Ruiz v. Social Security Administration, No. 2:2012cv00725 - Document 37 (D. Ariz. 2013)

Court Description: ORDER denying 24 Motion that Case be Kept Confidential; denying 28 Motion to Strike ; denying 31 Motion for an Award of Benefits. ORDER that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge is AFFIRMED. ORDER that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly. The judgment will serve as the mandate of this Court. Signed by Senior Judge James A Teilborg on 7/29/13.(TLJ)

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Ruiz v. Social Security Administration 1 Doc. 37 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 10 11 No. CV-12-00725-PHX-JAT Reyes Ruiz, Plaintiff, ORDER v. 12 13 Social Security Administration, Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court are: (1) Plaintiff’s Motion that Case be Kept 16 Confidential (Doc. 24); (2) Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Notice of Filing of Social Security 17 Transcript (Doc. 28) and (3) Plaintiff’s Motion for an Award of Benefits (Doc. 31). The 18 Court now rules on the Motions. 19 I. 20 Plaintiff requests that his case “be kept confidential to the public, not to include 21 any Government of[f]ice” and asks that no information be giving to “any one claiming to 22 be [his] family or the general public.” (Doc. 24). Plaintiff has provided no reasons that 23 the Court should seal this case. Plaintiff’s Motion that Case be Kept Confidential (Doc. 24) 24 There is a strong presumption in favor of public access to documents. Kamakana 25 v. City of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). A 26 party seeking to seal a judicial record must overcome the strong presumption by 27 articulating compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings that outweigh the 28 general history of access and public policies favoring disclosure. Id. at 1178–1179 Dockets.Justia.com 1 (internal citations and quotations omitted). “In turn, the court must conscientiously 2 balance the competing interests of the public and the party who seeks to keep certain 3 judicial records secret.” Id . at 1179 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “After 4 considering these interests, if the court decides to seal certain judicial records, it must 5 base its decision on a compelling reason and articulate the factual basis for its ruling, 6 without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” 7 omitted). Id. (internal quotations and citations 8 There is an exception to the presumption of access to judicial records for a sealed 9 discovery document attached to a non-dispositive motion. Id. (internal citations omitted). 10 To seal a document attached to a non-dispositive motion, the party seeking to seal must 11 make a good cause showing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). Id. (internal 12 citation omitted). However, even when a motion is not traditionally considered to be 13 dispositive, if the motion could have a dispositive effect on the case, the compelling 14 reasons standard should be applied. See In re Midland Life Ins. Co. Annuity Sales 15 Practices Litig., 686 F.3d 1115, 1119–1120 (9th Cir. 2012). 16 In this case, Plaintiff has provided no reasons why this entire case should be 17 sealed. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion that Case be Kept Confidential (Doc. 24) is 18 denied. 19 20 II. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Notice of Filing of Social Security Transcript (Doc. 28) 21 Plaintiff moves to strike pages 66, 67, and 68 from the Administrative Transcript 22 of Record because “the conclusion” in those documents is “simply speculation and 23 incorrect.” (Doc. 28). Pages 66, 67, and 68 of the Administrative Transcript of Record 24 are part of the Social Security Administration’s “Notice of Disapproved Claims” to 25 Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s disagreement with the Social Security Administration’s decision 26 does not constitute a reason to strike that decision from this Court’s Record. 27 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Notice of Filing of Social Security Transcript 28 (Doc. 28) is denied. -2- 1 III. Plaintiff’s Motion for an Award of Benefits (Doc. 31) 2 Plaintiff appeals the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of Plaintiff’s 3 Title II application for disability insurance benefits and Title XVI application for 4 supplemental security income based on disability. 5 Plaintiff filed his applications in February 2009, alleging disability beginning 6 November 1, 2008. (Record Transcript (“TR”) 130). Plaintiff’s claims were denied on 7 May 1, 2009. Reconsideration was denied on February 17, 2010. After an administrative 8 hearing, Plaintiff’s claims were again denied on April 27, 2011. On February 13, 2012, 9 the Appeals Counsel denied Plaintiff’s request for review. 10 On April 5, 2012, Plaintiff filed his Complaint for Judicial Review of the 11 Administrative Determination of Claim, which is the subject of this appeal (Doc. 1). 12 Plaintiff argues that the Court should vacate the Administrative Law Decision because he 13 has a medical condition which prevented him from working for twelve or more months. 14 (Doc. 31 and Doc. 35). 15 A. Legal Standard 16 The Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits will be overturned “only if it is not 17 supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 18 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation omitted). Substantial evidence is more 19 than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Reddick v. Charter, 157 F.3d 715, 20 720 (9th Cir. 1998). It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 21 adequate to support a conclusion. Id. 22 In determining whether there is substantial evidence to support a decision, this 23 Court considers the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports the 24 administrative law judge’s conclusions and the evidence that detracts from the 25 administrative law judge’s conclusions. Id. If there is sufficient evidence to support the 26 Commissioner’s determination, the Court cannot substitute its own determination for that 27 of the ALJ. Id. Additionally, the administrative law judge is responsible for resolving 28 conflicts in medical testimony, determining credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See -3- 1 Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, if on the whole record 2 before this Court, substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision, this Court 3 must affirm it. See Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989); see also 42 4 U.S.C. § 405(g). 1. 5 Definition of Disability 6 To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must 7 show, among other things, that he is “under a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). The 8 Social Security Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial 9 gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment 10 which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for 11 a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A person is 12 “under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such 13 severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his 14 age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work 15 which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). 2. 16 Five-Step Evaluation Process 17 The Social Security regulations set forth a five-step sequential process for 18 evaluating disability claims. