Maria Maldonado v. Michael J. Astrue, No. 2:2009cv07703 - Document 17 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Marc L. Goldman. The decision of the Commissioner is affirmed. (db)
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1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 WESTERN DIVISION 8 9 MARIA MALDONADO, 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. 12 13 MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, 14 Defendant. 15 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 09-7703-MLG MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 16 17 Plaintiff Maria Maldonado seeks judicial review of the Social 18 Security 19 Security Disability Insurance ( SSDI ) benefits pursuant to Title 20 II of the Social Security Act. For the reasons stated below, the 21 decision of the Commissioner is affirmed. Commissioner s denial of her application for Social 22 23 I. Facts and Procedural Background 24 Plaintiff was born on November 24, 1956. She completed the 25 ninth grade in Mexico and has worked as an assembler and janitor. 26 (Administrative Record ( AR ) at 52, 79, 99.) Plaintiff filed an 27 28 1 benefits1 1 application 2 disability as of August 1, 1999, due to shoulder, lower back, arm, 3 and knee impairments arising from a work-related injuries in 1995 4 and 1997.2 (AR at 79.) Her application was denied initially and 5 upon reconsideration. (AR at 67, 98.) An administrative hearing was 6 held on July 7, 2008, before Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ ) 7 Robert J. Grossman. (AR at 47-65.) Plaintiff was represented by 8 counsel and testified on her own behalf with the aid of an 9 interpreter. A vocational expert ( VE ), Barbara Miksic, also 10 for SSDI on March 19, 2007, alleging testified at the hearing. (Id.) 11 ALJ Grossman issued an unfavorable decision on February 20, 12 2009. (AR at 21-28.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged 13 in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date of 14 August 1, 1999, to December 31, 2002, the date she was last 15 insured. Plaintiff s severe impairments were found to include 16 internal derangement of the knees and degenerative disc disease of 17 the lumbar spine, but these impairments, alone or in combination, 18 did not meet the requirements of a listed impairment found in 20 19 20 1 21 22 23 24 25 26 Plaintiff states that she also applied for Supplemental Security Income benefits ( SSI ) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. (Joint Stip. at 2.) However, the record contains only a Title II SSDI application, and the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision solely on the issue of whether Plaintiff was disabled during the SSDI period. Although there is one reference to a pending SSI application in the record, (AR at 83), the remainder of the record reflects the existence of a standalone SSDI claim. (AR at 66-67, 72, 93-94, 109, 116, 196.) The Commissioner only reached a final decision as to Plaintiff s eligibility for SSDI benefits, and this Court s judicial review is limited to that decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 27 2 28 Plaintiff received worker s compensation benefits connection with these injuries from 1999 through early 2007. 2 in 1 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AR at 23-24.) The ALJ 2 concluded that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity 3 ( RFC ) to perform light work.3 (AR at 24-27.) This RFC precluded 4 Plaintiff from returning to her past relevant work. (AR at 27.) 5 Nonetheless, the ALJ concluded that there existed work in the 6 economy that Plaintiff could perform and that she was not disabled 7 based upon Medical-Vocational Rule 202.16. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 8 Subpart P, Appendix 2. 9 The Appeals Council denied review on August 25, 2009, (AR at 10 9), and Plaintiff commenced this action on October 23, 2009. 11 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by (1) finding that Plaintiff 12 could perform light work; and (2) failing to properly evaluate 13 Plaintiff s subjective testimony. (Joint Stip. at 7, 17.) 14 15 16 II. Standard of Review Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the 17 Commissioner s 18 decision must be upheld unless the ALJ s findings are based on 19 legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the 20 record as a whole. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 21 1999); 22 Substantial evidence means more than a scintilla, but less than a 23 preponderance; it is evidence that a reasonable person might accept Parra decision v. Astrue, to deny 481 benefits. F.3d 742, 746 The Commissioner s (9th Cir. 2007). 24 25 26 27 28 3 Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects up to 10 pounds...[A] job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b). 3 1 as adequate to support a conclusion. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 2 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007)(citing Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 3 466 4 substantial evidence supports a finding, the reviewing court must 5 review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the 6 evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the 7 Commissioner s conclusion. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 8 (9th Cir. 1996). If the 9 or reversing the ALJ s conclusion, the reviewing court may not 10 substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 11 882. F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). evidence can To support determine either whether affirming 12 13 III. Discussion 14 A. 15 Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred in concluding that she 16 retains the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of 17 light work. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to 18 base 19 [Plaintiff s] testimony and reports stemming from chiropractic 20 treatment, and failed to consider whether [Plaintiff] would be 21 able to sustain work activity. (Joint Stip. at 11.) In support of 22 this argument, Plaintiff chronicles the medical evidence from 23 November, 2001, through the end of 2007, and argues that it 24 supports a finding that she would not be able to sustain work 25 activity. (Id.) his The ALJ Properly Determined Plaintiff s RFC RFC determination on the entire record including 26 Plaintiff s insured status expired on December 31, 2002, and 27 she bore the burden of establishing that she was disabled prior to 28 that date. Parra, 481 F.32 at 746 (citing Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 4 1 F.3d 599, 601 (9th th Cir. 1998)); Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 2 182 (9th Cir. 1995). The mere existence of an impairment is 3 insufficient proof of a disability. Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 4 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1993). Instead, Plaintiff was required to 5 demonstrate that her impairments resulted in functional limitations 6 severe enough to prevent her from engaging in any substantial 7 gainful activity. Id. For the reasons stated below, the ALJ s 8 determination that Plaintiff had not met this burden was supported 9 by substantial evidence in the record. 10 The ALJ noted both at the hearing and in his written decision 11 that the majority of Plaintiff s medical records are dated after 12 December 31, 2002, the date she was last insured. (AR at 25, 58- 13 64.) The ALJ provided Plaintiff with 60 days after the hearing to 14 supplement the record to remedy the deficiency. (AR at 64.) 15 Although Plaintiff did submit additional records, the earliest of 16 those medical records is dated October 30, 2001, more than two 17 years after her alleged onset date. In his unfavorable decision, 18 the ALJ surveyed the available medical records for the time period 19 during and up to six months after Plaintiff s insurance status 20 expired, including records from two orthopaedists, Drs. Missirian 21 and Angerman, and her chiropractor, Steve Settlage. (AR at 25.) 22 Each of these medical sources treated or examined Plaintiff in 23 connection with her worker s compensation claim. 24 Between October 2001 and October 2003 Dr. Missirian evaluated 25 Plaintiff for lumbar spine and knee injuries at the request of her 26 treating chiropractor. (AR at 440-507.) Dr. Missirian noted a 27 history 28 diagnosed internal knee derangement, ligament tears in both knees, of right and left arthroscopic 5 knee surgeries and 1 and lumbar spine musculoligamentous injury with disc protrusion. 2 (See AR at 483, 497-98, 505.) He performed arthroscopic surgery on 3 Plaintiff s left knee and epidural steroid injections to the lumbar 4 spine. 5 throughout this period with her chiropractor and taking medication 6 to alleviate pain. During the relevant time period, Plaintiff 7 reported slight to moderate pain in her knees and back, which were 8 aggravated by bending, stooping, squatting, prolonged walking, and 9 cold weather. She reported that her symptoms were alleviated with 10 pain medication. (AR at 468-507.) During Plaintiff s first visit on 11 October 30, 2001, Dr. Missirian concluded that Plaintiff s work 12 status 13 worker s 14 evaluations during the period of disability, Dr. Missirian deferred 15 to chiropractor Steve Settlage s work status evaluation. (Id.) Plaintiff was was undergoing temporarily compensation concurrent totally disabled standards. In the physical under therapy California s remainder of the 16 Steve Settlage, D.C., began treating Plaintiff in connection 17 with the worker s compensation claim on September 14, 2001. (AR at 18 439.) Although he opined that Plaintiff was temporarily totally 19 disabled under California worker s compensation rules through 20 Plaintiff s last insured date, (AR at 371), that conclusion is not 21 determinative of an entitlement to benefits under social security 22 law. See Booth v. Barnhart, 181 F.Supp.2d 1099, 1104-05 (C.D. Cal. 23 2002) (citing Macri v. Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 544 (9th Cir. 1996)) 24 and Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 846 F.2d 25 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988)); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504. The determination 26 that 27 worker s compensation rules indicated that she could not return to 28 her previous job as an assembler, not that she was precluded from Plaintiff was temporarily 6 totally disabled under state 1 all substantial gainful activity. Aside from the conclusion that 2 Plaintiff should not return to her previous job as an assembler, 3 Settlage did not provide specific functional limitations caused by 4 Plaintiff s impairments that would preclude work.4 5 Dr. Angerman examined and evaluated Plaintiff several times 6 as a neutral Orthopaedic Agreed Medical Examiner in her worker s 7 compensation case. (See AR at 166-67, 360-66.) Dr. Angerman first 8 examined Plaintiff in 2001. On March 3, 2003, he performed a full 9 orthopaedic examination and took x-rays of Plaintiff s knees and 10 spine. On June 26, 2003, after receiving copies of Plaintiff s 11 medical records to supplement his own examination, Dr. Angerman 12 concluded that Plaintiff s physical impairments limited her to 13 light work. (AR at 122-37, 166-67.) Dr. Angerman s conclusion 14 conflicted 15 Plaintiff was restricted to sedentary work. (AR at 474.) Because 16 both of these opinions were based on independent clinical testing 17 and examination, it was solely the province of the ALJ to resolve 18 the conflict between Drs. Missirian and Angerman. Andrews v. 19 Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th 20 Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). The ALJ resolved the 21 conflict in favor of Dr. Angerman s opinion because he was a 22 neutral agreed upon medical examiner. (AR at 25-26.) This was not 23 error. 