Muhammad v. Bethel-Muhammad et al, No. 2:2011cv00690 - Document 255 (S.D. Ala. 2013)

Court Description: ORDER denying 211 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by plaintiff. All claims against Bethel are dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Chief Judge William H. Steele on 10/17/2013. Copy mailed to Plaintiff & Brenda Bethel-Muhammad on 10/17/13. (tgw)
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Muhammad v. Bethel-Muhammad et al Doc. 255 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION KALIM A.R. MUHAMMAD, etc., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CIVIL ACTION 11-0690-WS-B ) BRENDA BETHEL-MUHAMMAD, et al.,) ) Defendants. ) ORDER Of the eight defendants in this action, two have been dismissed on motion to dismiss and five have been dismissed on motion for summary judgment. Only Brenda Bethel-Muhammad (“Bethel”) remains. After reviewing the motions for summary judgment, it appeared to the Court that Bethel likely would be entitled to summary judgment as well and for similar reasons. Accordingly, and pursuant to Rule 56(f), the Court notified the plaintiff that it would consider granting summary judgment in favor of Bethel sua sponte and provided the plaintiff two weeks to submit any brief and/or evidentiary materials in opposition to such relief. (Doc. 240). No sooner had that order issued than Bethel filed a notice advising that she had received a discharge in bankruptcy, which discharge included the plaintiff’s claim against her. (Doc. 241). Accordingly, the Court ordered the plaintiff to show cause why his action as to Bethel should not be dismissed on this basis. (Doc. 242). Dockets.Justia.com The plaintiff has filed an untitled document in response to these orders. (Doc. 253).1 His filing is unaccompanied by exhibits, but the Court is aware that he filed a number of exhibits in opposition to the motions for summary judgment filed by five defendants. (Doc. 229). Now ripe for resolution is the Court’s sua sponte determination whether Bethel should receive dismissal and/or summary judgment. After careful consideration, the Court concludes that Bethel is entitled to dismissal with prejudice of all claims asserted against her. BACKGROUND This is the pro se plaintiff’s second lawsuit covering essentially the same subject matter.2 The defendants are: (1) Bethel; (2) LaJenna Hatcher; (3) Dallas County Department of Human Resources (“Dallas DHR”); (4) Alabama Department of Human Resources (“State DHR”);3 (5) Judge Robert Armstrong; (6) Paul Vaughan Russell; (7) Equifax Credit Reporting Agency (“Equifax”); and (8) Experian Credit Reporting Agency (“Experian”). In general, the amended complaint, (Doc. 37), alleges that the plaintiff and Bethel entered an agreement purporting to require that any disputes regarding their minor daughter be resolved by a religious tribunal. Bethel, represented by Russell, nevertheless filed custody and child support actions in state court, presided over by Judge Armstrong. Hatcher, a DHR employee, assisted Bethel. Experian and Equifax (collectively, 1 The plaintiff also has filed a “notice to the Honorable Court of possible misunderstanding,” (Doc. 254), which apologizes for any offense given by his erroneous denials that Bethel had filed Document 241. No offense was taken. 2 The first was dismissed without prejudice due to the plaintiff’s prolonged failure to present a comprehensible complaint compliant with basic pleading requirements, a ruling upheld on appeal. (Docs. 20, 35 and attachments). Muhammad v. Bethel, Civil Action No.10-0086-WS-B (“Muhammad I”). 3 The State and Dallas County DHR are referred to herein collectively as the “DHR defendants.” 2 “the Credit defendants”) disseminated negative information from the DHR defendants and/or the court file. The counts, and the defendants under each, are as follows: 1 Section 1981 and First Amendment Bethel, Russell, Hatcher 2 Fourteenth Amendment Due Process All 3 Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy All non-Credit defendants 4 Fifth Amendment Due Process/ All non-Credit defendants Federal Arbitration Act 5 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2 All non-Credit defendants 6 18 U.S.C. § 241 All 7 18 U.S.C. § 242 All non-Credit defendants 8 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 All non-Credit defendants 9 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), (3) All