Andreason v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, No. 2:2021cv01051 - Document 22 (D. Ariz. 2022)
Court Description: ORDER granting Defendant's Countermotion to Remand (Doc. 20 ). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the final decision of the Social Security Commissioner is vacated and this matter is remanded to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings consistent with the Order. IT IS FINALLY ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. See document for complete details. Signed by Judge Michael T Liburdi on 10/27/2022. (WLP)
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Andreason v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration 1 Doc. 22 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Philana Andreason, Plaintiff, 10 11 v. 12 Commissioner Administration, 13 No. CV-21-01051-PHX-MTL of ORDER Social Security Defendant. 14 15 Before the Court is Plaintiff Philana Andreason’s appeal of an Administrative Law 16 Judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of her applications for Disability Insurance benefits and 17 Supplemental Security Income benefits. Plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking judicial review 18 of that denial. (Doc. 1.) The Court now addresses Andreason’s Opening Brief (Doc. 16, Pl. 19 Br.), the Commissioner’s Response Brief and Countermotion for Remand (Doc. 20, Def. 20 Br.), and the Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 21, Reply), as well as the Administrative Record 21 (“R.”). For the reasons expressed herein, the Court reverses the ALJ’s decision and 22 remands for additional proceedings. 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 Andreason filed an Application for Disability Insurance benefits and Supplemental 25 Security Income benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act on May 14, 26 2015, based on a disability beginning on April 14, 2014. (R. at 27.) The claims were denied 27 initially on October 1, 2015, and upon reconsideration on February 6, 2016. (Id.) After this 28 denial, Andreason testified at a hearing before the ALJ in November 2017. (R. at 45, 80–81, Dockets.Justia.com 1 118–19.) Following the hearing, the ALJ found Andreason was not disabled. (R. at 27–36.) 2 The Appeals Council denied Andreason’s request for review and she then appealed to a 3 court in this District. (R. at 1056–62.) On February 13, 2020, the court reversed the ALJ’s 4 decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. (R. at 1066–78.) On March 29, 5 2021, after the remand, a different ALJ denied Andreason’s claims. (R. at 967–93.) The 6 Appeal’s Council denied Andreason’s request for review and adopted the ALJ’s decision 7 as the agency’s final decision. (R. at 956–66.) Andreason now seeks judicial review under 8 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 9 Upon reviewing the medical records and opinions, the ALJ evaluated Andreason’s 10 disability based on the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease, 11 generalized osteoarthritis, major depressive disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder. (R. 12 at 972.) The ALJ found that Andreason “does not have an impairment or combination of 13 impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 14 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (R. at 973.) next, the ALJ calculated Plaintiff’s 15 residual functional capacity (“RFC”): 16 [Andreason] has the [RFC] to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except the claimant can lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently, stand and walk for 6 hours in an 8 hour day, and sit for 6 hours in an 8 hour day. The claimant can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but never climb ladders or scaffolds. The claimant can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. The claimant must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold and vibration. The claimant can follow simple instructions and perform simple tasks with occasional contact with coworkers and the public. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 (R. at 975.) The ALJ found that Andreason can perform jobs that exist in the national 24 economy. (R. at 980–81.) Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that Andreason was not disabled 25 from the alleged disability onset date through the date of the decision. (R. at 791.) 26 II. LEGAL STANDARD 27 In determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the district court reviews only 28 those issues the parties raised in challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, -2- 1 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court may set aside the Commissioner’s disability 2 determination only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. 3 Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). The parties, however, agree that the ALJ 4 did not support his decision with substantial evidence. (Def. Br. at 14.) The Commissioner 5 concedes that there is reversible error regarding the ALJ’s evaluation of medical source 6 opinions and remand is appropriate to evaluate these opinions. (Id. at 2.) The only issue 7 that remains is whether to remand the case for additional investigation or for the calculation 8 of benefits. 9 III. CREDIT-AS-TRUE ANALYSIS 10 Andreason’s preferred remedy is for the Court to remand this case for immediate 11 computation of benefits under the “credit-as-true” rule. (Pl. Br. at 25.) This remedy is rare 12 and discretionary. Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 13 2014). The Court only applies the rule when three factors are met: (1) the ALJ must have 14 rejected evidence for legally insufficient reasons; (2) the record has to be fully developed 15 without any outstanding issues necessary to determine whether a claimant is disabled under 16 the social security regulations; and (3) the record must, with certainty, reflect that a remand 17 should result in a finding that the claimant is disabled. Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1100–01. In 18 the Ninth Circuit, even if the three factors are met, the law is unclear as to whether applying 19 the credit-as-true rule is mandatory or the Court has discretion to remand for further 20 proceedings. Compare Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 593–94 (9th Cir. 2009), and 21 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1019–23 (9th Cir. 2014), with Treichler, 775 F.3d at 22 1099–02. 23 proceedings, rather than benefits.” Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1102. Here, the Court agrees with 24 the Commissioner that applying the credit-as-true rule is not appropriate in this case. Courts “frequently exercise[] [their] discretion to remand for further 25 The parties agree that the decision was legally insufficient, thus satisfying factor 26 one. See Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 408 (9th Cir. 2015), as amended (Feb. 5, 27 2016) (finding the first element is met where the issue is undisputed.) The other two factors 28 preclude remand for computation of benefits. First, the record contains outstanding issues -3- 1 better resolved by an ALJ. Andreason asserts that the ALJ did not adequately evaluate the 2 medical opinions of Dr. Alpern, Mr. Chukwuemeka, and Dr. Coehlo that, if credited as 3 true, would require finding Andreason disabled. (Pl. Br. at 1–2, 14–20.) The Commissioner 4 agrees remand is appropriate because the ALJ improperly discounted one of Dr. Alpern’s 5 opinions but argues Mr. Chukwuemeka and Dr. Coehlo’s opinions conflict and require 6 further investigation. (Def. Br. at 15–16.) Regarding Dr. Alpern’s opinion, the parties agree 7 that the ALJ incorrectly stated that Dr. Alpern based his opinion that Andreason had 8 sedentary limitations and would miss three days of work a month on medication side 9 effects. (R. at 979–80, 1014.) Rather, the monthly absences are associated with “problems 10 with pain, mostly, dizziness, [and] fatigue[.]” (R. at 1014.) And as Andreason notes (Pl. 11 Br. at 20), the vocational expert testified that a person who would miss two to three days 12 of work would not sustain employment (R. at 66.) Even if Dr. Alpern’s opinion is credited 13 as true, further administrative proceedings would be useful and an ALJ would not be 14 required to find Andreason disabled because the record is not entirely consistent. The ALJ 15 would need to weigh other medical record evidence against Dr. Alpern’s opinion. For 16 example, both Dr. Hutchinson and Dr. Maloney opined that medical evidence did not 17 establish chronic fatigue and that Andreason was capable of working. (R. at 101–03, 18 111–12.) Dr. Maloney also opined that medical evidence did not support her alleged pain. 19 (R. at 121–23, 129–31.) The ALJ did not address these inconsistencies between the expert 20 opinions in his decision. 21 Regarding Mr. Chukwuemeka and Dr. Coehlo’s opinions, Andreason argues that 22 the ALJ did not provide specific reasons for rejecting the opinions. (Pl. Br. at 21–22.) The 23 Commissioner argues that even if the ALJ did not provide sufficient reasons for rejecting 24 the opinions, they conflict about Andreason’s mental limitations. (Def. Br. at 16.) The 25 Court agrees that the two opinions appear to conflict as to Andreason’s mental 26 impairments. Mr. Chukwuemeka opined that Andreason had a poor ability to function in a 27 work setting because of her physical limitations and mood disorders. (R. at 747.) Dr. 28 Coehlo opined that despite her limitations, Andreason was able to carry out simple -4- 1 instructions, could remember work-related instructions and procedures, could work with 2 others, and could respond appropriately to changes in the work setting. (R. at 471–72.) The 3 ALJ reasoned that medical evidence in the record did not support Mr. Chukwuemeka’s 4 opinions. (R. at 979.) The ALJ also reasoned that it gave “some weight” to Dr. Coelho’s 5 opinions because it supports that Andreason’s limitations are largely physical and not 6 mental. (Id.) Crediting both of the opinions as true does not necessarily require finding a 7 disability because if even the ALJ gives them full weight, they appear to conflict. The ALJ 8 is better suited to evaluate the opinions and consider the medical record evidence on 9 remand to determine the severity of Andreason’s physical or mental limitations. 10 Further proceedings would also be useful to evaluate Andreason’s symptom 11 testimony. Andreason argues that crediting her symptom testimony as true requires finding 12 her disabled. (Reply at 9.) The Court disagrees. Even if Andreason’s subjective symptom 13 testimony is credited as true, the ALJ may find discrepancies with her testimony in 14 comparing it to other medical record evidence. For example, an emergency room report 15 shows that, while Andreason claimed her pain was so severe she could not stand up and 16 refused to do so, when medical staff were not looking, she stood up, changed her clothes, 17 and moved without difficulty. (R. at 1699.) Other medical record evidence shows that 18 Andreason complained of chronic neck pain, but medical examinations did not substantiate 19 her claims. (R. at 2043.) And as the Commissioner notes, Andreason appeared to have good 20 motor strength, a normal gait, and unremarkable neurological testing at several 21 examinations. (See R. at 457–58, 1269, 1527, 2033.) 22 Andreason’s arguments do not establish that crediting the medical opinions or 23 symptom testimony as true would require the ALJ to find her disabled. The Court finds 24 there are outstanding issues and ambiguity in the record that preclude applying the 25 credit-as-true rule. Thus, the Court remands this case for further administrative proceedings 26 to evaluate the record as necessary to determine Andreason’s disability status. 27 /// 28 /// -5- 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 Accordingly, 3 IT IS ORDERED granting Defendant’s Countermotion to Remand (Doc. 20). 4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the final decision of the Social Security 5 Commissioner is vacated and this matter is remanded to the Social Security Administration 6 for further proceedings consistent with the Order. 7 8 9 IT IS FINALLY ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. Dated this 27th day of October, 2022. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -6-
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