Eppes v. Social Security Administration, No. 5:2018cv00026 - Document 15 (E.D. Ark. 2018)
Court Description: RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION: The magistrate judge recommends reversing and remanding for an immediate award of benefits with the onset date of 2/22/2016. Objections to these Findings and Recommendations are due no later than 14 days from the date of this Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jerome T. Kearney on 8/30/2018. (mcz)
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Eppes v. Social Security Administration Doc. 15 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS PINE BLUFF DIVISION SHARON D. EPPES PLAINTIFF v. No. 5:18-CV-00026-BSM-JTK NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, performing the duties and functions not reserved to the Commissioner of Social Security DEFENDANT RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS The following Recom m ended Disposition (“Recom m endation”) has been sent to United States District J udge Brian S. Miller. You m ay file written objections to all or part of this Recom m endation. If you do so, those objections m ust: (1) specifically explain the factual and/ or legal basis for your objection; and (2) be received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of this Recom m endation. By not objecting, you m ay waive the right to appeal questions of fact. REASONING FOR RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION Sharon Eppes applied for social security disability benefits with an alleged onset date of February 22, 20 16. (R. at 62). After a hearing, the adm inistrative law judge (ALJ ) denied her application. (R. at 24). The Appeals Council denied her request for review. (R. at 1). The ALJ ’s decision now stands as the Com m issioner’s final decision, and Eppes has requested judicial review. For the reasons stated below, the m agistrate judge recom m ends reversing and rem anding the Com m issioner’s decision for an im m ediate award of benefits. I. The Commissioner’s Decision Dockets.Justia.com The ALJ found that Eppes had the severe im pairm ents of hypertension, kidney transplant, back pain, and sleep apnea. (R. at 17). The ALJ then found that Eppes’s im pairm ents left her with the residual functional capacity (RFC) to lift/ carry and push/ pull up to twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently; sit for two hours in an eight-hour workday; stand/ walk six hours in an eight-hour workday; occasionally clim b, crouch, balance, kneel, stoop, crawl, and bend. (R. at 18). The ALJ found that Eppes could perform her past relevant work as a general clerk and therefore held that she was not disabled. (R. at 23– 24). II. Discussion The Court is to affirm the ALJ ’s decision if it is not based on legal error and is supported by “substantial evidence in the record as a whole,” which is m ore than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. Long v. Chater, 10 8 F.3d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1997). The Court considers evidence supporting and evidence detracting from the Com m issioner’s decision, but it will not reverse sim ply because substantial evidence could support a different outcom e. Prosch v. Apfel, 20 1 F.3d 10 10 , 10 12 (8th Cir. 20 0 0 ). Eppes argues that she cannot perform her past relevant work under the RFC found by the ALJ , that the ALJ failed to include lim itations from consultative exam iners, and that the ALJ failed to give her a full and fair hearing. As the undersigned agrees that the RFC as presented in the ALJ ’s decision would preclude her past relevant work, it is not necessary to reach her other points. The ALJ em ployed a vocational expert (VE) at the hearing to determ ine whether Eppes could perform her past relevant work. The ALJ presented a hypothetical question in which he asked the VE to consider an individual capable of the “full range” of light work who could occasionally clim b, balance, stoop, bend, crouch, kneel, and crawl. (R. at 54). The VE responded that such an individual could perform Eppes’s past relevant work as a general clerk. (R. at 54– 55). The VE classified Eppes’s past work as a secretary as a general clerk. (R. at 54). The VE relied on Eppes’s description of her duties in classifying this work. Eppes listed the requirem ents of this job as including sitting for eight hours per day. (R. at 226, 228, 236, 238). While the VE testified that the general clerk was at a light exertional level, the Social Security Adm inistration acknowledges that som e light jobs require sitting for six to eight hours per day. Titles II & Xvi: Determ ining Capability to Do Other W ork-the Med.-Vocational Rules of Appendix 2, SSR 83-10 (S.S.A. 1983). There is no evidence or argum ent that the sitting requirem ents alleged by Eppes are incorrect. Norm ally, the full range of light work also encom passes the full range of sedentary work, except in unusual circum stances such as when an individual cannot sit for the tim e required by sedentary work. 20 C.F.R. § 40 4.1567(b). It is therefore assum ed that a person capable of the full range of light work can sit for six to eight hours per day. The Com m issioner does not dispute that the RFC in the ALJ ’s decision lim its Eppes to sitting for two hours. The Com m issioner does not dispute that the RFC in the decision is written as intended. The Com m issioner does not dispute that Eppes would be precluded from perform ing her past relevant work if she were lim ited to sitting for two hours per day. As such, she could not perform her past relevant work. The ALJ erred in relying on the answer to a hypothetical question for the full range of light work where he included sitting lim itations beyond what is norm ally contem plated for light work. Eppes has a lim ited education and was of advanced age at the onset date. (R. at 34, 62). The VE testified that Eppes had no transferable skills. (R. at 54). According to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, a person of advanced age with a lim ited education and an RFC for light work with no transferable skills is disabled if unable to return to past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 40 4, Subpt. P, App. 2. With the RFC that the ALJ found, Eppes would be disabled under the Medical-Vocational Guidelines. “Reversal and rem and for an im m ediate award of benefits is the appropriate rem edy where the record overwhelm ingly supports a finding of disability.” Pate-Fires v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 935, 947 (8th Cir. 20 0 9). Reversing for an im m ediate award of benefits does not require the Court to disturb the ALJ ’s factual findings concerning Eppes’s im pairm ents and RFC, and the undersigned finds that this is the appropriate rem edy in this case. III. Recommended Disposition The ALJ did not present the RFC to the VE in a hypothetical question and thus relied on an im proper response in finding Eppes capable of returning to past relevant work. Under the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, a person of Eppes’s vocational profile is disabled. The ALJ ’s decision is therefore not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. For these reasons, the undersigned m agistrate judge recomm ends REVERSING and REMANDING for an im m ediate award of benefits with the onset date of February 22, 20 16. Dated this 30 th day of August, 20 18. ________________________________ J EROME T. KEARNEY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE J UDGE
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