individual defendants 10 18 U.S.C. § 1341 All 11 42 U.S.C. § 1986 All but State, Dallas DHR 12 Article 1, Section 10, 14th Amendment All non-Credit defendants 13 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1), (2) All 14 42 U.S.C. § 2000a All non-Credit defendants 15 40 U.S.C. § 122 Armstrong 16 42 U.S.C. § 1994 Armstrong 17 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(2), (3), 1986, All but Russell, Armstrong 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) 18 Ninth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d All non-Credit defendants 19 Fifth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, All 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1983 20 Article 1, Section 10, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 21 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(d), 1514, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3), 1986 All All 3 22 Ala. Code § 12-16-217, All non-Credit defendants 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 23 Canon 1, Canons of Judicial Ethics All non-Credit defendants 24 Canon 2, Canons of Judicial Ethics All non-Credit defendants 25 Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) All Bethel is thus a defendant under all counts except Counts Fifteen and Sixteen. DISCUSSION The Court considers first Bethel’s discharge in bankruptcy, then turns to her entitlement vel non to summary judgment. I. Discharge in Bankruptcy. Bethel filed a bankruptcy petition in March 2013.4 In May, she filed an amended Schedule F adding the plaintiff as an unsecured creditor based on this lawsuit and providing as his address the same address he has consistently used in this litigation. On June 17, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court entered the following order: It appearing that the debtor is entitled to a discharge, IT IS ORDERED: The debtor is granted a discharge under section 727 of title 11, United States Code, (the Bankruptcy Code). “A discharge in a case under this title ... voids any judgment … to the extent such judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged under section 727 … of this title, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived ….” 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1). Moreover, “[a] discharge under this title … operates as an injunction against the commencement 4 Relevant portions of the bankruptcy file are attached to this order. 4 or continuation of an action … to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived ….” Id. § 524(a)(2). The plaintiff’s suit against Bethel plainly falls within this provision. While there are certain exceptions to discharge, see id. § 523, the plaintiff invokes none of them, and it is plain that none applies.5 The plaintiff argues that the Court should strike Bethel’s notice of discharge due to “the herein prejudices and those to be inferred, discovered and announced in later briefs or on appeal.” (Doc. 253 at 25). These prejudices are difficult to discern in the plaintiff’s rambling, unfocused brief, but they appear to center on his belief that Bethel has not properly placed her discharge in issue. Formerly, discharge in bankruptcy was an affirmative defense, required to be asserted or waived, but the 2010 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure deleted it from the list of affirmative defenses. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1). Thus, Bethel was not required to file an amended answer asserting discharge in bankruptcy. Even if she were so required, the Court would construe her notice as a motion for leave to amend her answer and would grant such motion under Rules 15(a)(2) and 16(b).6 Because the plaintiff’s claims against Bethel have been discharged in bankruptcy, they are due to be dismissed with prejudice. 5 The plaintiff complains that Bethel did not “serve” him the “complaint or summons” in the bankruptcy case. (Doc. 253 at 18, 27). There is no complaint and summons in a bankruptcy case, and the debtor does not serve her petition on creditors. The debtor is responsible for listing her creditors and providing their addresses; the bankruptcy clerk’s office is responsible for giving the listed creditors notice. See Bankruptcy Rules 1007, 2002(a). The plaintiff does not assert that he failed to receive such notice. Nor does he provide evidence that he received no notice. 