C & C Imports, Inc. v. Kevin Crosby et al, No. 2:2008cv05976 - Document 16 (C.D. Cal. 2008)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION by Judge Otis D Wright, II, re MOTION to Transfer Case to Southern District of Florida or in Alternative, To Dismiss 3 . The Court GRANTS the Defendants Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and DENIES as moot the Request for Change of Venue. (tad)
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C & C Imports, Inc. v. Kevin Crosby et al Doc. 16 O / JS-6 1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 WESTERN DIVISION 8 9 10 C & C IMPORTS, INC., a California ) Corporation, dba NANCY CORZINE, ) 17 ) ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) ) ) KEVIN CROSBY, an individual, BRINKLEY, MORGAN, SOLOMON, ) ) TATUM, STANLEY, LUNNY, & ) CROSBY, LLP, and DOES 1-10, ) ) Defendants. ) ______________________________________ 18 I. 11 12 13 14 15 16 Case No. CV 08-5976 ODW (MANx) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION INTRODUCTION 19 This case involves claims for professional negligence and breach of contract filed 20 by Plaintiff C & C Imports, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) against the Fort Lauderdale, Florida law firm 21 of Brinkley, Morgan, Solomon, Tatum, Stanley, Lunny & Crosby, LLP and one of its 22 partners, Kevin P. Crosby (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges this Court has 23 jurisdiction due to diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 24 Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal 25 Jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). Alternatively, Defendants request that 26 this action be transferred to the Southern District of Florida pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 27 1404(a). For the reasoned stated below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 28 Personal Jurisdiction is GRANTED. Dockets.Justia.com 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 In approximately 2000, Plaintiff, a California furniture company, entered into a 3 contract with the predecessor of Defendant Law Firm to perform legal services as 4 necessary to obtain a copyright on several pieces of furniture, including a piece commonly 5 known as the Thysson armoire. (Compl. ¶ 4.) 6 In approximately 2006, Plaintiff became aware that the copyright to the Thysson 7 armoire has been infringed by a North Carolina furniture company, Century Furniture 8 Industries, Inc. (“Century”). (Compl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff hired a Los Angeles based law firm 9 to represent it in a copyright infringement action against Century in the United States 10 District Court for the Central District of California. (Id.) In July 2007, Defendants were 11 engaged by Plaintiff as co-counsel pro hac vice in the Century copyright matter. (Compl. 12 ¶ 7.) In March 2008, Century filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that 13 there was no copyright issued on the Thysson armoire. (Compl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff then 14 dismissed the lawsuit after being informed by its attorneys that there was a great likelihood 15 of losing. (Id.) 16 Plaintiff believes that Defendants never obtained a copyright on the Thysson 17 armoire. (Compl. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff argues that the failure to discover a filing error in 18 connection with the original copyright filing was due to the negligence of Defendants. (Id.) 19 As a proximate result of Defendants’ alleged negligence, Plaintiff argues it incurred 20 unnecessary costs and legal fees in prosecuting the Century lawsuit. (Compl. ¶ 13.) 21 Defendants argue that they have no connection to and cannot be subject to personal 22 jurisdiction in California. Defendants have allegedly never purposely availed themselves 23 of the privilege of conducting activities in California. Further, Defendants argue that 24 Plaintiff’s instant lawsuit arises from Defendants’ alleged negligence in connection with 25 their work performed in Florida in 2000 and not the California lawsuit involving Century. 26 The Court will address each of these arguments in turn. 27 28 2 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 A. 3 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), when a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of 4 personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction exists. 5 Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004). However, 6 when a district court rules on such a motion without an evidentiary hearing, as here, “the 7 plaintiff need make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts in order to withstand 8 the motion to dismiss.” Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001). In other 9 words, the plaintiff “need only demonstrate facts that if true would support jurisdiction 10 Legal Standard: Personal Jurisdiction over the defendant.” Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995). 11 Where there is no applicable federal statute governing personal jurisdiction, a court 12 applies the law of the state in which the district court sits. See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d 13 at 800. “Because California’s long-arm jurisdictional statute is coextensive with federal 14 due process requirements, the jurisdictional analyses under state law and federal due 15 process are the same.” Id. at 800-801. 16 The constitutional requirement is satisfied if personal jurisdiction arises from 17 traditional circumstances, or if it is established that the nonresident defendant has sufficient 18 “minimum contacts” with the forum state, “such that exercise of jurisdiction does not 19 offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” In re Marriage of Fitzgerald 20 v. King, 39 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1425-26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); International Shoe Co. v. 21 Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). There are two types of jurisdiction to consider under 22 the minimum contacts doctrine: (1) general jurisdiction and (2) specific jurisdiction. Vons 23 Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., 14 Cal.4th 434, 445 (Cal. 1996); Sher v. Johnson, 24 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990). 