distinction is without basis in the statutory and 4 regulatory scheme fares no better, because this is a classic case in which the Court 5 should give Chevron and Auer deference to the agency’s interpretation of the relevant 6 statutes and regulations, respectively. 7 condemnation of poultry be based on “scientific fact, information, or criteria,” and 8 that such condemnation be achieved “through uniform inspection standards and 9 uniform applications thereof.” 21 U.S.C. § 452. Despite this, the PPIA and its 10 implementing regulations are filled with broad and ambiguous phrases describing the 11 bases for condemning poultry or removing it from commerce. Indeed, § 453(g)(3) 12 alone contains seven such words: “filthy,” “putrid,” “decomposed,” “unsound,” 13 “unhealthful,” “unwholesome,” and “unfit.” The implementing regulations contain 14 only slightly less broadly worded phrases, such as “abnormal physiologic state,” 9 15 C.F.R. § 381.83, “affected by an inflammatory process,” and “general systemic 16 disturbance,” id. § 381.86. 17 scientific judgments necessary to determine which physiologic conditions render a 18 bird “unsound” or “unwholesome” and thus in need of condemnation—to say nothing 19 of the inability of hundreds of district courts and twelve circuit courts to achieve a 20 uniform standard for such determinations. As a result, it is a virtual certainty that 21 Congress intended FSIS to supply the “scientific fact, information, [and] criteria” that 22 gives meaning and substance these otherwise hopelessly ambiguous statutory phrases, 23 and to achieve the “uniform application[]” of these standards. 21 U.S.C. § 452. The PPIA explicitly requires that the The courts are obviously ill-equipped to make the 24 Here, there is nothing in the PPIA or the implementing regulations that renders 25 FSIS’s distinction between causes of hepatic lipidosis unreasonable. Plaintiffs point, 26 for example, to the requirement that FSIS condemn any poultry carcass that “show[s] 27 evidence of an abnormal physiologic state,” 9 C.F.R. § 381.83, and argue that the 28 phrase “abnormal physiologic state” precludes any consideration of what causes that 17 1 state. (Pls.’ Mot. at 19–21.) However, this is far from the only reasonable 2 interpretation of this phrase; indeed, the cause of the physiologic state may be exactly 3 what makes it “abnormal.” (See Thaler Decl. ¶ 39 (“[A]bnormal physiology is the 4 term used to describe situations where one or more steps in th[e] complex web of 5 interacting body functions is not working as expected.”); ¶ 40 (“Fat storage is a liver 6 function that is normal physiology.”).) Similarly, the Court sees nothing inherent in 7 the word “diseased,” 21 U.S.C. § 460(d), that requires FSIS to totally disregard the 8 cause of a physiologic state as a basis for condemnation (or, in this case, non- 9 condemnation). 10 Finally, Plaintiffs point to a regulation enacted under the Federal Meat 11 Inspection Act that requires FSIS to condemn “all carcasses showing signs of . . . fatty 12 and degenerated liver,” 9 C.F.R. § 311.16 (emphasis added), and argue that this 13 discredits FSIS’s attempt to distinguish here between the causes of fatty livers as a 14 basis for condemnation. See Kenney v. Glickman, 96 F.3d 1118, 1124 (8th Cir. 1996) 15 (“The legislative history of the two Acts and subsequent amendments indicate a 16 congressional intent to construe the PPIA and the FMIA consistently.”). This is 17 unpersuasive. Section 311.16 requires that the liver be both “fatty and degenerated” 18 before being condemned; the regulation does not, as Plaintiffs suggest, categorically 19 mandate the destruction of all carcasses with excess fat in the liver. Plaintiffs also 20 give no reason why the cause of the fatty liver should not inform whether the liver is 21 “degenerated.”7 Thus, Plaintiffs’ argument fails. For these reasons, the Court concludes that FSIS acted within its discretion in 22 23 rejecting the petitioners’ arguments concerning hepatic lipidosis. 24 /// 25 26 27 28 7 And if a fatty liver was per se a degenerated state, there would be no need to separately require that the liver be both “fatty” and “degenerated.” Cf. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 622 (5th Cir. 2013) (“In construing a statute, a court should give effect, if possible, to every word and every provision Congress used.”) 18 ii. 1 Secondary Amyloidosis 2 Plaintiffs again attack the scientific reasoning, and the underlying statutory and 3 regulatory constructions, behind FSIS’s conclusion that the study petitioners presented 4 to FSIS (“Solomon Study”) did not show a connection between human consumption 5 of foie gras and the onset of secondary amyloidosis. (Pls.’ Mot. at 23–25; Pls.’ Opp’n 6 at 22–25.) 