6 Amendments to the pleadings were required by February 22, 2013. (Doc. 167 at 2). Good cause is required to modify this deadline. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Because Bethel did not obtain her discharge until long after February 2013, she could not have asserted discharge by that date, and that impossibility furnishes good cause for her later invocation of discharge. 5 II. Summary Judgment. Summary judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence, and all reasonable inferences, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant ….” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). There is no burden on the Court to identify unreferenced evidence supporting a party’s position.7 Accordingly, the Court limits its review to the exhibits, and to the specific portions of the exhibits, to which the plaintiff has expressly cited. A. Claims Resolved on Other Motions for Summary Judgment. For the reasons set forth in Parts II, III, IV, V, VIII and IX of the Court’s order on the DHR defendants’ motion for summary judgment, (Doc. 247), Bethel is entitled to summary judgment as to Counts Five, Six, Seven, Eight, Ten, Thirteen, Fourteen, Twenty-Three and Twenty-Four and is entitled to summary judgment as to those portions of Counts Four, Seventeen, Twenty, Twenty-One and Twenty-Two addressed therein. B. Constitutional Claims. As discussed in Part II of the Court’s order on Russell’s motion for summary judgment, (Doc. 249), all of the plaintiff’s constitutional claims are brought through the vehicle of Section 1983 and thus require conduct under color of state law. “[T]he under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” Focus 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) (“The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.”); accord Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 672 (10th Cir. 1998) (“The district court has discretion to go beyond the referenced portions of these [summary judgment] materials, but is not required to do so.”). 6 on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority, 344 F.3d 1263, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotes omitted). The amended complaint asserts that Bethel “is a private citizen,” (Doc. 37 at 2), and she is sued for her conduct in connection with the custody and child support matters. “Use of the courts by private parties [a client and his lawyer] does not constitute an act under color of state law.” Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1133 (11th Cir. 1992). It is possible for a private party to be deemed a state actor if the state has compelled her conduct; if her function is one traditionally performed exclusively by the state; or if the state has insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with her to such an extent as to be a joint participant. Focus on the Family, 344 F.3d at 1277. The plaintiff, however, has asserted none of these things, much less shown them to exist. There is one other possibility. “[A]n otherwise private person acts ‘under color of’ state law when engaged in a conspiracy with state officials to deprive another of federal rights.” Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984). The amended complaint alleges that Bethel conspired with Hatcher and with Judge Armstrong, (Doc. 37 at 6-7, 8, 17), and both are state officials for purposes of this analysis. The plaintiff, however, has identified no evidence that Bethel in fact conspired with Hatcher or Judge Armstrong. With respect to Hatcher, the amended complaint alleges that Bethel and Hatcher “are close cousins and that was the initial base of the conspiracy.” (Doc. 37 at 17). The mere fact of familial relationship would of course be irrelevant to the existence of a conspiracy to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, but in any event the only evidence before the Court is that Bethel and Hatcher are not related. (Doc. 235, Hatcher Affidavit at 2). The amended complaint also alleges that Hatcher and Bethel agreed to attack the plaintiff by pursuing child support against him despite his agreement with Bethel to keep such matters out of the civil courts. (Doc. 37 at 8). But it is uncontroverted that Hatcher’s very job is to 7 participate in child support proceedings as a witness and in helping the parents fill out income affidavits, (Doc. 235, Hatcher Affidavit at 2), so her doing so in this case is not evidence that she reached an