25 General jurisdiction applies where a defendant’s activities in the state are 26 “substantial” or “continuous and systematic,” even if the cause of action is unrelated to 27 28 3 1 those activities. Sher, 911 F.2d at 1361 (citing Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Tech. Assoc., 557 2 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir 1977)). “Where general jurisdiction is inappropriate, a court may 3 still exercise specific jurisdiction if the defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum 4 state in relation to the cause of action.” Id. 5 B. Analysis 6 Here, Plaintiff alleges specific jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit uses a three-part test 7 to evaluate the nature and quality of Defendants’ contacts for purposes of specific 8 jurisdiction: (1) some action must be taken whereby defendant purposefully avails himself 9 or herself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the 10 benefits and protections of the forum’s laws; (2) the claim must arise out of or result from 11 Defendants’ forum-related activities; and (3) exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. 12 Sher, 911 F.2d at 1361 (citing Cubbage v. Merchent, 744 F.2d 665, 668 (9th Cir 1984)); 13 see also Menken v. Emm, 503 F.3d 1050, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007). “The plaintiff bears the 14 burden of satisfying the first two prongs of the test.” Menken, 503 F.3d at 1057. (citations 15 omitted). “If the plaintiff fails to satisfy either of these prongs, personal jurisdiction is not 16 established in the forum state.” Id. “On the other hand, if the plaintiff succeeds in 17 satisfying both of the first two prongs, the burden then shifts to the defendant to present a 18 compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Id. (internal 19 quotation marks and citations omitted). 20 As for the first element of the test, “‘purposeful availment’ requires that the 21 defendant ‘have performed some type of affirmative conduct which allows or promotes the 22 transaction of business within the forum state.’” Sher, 911 F.2d at 1362 (quoting Sinatra 23 v. National Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir.1988)). There is no evidence that 24 indicates Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting 25 activities in the forum prior to the Century action in this district. Defendants were solicited 26 in Florida to perform legal work for Plaintiff, that is to obtain copyrights for Plaintiff’s 27 28 4 1 furniture pieces. When fulfilling their 2000 representation, Defendants’ only out-of-state 2 interactions were allegedly with the U.S. Copyright Office in Washington D.C. Defendants 3 concede that they corresponded a few times with Plaintiff when Plaintiff was in California. 4 Without more, however, a few phone calls and letters directed toward the forum state do 5 not establish purposeful availment. See id. at 1362-63. 6 Conversely, in addition to Defendants’ 2000 representation of Plaintiff, Defendants 7 appeared pro hac vice in the California action involving Century. Defendants argue their 8 involvement in the Century action required them to perform only minimal work in 9 California, namely one court appearance. Still, Defendants agreed to represent Plaintiff 10 and applied for pro hac vice status knowing they would seek payment for their work in a 11 California case involving a California corporation. Thus, by agreeing to represent Plaintiff 12 in a California action, Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of 13 conducting activities in the forum. 14 jurisdiction test has been met. Accordingly, the first element of the specific 15 The second prong requires Plaintiff’s claim(s) to arise out of or result from 16 Defendants’ forum-related activities. “The second prong of the specific jurisdiction test 17 is met if ‘but for’ the contacts between the defendant and the forum state, the cause of 18 action would not have arisen.” Terracom v. Valley Nat. Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 561 (9th Cir. 19 1995) (citing Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385-86 (9th Cir.1990)); see 20 also Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, it cannot 21 be said that “but for” Defendants involvement in the Century case (Defendants’ only 22 forum-related activity), Plaintiff’s claims would not have arisen. Plaintiff’s claims relate 23 to Defendant’s alleged failure to register certain copyrights in 2000 and not Defendants’ 24 pro hac vice representation in the Century action. Therefore, Defendants’ forum-related 25 activities are wholly unrelated to Plaintiff’s claims. 26 Nonetheless, Plaintiff argues that Defendants are tied to the forum by the allegation 27 28 5 1 in Plaintiff’s Complaint that states, “[a]s a proximate result of defendant’s negligence, 2 plaintiff incurred unnecessary costs and legal fees in prosecuting the [Century] lawsuit.” 3 (Compl. ¶ 13.) While the Court is required to accept this allegation as true, it does not help 4 Plaintiff in establishing personal jurisdiction. The fact remains that even if Plaintiff had 5 hired attorneys other than Defendants in the Century action, Plaintiff would have the same 6 claims seeking reimbursement for legal fees due to Defendants’ alleged negligence in 2000. 7 This is essentially the reverse of what is required under the above “but for” test. 8 Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s claims for professional negligence and breach of contract 9 do not arise out of or result from Defendants’ forum-related activities, this Court is 10 restricted from exercising personal jurisdiction over Defendants. 11 Because the second prong negates personal jurisdiction over Defendants, the Court 12 need not examine the reasonableness prong. In addition, because this Court lacks personal 13 jurisdiction over Defendants, the request to transfer venue is DENIED as moot. 14 15 IV. CONCLUSION 16 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 17 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and DENIES as moot the Request for 18 Change of Venue. 19 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 22 DATED: October 21, 2008 23 24 ________________________ OTIS D. WRIGHT II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 25 26 27 28 6
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