Castaneda v. The United States of America California et al, No. 2:2007cv07241 - Document 306 (C.D. Cal. 2013)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 297 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. (lc). Modified on 9/24/2013 (lc).
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Castaneda v. The United States of America California et al Doc. 306 1 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 FRANCISCO CASTANEDA, 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CALIFORNIA, GEORGE MOLINAR, in his individual capacity, CHRIS HENNEFORD, in his individual capacity, JEFF BRINKLEY, in his individual capacity, GENE MIGLIACCIO, in his individual capacity, TIMOTHY SHACK, M.D., in his individual capacity, ESTHER HUI, M.D., in her individual capacity, et al. , 21 Defendants. 22 ___________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 07-07241 DDP (JCx) ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 23 24 Presently before the court is Defendant Robert Mekemson (“Dr. 25 Mekemson”) and Susan Pasha (“Nurse Pasha”)’s Motion for Summary 26 Judgment. 27 oral argument, the court denies the motion and adopts the following 28 order. Having reviewed the parties’ moving papers and heard Dockets.Justia.com 1 2 I. Background The facts of this case are known to the parties, and are more 3 fully described in this court’s previous orders. 4 court will only explain the facts here as necessary. 5 Accordingly, the In December 2005, Francisco Castaneda (“Castaneda”) was 6 incarcerated at California’s North Kern State Prison. 7 medical screening on December 8, 2005, Dr. Andrew Leong found a 8 lesion on Castaneda’s penis. 9 see a urologist and obtain a circumcision. During a Dr. Leong recommended that Castaneda On December 27, Dr. 10 Leong observed discolorations on Castaneda’s penis, a constriction 11 of the foreskin, and a foul smell. 12 “Physician Request for Services form.” 13 wrote “rule out squamous cell [carcinoma]” and requested that 14 Castaneda consult with a urologist. 15 as “Routine,” rather than urgent or emergent, but marked the 16 request form “ASAP – 1 - 2 weeks.” 17 Dr. Leong filled out a On the form, Dr. Leong Dr. Leong marked the request Roughly two weeks later, on January 11, 2006, Dr. Mekemson, in 18 his capacity as Chief Medical Officer of the North Kern State 19 Prison, reviewed Dr. Leong’s request. 20 Castaneda was scheduled to be transferred to a different facility 21 the following day, January 12. 22 Castaneda would receive a medical screening at the new facility, 23 and therefore denied the request for a urology consultation. 24 Dr. Mekemson observed that Dr. Mekemson believed that Nurse Pasha examined Castaneda on February 7, 2006. Nurse 25 Pasha observed a raised, white-yellow lesion on Castaneda’s penis. 26 Nurse Pasha filled out a Physician Request for Services Form. 27 the form, Nurse Pasha wrote, “Rule out squamous cell [carcinoma].” 28 Nurse Pasha requested a urology consultation, marked the request 2 On 1 “Urgent,” and noted that Castaneda should make a follow-up visit in 2 one month. 3 received a urology consultation. 4 follow up after one month. 5 consultation on March 29, 2006, but was released into federal 6 custody on March 26, 2006, three days before his urology 7 appointment. 8 9 One month later, on March 7, Castaneda had not yet Nurse Pasha again planned to Castaneda was scheduled for a urology Castaneda was later diagnosed with penile cancer. Despite having his penis amputated, Castaneda died from cancer in February 10 2008. 11 Nurse Pasha (collectively, “Defendants”) were deliberately 12 indifferent to Castaneda’s medical needs, in violation of the 13 Eighth Amendment. 14 under California State Law. 15 In the instant case, Plaintiffs allege that Dr. Mekemson and Plaintiffs also bring a wrongful death claim In a related state-court action, Plaintiffs sought to hold the 16 State of California liable for Defendants’ actions. 17 jury returned a verdict against the State for over $1.7 million. 18 The State appealed, and in 2013, the California Court of Appeal 19 reversed the judgment. 20 Cal. App. 4th 1051 (2013). 21 held that the State can only be held liable for failure to summon 22 medical care, not for malpractice in providing that care. 23 Castaneda, 212 Cal. App. 4th at 1070. 24 examine and treat Castaneda to some extent, the Court of Appeal 25 concluded that the State did not fail to summon medical care, and 26 that the State is therefore immune from liability for Castaneda’s 27 injuries. In 2010, a Castaneda v. Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 212 In relevant part, the Court of Appeal Id. at 1074. 28 3 Because the State did 1 Defendants now move for judgment on the pleadings in the case 2 before this court. 3 Appeal’s decision in Castaneda bars the claims here as res 4 judicata. 5 II. 6 Defendants contend that the California Court of Legal Standard A party may move for judgment on the pleadings “[a]fter the 7 pleadings are closed [] but early enough as not to delay the 8 trial.” 9 proper when the moving party clearly establishes that no material Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Judgment on the pleadings is 10 issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to 11 judgment as a matter of law. 12 Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990; Doleman v. Meiji 13 Mut. Life Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 1480, 1482 (9th Cir. 1984). 14 standard applied on a Rule 12(c) motion is essentially the same as 15 that applied on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to 16 state a claim, with the court accepting all of the non-moving 17 party’s allegations as true. 18 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2011). 