Chatman v. Ferrell et al, No. 2:2017cv03826 - Document 27 (D. Ariz. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER denying 21 Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge Douglas L Rayes on 6/29/2018. (MMO)
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Chatman v. Ferrell et al 1 Doc. 27 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Montiah Chatman, Plaintiff, 10 11 ORDER v. 12 No. CV-17-03826-PHX-DLR Marci D Ferrell, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 16 Plaintiff Montiah Chatman alleges that Defendants Marci Ferrell and Cindy 17 Chrisman, employees at the Arizona Department of Child Services (“ADCS”), 18 unlawfully removed her children from her home in violation of her and her sons’ Fourth 19 Amendment rights. Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss First Amended 20 Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 21.) The motion 21 is fully briefed and neither party requested oral argument. (Docs. 22, 23.) For reasons 22 stated below, the motion is denied. 23 BACKGROUND 24 In November 2016, Plaintiff allowed her two sons, J.L.C. and E.V.T.P., to visit 25 Corey Pearson, E.V.T.P.’s paternal grandmother, in Minnesota. (Doc. 16 ¶¶ 14-15.) 26 Two days after dropping the boys off with Pearson, Plaintiff was contacted by the 27 Minnesota Child Protective Services (“MCPS”), inquiring about whether she had 28 abandoned the boys in the state. (¶¶ 21, 23.) Plaintiff returned to Minnesota, regained Dockets.Justia.com 1 custody of the boys, and immediately returned to Arizona. (¶¶ 24-26.) 2 Pearson subsequently filed suit in a Minnesota family court, and offered an 3 affidavit asserting that Plaintiff had abandoned her boys in Minnesota. (¶¶ 27-29.) 4 Pearson successfully obtained an ex parte temporary custody order over the children from 5 the Minnesota District Court for Wright County (hereinafter “Minnesota order”). (¶ 30; 6 Doc. 13-1.) Pearson contacted the ADCS and sought enforcement of the Minnesota 7 order, and reported the children as missing to the Phoenix Police Department. (Doc. 16 8 ¶¶ 33-34.) 9 As a result, on December 29, 2016, ADCS investigator Ferrell met with Plaintiff 10 and her boys to evaluate the children’s condition. (¶ 37.) After spending time with the 11 children, Ferrell was satisfied enough there was no abuse or neglect to take the children 12 off the missing persons list. (¶¶ 38-39.) On January 4, 2017, however, Ferrell returned to 13 Plaintiff’s home and removed both boys from her custody. (¶¶ 44-45, 63.) Ferrell issued 14 a temporary custody notice (“TCN”), which stated that removal was necessary because of 15 the temporary custody order issued by the Minnesota court. (¶ 48.) Plaintiff had to 16 undergo four months of litigation to get her boys back. (¶ 81.) 17 Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of J.L.C. and E.V.T.P., filed suit against 18 Ferrell and Chrisman asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state common 19 law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, false arrest, and negligence. 20 (Doc. 16.) Defendants have moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 21 to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 22 granted. 23 JUDICIAL NOTICE 24 Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of the Minnesota order. 25 (Doc. 13-1.) The Court may take judicial notice of public records without converting a 26 motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 689 27 (9th Cir. 2001). However, the Court may not take judicial notice of a fact that is subject 28 to reasonable dispute. Id.; Fed. R. Evid. 201. The document at issue consists of factual -2- 1 and legal findings of the Minnesota District Court for Wright County. The Court will 2 take judicial notice of the existence of the Minnesota order because it is beyond 3 reasonable dispute that the Minnesota order issued and contained these factual and legal 4 findings. Moreover, Plaintiff refers to the Minnesota order throughout her complaint 5 (see, e.g., Doc. 16 ¶¶ 27-32, 34, 68-70, 99, 103), and therefore the Court may consider it 6 under the incorporation by reference doctrine. See U.S v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th 7 Cir. 2003) (“Even if a document is not attached to a complaint, it may be incorporated by 8 reference into a complaint if the plaintiff refers extensively to the document or the 9 document forms the basis of the plaintiff's claim.”). To the extent Plaintiff reasonably 10 disputes the truth or validity of the factual and legal findings in the order, the Court 11 judicially notices only the fact that the Minnesota order issued and contained certain 12 findings and conclusions. The Court does not take as true the findings and conclusions 13 contained therein. 14 LEGAL STANDARD 15 When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim to relief under Rule 16 12(b)(6), the well-pled factual allegations are taken as true and construed in the light 17 most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th 18 Cir. 2009). Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not entitled to the 19 assumption of truth, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009), and therefore are 20 insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, In re Cutera Sec. 21 Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010). To avoid dismissal, the complaint must 22 plead sufficient facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. 23 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This plausibility standard “is not akin to a 24 ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant 25 has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) 26 DISCUSSION 27 Defendants contend they are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity or 28 qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim. Defendants also contend that under -3- 1 Arizona law they are entitled to absolute-quasi judicial immunity as to Plaintiff’s state 2 common law claims. The Court discusses each in turn. 3 I. § 1983 Claim 4 Section 1983 provides a cause of action for persons who have been deprived of 5 their constitutional rights by persons acting under color of law. It is a mechanism “for 6 vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred,” and “is not itself a source of substantive 7 rights.” Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal 8 quotations omitted). To succeed on a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show “(1) that 9 a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States was violated, and (2) 10 that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of State law.” 11 Long v. Cty. of L.A., 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). 12 Defendants violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by seizing her children 13 without a warrant or the requisite exigency. (Doc. 16 ¶¶ 88-101.) Plaintiff alleges that 14 A. Absolute Quasi-Judicial Immunity 15 Absolute judicial immunity “insulates judges from charges of erroneous acts or 16 irregular action.” In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002). Judicial immunity is 17 based on an understanding that these individuals execute an “independent and impartial 18 exercise of judgment vital to the judiciary [which] might be impaired by exposure to 19 potential damages liability.” Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435 20 (1993). Quasi-judicial immunity extends judicial immunity to non-judicial officials when 21 performing “official duties that are functionally comparable to those of judges, i.e., duties 22 that involve the exercise of discretion in resolving disputes.” In re Castillo, 297 F.3d at 23 948. 24 Defendants contend that they are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity 25 because they were acting pursuant to a valid court order when they removed the children. 26 Defendants rely on Coverdell v. Department of Social and Health Services, State of 27 Washington, 834 F.2d 758, 765 (9th Cir. 1987), which states that a child protective 28 services worker must be “accorded absolute quasi-judicial immunity from liability for -4- 1 damages stemming from the worker’s apprehension of a child pursuant to a valid court 2 order.” 3 Coverdell, however, no longer controls. Subsequent to Coverdell, the Supreme 4 Court decided Antoine, which “worked a sea change in the way in which . . . absolute 5 quasi-judicial immunity for nonjudicial officers” is applied. In re Castillo, 297 F.3d at 6 948. Now, it is “only when the judgment of an official other than a judge involves the 7 exercise of discretionary judgment that judicial immunity may be extended to that 8 nonjudicial officer.” Id. at 949; see Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) 9 (noting that “circuit precedent, authoritative at the time that it issued, can be effectively 10 overruled by subsequent Supreme Court decisions that ‘are closely on point,’ even 11 though decisions do not expressly overrule prior precedent”). 12 Here, Defendants do not allege that they exercised discretionary judgment. In 13 fact, they allege the opposite—their actions were taken at the direction of, and in 14 accordance with, the Minnesota order.1 Defendants also contend that the Minnesota court 15 order provided them “probable cause” for removing the children. (Doc. 21 at 5-6.) 16 Specifically, Defendants assert the Minnesota order put them “on notice that exigent 17 circumstances existed” in the home. (Doc. 23 at 3.) Defendants, however, cite no 18 authority extending absolute quasi-judicial immunity to a state official under such 19 circumstances. 20 immunity. Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to absolute quasi-judicial 21 B. Qualified Immunity 22 In the alternative, Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. A 23 defendant is entitled to qualified immunity if her conduct “does not violate clearly 24 established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 25 known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The qualified immunity 26 analysis involves two inquiries: whether the facts show that the officer’s conduct violated 27 1 28 Even if Coverdell controlled, Defendants actions were not taken pursuant to a court order because the Minnesota order did not direct removal of the children. Defendants concede as much in their reply brief. (Doc. 23 at 3.) -5- 1 a constitutional right and whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time. 2 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). In determining whether qualified immunity 3 applies, courts have the discretion to bypass the first inquiry and proceed directly to the 4 second. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 226 (2009). 5 A motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity puts the Court in the difficult 6 position of deciding “far-reaching constitutional questions on a non-existent factual 7 record.” Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2004). Granting 8 dismissal based on qualified immunity “pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is only 9 appropriate if the Court can determine from the face of the complaint that qualified 10 immunity applies.” 11 4537975, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 3, 2010); see also Groten v. Cali., 251 F.3d 844, 851 (9th 12 Cir. 2001). Here, the Court finds that a final determination on qualified immunity cannot 13 be made at this time. Hernandez v. Ryan, No. 09-CV-2683-PHX-DGC, 2010 WL 14 Moving directly to the second prong, a right is clearly established if its contours 15 are “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing 16 violates that right.” Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1065 (9th Cir. 2006). 17 It is not necessary that there be a prior case with the identical facts showing that a right is 18 clearly established; it is enough that there is preexisting law that provides a defendant 19 “fair warning” that his conduct was unlawful. Id. at 1065. “The relevant, dispositive 20 inquiry . . . is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was 21 unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202 (emphasis added). 22 It is well established that “[p]arents and children have a [] constitutional right to 23 live together without governmental interference.” Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 24 1136 (9th Cir. 2000). “The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that parents will not be 25 separated from their children without due process of law except in emergencies.” Mabe 26 v. San Bernardino Cty., Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2001). 