Stephen Prince v. Michael J Astrue, No. 2:2011cv09576 - Document 22 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER by Magistrate Judge Marc L. Goldman GRANTING MOTION for Attorney Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 2412 19 . (twdb)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 WESTERN DIVISION 9 10 STEPHEN PRINCE, Plaintiff, 11 12 13 14 v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, 15 Defendant. 16 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 11-9576-MLG MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF S MOTION FOR EAJA ATTORNEY FEES 17 18 On August 1, 2012, the Court entered an Opinion and Order reversing 19 the Commissioner s decision denying Plaintiff s applications for Social 20 Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income benefits, 21 and remanded the case for further administrative proceedings. On October 22 2, 2012, Plaintiff filed a motion for award of attorney fees pursuant to 23 the Equal Access to Justice Act ( EAJA ), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 et. seq. 24 Plaintiff seeks an award in a total amount of $5,636.57, which 25 consists of the following: (1) $505.65 for work on the merits of the 26 case in 2011, which represents 2.8 hours of attorney time at $180.59 per 27 hour; (2) $4660.74 for work on the merits of the case in 2012, which 28 represents 25.2 hours of attorney time at $184.95 per hour; and (3) 1 $520.18 for preparation of the reply memorandum, which represents 2.8 2 hours of attorney time at a rate of $185.78 per hour. The total number 3 of hours for which Plaintiff is seeking attorney fees is 30.8. 4 The Commissioner opposes Plaintiff s application for attorney fees, 5 arguing that the government s position was substantially justified, , 6 precluding 7 Alternatively, the Commissioner argues that the number of hours expended 8 are excessive and requests that the Court reduce the number of hours. 9 (Def. s Opp. at 1.) any award of fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). 10 Having considered the motion for attorney fees, the Commissioner s 11 opposition, and the reply, as well as the records and pleadings, the 12 Court 13 administrative hearing constitutes a favorable decision and that the 14 Commissioner s position was not substantially justified. Accordingly, 15 Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees. In 16 addition, the Court concludes that the number of hours for which counsel 17 seeks reimbursement is reasonable, and therefore the Court declines to 18 reduce the number of hours sought by counsel. finds that the remand of Plaintiff s claim for a new 19 20 21 II. Discussion A. Plaintiff Is Entitled to Attorney Fees As the Prevailing Party 22 Because 23 Justified the Government s Position Was Not Substantially 24 The EAJA provides that a court may award reasonable attorney fees, 25 court costs and other expenses to the prevailing party unless the court 26 finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified 27 or that special circumstances make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 28 2412(d)(1)(A); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988); Lewis v. 2 1 Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2002). The term position of 2 the United States means, in addition to the position taken by the 3 United States in the civil action, the action or failure to act by the 4 agency upon which the civil action is based. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D). 5 A position is substantially justified if it has a reasonable basis in 6 law and fact. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565. The government has the burden of 7 proving its positions were substantially justified. Flores v. Shalala, 8 49 F.3d 562, 569 (9th Cir. 1995). However, the mere fact that a court 9 reversed and remanded a case for further proceedings does not raise a 10 presumption that [the government s] position was not substantially 11 justified. Kali v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 329, 335 (9th Cir. 1988.) 12 Here, judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff, remanding the 13 case for further administrative proceedings because the Administrative 14 Law Judge ( ALJ ) erred by failing to give appropriate weight to the 15 opinion of Plaintiff s treating physician and by failing to provide 16 legally sufficient reasons for finding Plaintiff not fully credible. 17 The Court found that the ALJ s reasons for failing to accord 18 controlling weight to the opinion of Plaintiff s treating physician, Dr. 19 Bhat, 20 contention, there were medical records showing that Plaintiff did in 21 fact have severe spinal stenosis and had received injections for pain; 22 (2) Plaintiff s history of relatively conservative treatment was based 23 upon his inability to pay for more aggressive treatment; (3) Plaintiff s 24 ability to watch television in a reclining position did not undermine 25 Dr. Bhat s finding that Plaintiff could not perform a job that required 26 watching a video screen; and (4) the fact that Dr. Bhat was an 27 internist, rather than an orthopaedic specialist, did not, without more, 28 constitute a reason for rejecting a treating physician s opinion. The were unsupported by the record: 3 (1) contrary to the ALJ s 1 Commissioner argued that these were sufficient reasons for rejecting Dr. 2 Bhat s opinion, a position which is not substantially justified. 