Dedeaux v. R. J. Reynolds American, Inc., No. 6:2009cv06099 - Document 22 (W.D. Ark. 2010)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER; granting in part and denying in part 9 Motion for Summary Judgment as set forth. This matter remains set for trial on 11/22/10. Signed by Honorable Robert T. Dawson on November 12, 2010. (lw)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS HOT SPRINGS DIVISION LAUREN DEDEAUX PLAINTIFF v. Civ. No. 09-6099 R. J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY DEFENDANT MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff October 19, Defendant.1 Lauren 2010, Dedeaux naming filed “RJ a Complaint Reynolds (Doc. American 1) Inc.” on the Plaintiff alleged that she was discriminated against on the basis of her age and disability. Plaintiff asserted claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”)as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; disability harassment and hostile workplace, Tort of Outrage, and wrongful termination in violation of Arkansas common law and public policy . Subject matter jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s State law claims is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Venue is proper in the Western District of Arkansas under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, as a 1 The Court changed the caption to reflect Defendant’s accurate name; the misnomer issue is addressed below. Page 1 of 12 substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in this district. Before the Court are Defendant’s Judgment and supporting documents Response to Defendant’s Motion supporting documents (Docs. Motion (Docs. for 16-18), 9-11), Summary and for Summary Plaintiff’s Judgment Defendant’s Reply and to Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 21). In her Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 16), Plaintiff seeks to voluntarily dismiss her ADA, Tort of Outrage, and disability claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss these claims will be granted and the claims dismissed. The remaining claims for consideration on Summary Judgment are Plaintiff’s age discrimination claims. For the reasons discussed below, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 9) is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part. I. Background Plaintiff, who was born on April 16, 1965, began full-time employment as a sales representative/territory Defendant on March 6, 1989. manager for Plaintiff alleged that on or about Page 2 of 12 November 2007 through March 2008, she received medical treatment and underwent surgeries for tumors on her spine. In or around December 2007, Pamela Bratton was assigned as the new Division Manager for Plaintiff’s region (Fayetteville Division). was Plaintiff alleges while supervised by Bratton, she subjected Plaintiff to alleges harassing the treatment harassment is because a part of of policies to discriminate against older employees. Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s policies serve her age. Defendant’s Specifically, the purpose of replacing older employees with younger inexperienced employees who are willing to work for less money and benefits. On November 24, 2008, in an attempt to evidence the harassment, Plaintiff recorded conversations with Bratton while the two were off company premises. Plaintiff contacted Andrea Garrison in Defendant’s human resources department, who learned of the recording and requested a copy. On November 25, 2008, Plaintiff sent Garrison a copy of the recording via email. On December Defendant’s Plaintiff 16, Regional was 2008, Manager delivered her Defendant Scott met with Payne. At termination letter. Garrison the and meeting, Plaintiff’s termination letter indicated termination was due to violation of generally accepted standards of business conduct, violation of Page 3 of 12 HR Policies and Practices General Rule 1.03, and acting in a manner contrary to company values. Violation of HR Policies and Practices General Rule 1.03 is set out in the employment manual as a terminable offense. On March 11, 2009, Plaintiff filed Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) charge. an Equal Employment On July 30, 2009, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a notice of right to sue letter. On October 19, 2010, Plaintiff filed her Complaint (Doc. 1) naming R.J. Reynolds American Inc., as the Defendant. II. Standard of Review Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 56(c). Fed.R.Civ.P. The court must view the facts and inferences from the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and the burden is placed on the moving party, to establish both the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); Page 4 of 12 Nat’l Bank of Commerce of El Dorado, Arkansas v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602 (8th Cir. 1999). Once the moving party has met this burden, the non-moving party may no longer rest on the allegations in its pleadings, but must set forth specific facts by affidavit and other evidence, showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., 838 withstand must F.2d 268, 273-74 (8th Defendant’s motion for substantiate his allegations Cir. 1988). summary with In order to judgment, Plaintiff “sufficient probative evidence that would permit a finding in his favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.” Gregory v. Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1992). III. Discussion A. Failure to Properly Name Defendant Defendant moves the Court to dismiss contending Plaintiff sued the wrong company. the Complaint Throughout the process and pleadings, Plaintiff refers to Defendant as “R.J. Reynolds American, Inc.” as opposed to “R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company”. Defendant contends that notices of the error were provided but Plaintiff failed to timely amend her Complaint to correct the misnomer. Plaintiff argues the Court should not Page 5 of 12 dismiss the action but rather, relying on Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, amend the Complaint to add RJ Reynolds Tobacco as the defendant. Plaintiff sets forth several reasons for the error, and urges the Court to take remedial action. The Court finds that no harm will result to the Defendant, and finds good cause warranting remedial action. Pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court will construe Plaintiff’s argument as a motion for leave to amend the Complaint to correct the misnomer, and simultaneously grant the motion. F.3d See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15; see also Roberts v. Michaels, 219 775, 777-78 (8th Cir. 2000)(misnomer principle most appropriate in instances where Plaintiff sues corporation but misnames it). Accordingly, Defendant will be addressed and referred to as “RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company”. See Id. B. Age Discrimination Under the ADEA, it is “unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, employment, § 623(a)(1). because terms, of such conditions, individual’s or privileges age.” 29 of U.S.C. The act applies to “individuals who are at least 40 years of age.” 29 U.S.C. § 631. Page 6 of 12 When a plaintiff alleges disparate treatment, “liability depends on whether the protected trait (under the ADEA, age) actually motivated the employer’s decision.” Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993). The plaintiff’s age must then have “actually played a role in [the employer’s decision making] process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.” Id. Plaintiff’s claims are based on circumstantial evidence and are therefore analyzed under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Riley v. Lance, 2008)(citations proceeds Corp. v. Green, in sufficient Inc. 518 omitted). three evidence to F.3d The stages. 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973). 996, McDonnell Plaintiff establish a prima 1000 (8th Douglas must facie first case Cir. analysis present of age discrimination, thereby creating a legal presumption of unlawful discrimination. 506 (1993). St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, The burden then shifts to Defendant to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. at 506-07. Once Defendant satisfies its burden of production, Plaintiff must establish a question of material fact as to whether the employer’s proffered reason was pretextual and that she was the victim of intentional discrimination. at 508. Throughout, the burden of Page 7 of 12 persuasion See id. remains with Plaintiff. See Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). To establish a prima facie case, Plaintiff must show: (1) that she was terminated; position a (2) from terminated member that which her; circumstances and she she a protected was was (4) giving discrimination. of class terminated; she was qualified otherwise when for the (3) that Defendant that her “discharge occurred to an inference of rise in unlawful Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1332 n.7 (8th Cir. 1996). The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for age discrimination. First, Plaintiff was 43 years old when terminated and a member of a protected class under the ADEA. otherwise qualified Defendant for Plaintiff’s a for her significant employment was position number Second, Plaintiff was (having of terminated. worked years). Fourth, for Third, the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff’s discharge give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination, e.g., a younger and less experienced employee replaced her. Keathley v. Ameritech Corp, 187 F.3d 915, 920-21 (8th Cir. 1999)(citations omitted). Page 8 of 12 Accordingly, evidence that the burden Plaintiff shifts was nondiscriminatory reason.” to Defendant terminated “for to a produce legitimate, Id. To satisfy its burden of production, Defendant has offered evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff, i.e., violation of a terminable offense under company policy by secretly recording her manager. The Court finds that Defendant’s proffered reason for terminating Plaintiff is legitimate and nondiscriminatory, i.e., violation of HR General Rule 1.03(6) is a terminable offense. Accordingly, the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to present evidence that creates a fact issue as to whether the employer’s proffered reasons are mere pretext and that the termination was an act of intentional discrimination based upon Plaintiff’s age. Id. (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000)). Plaintiff can avoid summary judgment “only if the evidence considered in its whether Defendant’s created a entirety (1) proffered reasonable created reasons inference that a are age 1336-37. A plaintiff shows that Page 9 of 12 a issue pretextual was factor in the adverse employment decision.” at fact a as and to (2) determinative Rothmeier, 85 F.3d reason is pretextual “directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing the employer’s Texas proffered Dept. Of explanation Cmty. is Affairs Burdine, v. unworthy 450 of credence.” U.S. 248, 256 (1981). In opposition to Defendant’s stated reason, among other points, Plaintiff contends her unauthorized recording did not fall within the confines of Rule 1.03(6) therefore Defendant had no reason to terminate her. Specifically, Plaintiff argues the recording took place off company premises whereas Rule 1.03(6) is limited to recordings on company premises. Plaintiff submits that in 2006, Rule 1.03(6) included the “on company premises” limiting language, but by 2010, after Plaintiff’s termination, Rule 1.03(6) was amended to remove the limiting language. support, Plaintiff points to her termination letter reflects she was terminated for violation of Rule In which 1.03, the “unauthorized use of recording devices on the premises of the Company.” In (Plaintiff’s Ex. 10). addition, Plaintiff argues that the purpose of Rule 1.03(6) removes its application to her because it is meant to prevent the information. unauthorized dissemination of proprietary Plaintiff also argues that even if Rule 1.03(6) Page 10 of 12 were applicable, Defendant’s her policies termination and history, is i.e., inconsistent a similarly with situated employee was not fired for violation of the same conduct. See Erickson v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 271 F.3d 718, 727 (8th Cir. 2001)(Plaintiff can show pretext by proving that an employer did not follow its own policy when terminating the plaintiff). Defendant termination, argues Rule that 1.03(6) at was recordings on company premises. the of Plaintiff’s limited not time to unauthorized Defendant also argues that Rule 1.03(6) was revised months prior to Plaintiff’s termination and includes a (Plaintiff’s notation Ex. that 5). it was revised Furthermore, on March Defendant 1, argues 2008. that Plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish that similarly situated employees were treated different. Viewing the evidence, in its entirety, the Court finds Plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence which creates a fact issue as to whether Defendant’s proffered reasons are pretextual and a reasonable inference that age was a determinative factor in the adverse employment decision. Rothmeier, 85 F.3d at 1336. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s age discrimination claims is DENIED. Page 11 of 12 IV. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss her ADA, tort of outrage, and disability claims is GRANTED. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s age discrimination claims brought pursuant to the ADEA and State law is DENIED. This matter remains set for trial on November 22, 2010. IT IS SO ORDERED this 12th day of November, 2010. /s/ Robert T. Dawson Honorable Robert T. Dawson United States District Judge Page 12 of 12