7 interpretations are rational. And, once again, the Court concludes that FSIS’s conclusions and 8 FSIS provided a reasonable scientific explanation for its position. FSIS found 9 that the Solomon Study did not evidence any connection between human consumption 10 of foie gras and the onset of secondary amyloidosis because: (1) the experiments in 11 the study were performed on mice, not humans, and humans are less susceptible than 12 mice to developing secondary amyloidosis; (2) the mice were genetically engineered 13 to have a pre-existing inflammatory process, making them even more susceptible to 14 developing secondary amyloidosis; (3) the mice that developed secondary amyloidosis 15 were injected or fed with “purified and concentrated amyloid fibrils extracted from 16 foie gras,” and that the removal of the fat from foie gras “could have altered how a 17 normal stomach . . . would have handled the ingestion”; (4) the authors of the study 18 themselves never concluded that the study evidences a definite connection in healthy 19 humans between eating foie gras and developing secondary amyloidosis, only that “it 20 would seem prudent” for those genetically susceptible to developing secondary 21 amyloidosis to “avoid” eating foie gras; and (5) the study’s theory that persons with 22 diabetes and Alzheimers may also be at an increased risk of developing secondary 23 amyloidosis after consuming foie gras was speculative and not even tested in the 24 study. (AR at 1548; Hafner Decl. ¶¶ 2–16.)8 Plaintiffs make conclusory assertions 25 that these reasons are irrational, but give no concrete reason why they are outside the 26 8 27 28 “[A] district court [may] consider extra-record evidence to develop a background against which it can evaluate the integrity of the agency’s analysis.” San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Locke, 776 F.3d 971, 993 (9th Cir. 2014). 19 1 realm of scientific possibility. Instead, Plaintiffs simply highlight the study’s findings 2 about the link between foie gras and secondary amyloidosis in mice, and then state 3 that this should be enough for FSIS to conclude that foie gras is also “unhealthful” for 4 humans to consume. This is insufficient under the deferential standard of review for 5 denials of rulemaking petitions. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378. 6 Plaintiffs also argue that it is irrational for FSIS “to (a) conclude that further 7 study is necessary to ascertain human health risks of foie gras, yet (b) permit that 8 product to enter the human food supply.” (Pls.’ Opp’n at 24; see also id. at 21 (“The 9 PPIA nowhere mentions a ‘wait-and-see’ approach to a diseased and adulterated 10 poultry product that may be unsafe for human health.”).) At bottom, this is a question 11 of statutory construction: does the PPIA require FSIS to remove from the food supply 12 any poultry product where it has not affirmatively ruled out any possible threat to 13 human health, or does the agency have the discretion evaluate the likelihood and 14 seriousness of the threat before banning the product? 15 The Court finds Plaintiffs’ absolutist approach untenable. As previously noted, 16 the statutory scheme taken as a whole clearly points to affording FSIS discretion in 17 carrying out the PPIA’s objectives, which must include reasonable discretion as to the 18 quantum of evidence needed before taking agency action as drastic as banning a food 19 product entirely from the market.9 In other words, FSIS must have the discretion to 20 determine what type and amount of scientific evidence crosses the threshold from 21 scientific possibility to “scientific fact.” 21 U.S.C. § 452 (emphasis added). Indeed, 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9 The only language that Plaintiffs point to for support is the PPIA’s statement of Congressional purpose, which expresses that the PPIA was enacted to “assur[e]” that poultry products are not adulterated. 21 U.S.C. § 451. However, as with their other arguments, Plaintiffs appear to rely exclusively on the dictionary definition of the term “assure” without considering the context in which the word is used (including that this phrase is a statement of general congressional intent, not an affirmative command regarding specific action FSIS must take), and its place in the broader statutory scheme. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (“[W]hen deciding whether the language is plain, we must read the words in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme. Our duty, after all, is to construe statutes, not isolated provisions.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 20 1 if Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the PPIA were the rule, it would force FSIS to initiate 2 rulemakings to ban and unban a poultry product every time any study came out that 3 even touched on the health implications of the product. 4 destabilize the entire poultry market, it would wreak havoc on FSIS’s resources. That 5 cannot possibly be what Congress envisioned. iii. 6 Not only would this Other Bases 7 Finally, Plaintiffs list a number of other conditions that the force-feeding 8 process apparently produces,10 and contend that FSIS wholly failed to address why 9 those conditions did not warrant initiating the requested rulemaking. Defendants 10 respond that these other conditions are merely animal welfare issues that FSIS 11 “properly ignored.” 