3 Flores, 49 F.3d at 570. 4 The Court also found that the ALJ s reasons for rejecting 5 Plaintiff s subjective pain and symptom testimony, that Plaintiff had 6 received only conservative treatment and that his activities of daily 7 living 8 supported by substantial evidence in the record. As noted above, 9 Plaintiff did receive injections for pain but was unable to afford more 10 extensive treatment, which has been found to be a good reason for 11 failure to seek treatment. The Court also noted that Plaintiff s limited 12 ability 13 considerable pain afterward, was an insufficient reason to discredit his 14 testimony. The Commissioner contended that these were sufficient reasons 15 to discredit Plaintiff s subjective testimony, a position which again 16 was not substantially justified under the facts of the case or well 17 settled law. Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of EAJA 18 fees. were to incompatible do certain with a finding household tasks, of disability, which often were caused not him 19 B. 20 Defendant contends that the amount of time Plaintiff s counsel 21 claims that he spent on the case is excessive and requests that the fees 22 be reduced. (Def. s Opp. at 6.) This Court has the discretion to 23 evaluate 24 prevailing party. Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001); 25 Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992). The court 26 should exclude hours that were not reasonably expended. Hensley v. 27 Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). In determining reasonableness, the 28 court must consider, among other factors, the complexity of the case or The Hours Claimed by Plaintiff Are Reasonable the reasonableness of the 4 number of hours claimed by a 1 the novelty of the issues, the skill required to perform the service 2 adequately, the customary time expended in similar cases, as well as the 3 attorney s expertise and experience.1 Widrig v. Apfel, 140 F.3d 1207, 4 1209 (9th Cir. 1998); Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 5 69-70 (9th Cir. 1975). In reducing a fee award, the court must provide 6 a reasonable explanation of how it arrived at the number of compensable 7 hours in determining the appropriate fee. Sorenson, 239 F.3d at 1145; 8 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. 9 The amount of time required to litigate any case can be highly 10 variable and is the subject of much debate. The Ninth Circuit recently 11 clarified that it is [ ] an abuse of discretion to apply a de facto 12 policy limiting social security claimants to twenty to forty hours of 13 attorney time in routine cases. Costa v. Comm r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 14 690 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. August 24, 2012). Further, the court 15 questioned the usefulness of reviewing the amount of time spent in 16 other cases to decide how much time an attorney could reasonably spend 17 on the particular case before the court. Id. Rather, the inquiry into 18 the reasonableness of a fee request must be based on the facts of each 19 case. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429. 20 The Court must generally give deference to the winning lawyer s 21 judgment as to how much time he was required to spend on the case, 22 particularly in contingency fee cases, such as this one. Costa, 690 F.3d 23 at 1136 (citing Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112-13 24 (9th 25 unnecessary time on contingency fee cases in the hope of inflating their Cir. 2008) (noting that lawyers are not likely to spend 26 27 28 1 Of the 12 factors used to evaluate attorney-fee claims, the articulated factors relate to the reasonableness of the time expended. 5 1 fees because [t]he payoff is too uncertain )). Here, after reviewing 2 the time records Plaintiff s counsel submitted and the pleadings in this 3 matter, the Court finds that the requested time, 30.8 hours total, is 4 reasonable. The hours requested for each task, primarily in drafting the 5 briefs and reviewing the record, appear reasonable and supported by 6 sufficiently detailed billing records. 7 8 9 10 III. Conclusion Plaintiff s motion for EAJA fees is hereby GRANTED. It is ordered that Plaintiff s counsel be awarded fees in the amount of $5,636.57. 11 12 13 DATED: November 2, 2012 14 15 16 ______________________________ Marc L. Goldman United States Magistrate Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6
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