27 “Officials, including social workers, who remove a child from [his] home without a 28 warrant must have reasonable cause to believe that the child is likely to experience -6- 1 serious bodily harm in the time that would be required to obtain a warrant.” Rogers v. 2 Cty. of San Joaquin, 487 F.3d 1288, 1294 (9th Cir. 2007). Although serious allegations 3 of abuse or neglect that have been investigated and corroborated usually give rise to a 4 reasonable inference of imminent danger sufficient to justify taking children into 5 temporary custody, delay in taking children into custody or a prior willingness to leave 6 the children in their home militates against finding such an exigency. Id. at 1294-1295; 7 see also Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808, 817 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding social worker not 8 entitled to qualified immunity for warrantless entry into home because 14-day delay 9 between report and investigation demonstrated lack of exigency). 10 Based on the allegations in the complaint, Defendants contend that the “reasonable 11 inference” is that they received the Minnesota order between the December 29 meeting 12 and the January 4 meeting, and that the order’s factual findings established probable 13 cause that an exigency existed. Although this is a reasonable inference, it is not the only 14 one. According to the complaint, ADCS was aware of the Minnesota order prior to the 15 December 29 meeting. (Doc. 16 ¶¶ 34, 42.) Drawing all reasonable inferences in 16 Plaintiff’s favor, the agents’ delay in taking the children into custody after receiving the 17 Minnesota order plausibly shows a lack of exigency. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion 18 to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is denied.2 19 II. State Common Law Claims 20 Plaintiff also raises state common law claims for intentional infliction of 21 emotional distress, false arrest, and negligence. 22 Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim, Defendants assert absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Whether 23 Defendants are immune from Plaintiff’s Arizona tort law claims is a question of Arizona 24 law. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 282 n. 5 (1980) (“[W]hen state law 25 creates a cause of action, the State is free to define the defenses to that claim, including 26 the defense of immunity . . . .”); Adams v. State, 916 P.2d 1156, 1163 (Ariz. Ct. App. 27 28 2 (Doc. 16 ¶¶ 102-115.) As with The Court does not decide whether Defendants violated a constitutional right because at this stage it is not equipped with the necessary facts to determine whether qualified immunity will ultimately protect them. Those issues must be resolved at summary judgment or at trial. -7- 1 1995) (explaining judicial immunity is a “creature of the common law” and Arizona 2 courts are responsible for shaping and monitoring [its] course). Federal courts must 3 follow the decisions of a state’s highest court when deciding issues of that state’s law. 4 Harvey’s Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. Van Blitter, 959 F.2d 153, 154 (9th Cir.1992). Arizona 5 recognizes absolute quasi-judicial immunity when an official: (1) acts pursuant to a court 6 order, or (2) performs a function integral to the judicial process. Adams, 916 P.2d at 7 1160-62. 8 Defendants appear to contend they are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity 9 under only the first category, arguing that they are entitled to immunity because they 10 removed the children pursuant to the Minnesota order. (Doc. 16 ¶ 48; Doc. 23 at 8.) The 11 Minnesota order, however, does not direct removal of the children. (Doc. 23 at 3.) 12 Moreover, by its own terms, the order had already expired two weeks prior to the 13 children being seized. (Doc. 13-1 ¶ 3.) 14 To the extent Defendants contend that they are entitled to immunity under the 15 second category, the Court is unpersuaded. Arizona “[c]ourts have found that certain 16 activities essential to the functioning of the judicial system warrant absolute protection 17 from suit.” Adams, 916 P.2d at 1161; see also Griggs v. Oasis Adoption Servs., Inc., 383 18 P.3d 1145, 1149 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016). “With respect to court officials performing 19 functions in judicial proceedings, it has narrowly construed the requirement that the act 20 raising the privilege have a close, direct relationship to such proceedings.” Davis v. 21 Spier, No. 08-CV-50-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL 1746165, at *8 (D. Ariz. Apr. 14, 2008) 22 (internal quotation and citation omitted). For example, immunity has been extended to 23 submitting 24 recommendations, initiating the filing of child dependency petitions, submitting adoption 25 recommendations, and making reports and recommendations to the court as a guardian ad 26 litem. Adams, 916 P.2d at 1161. Arizona courts have extended absolute immunity to 27 non-judicial officers performing a function, pursuant to a court directive, which was 28 related to the judicial process. Here, there was no such directive to remove the children. presentence reports, submitting -8- child-custody evaluations and 1 The decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals in Adams supports this conclusion. 2 There, the court was asked to decide whether certain social workers were absolutely 3 immune from claims for negligently supervising and investigating prospective adoptive 4 parents. The court noted that the judge did “not specify how the caseworkers should 5 conduct their investigations” and that the social workers had not shown that they “acted 6 pursuant to any specific court order in conducting their investigations or in supervising 7 the children post placement.” Id. at 1160. Therefore, it held that the social workers’ 8 “investigative and supervisory functions cannot clearly be characterized as court-ordered 9 so as to justify absolute immunity on that ground.” Id. The Court finds this analysis 10 11 12 13 equally applicable to this matter. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint (Doc. 21) is DENIED. Dated this 29th day of June, 2018. 14 15 16 17 18 Douglas L. Rayes United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -9-
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