Mohave Estate Management Office v. Bunton et al, No. 3:2011cv08202 - Document 86 (D. Ariz. 2013)

Court Description: ORDER denying Defendant Southern California Edison Company Retirement Plan's Motion for Sumamry Judgment (Doc. 62 ). FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant show cause by 8/9/13 as to why summary judgment should not be granted in favor of Mohave and Ms. Cameron on its counterclaims. FURTHER ORDERED that SCECR show cause why the remainder of its counterclaims should not be dismissed and this action terminated by 8/9/13. See order for details. Signed by Judge Neil V. Wake on 7-12-13. (NVW, nb)

Download PDF
Mohave Estate Management Office v. Bunton et al 1 Doc. 86 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Rashiel Salem Enterprises LLC, Plaintiff, 10 11 12 No. CV-11-08202-PHX-NVW ORDER v. Cheryl A. Bunton, et al., Defendants. 13 14 15 Before the Court is Southern California Edison Company Retirement Plan’s 16 Motion for Summary Judgment on Its Counterclaims. In its Motion, Southern California 17 Edison Company Retirement Plan (the Retirement Plan) argues it is entitled to judgment 18 as a matter of law on its counterclaims against Lela Cameron, John Doe Cameron, and 19 Mohave Estate Management Office (Mohave). For the following reasons, the Retirement 20 Plan’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied. 21 I. Background 22 This case began when Mohave brought claims against Cheryl Bunton and 23 Southern California Edison Company (SCE), an electrical utility in California, relating to 24 the pension benefits of Lela Cameron. The Retirement Plan is a defined-benefit ERISA 25 plan that provides benefits to retirees from SCE. 26 conservator for Ms. Cameron, sought declaratory relief and reinstatement of Ms. 27 Cameron’s pension benefits on the grounds that SCE wrongly terminated those benefits 28 after Ms. Bunton caused the benefit to be liquidated. In response, the Retirement Plan Mohave, as the guardian and 1 brought counterclaims against Ms. Cameron and Mohave, claiming that Ms. Cameron 2 received two errant payments from the Retirement Plan and failed to return those funds. 3 Ms. Cameron, an employee of SCE, qualified for long term disability benefits 4 from SCE after she became unable to work due to Huntington Disease in 1997. As part 5 of her employment with SCE, Ms. Cameron also participated in SCE’s Retirement Plan. 6 As part of the Retirement Plan, Ms. Cameron had the option of receiving monthly 7 retirement benefits or a lump sum payment of all her earned benefits after she separated 8 from SCE’s service. 9 As her disease progressed, Ms. Cameron became unable to care for herself. Her 10 father, Daniel Frasier, became her caregiver and remained so until he passed away in 11 2009. Ms. Bunton served as Mr. Frasier’s housekeeper and assisted with Ms. Cameron’s 12 care. Around the time of Mr. Frasier’s death, Ms. Bunton began to refer to herself as Ms. 13 Cameron’s trustee. 14 execute estate planning documents and assumed control of all of Ms. Cameron’s 15 finances. Ms. Cameron by then lacked the capacity to manage her finances herself. In September 2009, Ms. Bunton arranged for Ms. Cameron to 16 At some point after September 3, 2009, Ms. Bunton submitted a power-of-attorney 17 document to SCE in which she purported to assume power-of-attorney on behalf of Ms. 18 Cameron. The parties vigorously dispute whether Ms. Cameron had the capacity to 19 execute a valid power-of-attorney in favor of Ms. Bunton at that time, but, for reasons 20 discussed below, that dispute is immaterial to this summary judgment motion. 21 November, 2009, Ms. Bunton contacted the Retirement Plan to request a lump-sum 22 distribution of Ms. Cameron’s pension benefits, purportedly acting under the power of 23 attorney for Ms. Cameron. In 24 Ms. Cameron’s retirement had accrued a lump-sum value of $120,138.40 in 25 November 2009. That amount was subject to mandatory federal income tax withholding 26 in the amount of $24,027.68. As a result, the correct lump-sum payment to Ms. Cameron 27 would have been $96,110.72. In response to Ms. Bunton’s request, on February 1, 2010, 28 the Retirement Plan deposited $120,138.40 into Ms. Cameron’s bank account, which was -2- 1 at that time controlled by Ms. Bunton. Due to the Retirement Plan’s processing error, the 2 federal income tax was not withheld, and the Retirement Plan overpaid $24,027.68 on 3 Ms. Cameron’s account. On March 1, 2010, the Retirement Plan deposited another 4 $96,548.86 into the bank account. That entire amount was deposited because of another 5 of the Retirement Plan’s processing errors. In total, the Retirement Plan’s errors resulted 6 in its $120,576.54 overpayment on Ms. Cameron’s retirement plan. 7 Ms. Bunton subsequently used Ms. Cameron’s bank account to write checks, make 8 debit card purchases, and take ATM withdraws for Ms. Bunton’s personal spending in a 9 total amount of at least $138,298.36. In November 2011, Ms. Bunton pled guilty to one 10 count of theft in Mohave County Superior Court and was sentenced to six years in prison. 