Lucero v. STI Trucking Incorporated et al, No. 3:2022cv08035 - Document 118 (D. Ariz. 2024)
Court Description: ORDER granting Defendants' Second 103 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment: Punitive Damages. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing punitive damages as to all parties. Signed by Judge Susan M. Brnovich on 4/8/2024. (ESG)
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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Joseph Lucero, Plaintiff, 10 11 v. 12 STI Trucking Incorporated, et al., 13 No. CV-22-08035-PCT-SMB ORDER Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Second Motion for Partial Summary 16 Judgment: Punitive Damages (Doc. 103) and the required statement of facts (Doc. 104). 17 Plaintiff filed a response (Doc. 105) and a contravening statement of facts (Doc. 106), to 18 which Defendant replied (Doc. 108). After reviewing the parties’ arguments and relevant 19 case law, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion. 20 I. 21 22 BACKGROUND The Court recounted much of this case’s factual background in its previous summary judgment Order (Doc. 98). However, for ease of reference it is repeated here. 23 This is a personal injury action involving two semi-trucks traveling east on Interstate 24 40 in Mohave County, Arizona. (Doc. 1 at 2.) The collision occurred on August 22, 2020. 25 (Id.) Defendant, Alexander Kim, was driving a white 2020 Volvo semi-truck, owned by 26 Defendant STI Trucking Inc. (“STI”). (Id. at 2, 6.) Defendant Alexander Karp, Kim’s 27 driver trainer, was also in the truck but was asleep at the time of the collision. (Id. at 6; 28 Doc. 88 at 12.) Plaintiff was driving a green 2020 Mack semi-truck. (Doc. 1 at 7.) At the 1 time of the accident, both Kim and Karp were employees of STI. (Id. at 6–8.) The accident 2 occurred when Kim attempted to merge into the lane that Plaintiff was driving in and 3 collided with Plaintiff’s truck. (Doc. 104 at 2 ¶ 2.) Plaintiff was transported to Kingman 4 Regional Medical Center for treatment. (Doc. 89-3 at 1.) Law enforcement issued 5 Defendant Kim a traffic citation at the scene for an unsafe lane change. (Doc. 106 at 10 6 ¶ 19.) 7 Plaintiff originally brought several claims against STI, Karp, and Kim. (See 8 generally Doc. 1.) Defendants then moved for summary judgment on the negligent 9 entrustment claim, the negligent hiring, training, and supervision and retention claims, and 10 the negligence per se claim arising out of Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 11 (“FMCSA”) violations against STI and sought to “dismiss” Karp from the case. (Doc. 72.) 12 The Court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs as to the negligent entrustment claim 13 and the negligent hiring, training, supervision and retention claims, but denied summary 14 judgment as to on the negligence per se claim based on 49 C.F.R. §§ 382.303(a)(2) and 15 383.111(a)(7). (Doc. 98.) Based on this Order, the Court dismissed Defendants Dimitry 16 Karp and Jane Doe Karp from the case. (Doc. 109.) 17 The only remaining claims are negligence claims against Kim and the vicarious 18 liability claims against STI. Now before the Court is the issue of whether punitive damages 19 are available for these claims. 20 II. LEGAL STANDARD 21 Summary judgment is appropriate in circumstances where “there is no genuine 22 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 23 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of a case under 24 the applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 25 Factual disputes are genuine when the evidence could allow a reasonable jury to find in 26 favor of the nonmoving party. Id. “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely 27 disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the 28 record” or by “showing that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to -2- 1 support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)–(B). Additionally, the Court may enter 2 summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 3 existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the 4 burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 5 When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence 6 in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 7 Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in 8 the nonmovant’s favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Additionally, the Court does not make 9 credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Id. at 253. The determination of whether 10 a given factual dispute requires submission to a jury is guided by the substantive 11 evidentiary standards that apply to the case. Id. at 255. 