Ignacio Del Rio v. The People of the States of California, No. 2:2010cv06890 - Document 27 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING PETITION AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, 1 by Magistrate Judge Patrick J. Walsh. (ca)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 13 14 15 IGNACIO DEL RIO, AKA ROBERTO COVEDA,) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) ) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) CALIFORNIA, ) ) Respondent. ) ) CASE NO. CV 10-6890-PJW MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING PETITION AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 16 I. 17 INTRODUCTION 18 Petitioner brings this habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 19 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that the state appellate court erred when it 20 concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction 21 for attempted burglary. 22 that the appellate court did not err. 23 II. 24 STATEMENT OF FACTS 25 For the following reasons, the Court finds Petitioner was convicted of a series of burglaries and attempted 26 burglaries in the South Pasadena area in January and February 2006. 27 He challenges one of those convictions, a conviction for attempted 28 burglary of an apartment where Lydia Mendoza and Phil Mosser lived. 1 According to Petitioner, the evidence was insufficient to sustain the 2 conviction. 3 it was. The state appellate court ruled otherwise, finding that It summarized the evidence against Petitioner as follows: 4 On January 29, 2006, Ms. Alexander managed and lived 5 in an apartment building on Orange Grove Avenue in South 6 Pasadena. 7 apartment occupied by Ms. Mendoza and Mr. Mosser. 8 Alexander's backyard abutted Ms. Mendoza's; the back doors 9 of the two apartments were approximately six feet apart. 10 At approximately 12:30 p.m. that afternoon, Ms. Ms. Alexander's apartment was next door to the Ms. 11 Alexander's doorbell rang. 12 [Petitioner] told Ms. Alexander that he was looking for 13 someone named Chris who lived in the building. 14 Alexander told [Petitioner] that no one named Chris lived 15 in the building. 16 [Petitioner] was at the door. Ms. [Petitioner] left. A few minutes later, Ms. Alexander heard a noise from 17 the back of her apartment. She went out her back door and 18 saw [Petitioner] entering the apartment through her 19 bedroom window. 20 fled. 21 from a photo lineup and in open court as the perpetrator. 22 Also on January 29, 2006, Ms. Mendoza and Mr. Mosser Ms. Alexander yelled and [Petitioner] Ms. Alexander subsequently identified [Petitioner] 23 left their apartment at approximately 8:30 a.m. The doors 24 and windows were locked when they left, and the screen on 25 their kitchen window was undamaged. 26 approximately 7:30 p.m. 27 was getting ready for work, he noticed that the screen on 28 the kitchen window had been bent, like someone tried to They returned at The next morning, as Mr. Mosser 2 1 get in.... 2 of the building and placed it against the outside wall 3 beneath the kitchen window. 4 Mendoza s apartment. 5 Someone also had moved a chair from the side Nothing was missing from Ms. The prosecution introduced evidence that [Petitioner] 6 perpetrated a total of six burglaries or attempted 7 burglaries between January 23 and February 16, 2006. 8 respect to four of these, [Petitioner] exhibited a similar 9 pattern of first knocking on the door or ringing the With 10 doorbell, and then entering or attempting to enter the 11 home through an unlocked door or window. 12 also introduced evidence that stolen property and burglary 13 tools were recovered from [Petitioner s] pickup truck, and 14 that [Petitioner] had rented self-storage lockers that 15 contained large amounts of stolen property and other 16 incriminating items, such as equipment used to melt gold 17 and a book on how to defeat alarm systems. 18 (Lodgment No. 5 at p. 2.) 19 III. 20 21 22 The prosecution STANDARD OF REVIEW The standard of review in this case is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254: 23 An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of 24 a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 25 court shall not be granted with respect to any claim 26 that was adjudicated on the merits in State court 27 proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim 28 3 1 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 2 involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 3 Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 4 United States; or 5 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 6 unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 7 evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 8 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court decision is contrary to clearly established 9 10 federal law if it applies a rule that contradicts Supreme Court 11 case law or if it reaches a conclusion different from the Supreme 12 Court s in a case that involves facts that are materially 13 indistinguishable. 14 (citing Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002)). 15 that the state court unreasonably applied federal law, a 16 petitioner must show that the state court s application of Supreme 17 Court precedent to the facts of his case was not only incorrect 18 but objectively unreasonable. 19 1862 (2010). 20 decided an issue, a state court s adjudication of that issue 21 cannot result in a decision that is contrary to, or an 22 unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. 23 Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 743 (2011) To establish Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, Where no decision of the Supreme Court has squarely See Petitioner raised his insufficiency claim in his petition for 24 25 review in the California Supreme Court, but that court did not 26 explain its reasons for denying it. 27 did. 28 Petitioner s claim for the same reasons the state appellate court The appellate court, however, This Court presumes that the state supreme court rejected 4 1 did. The Court, therefore, looks to the appellate court s 2 reasoning and will not disturb it unless it concludes that 3 fairminded jurists would all agree that the decision was wrong. 