11 It total, Ms. Bunton stole more than $200,000 worth of Ms. Cameron’s property and 12 money while Ms. Cameron was incapacitated. 13 II. Legal Standard 14 The Retirement Plan moves for summary judgment on its counterclaim that Lela 15 Cameron must return the overpayment the Retirement Plan made in its lump-sum 16 disbursement of Ms. Cameron’s pension benefits. 17 judgment must demonstrate that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 18 that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A 19 material fact is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. 20 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The movant has the burden 21 of showing the absence of genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 22 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). At the summary judgment stage, the nonmoving party’s evidence 23 is presumed true, and all inferences from the evidence are drawn in the light most 24 favorable to the non-moving party. Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Imp. & Power Dist., 25 555 F.3d 850, 864 (9th Cir. 2009). 26 III. A party moving for summary Analysis 27 A. Equitable Relief Under ERISA 28 Ordinarily, a party in the Retirement Plan’s position would file a claim for breach -3- 1 of contract and seek relief in the form of a judgment for money damages. Under § 2 502(a)(3) of ERISA, however, a plan fiduciary such as the Retirement Plan can seek only 3 “equitable relief” from a plan participant such as Ms. Cameron. Bilyeu v. Morgan 4 Stanley Long Term Disability Plan, 683 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 133 5 S. Ct. 1242 (2013); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B). Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA authorizes a 6 civil action: “by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice 7 which violates . . . the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief 8 (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of . . . the terms of the 9 plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). The Retirement Plan may therefore seek equitable relief 10 under § 502(a)(3) to enforce the terms of the plan. As a result, under ERISA, the 11 Retirement Plan may only seek “the kinds of relief typically available in equity in the 12 days of the divided bench, before law and equity merged”; it may not seek legal relief. 13 US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537, 1544 (2013) (citation and internal 14 quotation marks omitted). 15 In order to maintain an action against Ms. Cameron, then, the Retirement Plan 16 must demonstrate that the relief it seeks is equitable under § 502(a)(3). 17 Retirement Plan seeks “in essence, to impose personal liability on [Ms. Cameron] for a 18 contractual obligation to pay money—relief that was not typically available in equity.” 19 Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002). In some 20 cases, however, a plaintiff “could seek restitution in equity, ordinarily in the form of a 21 constructive trust or an equitable lien, where money or property identified as belonging in 22 good conscience to the plaintiff could clearly be traced to particular funds or property in 23 the defendant’s possession.” Id. at 213. To determine whether the kind of relief the 24 Retirement Plan seeks here—restitution of funds improperly paid to a plan beneficiary— 25 is equitable rather than legal restitution, courts therefore must examine whether a plaintiff 26 “sought to impose a constructive trust or equitable lien on ‘particular funds or property in 27 the defendant’s possession.’” Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 362 28 (2006) (quoting Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210). -4- Here, the 1 The fact that the Retirement Plan seeks a money payment in this case does not, 2 therefore, necessarily “remove it from the category of traditionally equitable relief.” 3 CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1880 (2011). Rather, the Retirement Plan may 4 recover a money judgment for reimbursement of overpayments it made to Ms. Cameron 5 if the money it seeks to recover is the particular disbursement that the Retirement Plan 6 made on her behalf. Id. at 1878. But the Ninth Circuit recently emphasized that Sereboff 7 “did not purport to do away with the long established principle that an equitable lien by 8 agreement applies only to ‘particular funds or property in the defendant's possession.’” 9 Bilyeu, 683 F.3d at 1092. The lien or constructive trust the Retirement Plan seeks can 10 only be equitable relief, in other words, if the funds it would recover are the specifically 11 identified funds at issue, distinct from Ms. Cameron’s general assets. Sereboff, 547 U.S. 12 at 364. 