agreement with Bethel to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. With respect to Judge Armstrong, the amended complaint relies on Bethel’s attorney-client relationship to Russell and on Russell’s alleged ex parte conversations with Judge Armstrong. (Doc. 37 at 6-7). As noted in the order granting Russell summary judgment, the only evidence presented to the Court is that no ex parte conversations occurred. (Doc. 209, Exhibit A at 2; Doc. 229 at 25). Thus, even if Bethel had agreed with Russell to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights (and there is no evidence that she did so), Russell is as much a private actor as is Bethel, and without evidence that Russell conspired with Judge Armstrong, Bethel cannot be part of a conspiracy with him. Because the plaintiff has shown no basis on which Bethel could be found to be a state actor, all of the plaintiff’s claims brought under Section 1983 – which means at least all of her constitutional claims – fail as a matter of law. Bethel is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Counts Two, Three and Twelve. She is also entitled to summary judgment with respect to the only remaining portions of Counts Four and Twenty. Finally, Bethel is entitled to summary judgment with respect to those portions of Counts One, Eighteen, Nineteen and Twenty-Two that assert constitutional claims or invoke Section 1983. C. Section 1985. “The core of a conspiracy claim is an agreement between the parties ….” Mickens v. Tenth Judicial Circuit, 181 Fed. Appx. 865, 876 (11th Cir. 2006). Thus, the plaintiff “must show … an agreement between two or more people (at least one of whom is a state actor) to violate his constitutional rights ….” AFLCIO v. City of Miami, 637 F.3d 1178, 1191 (11th Cir. 2011). As noted in Part II.B, the plaintiff has no evidence that Bethel reached such an agreement with a state 8 actor. Thus, the plaintiff’s Section 1985 claims against Bethel fail as a matter of law. Bethel is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Count Nine and with respect to those portions of Counts Seventeen, Twenty-One and Twenty-Two that invoke Section 1985. D. Section 1986. A claim under Section 1986 requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant knew of a Section 1985 conspiracy, that she had the power to prevent (or aid in preventing) the constitutional violation made the object of the conspiracy, and that she failed to do so. 42 U.S.C. § 1986; accord Cox v. Mills, 465 Fed. Appx. 885, 888 (11th Cir. 2012). The plaintiff has identified no evidence that Bethel knew of a Section 1985 conspiracy involving Judge Armstrong, Hatcher and/or the DHR defendants and that she had the power to stop the conspiracy from succeeding. For that matter, the plaintiff has identified no evidence that an underlying Section 1985 conspiracy existed. As noted in Part II.C, the plaintiff must show an agreement to violate his constitutional rights. While the plaintiff is full of conspiracy theories, he has yet to point to evidence that could support an inference that an agreement to violate his rights existed. Since claims under Section 1986 are “derivative” of Section 1985 claims, the failure to establish a conspiracy for purposes of a Section 1985 claim dooms the derivative Section 1986 claim. E.g., Cox, 465 Fed. Appx. at 888. For both these reasons, the plaintiff’s Section 1986 claims against Bethel fail as a matter of law. Bethel is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Count Eleven and with respect to the sole remaining portions of Counts Seventeen, Twenty-One and Twenty-Two. 9 E. Race Discrimination Claims. Section 1981 addresses only intentional discrimination on the basis of race. E.g., Lopez v. Target Corp., 676 F.3d 1230, 1233 (11th Cir. 2012). Likewise, Section 1982 addresses “discrimination based on race.” Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 479 (2008). Finally, Title VI is limited to discrimination “on the ground of race, color, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d). The amended complaint, however, does not accuse Bethel of a racial motivation. While his briefs are full of racial invective, the plaintiff identifies no actual evidence that Bethel acted based on racial animus.8 The Court incorporates its discussion in Part VII of its order disposing of the DHR defendants’ motion for summary judgment concerning the standard and method of proof of racial animus. For want of such evidence, the plaintiff’s claims under Section 1981, Section 1982 and Title VI fail as a matter of law. Bethel is entitled to summary judgment with respect to the last remaining portions of Counts One, Eighteen and Nineteen. F. Fair Credit Reporting Act. The plaintiff invokes Section 1681s-2, (Doc. 37 at 28), which generally requires a furnisher of information to consumer reporting agencies to investigate a consumer’s challenge to the accuracy of the information transmitted. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(8)(E), (b)(1)(A). The amended complaint, however, does not allege that Bethel is a furnisher of information to consumer reporting agencies, and the plaintiff has identified no evidence that Bethel was such a furnisher. Without such evidence, his claim under FCRA fails as a matter of law. Bethel is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Count Twenty-Five. 8 This would be a hard sell, given that Bethel and the plaintiff are both AfricanAmerican. 10 III. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Also pending is the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for judgment as a matter of law. (Doc. 211).9 The plaintiff asks that judgment be entered against Bethel due to her failure to prosecute and failure to comply with the Magistrate Judge’s orders concerning discovery. The plaintiff invokes Rule 41(b), but that rule addresses only dismissal of a plaintiff’s case, not entry of judgment against a defendant.10 He also invokes Rule 37, which does apply to defendants. For failing to serve answers to interrogatories, or for failing to obey an order to provide discovery, a defendant is subject to sanction, up to and including default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A), 37(d)(1), (3). In September 2013, the Magistrate Judge entered an order granting the plaintiff’s motion to compel and ordering the plaintiff to respond to the plaintiff’s interrogatories by September 27, 2013. (Doc. 238 at 2). The plaintiff’s motion was filed in June 2013, and the plaintiff has filed nothing asserting that Bethel has failed to serve interrogatory responses following the Magistrate Judge’s September order. Without such an assertion, the plaintiff can obtain no relief. Even had the plaintiff made this threshold showing, his motion would be denied. While Rule 37 “gives district judges broad discretion to fashion appropriate sanctions for violation of discovery orders[,] this discretion is guided by judicial interpretation of the rule. For example, a default judgment sanction requires a willful or bad faith failure to obey a discovery order.” Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1542 (11th Cir. 1993). “Violation of a discovery 9 Because a motion for judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only after the introduction of evidence in a jury trial, Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a), the Court construes the plaintiff’s motion exclusively as one for summary judgment. 10 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how a defendant such as Bethel, who asserts no counterclaims, could fail to “prosecute.” 11 order caused by simple negligence, misunderstanding, or inability to comply will not justify a Rule 37 default judgment or dismissal.” Id. Where, then, is the plaintiff’s showing of Bethel’s bad faith or willfulness? As noted, she filed a bankruptcy petition in March 2013, and she was from that moment protected by the automatic stay of Section 362(a). Once she received her discharge in June, she was protected by the injunction of Section 524(a). The plaintiff has not attempted to show how, in light of these circumstances, Bethel’s silence could be deemed willful or in bad faith. Moreover, the interrogatories the plaintiff submitted to Bethel bear no relation to the issues in the case in general or to Bethel’s entitlement to summary judgment in particular. (Doc. 229 at 47-56). It would be wildly inappropriate to enter default judgment against a defendant, who is entitled to summary judgment, merely for failing to respond to irrelevant questions. See Dunbar v. United States, 502 F.2d 506, 509 n.2 (5th Cir. 1974) (“It is perhaps worthy of note that even though a given piece of information may be ‘relevant’ for purposes of Rule 26(b), the less relevant that information becomes, the less appropriate a Rule 37 sanction is, where there is a failure or refusal to produce the information.”). For the foregoing reasons, the Court exercises its broad discretion against the extreme sanction of default judgment. The plaintiff’s motion is denied. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, all claims against Bethel are dismissed with prejudice. Judgment shall be entered accordingly by separate order. DONE and ORDERED this 17th day of October, 2013. s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 12 BI Counr UNTTED STATES BANTRUPTCy Southern District of Alabama tt*'3;rn",. Nano of Debtor (if individrul, cntcr Last First All Odwr Namc uscd by thc Dcbtor in thc last (include manicd, rnaiden, and trade namcs): E Name of Joint Debtor (Spotso) (l"sst, Firsl, Middtc): Brenda Lea I thc Joint Dcbtor in thc last Ottrcr Namrs uscd (include rnanied, maidcn, urd tradc names): Tn yrrN 8 ycan Last four digits ofSoc. Sec. or lndividual'Taxpayer l.D. (lTlNycunplcle tslN (ifmore than onc, statc all): Last ficw digits of Soc, Scc. or Indivi{tual-Taxpaycr l.D. (lTlNyL'omplcte tilN than orr, statc 8tl): (if morc 3538 Strca eCCrcis ofJoint Debtor (No. and Strcet, City, and Statc): Strcct Addrcss of Dobtor (No. 8nd Sbect City, and Statc): 1208 ilemorial Ave. Selma, ALa ztPcoDE36703 County of Rs3idcrce or of thc hincipEl Placc of Busi**, EiPcoEE | County ofRcsidcncc or ofthe Principel Placo ofBusincss: O"ll", Coun' Mailing Addrcss ofJoint Debtor (ifdiffcrcnt from srcat sddtcss): Mailing Addres of Dchor(if diffcrcnt from strcct addrcss): VIPC( Location of Principal Asscu ofBusincss Deb{or (ifdiffereflt from $rert addtos abovc): tr tr tr lhc Potlllon ir Fllcd (Check onc box.) (Chcck orc box.) (Chcck onc box,) g ErPcqpE___l Chr6or of Brnkruplcy Codc Uodcr Whicb Nrturc.f Burlrcrr Typc of Dcbtor (Form ofOrganization) tr tr lndividrnl (includes Joint Dobtors) Scc Erhibtt D on pgc 2 of thisforn. tr tr tr D |--l Corporation(includcsLLCandLLP) Partrrrship Other (lfdcbtor ir notoneofficabovc cntitics,chcck this box and stato typc ofcntity bolow.) Hcal0r Carc Busincss Single Asd Real Estste il Es dcfird in u.s.c. $ r0r(5rB) Railroad Stockkokcr g ChaptcrT tr D Cfuptcr 9 tr Chapter I I tr tr Chaplcr 12 tr Chapter 13 ClcaringBank f).hf Nrturc of Dcbr (Chcck onc box.) Tu-Er.mpt Eldry Cheptcr l5 Dcbton (Chcck box, if applicrble.) Each country in which a forcign proceoding by, regrrding, or againsl debtor is pending: Recognition of o Foreign Main Procccding Chaplcr 15 Petition for Rocognitionofa Forcign Nonmain hocecding Commodity Brokcr Country of dcbtor's entcr of main intcrcsts: O Chaptcr15Petitionfor E Dcbtorisalax-cxcmptorganization undcr titlc 26 oftho Unitcd Statcr Codc (thc lntcrnsl Rcvcnuc Codc). ocbts$aprirurilyconsumer U.S.C. g l0l(8) as "incuned by an debts, dcfinod in I I I Dcltsare ptimorily busincss dcbts, individual primarily fot a penonal, fanily, or houschold purposc," ClrPtcr tt Dcblorr Cbccl orc bor: Dcbtorirasmall busincssdcbtorasdeflncd in Filiry Frc (Chcck onc box.) tr tr g tr tr FullFilingFecaruchod. Filing Fcc lo bc poid in imtallmcns (applicablo to individrnls only). Must attach signcd application for thc court's coruidcration cortiSing that th€ dlbtor is unable to poy fco oxcGpt in installmcnr. Rulc l005(b). Soo Ofticisl Form 3A. ll U'S.C' $ l0l(5lD)' Dcbtor is not a small busincs dcbtor as detlncd in I I U.S.C. $ l0l(51D). Cbeck lf: Dobtor's aggrcgatc noncontingcnt liqoidatcd dcbts (cxcluding dcbts ou€d to insidcrs or afliliabs) rrc las than $2 ,143,700 (anowt tubiect to adiusrment on 1/01/1 3 and cvery three ye$t ,herearer). tr Filing Fcc uaivcr requ€sed (applhablc to chopter 7 individurls only). Must Clocl rll rppllcebl. bor$! O tr A plan is bcing filcd with this pctition. Acceptancos ofthc plan woro solicited propetition from one or nore classss of crcditon. in accordancc with I I U.S.C. I ! 