4 Id. 5 IV. 6 DISCUSSION 7 Petitioner claims that there was insufficient evidence to 8 convict him of attempting to burglarize Mendoza s and Mosser s 9 apartment and that, therefore, the state appellate court erred 10 when it ruled that there was. 11 Court disagrees. 12 For the following reasons, the In order to prevail on an insufficiency claim, a petitioner 13 must establish that no rational trier of fact could have found 14 proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 15 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). 16 appear in the record, that the jury resolved any conflicting 17 inferences in favor of the prosecution. 18 277, 296 97 (1992). 19 claims with an additional layer of deference, granting relief 20 only when the state court s judgment was contrary to or an 21 unreasonable application of Jackson. 22 1262, 1274 75 (9th Cir. 2005). 23 Jackson v. Virginia, The Court presumes, even if it does not Wright v. West, 505 U.S. Further, the Court reviews insufficiency Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d Petitioner does not challenge the prosecution s claim that 24 there was an attempted burglary of the Mendoza/Mosser apartment on 25 January 29, 2006, as evidenced by the chair found under the window 26 and the bent screen. 27 cient evidence to link him to the crime. 28 Traverse at 5-9.) Rather, he argues that there was insuffi(Petition at 8-15; He recognizes that the circumstances 5 1 surrounding the attempted break-in at the Mendoza/Mosser apartment 2 on the same day as he broke into neighbor Alexander s apartment 3 are arguably suspicious, but contends that that is not enough to 4 support the conviction. 5 a single witness testified that they saw him put the chair under 6 the window or bend the screen. 7 (Traverse at 8.) He points out that not (Traverse at 8.) As the California Court of Appeal pointed out, however, the 8 inferences that could be drawn from the evidence that was admitted 9 were enough to sustain the conviction: 10 In this case, there was evidence that [Petitioner] 11 committed at least four burglaries or attempted 12 burglaries in a similar manner, first knocking on the 13 door or ringing the doorbell and then entering the 14 victim s home through an unlocked door or window. 15 Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b) [other crimes to show 16 identity].) 17 committed a total of six burglaries or attempted 18 burglaries within a four-week period between January 23 19 and February 16, 2006, including two crimes on January 20 29 and three crimes on February 16. 21 stolen property, burglary tools and other incriminating 22 items (such as equipment used to melt gold and a manual 23 on how to defeat alarm systems) were recovered from 24 [Petitioner] s pickup truck and storage lockers. 25 such evidence, a reasonable jury could infer that 26 [Petitioner] was a burglar by vocation, and not merely 27 an opportunistic thief. (See There was also evidence that [Petitioner] 28 6 A large amount of From 1 Ms. Mendoza testified that she and Mr. Mosser were 2 away from their apartment from 8:30 a.m. to 7:30 p.m. on 3 January 29; that the screen on the kitchen window was 4 undamaged when they left that morning; and that Mr. 5 Mosser discovered the damage to the screen the next 6 morning as he was getting ready for work. 7 jury could infer from this testimony that the damage to 8 the screen occurred while the apartment was empty on 9 January 29. A reasonable Ms. Alexander testified that, on the 10 afternoon of January 29, consistent with [Petitioner] s 11 method of operation, [Petitioner] rang her doorbell; a 12 few minutes later, she confronted [Petitioner] as he 13 climbed through a rear bedroom window of her apartment. 14 The evidence thus placed [Petitioner] mere yards from 15 Ms. Mendoza s kitchen window at a time when the damage 16 to the window screen likely occurred. 17 also could infer that the attempt to gain entry to Ms. 18 Mendoza s apartment by climbing through a window at the 19 rear of the apartment was consistent with [Petitioner] s 20 established method of operation. A reasonable jury 21 The prosecution thus submitted evidence that 22 [Petitioner] was present at the scene at about the time 23 the attempted burglary occurred; that [Petitioner], as a 24 professional thief, had a motive to commit the burglary; 25 that [Petitioner] had the opportunity to commit the 26 burglary, due to the absence of Ms. Mendoza and Mr. 27 Mosser from the apartment; and that the attempted 28 burglary was effected in a manner similar to other 7 1 crimes committed by [Petitioner]. 2 sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that 3 [Petitioner] was the burglar. 4 supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 1255-1256.) 5 The evidence was (See People v. Prince, (Lodgment No. 5 at pp. 9-10.) 6 The Court agrees with the appellate court that, though 7 largely circumstantial, there was sufficient evidence to sustain 8 the conviction because circumstantial evidence alone is enough. 9 See Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995) 10 ( Circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from it may be 11 sufficient to sustain a conviction. ) (quoting United States v. 12 Lewis, 787 F.2d 1318, 1323 (9th Cir.), amended on denial of reh'g, 13 798 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also United States v. Cordova 14 Barajas, 360 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 2004) ( [C]ircumstantial 15 evidence alone can be sufficient to demonstrate a defendant's 16 guilt. ). 17 unfair that he be convicted of a crime where not a single 18 eyewitness tied him to it. 19 law or the Constitution that an eyewitness witness a crime and 20 testify to what he saw at trial. 21 rejected. Petitioner disagrees and seems to argue that it is But there is no requirement under the As such, this argument is 22 Finally, because Petitioner has not made a substantial 23 showing of the denial of a constitutional right, the Court will 24 not issue a certificate of appealability in this action. 25 26 27 28 8 See 28 1 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 2 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). 3 It IS SO ORDERED. 4 DATED: January 9, 2012. 5 6 PATRICK J. WALSH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 S:\PJW\Cases-State Habeas\DEL RIO, I 6890\memorandum opinion and order.wpd 9
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