13 B. 14 The Retirement Plan contends that it is entitled to summary judgment because the 15 undisputed facts show that SCE’s retirement plan paid a total of $216,687.26 on Ms. 16 Cameron’s behalf, which represents an overpayment of $120,576.54. According to the 17 Retirement Plan, the plain terms of the governing Summary Plan Description require Ms. 18 Cameron to repay SCECRP for any overpayment. The Retirement Plan contends that the 19 Summary Plan Description created an equitable lien by agreement which, under Sereboff, 20 permits the Retirement Plan to follow the overpayments into Ms. Cameron’s hands and 21 impose an equitable lien on those funds. Criteria for Equitable Liens in ERISA Actions 22 The Ninth Circuit has, however, interpreted Sereboff to establish at least three 23 clear criteria that the Retirement Plan must meet in order to establish an equitable lien by 24 agreement in an ERISA action. “First, there must be a promise by the beneficiary to 25 reimburse the fiduciary for benefits paid under the plan in the event of [an overpayment] . 26 . . Second, the reimbursement agreement must specifically identify a particular fund, 27 distinct from the beneficiary's general assets, from which the fiduciary will be 28 reimbursed. Third, the funds specifically identified by the fiduciary must be within the -5- 1 possession and control of the beneficiary.” Bilyeu, 683 F.3d at 1092-93 (citations and 2 internal quotation marks omitted). These three criteria are the only relevant questions of 3 law and fact in this Motion for Summary Judgment. The dispute between the parties 4 about whether the Retirement Plan knew or should have known about Ms. Cameron’s 5 disability, and correspondingly about whether the Retirement Plan should have honored 6 the power of attorney in favor of Ms. Bunton, therefore has no bearing on the Court’s 7 analysis. 8 9 1. Promise To Reimburse In this case, the first criterion from Bilyeu is satisfied. The Summary Plan 10 Description, which describes “the main features of the Retirement Plan,” clearly sets 11 forth that if a beneficiary of the plan receives an overpayment, the beneficiary “will be 12 required to repay the plan.” (Doc. 62 at 4.) Ms. Cameron does not dispute that this 13 language was a part of the plan description; rather, she contends that the first criterion is 14 not met because she has not and will not receive the overpayment herself. The first 15 criterion does not require that the condition triggering the promise come to pass, 16 however; the requirement is only that the beneficiary promised to reimburse the fiduciary 17 in the event of the condition. Ms. Cameron promised to repay the Retirement Plan in the 18 event of an overpayment, and so the first criterion is met. 19 2. Specific Property for Reimbursement 20 It is unclear in this case, as it was in Bilyeu, whether the second criterion—the 21 agreement must specifically identify a particular fund, distinct from the beneficiary's 22 general assets, from which the fiduciary will be reimbursed—is satisfied. The Summary 23 Plan Description does specify that “[o]verpayment resulting from an error may be 24 deducted from future benefit payments, if any.” (Doc. 62 at 4.) If that portion of the 25 Summary Plan were relevant in this case, the agreement would have specified a particular 26 fund from which the Retirement Plan would be reimbursed: future benefit payments, as 27 distinct from Ms. Cameron’s general assets. But because there were no future benefit 28 payments to be made after the lump-sum distribution of Ms. Cameron’s pension, that -6- 1 language has no bearing on this case. 2 Rather, the relevant language is “[i]f you receive an overpayment, you will be 3 required to repay the plan.” (Id.) As a result, the Plan Description raises the same 4 problem for equitable relief that the Ninth Circuit identified in Bilyeu: the overpaid 5 benefits themselves are meant to be the specifically identified fund. 683 F.3d at 1093. 6 As in that case, the overpaid benefits here “are not a particular fund, but a specific 7 amount of money encompassed within a particular fund—the . . . benefits [the fiduciary] 8 paid to [the beneficiary].” Id. As a result, “the overpayment has never existed as a 9 distinct object or fund.” Id. That makes a determination of whether the overpayment is 10 specific property, separate from Ms. Cameron’s general assets, problematic. If there 11 were remaining benefits payments from the retirement plan from which the Retirement 12 Plan could draw the reimbursement funds, the requirement of specific property would 13 have been met. There were not, and the Retirement Plan therefore cannot establish that 14 the agreement specifically identifies a particular fund as required by the second criterion. 