Clark v. Social Security Administration Commissioner, No. 3:2013cv03082 - Document 19 (W.D. Ark. 2014)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Erin L. Setser on October 14, 2014. (rg)
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Clark v. Social Security Administration Commissioner Doc. 19 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS HARRISON DIVISION MELISSA R. CLARK PLAINTIFF v. CIVIL NO. 13-3082 CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner Social Security Administration DEFENDANT MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff, Melissa R. Clark, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (Commissioner) denying her claims for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) benefits under the provisions of Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (Act). In this judicial review, the Court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the Commissioner's decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). I. Procedural Background: Plaintiff protectively filed her current applications for DIB and SSI on February 18, 2011, alleging an inability to work since July 22, 2006, due to an anxiety disorder, a panic disorder, depression, and agoraphobia. (Tr. 133, 140, 175). For DIB purposes, Plaintiff maintained insured status through June 30, 2011. (Tr. 10, 146). An administrative video hearing was held on July 3, 2012, at which Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified. (Tr. 23-67). AO72A (Rev. 8/82) Dockets.Justia.com By written decision dated August 23, 2012, the ALJ found that during the relevant time period, Plaintiff had an impairment or combination of impairments that were severe. (Tr. 12). Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: anxiety disorder, NOS; and depressive disorder, NOS. However, after reviewing all of the evidence presented, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff s impairments did not meet or equal the level of severity of any impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments found in Appendix I, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. (Tr. 12). The ALJ found Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to: perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: work is limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, involving only simple, work-related decisions, with few, if any, workplace changes, and no more than incidental contact with co-workers, supervisors, and the general public. (Tr. 14). With the help of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform work as a dishwasher, and a grocery stocker. (Tr. 17-18). Plaintiff then requested a review of the hearing decision by the Appeals Council, which denied that request on August 29, 2013. (Tr. 1-4). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed this action. (Doc. 1). This case is before the undersigned pursuant to the consent of the parties. (Doc. 8). Both parties have filed appeal briefs, and the case is now ready for decision. (Docs. 16, 18). The Court has reviewed the entire transcript. The complete set of facts and arguments are presented in the parties briefs, and are repeated here only to the extent necessary. II. Applicable Law: This Court's role is to determine whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but it is enough that a reasonable mind -2- AO72A (Rev. 8/82) would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's decision. The ALJ's decision must be affirmed if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner's decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the Court would have decided the case differently. Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). In other words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000). It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of proving her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one year and that prevents her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir.2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines physical or mental impairment as an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A Plaintiff must show that her disability, not simply her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months. The Commissioner s regulations require her to apply a five-step sequential evaluation process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity since filing her claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or mental impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal -3- AO72A (Rev. 8/82) an impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy given her age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Only if the final stage is reached does the fact finder consider the Plaintiff s age, education, and work experience in light of her residual functional capacity. See McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1141-42 (8th Cir. 1982); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. III. Discussion: Plaintiff argues the following issues on appeal:1) the ALJ erred in failing to develop the record by ordering a consultative physical examination; and 2) the ALJ s decision denying benefits was not supported by substantial evidence. A. Insured Status: In order to have insured status under the Act, an individual is required to have twenty quarters of coverage in each forty-quarter period ending with the first quarter of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(3)(B). Plaintiff last met this requirement on June 30, 2011. Regarding Plaintiff s application for DIB, the overreaching issue in this case is the question of whether Plaintiff was disabled during the relevant time period of July 22, 2006, her alleged onset date of disability, through June 30, 2011, the last date she was in insured status under Title II of the Act. In order for Plaintiff to qualify for DIB she must prove that, on or before the expiration of her insured status she was unable to engage in substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which is expected to last for at least twelve months or result in death. Basinger v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1166, 1168 (8th Cir. 1984). Records and -4- AO72A (Rev. 8/82) medical opinions from outside the insured period can only be used in helping to elucidate a medical condition during the time for which benefits might be rewarded. Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir.2006) (holding that the parties must focus their attention on claimant's condition at the time she last met insured status requirements). B. Fully and Fairly Develop the Record: Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to develop the record by declining to send Plaintiff for a consultative general physical examination. The Court disagrees. The ALJ has a basic obligation to develop the medical record, but the Plaintiff bears the burden of proving she is disabled and is responsible for producing evidence to support her claim. See Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir.2004). In this case, Plaintiff did not to allege a disabling physical impairment, and the record failed to reveal that Plaintiff sought consistent treat for a physical impairment. Thus, a consultative general physical examination was not required. See Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 749 50 (8th Cir.2001) (it is permissible for ALJ to issue decision without obtaining added medical evidence, so long as other evidence provides sufficient basis for ALJ's decision). Furthermore, the record before the ALJ contained the evidence required to make a full and informed decision regarding Plaintiff s capabilities during the relevant time period. See Strongson v. Barnhart, 361 F.3d 1066, 1071-72 (8th Cir.2004) (ALJ must develop record fully and fairly to ensure it includes evidence from treating physician, or at least examining physician, addressing impairments at issue). C. Subjective Complaints and Credibility Analysis: The ALJ was required to consider all the evidence relating to Plaintiff s subjective complaints including evidence presented by third parties that relates to: (1) Plaintiff's daily -5- AO72A (Rev. 8/82) activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of her pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of her medication; and (5) functional restrictions. See Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). While an ALJ may not discount a claimant's subjective complaints solely because the medical evidence fails to support them, an ALJ may discount those complaints where inconsistencies appear in the record as a whole. Id. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit observed, Our touchstone is that [a claimant's] credibility is primarily a matter for the ALJ to decide. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003). After reviewing the administrative record, it is clear that the ALJ properly considered and evaluated Plaintiff s subjective complaints, including the Polaski factors. A review of the record revealed that during the relevant time period Plaintiff was able to take care of her mother from 2006, until she passed in 2009; to take care of her grandmother for a period of time in 2010; to help her uncle feed his cattle and her aunt clean her home; to help clean her cousin s home; to perform regular household chores; and to spend time at the lake with her boyfriend. (Tr. 38, 44, 388, 390-391). The Court would note that while Plaintiff alleged an inability to seek treatment due to a lack of finances, the record is void of any indication that Plaintiff had been denied treatment due to the lack of funds. Murphy v. Sullivan, 953 F.3d 383, 386-87 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that lack of evidence that plaintiff sought low-cost medical treatment from her doctor, clinics, or hospitals does not support plaintiff s contention of financial hardship). The record further revealed that Plaintiff was able to come up with the funds to support her smoking habit during the relevant time period. -6- AO72A (Rev. 8/82) Therefore, although it is clear that Plaintiff suffers with some degree of limitation, she has not established that she is unable to engage in any gainful activity. Accordingly, the Court concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ s conclusion that Plaintiff s subjective complaints were not totally credible. D. The ALJ s RFC Determination: RFC is the most a person can do despite that person s limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). It is assessed using all relevant evidence in the record. Id. This includes medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and the claimant s own descriptions of her limitations. Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005); Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004). Limitations resulting from symptoms such as pain are also factored into the assessment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that a claimant s residual functional capacity is a medical question. Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001). Therefore, an ALJ s determination concerning a claimant s RFC must be supported by medical evidence that addresses the claimant s ability to function in the workplace. Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2003). [T]he ALJ is [also] required to set forth specifically a claimant s limitations and to determine how those limitations affect his RFC. Id. After reviewing the entire record, the Court finds there was sufficient evidence for the ALJ to make an informed decision. The Court notes that in determining Plaintiff could perform work at all exertional levels but that she had some non-exertional limitations, the ALJ specifically discussed the relevant medical records and Plaintiff s subjective complaints. Plaintiff's capacity to perform this level of work is also supported by the fact that the medical -7- AO72A (Rev. 8/82) evidence does not indicate that Plaintiff's examining physicians placed restrictions on her activities that would preclude performing the RFC determined. See Hutton v. Apfel, 175 F.3d 651, 655 (8th Cir. 1999) (lack of physician-imposed restrictions militates against a finding of total disability). Based on the record as a whole, the Court finds substantial evidence to support the ALJ s RFC determination for the relevant time period. E. Hypothetical Question to the Vocational Expert: After thoroughly reviewing the hearing transcript along with the entire evidence of record, the Court finds that the hypothetical the ALJ posed to the vocational expert fully set forth the impairments which the ALJ accepted as true and which were supported by the record as a whole. Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 794 (8th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the Court finds that the vocational expert's opinion constitutes substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff's impairments did not preclude her from performing work as a dishwasher, and a grocery stocker. Pickney v. Chater, 96 F.3d 294, 296 (8th Cir. 1996)(testimony from vocational expert based on properly phrased hypothetical question constitutes substantial evidence). IV. Conclusion: Accordingly, having carefully reviewed the record, the undersigned finds substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's decision denying the Plaintiff benefits, and thus the decision should be affirmed. The undersigned further finds that the Plaintiff s Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. DATED this 14th day of October, 2014. /s/ Erin L. Setser HON. ERIN L. SETSER -8- AO72A (Rev. 8/82)
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