126(b). Strtbti.ryA dnrlnblrrtivc Infortl.tloD tr g THI$ SPACE IS FOR CPURT I.'SE ONLY Dcbior cstimrtcs that funds will bc availablc for distribution to unsccurcd grcditon. Dcbtor ctimatcs that, aftcr any c,(Gmpt propcrty is cxcludcd urd administrativc cxpcrucs paid, thcre will bc no funds availablc for disaibution to uns.cured crcditofr. gtru 50-99 l-49 trtr 200-999 Estirnntcd Numbor of Cndilors r0Gt99 Estrmatc{l Asscts qjDDD $0 to $50,001 to t100,001 to $500,001 $50,000 $100,000 $500,000 to$l million nstrnnntrDntr to to t0to tr t,0005,000 5,00110,m0 E 10,00 t- 25,000 trtrDtr $,000,00r Jt0.000,001 $50,000,00t to JlO rnillim to 350 millim toJlOO million t100,001 $50,000 $100,000 $500,000 tr 25,00r" 50,00t- Ovcr 50,000 r00,000 t00,000 st00,@0,001 to $500 3500,000.001 Morc thm Case 1-3-00819 Doc 1 million million Filed 03/11/13 Document ' ,\) to 3l billion fl billion million to$10 to$50 to$100 toJ500 million million '':2 trtr t500,001 $1,000,00t t10,000,00t S50,000,001 t100,000,001 t500,000,001 totl .a:2 fI tr Estimatcd Liabilities S50,001 F to$l billion . ir) Morethan $l billion {'\ million Entered 03lLLlI31-l-:55:04 Desc Main Paqe Lof 46 B Namc of volunt|ry P.ullen f*k wo anr ht nannloted nnd lilil Dcbtor(s)' B"th"r, Brenda Lee in YGln 0f lnqlll lisn t'ro. attach additioflsl $hGGt') Looation Wherc Filcd: Caso Numbcr: Datc Filcd: Location Whcrc Filed: Casc Numbcr; - Datc Filcd: Pcndlns Brrknnlw Cr|. tr'll.d by rnv Siourr- Prrlncr. or Amllrlr oI lbit DlDtor (lt lnofe tnan Onc. anacn I ional slrccf.) Name of Dcbtor: Casc Numbcr: Datc Filcd: District: Rclationship: Judge: Exhibit B Erhibit A (To bc conplctcd if dsbtor is rcquircd to filc pcriodic rcports (c.9., foms lOK and lOQ) witb thc Sccuritics and Exchangc Conmission punuant to Scction 13 or l5(d) of thc Sccuritic Exchsngc Aot of | 934 and is rcqucting rcl ief undcr chaptcr | | ) (To bc complc{cd if &btor is an individual whosc dcbts arc prinnrily consumsr dcbts ) . I, thc anomcy for thc potitionar namcd in thc forogoing pctition, d€clato thEt I have informcO thspctition; dt8t fhc or shc] may pocccd undcr chaptcr 7, I l, 12' or 13 of tittc I l, U;itcd Statos Codo, rnd have oxplairrd 0lc rclief avrilabl. urdct cach $!ch chsptcr. I furthcr carriry thrt I havc dclivared to tlrc dcbtor 0tc notice rcguirrd byllu.s.c.$342(b). tr ExhibitA isattrchcdand madcapartofthispctition. sicmrurc of Attoflicv for Dcbtor{s) (Datc) Exhibit C Docs the dcbtor own or hovc posscsion ofany propcrty that poses or is allcged to po6r s thnat ofimminent and idcntifiable harm to public hcalth or safcty? tr f, Ycs, and Exhibit C ir att*hcd and madc a part of this pctition. No. Exhibit D (To bc complotcd by evcry individurl dcbtor. lfa joint pctition is liled, crch spousc must complctc and attrch Ef lfthis E nxnifir is a scparate Exhibit D.) O, comphtcd and signcd by the debtor, is atlachcd and madc a part ofthis pctition, ajoint pctition: Exhibit D, also compteted and signed by thc joint dcbtor, is atlached and made a pan ofthis pctition. Informrtlor Rcgrrdhg thc Dcbtor - v.nu. fr (Chcck rny applicablc box.) Dcbtor has been domicilcd or has h8d a residencc, principal placc ofhsincs, or principal assets in this District for lEO days immcdiatcly preceding the date ofthis potition or for o longer part ofswh 180 days than in any otha District tr Thcrc is a bankruptcy casr conccming dcbtor's alliliatc, gcncrsl panncr, or pqnncrship pcnding in this Disttict, D Dcbtor is E druor in a forrigrr prccccding ard has iB principll plmc of businors or prircipal ass€ts in thc Unircd Starcs in lhis District, or hss no prirrcipal placc ofburincrr or.nscts in thc Unitcd State but is a dcfcndant in ao aotiot or procccding [in a fcdcral or sldc cowtl in this District, or tlr intercsE oftlp psrtics will bc scrvod in rcgard to thc rclicfsought in this Disrict. CcrllfLrtlotr by r Dcbtor Who Rcidrr rr r Tcnrnt of Rcrld.ntid Pr.pcrty (Chcck all applicablc boxes,) tr Landlordhasajrdgmcntagainsthcdcbtorforpossessionofdebtor'srosidoncc. (lfboxchccked,complctcthcfollowing.) (Namc of landlord that obtain€d judgncnt) (Addr6s of landlord) tr tr tr Deblor claims thEt undcr applicablc nonbankruptry lau thcre rrp circumstansw urdar which thc dcbtor urculd bc pcrmincd to curc th? ri* to thc judgrnont for possGrsioo, rftcr the judgrrcnt for posr€gsion ws cntered, and ontiF momtsry dofauli lhat gave Dcbtor has includcd with this pctition thc dcpositwith thc courtofEny rcnt that would bccome due duringthe 30-day pcriod affcr thc filing ofthc pctition, Dcbtor oGrtifics that hc/shc has scrvcd thc lrndlord with this ccrtifigation. Case 13-0081-9 Doc 1 Filed 03/l-L113 Document (l I U.S.C. $ 362(l). Entered 03lL1,l!311-:55:04 Desc Main Paqe 2 of 46 Narnc of Dcbtor(s): - 'Bethel. Sllrrtur.