12 explaining why those conditions do not warrant a different outcome. The Court 13 concludes that FSIS’s failure to address these specific issues does not warrant 14 remanding the matter to the agency, but for a different reason: the petitioners did not 15 adequately preserve the issue for judicial review. However, Defendants also provide two expert declarations 16 “It is a hard and fast rule of administrative law, rooted in simple fairness, that 17 issues not raised before an agency are waived and will not be considered by a court on 18 review.” Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 373 F.3d 1251, 1297 (D.C. 19 Cir. 2004); see also Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 807 F.2d 759, 767–68 (9th 20 Cir. 1986); Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 606 F.3d 21 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2010); cf. Appalachian Power Co. v. E.P.A., 251 F.3d 1026, 1036 22 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“‘[A] party must initially present its comments to the agency during 23 the rulemaking in order for the court to consider the issue.’” (quoting Tex Tin Corp. v. 24 25 26 27 28 10 Plaintiffs contend that FSIS failed to address the fact that force-fed birds: (1) exhibit systemic inflammatory processes including arthritis and bacterial infections; (2) suffer from an abnormal physiologic state, caused by the liver expanding to 6 to 10 times its original size, restricting the birds’ ability to move and breathe; (3) are unable to walk due to liver enlargement and use of nutritionally deficient feed; (4) are dying because of the ailments caused by force-feeding; (5) suffer from septicemia, including due to the presence of E. Coli and other bacteria; and (6) suffer from toxemia, i.e., the presence toxins in the blood due to the failing liver. (Pls.’ Mot. at 22.) 21 1 EPA, 935 F.2d 1321, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1991))). “An agency cannot be faulted for 2 failing to address such issues that were not raised by petitioners.” Appalachian Power 3 Co., 251 F.3d at 1036; Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety v. Fed. Motor Carrier 4 Safety Admin., 429 F.3d 1136, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he role of the court is to 5 determine whether the agency’s decision is arbitrary and capricious for want of 6 reasoned decisionmaking. Therefore, it is unsurprising that parties rarely are allowed 7 to seek ‘review’ of a substantive claim that has never even been presented to the 8 agency for its consideration.” (citations omitted)). Moreover, “[g]eneralized 9 objections to agency action . . . will not do. [Instead, a]n objection must be made with 10 sufficient specificity reasonably to alert the agency.” Appalachian Power Co., 251 11 F.3d at 1036. 12 Here, Plaintiffs did not adequately raise in their administrative petition the other 13 issues that they now contend could form a basis for initiating the rulemaking. The 25- 14 page petition focused on two points: that “force-feeding induces liver disease [i.e., 15 hepatic lipidosis] in ducks and geese” (AR at 14); and that consumption of foie gras 16 could lead to secondary amyloidosis in humans (AR at 22–24). The petitioners made 17 passing references to other ailments that the force-feeding process could cause (most 18 of which were simply secondary to hepatic lipidosis), and did not mention any of the 19 myriad regulations which Plaintiffs now cite. (AR at 17, 20, 21.) This cannot be 20 fairly construed to “alert the agency” that each secondary ailment was a substantive 21 and independent basis for the petition. Appalachian Power Co., 251 F.3d at 1036. 22 For example, Plaintiffs now make much of the fact that the force-feeding process can 23 cause toxemia or septicemia, yet the petitioners did not mention either condition in the 24 petition or cite the relevant regulation (9 C.F.R. § 381.83). While this and the other 25 issues may have been lurking somewhere in the 1,150 pages of exhibits that 26 petitioners submitted to FSIS, the Court can hardly fault FSIS for not scouring the 27 exhibits and addressing possible issues that Plaintiffs would later deem important 28 enough to ferret out on judicial review. See Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety, 22 1 429 F.3d at 1150 (“[A] rulemaking cannot be found wanting simply because an 2 agency fails to address every alternative ‘thought conceivable by the mind of man.’” 3 (citation omitted)); McNair, 537 F.3d at 988 (the agency need not “explain every 4 possible scientific uncertainty”). V. 5 CONCLUSION 6 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for 7 Summary Judgment (ECF No. 67), and DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary 8 Judgment (ECF No. 61). 9 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 12 December 14, 2016 13 14 15 ____________________________________ OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 23
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
