Wilson v. Berryhill, No. 2:2018cv00418 - Document 22 (S.D. Ala. 2020)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER that the Commissioner's decision denying plaintiff's applications for disability is AFFIRMED under sentence four of 42:405(5). Signed by Magistrate Judge Katherine P. Nelson on 3/23/20. (srr)
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Wilson v. Berryhill Doc. 22 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION TABITHA WILSON, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security,1 Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:18-00418-N MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Tabitha Wilson brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”) denying her applications for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq., and for supplemental security income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq. 2 Upon Having been sworn in on June 17, 2019, Commissioner of Social Security Andrew M. Saul, as successor to Acting Commissioner Nancy A. Berryhill, is automatically substituted as the Defendant in this action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). (See https://www.ssa.gov/agency/commissioner.html & https://blog.ssa.gov/social-security-welcomes-its-new-commissioner (last visited Mar. 23, 2020)). This change does not affect the pendency of this action. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any action instituted in accordance with this subsection shall survive notwithstanding any change in the person occupying the office of Commissioner of Social Security or any vacancy in such office.”). The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to update the docket heading accordingly. 1 “Title II of the Social Security Act (Act), 49 Stat. 620, as amended, provides for the payment of insurance benefits to persons who have contributed to the program and who suffer from a physical or mental disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(D) (1982 ed., Supp. III). Title XVI of the Act provides for the payment of disability benefits to indigent persons under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. § 2 Dockets.Justia.com consideration of the parties’ briefs (Docs. 13, 14, 16) and those portions of the administrative record (Doc. 12) (hereinafter cited as “(R. [page number(s) in lowerright corner of transcript])”) relevant to the issues raised, the Court finds that the Commissioner’s final decision is due to be AFFIRMED.3 I. Procedural Background Wilson filed the subject applications for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI with the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) on July 14, 2014. After they were initially denied, Wilson requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) with the SSA’s Office of Disability Adjudication and Review. A hearing was held on August 31, 2017; on January 24, 2018, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on Wilson’s applications, finding her not disabled under the Social Security Act and thus not entitled to benefits. (See R. 7 – 25). The Commissioner’s decision on Wilson’s applications became final when the Appeals Council for the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review denied her request for review of the ALJ’s decision on September 11, 2018. (R. 1 – 5). Wilson subsequently brought this action under § 405(g) and § 1383(c)(3) for judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) (“The final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security after a hearing [for SSI 1382(a).” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987). With the consent of the parties, the Court has designated the undersigned Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings and order the entry of judgment in this civil action, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73, and S.D. Ala. GenLR 73. (See Docs. 19, 20). With the Court’s consent, the parties jointly waived the opportunity for oral argument. (See Docs. 18, 21). 3 benefits] shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 405(g) of this title to the same extent as the Commissioner’s final determinations under section 405 of this title.”); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow.”); Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The settled law of this Circuit is that a court may review, under sentence four of section 405(g), a denial of review by the Appeals Council.”). II. Standards of Review “In Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether the Commissioner’s decision is ‘ “supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” ’ ” Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997))). In reviewing the Commissioner’s factual findings, the Court “ ‘may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].’ ” Id. (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983))). “ ‘Even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner]’s factual findings, [the Court] must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.’ ” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). Additionally, “[u]nder the substantial evidence standard, we cannot look at the evidence presented to [an administrative agency] to determine if interpretations of the evidence other than that made by the [agency] are possible. Rather, we review the evidence that was presented to determine if the findings made by the [agency] were unreasonable. To that end, [judicial] inquiry is highly deferential and we consider only whether there is substantial evidence for the findings made by the [agency], not whether there is substantial evidence for some other finding that could have been, but was not, made. That is, even if the evidence could support multiple conclusions, we must affirm the agency's decision unless there is no reasonable basis for that decision.” Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1029 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (citations and quotation omitted). “Yet, within this narrowly circumscribed role, [courts] do not act as automatons. [The Court] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence[.]” Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (citations and quotation omitted). See also Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (“We are neither to conduct a de novo proceeding, nor to rubber stamp the administrative decisions that come before us. Rather, our function is to ensure that the decision was based on a reasonable and consistently applied standard, and was carefully considered in light of all the relevant facts.”). “In determining whether substantial evidence exists, [a court] must…tak[e] into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the [Commissioner’s] decision.” Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). See also McCruter v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1544, 1548 (11th Cir. 1986) (“We are constrained to conclude that the administrative agency here…reached the result that it did by focusing upon one aspect of the evidence and ignoring other parts of the record. In such circumstances we cannot properly find that the administrative decision is supported by substantial evidence. It is not enough to discover a piece of evidence which supports that decision, but to disregard other contrary evidence. The review must take into account and evaluate the record as a whole.”).4 Nevertheless, “district court judges are not required to ferret out delectable facts buried in a massive record,” Chavez v. Sec'y Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 2011) (28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas proceedings), and “ ‘[t]here is no burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument that could be made based on the materials before it…’ ” Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672 F.3d 1230, 1239 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 motion for summary judgment) (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc)) (ellipsis added). Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, whose review of Social Security appeals “is the same as that of the district court[,]” Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam), generally deems waived claims of error not fairly raised in the district court. See Stewart v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d 115, 115-16 (11th Cir. 1994) (“As a general principle, [the court of appeals] will not address an argument that has not been raised in the district court…Because Stewart did not present any of his assertions in the district court, we decline to consider them on appeal.” (applying rule in appeal of judicial review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3)); Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1161 (same); Hunter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 651 F. App'x 958, 962 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished) (same); Cooley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 671 F. App'x 767, 769 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“As a general rule, we do not consider arguments that have not been fairly presented to a respective agency or to the district court. See Kelley v. Apfel, 185 F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 1999) (treating 4 Moreover, the “substantial evidence” “standard of review applies only to findings of fact. No similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner]’s conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims.” MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986) (quotation omitted). Accord, e.g., Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Our standard of review for appeals from the administrative denials of Social Security benefits dictates that ‘(t)he findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive ....’ 42 U.S.C.A. s 405(g) … As is plain from the statutory language, this deferential standard of review is applicable only to findings of fact made by the Secretary, and it is well established that no similar presumption of validity attaches to the Secretary’s conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims.” (some quotation marks omitted)). This Court “conduct[s] ‘an exacting examination’ of these factors.” Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d as waived a challenge to the administrative law judge’s reliance on the testimony of a vocational expert that was ‘not raise[d] . . . before the administrative agency or the district court’).”); In re Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., Maternity Leave Practices & Flight Attendant Weight Program Litig., 905 F.2d 1457, 1462 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[I]f a party hopes to preserve a claim, argument, theory, or defense for appeal, she must first clearly present it to the district court, that is, in such a way as to afford the district court an opportunity to recognize and rule on it.”); Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999) (applying In re Pan American World Airways in Social Security appeal); Sorter v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 773 F. App'x 1070, 1073 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“Sorter has abandoned on appeal the issue of whether the ALJ adequately considered her testimony regarding the side effects of her pain medication because her initial brief simply mentions the issue without providing any supporting argument. See Singh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 561 F.3d 1275, 1278–79 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that ‘simply stating that an issue exists, without further argument or discussion, constitutes abandonment of that issue’).”). 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). “‘The [Commissioner]’s failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates reversal.’” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991)). Accord Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994). In sum, courts “review the Commissioner’s factual findings with deference and the Commissioner’s legal conclusions with close scrutiny.” Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). See also Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“In Social Security appeals, we review de novo the legal principles upon which the Commissioner's decision is based. Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). However, we review the resulting decision only to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2004).”). Eligibility for DIB and SSI requires that the claimant be disabled. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(E), 1382(a)(1)-(2). A claimant is disabled if she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment ... which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). Thornton v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 597 F. App’x 604, 609 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished).5 In this Circuit, “[u]npublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. R. 36-2. See also Henry v. 5 The Social Security Regulations outline a five-step, sequential evaluation process used to determine whether a claimant is disabled: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of Impairments; (4) based on a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment, whether the claimant can perform any of his or her past relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there are significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform given the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)(v); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237-39).6 “These regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work.” Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211 (citing Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1093 (11th Cir. 1985)). “In determining whether the claimant has satisfied this initial burden, the examiner must consider four factors: (1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; (2) the diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant’s age, education, and work history.” Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citing Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). “These factors must be considered both singly and in combination. Presence or absence of a single factor is not, in itself, conclusive.” Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (citations omitted). Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 n.1 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“Cases printed in the Federal Appendix are cited as persuasive authority.”). The Court will hereinafter use “Step One,” “Step Two,” etc. when referencing individual steps of this five-step sequential evaluation. 6 If, in Steps One through Four of the five-step evaluation, a claimant proves that he or she has a qualifying disability and cannot do his or her past relevant work, it then becomes the Commissioner’s burden, at Step Five, to prove that the claimant is capable—given his or her age, education, and work history—of engaging in another kind of substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999); Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1985). Finally, although the “claimant bears the burden of demonstrating the inability to return to [his or] her past relevant work, the Commissioner of Social Security has an obligation to develop a full and fair record.” Shnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987). See also Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“It is well-established that the ALJ has a basic duty to develop a full and fair record. Nevertheless, the claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled, and, consequently, he is responsible for producing evidence in support of his claim.” (citations omitted)). “This is an onerous task, as the ALJ must scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all relevant facts. In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider the evidence as a whole.” Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citation and quotation omitted). When the ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review of that decision, the Court “review[s] the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s final decision.” Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278. But “when a claimant properly presents new evidence to the Appeals Council, a reviewing court must consider whether that new evidence renders the denial of benefits erroneous.” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1262. Nevertheless, “when the [Appeals Council] has denied review, [the Court] will look only to the evidence actually presented to the ALJ in determining whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 1998). III. Summary of the ALJ’s Decision At Step One, the ALJ determined that Wilson met the applicable insured status requirements through December 31, 2014, and that she had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged disability onset date of July 14, 2014. (R. 12). 7 At Step Two, the ALJ determined that Wilson had the following severe impairments: degenerative joint disease; osteoarthritis of the left hip and knees; degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine; obesity; anxiety; and depression. (R. 13). At Step Three, the ALJ found that Wilson did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled the severity of a specified impairment in Appendix 1 of the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. (R. 13 – 16). At Step Four,8 the ALJ determined that Wilson had the residual functional “For DIB claims, a claimant is eligible for benefits where she demonstrates disability on or before the last date for which she were insured. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A) (2005). For SSI claims, a claimant becomes eligible in the first month where she is both disabled and has an SSI application on file. 20 C.F.R. § 416.202– 03 (2005).” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 7 8 At Step Four, capacity (RFC) “to perform a reduced range of sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a).[9] Specifically, she will be allowed use of an assistive device for prolonged ambulation[;] will be allowed to alternate positions while remaining at her workstation to relieve pain or discomfort[;] will occasionally balance, stoop, and crouch[;] will never kneel, crawl, climb ramps or stairs, or climb the ALJ must assess: (1) the claimant's residual functional capacity (“RFC”); and (2) the claimant's ability to return to her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). As for the claimant's RFC, the regulations define RFC as that which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). Moreover, the ALJ will “assess and make a finding about [the claimant's] residual functional capacity based on all the relevant medical and other evidence” in the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). Furthermore, the RFC determination is used both to determine whether the claimant: (1) can return to her past relevant work under the fourth step; and (2) can adjust to other work under the fifth step…20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). If the claimant can return to her past relevant work, the ALJ will conclude that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) & (f). If the claimant cannot return to her past relevant work, the ALJ moves on to step five. In determining whether [a claimant] can return to her past relevant work, the ALJ must determine the claimant's RFC using all relevant medical and other evidence in the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). That is, the ALJ must determine if the claimant is limited to a particular work level. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567. Once the ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC and determines that the claimant cannot return to her prior relevant work, the ALJ moves on to the fifth, and final, step. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39 (footnote omitted). “To determine the physical exertion requirements of different types of employment in the national economy, the Commissioner classifies jobs as sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very heavy. These terms are all defined in the regulations … Each classification … has its own set of criteria.” Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1239 n.4. See also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567, 416.967. 9 ladders, ropes or scaffolds[;] will reach frequently, except she will reach overhead occasionally[;] will occasionally push or pull using her upper or lower extremities[;] will frequently handle, finger, feel and grasp[;] will avoid concentrated exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights and hazardous machinery[;] will avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, heat, wetness, and humidity[;] will avoid concentrated exposure to vibration[;] will avoid concentrated exposure to pulmonary irritants such as fumes, odors, dusts, gases or poor ventilation[;] will work in an environment with no greater than a moderate noise level[;] will be provided short simple instructions[;] will be provided breaks every 2 hours, and … will have infrequent workplace changes that will be introduced gradually.” (R. 16 – 22). Based on the RFC and the testimony of a vocational expert, 10 the ALJ determined that Wilson was unable to perform any past relevant work. (R. 22). At Step Five, after considering additional testimony from the vocational expert, the ALJ found that there exist a significant number of other jobs in the national economy that Wilson could perform given her RFC, age, education, and work experience. (R. 22 – 24). Thus, the ALJ found that Wilson was not under a disability as defined by Social Security Act during the relevant adjudicatory period. (R. 24). “A vocational expert is an expert on the kinds of jobs an individual can perform based on his or her capacity and impairments. When the ALJ uses a vocational expert, the ALJ will pose hypothetical question(s) to the vocational expert to establish whether someone with the limitations that the ALJ has previously determined that the claimant has will be able to secure employment in the national economy.” Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240. 10 IV. A. Analysis Treating Physician’s Opinion “ ‘Medical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [the claimant's] impairment(s), including [the claimant’s] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [the claimant's] physical or mental restrictions.’ ” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178-79 (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2)). “There are three tiers of medical opinion sources: (1) treating physicians; (2) nontreating, examining physicians; and (3) nontreating, nonexamining physicians.” Himes v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 585 F. App'x 758, 762 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)-(2), 416.927(c)(1)-(2)). “In assessing medical opinions, the ALJ must consider a number of factors in determining how much weight to give to each medical opinion, including (1) whether the physician has examined the claimant; (2) the length, nature, and extent of a treating physician's relationship with the claimant; (3) the medical evidence and explanation supporting the physician’s opinion; (4) how consistent the physician’s opinion is with the record as a whole; and (5) the physician’s specialization. These factors apply to both examining and non-examining physicians.” Eyre v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 586 F. App'x 521, 523 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) & (e), 416.927(c) & (e)). “These factors must be considered both singly and in combination. Presence or absence of a single factor is not, in itself, conclusive.” Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (citation omitted). While “the ALJ is not required to explicitly address each of those factors[,]” Lawton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 431 F. App'x 830, 833 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished), “the ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to different medical opinions and the reasons therefor.” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179. An “ALJ may reject any medical opinion if the evidence supports a contrary finding.” Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 280 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). “The opinion of a treating physician…‘must be given substantial or considerable weight unless “good cause” is shown to the contrary.’ ” Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240 (quoting Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440)).11 Consistent with the long-settled principle that “the [Commissioner] may reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion[,]” id., “[g]ood cause exists ‘when the: (1) treating physician's opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician's opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records.’ With good cause, an ALJ may disregard a treating physician’s opinion, but he ‘must clearly articulate [the] reasons’ for doing so.” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240-41) (internal citation omitted). Failure to clearly articulate the reasons for giving less weight to the opinion of a treating physician “constitutes reversible On January 18, 2017, the SSA substantially revised the regulations governing how the Commissioner considers medical opinions. However, those revisions apply only to claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, and are therefore inapplicable to Wilson’s present applications. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c. 11 error.” Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440. “But if an ALJ articulates specific reasons for declining to give the opinion of a treating physician controlling weight, and those reasons are supported by substantial evidence, there is no reversible error.” Horowitz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 688 F. App'x 855, 861 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing Moore, 405 F.3d at 1212). Accord Huigens v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 718 F. App'x 841, 844 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (unpublished). Wilson argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting to the August 2017 medical opinion of one of her treating physician, Dr. Perry Timberlake. (R. 1299 – 1300).12 Characterizing the opinion as outlining “extreme limitations,” the ALJ assigned it “little weight” and offered specific reasons for doing so. (See R. 21). Those stated reasons “clearly articulated” “good cause” to assign less than substantial or considerable weight to Dr. Timberlake’s opinion, and substantial evidence supports those reasons. First, it is well established that “the opinion of a treating physician may be rejected when it is so brief and conclusory that it lacks persuasive weight or where it is unsubstantiated by any clinical or laboratory findings.” Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240. As the ALJ correctly noted, “Dr. Timberlake failed to provide an explanation or objective evidence in support of his opinion” (R. 21), even checking “no” on the opinion form when it asked if “the diagnoses in this case are confirmed The ALJ noted that there were additional medical opinions from Dr. Timberlake in the record but found that “these opinions fall outside the alleged period of disability” and were “[a]ccordingly … of little significance.” (R. 21). The ALJ also gave “little weight” to the medical opinion of another of Wilson’s treating physicians, Dr. Walid Freij. (see R. 21). Wilson’s brief does not challenge those aspects of the ALJ’s decision. 12 by objective medical findings[,]” and leaving blank the space asking that he “[s]tate the medical basis for these restrictions.” (R. 1299). Dr. Timberlake’s failure to offer any explanation for his opinion was particularly glaring because, as the ALJ also noted (see R. 1), Dr. Timberlake also answered “no” when asked if the limitations assigned in his opinion were “normally expected from the type and severity of the diagnoses in [Wilson’s] case.” (R. 1299).13 Second, the ALJ found that Dr. Timberlake’s opinion was “not consistent with imaging and the medical record as a whole[,]” citing to specific portions of the record in noting that Wilson’s “physical exams were largely normal” (Doc. 12-2, PageID.75 (citing Doc. 12-23, PageID.1024; Doc. 12-24, PageID.1040-1042; Doc. 1226, PageID.1245, 1258)) – in other words, Dr. Timberlake’s opinion “was not bolstered by the evidence.” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (quotation omitted). Wilson’s brief largely just cites various portions of the record without linking them to specific portions of the ALJ’s decision. However, the Court may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for the Commissioner’s. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178. “The court need not determine whether it would have As noted previously, see n.12, supra, Dr. Timberlake submitted two other medical opinions – one dated February 24, 2014 (R. 534 – 535), and the other dated March 23, 2016 (R. 1186 – 1187), which the ALJ found to be “outside the alleged period of disability” and “[a]ccordingly…of little significance.” (R. 21). Both of those opinions utilized the same form as Dr. Timberlake’s August 2017 opinion. Observing that Dr. Timberlake checked “yes” on those forms when asked if the assigned limitations were “normally expected from the type and severity of the diagnoses,” and “are the diagnoses in this case confirmed by objective medical findings,” Wilson states that “one must assume Dr. Timberlake simply marked the wrong blanks on the form.” (Doc. 14, PageID.1395). The undersigned rejects this argument as mere speculation seeking to have the Court impermissibly substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178. 