19 III. Discussion 20 Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard The Lyon v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 656 A federal court must “give the same preclusive effect to a 21 state-court judgment as another court of that State would give.” 22 Gathright v. City of Portland, 439 F.3d 573, 580 (9th Cir. 2006) 23 (quotation and citation omitted); 28 U.S.C. § 1738. 24 the doctrine of res judicata bars claims that are 1) identical to a 25 claim raised in a prior proceeding that (2) resulted in a final 26 judgment on the merits against (3) the same parties or their 27 privies. 28 (2010); Sargon Enters., Inc. v. Univ. of S. California, 215 Cal. In California, Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 48 Cal.4th 788, 797 4 1 App. 4th 1495, 1508 (2013). 2 judicata “operates as a bar to the maintenance of a second suit 3 between the same parties on the same cause of action.” 4 Cal. 4th at 797. The claim preclusion aspect of res Boeken, 48 5 “Unlike the federal courts, which apply a ‘transactional 6 nucleus of facts’ test, California courts employ the ‘primary 7 rights’ theory to determine what constitutes the same cause of 8 action for preclusion purposes.” 9 1268 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 10 Under this theory, “the determinative factor is the harm suffered.” 11 Boeken, 48 Cal.4th at 797. 12 obtain redress for a harm suffered, regardless of the specific 13 remedy sought or the legal theory . . . advanced.” 14 judgment for the defendant is a bar to the subsequent action by the 15 plaintiff based on the same injury to the same right, even though 16 he presents a different [l]egal ground for relief.” 17 Blackwood, 15 Cal.3d 791, 795 (1975) (quotation marks and citation 18 omitted); See also Branson v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 24 Cal. App. 4th 19 327, 341 (1994) (“[I]f the facts alleged show one primary right of 20 the plaintiff, and one wrong done by the defendant which involves 21 that right, the plaintiff has stated but a single cause of action, 22 no matter how many forms of kinds of relief he may claim . . . .” 23 (quotation marks and citation omitted)). 24 “The cause of action is the right to Id. “Hence, a Slater v. Defendants argue that both the instant suit and the state 25 court matter share “one cause of action based on Francisco 26 Castaneda’s death.” 27 right is defined by the legally protected interest which is harmed 28 by defendant’s wrongful act, and is not necessarily coextensive (Reply at 5.) 5 “But a plaintiff’s primary 1 with the consequence of that wrongful act.” 2 Mesa Unified Sch. Dist., 214 Cal. App. 4th 478, 499 (2013) 3 (emphases original); Boeken, 48 Cal.4th at 804 (“[W]e reject the 4 assertion . . . that the primary right at issue in a wrongful death 5 action is necessarily defined in terms of the death of the 6 decedent.”). 7 Henderson v. Newport- Plaintiffs filed their state suit under California’s 8 Government Tort Claims Act. 9 845.6, the state and its employees are immune from liability “for Under California Government Code § 10 failure to furnish or obtain medical care” for a prisoner. 11 also Cal. Gov. Code § 844.6. 12 that immunity, however, “if the [public] employee knows or has 13 reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical 14 care and he fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical 15 care.” 16 California as a defendant, and did not bring state claims against 17 Doctor Mekemson or Nurse Pasha. 18 See There is a statutory exception to Cal. Gov. Code § 845.6. Plaintiffs only named the State of As the California Court of Appeal explained, “Section 845.6 is 19 very narrowly written to authorize a cause of action against a 20 public entity for its employees’ failure to summon immediate 21 medical care only, not for certain employees’ malpractice in 22 providing that care.” 23 Seeking to avail themselves of that limited waiver, Plaintiffs 24 contended that Defendants failed to summon care by failing to 25 ensure that Castaneda received a biopsy or urology consultation. 26 Id. at 1072-73. 27 Appeal concluded that a public employee’s duty to summon immediate 28 medical care is separate and distinct from that employee’s duty, Castaneda, 212 Cal. App. 4th at 1070. Critically, however, the California Court of 6 1 “once summoned,” to provide any particular standard of care. 2 at 1072, 1074. 3 held that, regardless whether Defendants breached their duty to 4 provide adequate medical care, Plaintiffs could not show a breach 5 of the separate duty to summon care because Castaneda received 6 medical treatment in the form of the assessments by Dr. Leong and 7 Defendant Pasha. 8 demonstrate any violation of the duty to summon, and absent any 9 claim regarding the separate duty to provide adequate medical care, Id. Looking to the evidence at trial, the court further Id. at 1072. Plaintiffs having failed to 10 the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. 11 Id. at 1075. 12 Put simply, the state court held that whatever harm Castaneda 13 suffered with respect to the care he received had no bearing on 14 whether he was harmed by a denial of care in the first instance. 15 In so concluding, the state court necessarily reasoned that 16 malpractice claims and failure to summon claims are different. 17 While the state court opinion has preclusive effect on duty to 18 summon issues, it acknowledged, but did not address, the separate 19 primary right implicated by the medical malpractice issues in the 20 instant federal case. 21 different causes of action, res judicata does not apply. Because the two suits are predicated upon 22 23 24 25 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 7 1 2 3 IV. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED. 4 5 6 7 8 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 11 12 13 Dated: September 24, 2013 DEAN D. PREGERSON United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