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 19 715, 721 (9th Cir.1998) (describing the sequential process). A finding of “not disabled” 20 at any step in the sequential process will end the ALJ’s inquiry. 21 404.1520(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of proof at the first four steps, but the 22 burden shifts to the ALJ at the final step. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721. 23 The five steps are as follows: 24 1. 20 C.F.R. § 25 26 First, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is “doing substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled. 2. If the claimant is not gainfully employed, the ALJ next determines whether 27 the claimant has a “severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 20 28 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). A severe impairment is one that “significantly limits [the -4- 1 claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 2 404.1520(c). Basic work activities means the “abilities and aptitudes to do most jobs.” 3 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b). Further, the impairment must either be expected “to result in 4 death” or “to last for a continuous period of twelve months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509 5 (incorporated by reference in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii)). The “step-two inquiry is a 6 de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 7 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). 3. 8 20 C.F.R. § Having found a severe impairment, the ALJ next determines whether the 9 impairment “meets or equals” one of the impairments specifically listed in the 10 regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is found disabled without 11 considering the claimant’s age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. at § 12 404.1520(d). 4. 13 At step four, the ALJ determines whether, despite the impairments, the 14 claimant can still perform “past relevant work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). To 15 make this determination, the ALJ compares its “residual functional capacity assessment . 16 . . with the physical and mental demands of [the claimant’s] past relevant work.” 20 17 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). If the claimant can still perform the kind of work the claimant 18 previously did, the claimant is not disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to the final 19 step. 20 5. At the final step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant “can make an 21 adjustment to other work” that exists in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 22 404.1520(a)(4)(v). 23 residual functional capacity, together with vocational factors (age, education, and work 24 experience). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1). If the claimant can make an adjustment to 25 other work, then he is not disabled. If the claimant cannot perform other work, he will be 26 found disabled. As previously noted, the ALJ has the burden of proving the claimant can 27 perform other substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy. Reddick, 157 28 F.3d at 721. In making this determination, the ALJ considers the claimant’s -5- 1 B. Analysis 2 The ALJ found that Plaintiff: (1) had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 3 since November 1, 2008, (2) had the following severe impairments: degenerative disk 4 disease of the lumbar spine, status-post anterior and posterior laminectomy, discectomy, 5 and fusion with instrumentation, and depression, (3) did not have an impairment or 6 combination of impairments specifically listed in the regulations, (4) had the residual 7 functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) and 20 8 C.F.R. § 416.967(b); (5) could not perform past relevant work; and (6) could perform 9 jobs in the national economy such as garment sorter, mail clerk, and bench assembler. 10 Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Social 11 Security Act. (TR 27-36). 12 Plaintiff makes no specific objections to the ALJ’s determinations. Rather, 13 Plaintiff argues that he has a medical condition that would prevent him from working for 14 over a year and, thus, the ALJ erred in not finding him disabled. From this, the Court 15 assumes that Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff is able to perform 16 jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Once the claimant makes a showing that he suffers from a severe impairment that prevents him from doing past work, the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) bears the burden of showing that the claimant can perform some other work that exists in ‘significant numbers' in the national economy, taking into consideration the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience. The Commissioner can meet this burden in one of two ways: (a) by the testimony of a vocational expert, or (b) by reference to the Medical–Vocational Guidelines [‘the grids'] at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2. Lockwood v. Commissioner of Social Security, 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted). In this case, the ALJ relied on the opinion of a Vocational Expert (“VE”). The ALJ posed a hypothetical to the ALJ containing all of Plaintiff’s limitations that the ALJ -6- 1 found credible and supported by substantial evidence in the record. The ALJ asked the 2 VE whether jobs exist in the national economy for an individual with the claimant’s age, 3 education, work experience, and residual functional capacity. (TR 58). In response, the 4 VE testified that, given all of those factors, Plaintiff could perform work as a garment 5 sorter, mail clerk, or bench assembler. The ALJ found that the VE’s testimony was 6 consistent with the information contained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. 7 The ALJ did not commit error at Step Five. The ALJ relied on testimony the VE 8 gave in response to the hypothetical based on Plaintiff’s limitations that the ALJ found 9 credible and supported by substantial evidence in the record. This reliance was proper. 10 See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 756–57 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that it is proper 11 for an ALJ to limit a hypothetical to restrictions supported by substantial evidence in the 12 record); Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217-1218 (9th Cir. 2005). Moreover, the 13 restrictions given by the ALJ in her hypothetical to the VE were supported by the record 14 as explained in her opinion. (TR 31-34). Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in finding 15 Plaintiff not disabled as defined in the Social Security Act. 16 IV. 17 Based on the foregoing, 18 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion that Case be Kept Confidential (Doc. 19 24) is denied. IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Notice of Filing of Social 20 21 Conclusion Security Transcript (Doc. 28) is denied. IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for an Award of Benefits (Doc. 31) is 22 23 denied. 24 /// 25 26 // 27 28 / -7- 1 2 3 4 5 IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge is AFFIRMED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly. The judgment will serve as the mandate of this Court. Dated this 29th day of July, 2013. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -8-

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