12 The burden initially falls with the movant to demonstrate the basis for a motion for 13 summary judgment, and they must identify “those portions of [the record] which it believes 14 demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 15 323. If this initial burden is not met, the nonmovant does not need to produce anything. 16 Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102–03 (9th Cir. 2000). 17 However, if the initial burden is met by the movant, then the nonmovant has a burden to 18 establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 1103. The nonmovant “must 19 do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” 20 Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. at 586. Bare assertions alone do not create a material issue 21 of fact, and “[i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, 22 summary judgment may be granted.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 247–50 (citations 23 omitted). 24 III. DISCUSSION 25 Courts may not award punitive damages based simply on negligence, gross 26 negligence or recklessness. Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 578 (Ariz. 1986). Instead, 27 under Arizona law, a plaintiff may only be entitled to punitive damages where they can 28 show that the defendant acted “with a knowing, culpable state of mind.” Gurule v. Illinois -3- 1 Mut. Life and Cas. Co., 734 P.2d 85, 86 (Ariz. 1987). “[U]nless the evidence establishes 2 that . . . [the] defendant acted with an evil mind, punitive damages are unnecessary because 3 compensatory damages adequately deter.” Id. “To establish an evil mind requires clear 4 and convincing evidence that the defendant’s actions either (1) intended to cause harm, (2) 5 were motivated by spite, or (3) were outrageous, creating a ‘substantial risk of tremendous 6 harm to others.’” Swift Transportation Co. of Arizona L.L.C. v. Carman, 515 P.3d 685, 7 692 (Ariz. 2022) (quoting Volz v. Coleman Co., 748 P.2d 1191, 1194 (Ariz. 1987)). As 8 applied to negligence cases, the only way a plaintiff can meet this burden is by 9 demonstrating “the outrageousness of the defendant’s conduct is such that the defendant 10 had ‘an evil mind’ when engaging in such conduct.” Id. Accordingly, “a plaintiff generally 11 must show that the defendant's conduct was ‘outrageous, oppressive or intolerable,’ and 12 ‘create[d] [a] substantial risk of tremendous harm,’ thereby evidencing a ‘conscious and 13 deliberate disregard of the interest[s] and rights of others.’” Id. (cleaned up). In other 14 words, “a plaintiff must establish that the defendant knew, or intentionally disregarded, 15 facts that created an unreasonable risk of physical harm—a risk substantially greater than 16 that necessary to make his or her conduct negligent or even grossly negligent—and 17 consciously disregarded that risk.” Id. at 693. 18 Defendants argue that the instant holding in Swift precludes punitive damages here. 19 (Doc. 103 at 5.) Conversely, Plaintiff argues that he can raise a genuine issue of fact as to 20 Defendant Kim acting with an evil mind based on the approach taken in other Arizona 21 cases. (Doc. 105 at 4.) 22 Plaintiff cites to Purdy v Metcalf, 502 P.3d 36, 43 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2021) for the 23 premise this Court should use a multi-factor test applied on a case-by-case basis “totality 24 of the circumstances” approach to decide whether punitive damages are warranted here. 25 (Doc. 105 at 8.) Although Purdy may stand for this proposition, Swift is a more recent case 26 from the Arizona Supreme Court and is therefore controlling. The Court in Swift did not 27 use, or mention, a “totality of the circumstances” test when analyzing punitive damages in 28 a truck crash negligence claim. See generally Swift, 515 P.3d 685. Instead, the Swift court -4- 1 affirmed that the standard for whether punitive damages are available for this kind of tort 2 is whether the defendant acted outrageously, with an “evil hand” and an “evil mind.” Id. 3 at 692. 4 Here, in light of Purdy, Plaintiff asks the Court to consider the following actions in 5 making its determination on the availability of punitive damages. First, Plaintiffs note that 6 an expert report indicates that Defendant may have been distracted while driving. (Doc. 7 89-5.) Next, although the parties dispute the severity of his injuries, Plaintiff was injured 8 in the collision and Defendant was issued a traffic citation1 for an unsafe lane change. 