13 reached a different result based upon the record” because “[e]ven if we find that the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner]'s decision, we must affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).14 Additionally, Wilson’s brief appears to focus on laboratory signs showing physical impairments, while failing to address the largely normal findings that accompanied those impairments. See Moore, 405 F.3d at 1213 n.6 (“To a large extent, Moore questions the ALJ’s RFC determination based solely on the fact that she has varus leg instability and shoulder separation. However, the mere existence of these impairments does not reveal the extent to which they limit her ability to work or undermine the ALJ's determination in that regard.”).15 See also Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991) (under the substantial evidence standard, “we do not reverse the [Commissioner] even if this court, sitting as a finder of fact, would have reached a contrary result…”); Hunter v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 808 F.3d 818, 822 (11th Cir. 2015) (“In light of our deferential review, there is no inconsistency in finding that two successive ALJ decisions are supported by substantial evidence even when those decisions reach opposing conclusions. Faced with the same record, different ALJs could disagree with one another based on their respective credibility determinations and how each weighs the evidence. Both decisions could nonetheless be supported by evidence that reasonable minds would accept as adequate.”); Barron v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 227, 230 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Substantial evidence may even exist contrary to the findings of the ALJ, and we may have taken a different view of it as a factfinder. Yet, if there is substantially supportive evidence, the findings cannot be overturned.”); Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended on reh'g (Aug. 9, 2001) (“If the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.”). 14 Wilson claims that the notes from a consultative exam conducted by Dr. Brittany Barnes, whose medical opinion the ALJ gave “great weight” because it was “consistent with the record as a whole” (Doc. 12-2, PageID.74), are supportive of Dr. 15 In sum, the ALJ did not err in rejecting Dr. Timberlake’s medical opinion. B. RFC Wilson also claims that three aspects of the RFC assigned to Wilson are not supported by substantial evidence – indeed, she goes so far as to say there is “no evidence” to support them. The undersigned disagrees. First, she claims that the provision of the RFC allowing her “to alternate positions while remaining at her workstation to relieve pain or discomfort” is not consistent with record evidence indicating that Wilson has difficulty in changing from a sitting to a standing position. However, the ALJ noted that Wilson herself testified she could get out of a chair with the assistance of a cane (see Doc. 12-2, PageID.71), and the RFC allowed for Wilson’s use of an assistive device for ambulation. While the evidence does demonstrate that Wilson has difficulties in rising to a standing position, she cites no evidence indicating that it was a near impossibility for her to do so, especially when using an assistive device. Wilson next challenges the RFC finding that she can “frequently handle, finger, feel and grasp.” In doing so, she largely relies on Dr. Timberlake’s medical opinion, but as discussed above, the ALJ properly assigned little weight to that opinion. Wilson points to Dr. Barnes’s examination finding that Wilson’s bilateral grip strength was 2/5 (Doc. 12-25, PageID.1200), but as the Commissioner notes, and Wilson fails to note, the very next page of Dr. Barnes’s report also states that Timberlake’s opinion. However, Dr. Barnes assigned Wilson less extreme limitations than Dr. Timberlake did based on her examination, and the portions of Dr. Barnes’s notes Wilson cites do not incontrovertibly support Dr. Timberlake’s disabling opinions. Wilson had 10/10 fine and gross manipulative skills in both hands, was “able to write her name and pick up coin from table,” and had no issue gripping her heavy cane. (Id., PageID.1201). Dr. Barnes’s opinion also assigned no limitations in handling, fingering, feeling, and grasping, and as the ALJ’s brief points out, the other largely normal examination findings of record did not support any significant limitations in these abilities. Finally, Wilson claims the RFC failed to take her obesity into account as required by SSR 02-1p The ALJ found that Wilson’s obesity was a severe impairment at Step Two and considered it in conjunction with Wilson’s other medically determinable impairments at Step Three. At Step Four, the ALJ also considered Wilson’s obesity “[i]n accordance with SSR 02-1p” but found that it did not warrant any greater limitations than those already assigned in the RFC. (Doc. 12-2, PageID.74). Wilson raises no specific challenge to these determinations, and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Wilson’s obesity did not warrant any additional RFC limitations, including Dr. Barnes’s opinion and the largely normal examination findings noted. Wilson has failed to convince the Court of any reversible error in the ALJ’s decision. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s final decision denying Wilson’s applications is due to be AFFIRMED. V. Conclusion In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that the Commissioner’s final decision denying Wilson’s July 14, 2014 applications for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI is AFFIRMED under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Final judgment shall issue separately in accordance with this order and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. DONE and ORDERED this the 23rd day of March 2020. /s/ Katherine P. Nelson KATHERINE P. NELSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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