15 3. Specific Funds Within Beneficiary’s Possession 16 Even if the second criterion were met, summary judgment for the Retirement Plan 17 would be inappropriate because the Retirement Plan cannot show that the overpaid funds 18 are in Ms. Cameron’s possession and control. The third Bilyeu criterion is a “requirement 19 that the specifically identified funds be within [the beneficiary’s] ‘possession and 20 control.’” Id. at 1094 (quoting Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 363). In Sereboff, the fiduciary 21 sought to recover funds that were within the possession and control of the beneficiaries 22 and that had “been set aside and preserved in the Sereboffs’ investment accounts.” 547 23 U.S. at 363. The Ninth Circuit, disagreeing with other circuits in their application of 24 Sereboff, found that equitable relief was not available to the fiduciary even when the 25 specific funds are not within the beneficiary’s possession simply because the beneficiary 26 spent them all. Bilyeu, 683 F.3d at 1094. 27 In this case, by contrast, there is no dispute that the overpaid funds are not within 28 Ms. Cameron’s possession. Indeed, this case is a particularly stark demonstration of a -7- 1 situation in which the beneficiary no longer possess the property the fiduciary seeks to 2 recover through no fault of the beneficiary. If Ms. Cameron would not be subject to an 3 equitable lien even if she had spent the overpayment, it would be particularly inequitable 4 to impose such a lien when the overpayment is not in her possession because Ms. Bunton 5 stole it. Because Ms. Cameron does not have the overpayment in her possession, the 6 Retirement Plan is seeking “the imposition of personal liability, rather than enforcement 7 of an equitable lien on particular property.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 8 omitted). That kind of relief “is quintessentially legal, rather than equitable,” and it is not 9 available to the Retirement Plan under ERISA. Id. 10 The Retirement Plan also contends that that Ms. Cameron’s judgment against Ms. 11 Bunton in this case represents an asset of Ms. Cameron’s that is traceable to the 12 overpayments. This argument is problematic for two reasons: first, those funds are not 13 yet within Ms. Cameron’s possession and control; second, the Retirement Plan has not 14 established an absence of disputed facts as to the contents of the judgment against Ms. 15 Bunton. Without a showing that some specific portion of that judgment is traceable to 16 the overpayments and that the specific portion is within Ms. Cameron’s possession or 17 control, the Retirement Plan cannot show that it is entitled to equitable relief as a matter 18 of law. 19 C. 20 The facts relevant to the Retirement Plan’s Motion for Summary Judgment are not 21 in dispute; the issue in this Motion is the purely legal question of whether, on those facts, 22 the Retirement Plan is entitled to judgment. For all of the reasons above, the Retirement 23 Plan has not shown that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As a result, though 24 they have not yet moved for summary judgment, it seems that judgment on these 25 counterclaims would be appropriate in favor of Mohave and Ms. Cameron. The Court 26 may, after giving notice and a reasonable time to respond, grant summary judgment for a 27 nonmovant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)(1). As a result, the Retirement Plan will be ordered to 28 show cause why summary judgment should not be granted in favor Mohave and Ms. Remaining Issues -8- 1 Cameron. 2 As discussed at oral argument on this Motion, apart from obtaining a default 3 judgment against Cross Defendant Cheryl Bunton, it also appears that the Retirement 4 Plan’s remaining counterclaims are resolved by this order. Any rights that the Retirement 5 Plan may have to Ms. Cameron’s hypothetical recovery of all of her default judgment 6 against Ms. Bunton are premature for adjudication. If future events come to pass that 7 make such adjudication necessary, the Retirement Plan can pursue it at that time. As a 8 result, the Retirement Plan will also be ordered to show cause why its remaining 9 counterclaims should not be dismissed as premature and why this action should not be 10 terminated. 11 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Southern California Edison Company 12 Retirement Plan’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Its Counterclaims (Doc. 62) is 13 denied. 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Southern California Edison Company 15 Retirement Plan show cause why summary judgment should not be granted in favor of 16 Mohave and Ms. Cameron on its counterclaims under Rule 56(f)(1) by August 9, 2013. 17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Southern California Edison Company 18 Retirement Plan show cause why the remainder of its counterclaims should not be 19 dismissed and why this action should not be terminated by August 9, 2013. 20 Dated this 12th day of July, 2013. 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -9-

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.