24 // with Dr. Missirian s March 4, 2003, opinion that Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. 25 26 27 28 4 The Court also notes in passing that the opinions of chiropractors are entitled to less weight than a physician s because they are not an acceptable medical source under the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a), Helmke v. Astrue, 2010 WL 997105, *1 (9th Cir. 2010). 7 1 B. 2 Plaintiff claims that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her The ALJ Properly Evaluated Plaintiff s Credibility 3 subjective 4 Plaintiff testified that her injuries prevent her from bending, and 5 that she cannot stand or sit for more than five to ten minutes at 6 a time. She testified that she lies down approximately 20 times per 7 day. (AR at 54-55.) 8 The complaints. (Joint determination of Stip. at credibility 17.) and At the the hearing, resolution of 9 conflicts in the testimony are functions of the ALJ acting on 10 behalf of the Commissioner. Morgan v. Commissioner of Social 11 Security, 169 F.3d 595, 599(9th Cir. 1999). In general, an ALJ's 12 assessment of credibility should be given great weight. Nyman v. 13 Heckler, 779 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1985). However, once a 14 claimant 15 impairment, the ALJ may not discredit the claimant's testimony 16 regarding subjective pain and other symptoms merely because the 17 symptoms, 18 objective medical evidence. Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035-36; 19 Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722; Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 20 792 21 testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering 22 specific, 23 Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036 (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 24 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996)). (9th has as presented opposed Cir. 1997). clear and medical to the " [T]he evidence impairments, ALJ convincing can of are reject reasons for an underlying unsupported the by claimant's doing so.'" 25 Here, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff s medical impairments 26 could be expected to produce some of the alleged symptoms, but that 27 her testimony that she was completely disabled was not credible 28 because it was not supported by the medical record. (AR at 25.) The 8 1 ALJ placed great weight on Dr. Angerman s opinion that Plaintiff 2 could perform light work despite her impairments, an opinion that 3 was offered after a full examination of Plaintiff and a review of 4 Plaintiff s reporting of symptoms. (AR at 26-27.) In essence, the 5 ALJ found that the symptoms reported by Plaintiff at the hearing 6 were inconsistent with the symptoms contained in the medical 7 records prior to the date she was last insured. This finding is 8 supported by substantial evidence in the record. 9 Dr. Missirian s treatment notes during the relevant time 10 period detail her subjective complaints. (AR at 478-507.) It is 11 worth noting that the pain she described at the hearing related to 12 current symptoms, while the medical records detail her subjective 13 complaints of pain specific to the period of time prior to the 14 expiration of her insured status. On October 30, 2001, Plaintiff 15 complained of constant slight to moderate lower back pain that was 16 aggravated by stooping and bending. She also complained of slight 17 to moderate pain in her right knee and intermittent aching pain in 18 her left knee, both of which were aggravated by cold weather and 19 alleviated by medication. (AR at 500-01.) Plaintiff s reporting of 20 symptoms to her physicians did not change significantly through 21 December 31, 2002, the date she was last insured. (AR at 479, 483- 22 84, 23 supported by the contemporaneous records detailing her symptoms 24 during the relevant time period, and the ALJ did not err in 25 rejecting her testimony on that basis. Morgan, 169 F.3d at 599-600 26 (affirming adverse credibility finding based on conflict between 27 symptom testimony and evidence of symptoms in the medical record). 28 Moreover, Plaintiff s testimony about her symptoms conflicted with 487-88.) Plaintiff s recitation 9 at the hearing was not 1 the record of conservative care during the relevant time period. 2 See Parra, 481 F.3d at 751; Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 3 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2008). For these reasons, the ALJ s credibility 4 determination was not based on legal error and was supported by 5 substantial evidence in the record. 6 7 8 9 IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed. 10 11 Dated: June 17, 2010 12 13 14 15 ______________________________ Marc L. Goldman United States Magistrate Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10
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