9 (Doc. 106 at 8 ¶ 28; Doc. 100 at 2 ¶ 2.) Plaintiff also asks the Court to consider that 10 Defendant Kim obstructed the collection of evidence by not giving a recorded or written 11 statement to STI and by not taking photos of the crash. (Doc. 105 at 10.) Plaintiff also 12 alleges that the fact that Kim is a professional driver and was operating a “larger size” truck 13 supports the ability to collect punitive damages. (Id. at 9.) Lastly, Plaintiff claims that 14 Kim’s “maneuver” of passing Plaintiff going uphill was “reckless driving” which should 15 be considered in making punitive damages available. (Id. at 11.) 16 In listing these factors, Plaintiff asks the Court to consider the “totality of the 17 circumstances” to determine whether Defendant disregarded a substantial risk thereby 18 warranting punitive damages. (Id. at 9.) However, as Defendants note, “disregard of a 19 substantial risk” is a much lower standard than what is required for punitive damages under 20 Swift. In fact, the court in Swift rejected the notion that mere disregard of a substantial risk 21 is enough to allow punitive damages, and instead found that a defendant must take an 22 outrageous action that “create[es] a substantial risk of tremendous harm.” Swift, 515 P.3d 23 at 693 (emphasis added). Here, instead of presenting how the facts show that Kim’s action 24 of changing lanes while going uphill in a large vehicle was outrageous, Plaintiffs argue 25 only that he consciously disregarded a risk. This, as a matter of law, is not enough to be 26 able to bring the issue of punitive damages before a jury. 27 28 Using the same standard, the Court also finds that there is not a genuine fact issue 1 Plaintiffs briefing attempts to color this ticket as a criminal charge. (Doc. 105 at 10.) This is false. Kim was only ever issued a civil traffic citation. (Doc. 74-1.) -5- 1 as to whether STI acted with an evil mind to make punitive damages available. As 2 Defendants note, Plaintiff’s Response and statement of facts attempts to recast their 3 negligent training claim against STI as evidence that can be used to support punitive 4 damages in the remaining vicarious liability claims. The Court already found that the 5 record failed to support a finding that Kim was incompetent or that STI failed to train him. 6 (Doc. 98 at 7–9.) Further, Plaintiff’s allegation that STI did not have a safety manager is 7 faulty at best, as the owner testified that he acts as a safety manager and there is a system 8 in place to prevent crashes. (Doc. 75-2.) However, even if there is a question on whether 9 there was an adequate safety manager, this is still insufficient to show that STI acted with 10 an evil mind. Swift, 515 P.3d at 694 (finding that a mere violation of safety protocol or 11 regulation may amount to negligence but does not rise to being “outrageous conduct” so to 12 warrant punitive damages). 13 Finally, as to the argument that Plaintiff’s pro se negligence claims should be subject 14 to punitive damages because they constitute a regulatory violation, the Court is not 15 persuaded. As explained in this Court’s previous Order, in Arizona, a “person who violates 16 a statute enacted for the protection and safety of the public is guilty of negligence per se.” 17 Jensen v. EXC, Inc., No. CV-15-08019-PHX-SPL, 2019 WL 588034, at *3 (D. Ariz. Feb. 18 13, 2019) (quoting Good v. City of Glendale, 722 P.2d 386, 389 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986)). 19 After this Court’s previous summary judgment Order, the only questions on regulatory 20 violations that remain are for 49 C.F.R. § 382.303(a)(2), which requires post-crash testing 21 for drugs and alcohol and 49 C.F.R. § 383.111(a)(7), which requires all CMV operators to 22 have knowledge in the importance of proper visual search and proper visual search 23 methods. The Court already found that punitive damages are not available for these kinds 24 of violations. (Doc. 98 at 11); see also 25A C.J.S. Damages § 228 (2023); Swift, 515 P.3d 25 694 (“Moreover, even if . . . conduct violated such a regulation, without more, such failure 26 is a far cry from the outrageous or quasi-criminal conduct sufficient to establish an evil 27 mind.”). 28 … -6- 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 Accordingly, 3 IT IS ORDERED granting Defendants’ Second Motion for Partial Summary 4 Judgment: Punitive Damages (Doc. 103). 5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing punitive damages as to all parties. 6 Dated this 8th day of April, 2024. 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -7-
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