(r) of Dobtor(r) Slgnrturr of r Fordgo Rcpratntrtlvr {ladlvldrrUJolrt) I declarc udcr pcmlty of pcrjury that tltc information providcd in this pctition is trrc and concct, JIf pctitiofEr is an individual whose dcbs are primarily consumcr dchs and has filc urder ch.pt6 4 I am awarc that I may procecd undcr chaptcr 7, I I, 12 or l3 oftith I I, Unitcd Strtcs Codc, undentand the rclicfavailablc undcr each suoh choscn to choptcr, and choosc to procccd undcr chapter 7. flfno attorncy rEprcscnts nrc and no ben]np{cy pctition preparcr rigns thc pctitionl I havc obtain€d and rcad thc noticc roquircd by I I U.S.C. $ 342(b). I rgquest roliof in accordanc€ with the chaptcr spccificd in this pctition. :lt 'f)..ro,..1,- x Brenda Lee of title I I, unitcd ststcs codc, I declarc undcr pcnalty of pcrjury that the information providod in this ptilion is true and concct, that I arn tlr foreign reptcscntslivc ofa debtor in a forcign procceding, and thal I am authotizcd to filc this pctition. (Check only onc box.) B I roqucst.rolicfin acoordancc with chrptor l5 oftitlc t l, Unitcd slalcs Cods. Ccrtified copics ofthc documents rcquirod by I I U.S.C' $ l515 are attach€d S Pursuant to | | U.S.C. g l5 I l, I rcquest rclicf in accordance with thc chaptcr oftitlc t t spccificd in this pctition. A cerriflcd copy ofthe ordcr granting rccognition ofthc fortign main procccding is attoched. ltzt (Printcd Name of Foreigr Rcprcscntativc) Numbc-r (ifnot rcprcscntod by attorncy) Sigortrrr of Non-Attoro.y Brnkruptcy P3litio[ Prcprn:r (l)l rm a bankruptcy Ftition prcparcr as I dcclarc un&r pcnalty of perjury 0rst dcfirrcd in I I U.S.C. $ I | 0l (2) | prepared this documcnt for compensation and have providcd thc debtor with a copy of this documcnt and the noticls and infomation rcquired undcr U.S.C. $$llqb), ll0(h), and 342(bI snd, (3)if rules or guirhlincs have bccn promslgsted pursu|nl lo I I U.S.C. $ I l0(h) sctting a maximum fce for scrviccs chage$lc by bankruptcy pctitkn prcpsters, I have givcn thc dcbtor noricc ofthc maximum amount bcfore preparing any document fol filing for a dcbtor or sccepting rny fec ftom trc dobtot as requircd in that scction. Ollictal Form 19 is Sigutuc of Attomcy for Dcbto(s) ll Printed Namc of Attomcy for Dcbto(s) attachcd. Printcd Namc and titlc, ifany, ofBankruptcy Pctition Prcparet Dalc rln a case in which g Social-Socurity numbcr (lf the benkruptcy pctition preparcr is mt an individual, thc Social-Sccurity numbcr oftlr oflicer, principal, rcsponsrblc pcrvrn or porhcr of thc bankrupcy pctition ptcporcr.) (Rcquired by | | U.S.C, $ | 10.) 70{b[4)(D) applics, this signaturc dso constitutcs a stratc cartification that rhc attomcy hrs no knowlodgc afier an inquiry that thc infonnation in tho schcdulcs is inconecl. I declare under pcmlty of pcrjury lhat thc information providcd in this pctition is trrr I havc bccn authorizcd to filc this pctition on bchalf of ttrc dcblor. ard corrccl and thst Thc debtor rGquels thc rclicfin accordancc with the chaptcr Code, spccificd in this pclitim. oftitle I l, Uniled Stltes x Date Signaturc of Ardhorizcd lndividual hintcd Signaturc ofbEnkruptcy pctition prcparcr or officer, principol, responsible pctson, or partncr whosc Social-Sccurity numbcr is providcd abovc. Namc of Authorizcd lndividrul Namcs and Social-Sccwity numbcrs in ofrll other individuals who prcparcd or assistcd preparing this documcnt unlcss the brnkruptcy pctitioo prcparcr is not an individual. lf morc lhan onc porson prcparcd lhis documcnt, atlach additional shects eonforming to lhc Eppropriatc ofticial form for cach pcrson. A banbuptcy pttltton pr.pnr't fallut. to compv vlth ,he p,oritlont at title I I and thc Fcderal Rulct of Banlvtgtcy Procedun may rcsult in tinct or imprlsonmcnt or both. Case 1-3-0081-9 Doc 1 Filed 03/1L/13 Document ll U.AC.6 ll0: 16 Entered O311L1L311-:55:04 Desc Main Paqe 3 of 46 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMAi ':-f '-" , -,,..r l'. . ! i.i:i 1..: iri l. ^n ': Debtor(s): cAsENo. ,13 CU M ULATIVE -0 oa{l'1 STATEMENT OF AMENDM ENTS Comes nowthe debtor(s) in the above-referenced case and pursuantto Bankruptcy Rule 1009 And Local Rule 1009-1 amends the schedules previously-filed as follows: Serrc-6-lev,td- "'"*il ;i,*.f :'t "r| clr'*Lt 6"Pl'* ;;i.., il::* IDc...*hel t;^,n t,fivsulaarsq ;ii, TrW og?rnA Aott., -*-t [O.- i|Vo..,r.oas. u affi :l:'" Tls*".. gtof{trtS r. 'p olr.7, P olrc7 ' r{,f ten.3L ftoy;,ly, ._,, Pr,floaeL ?tofut3l, 5l"ta6tcnt bg rr.1 tileoilt.-.r.a.l' 5cr+rcf - 3.ofi *off pAJr$rrd.- .flI.{hc,,n-+j- l - 4t il* ?o-{rJ5-'S - p.,}a,15G..r,0 t '# lotl &huby *ctoua/ (Ln'qrlJ ffLn*ttx t ftLl'Foro- /4nhn^,n*& *a r'5 &ag.r1,.*traa) *c" pi*o o nt',l a.6s &on onJ I ta'hrtt rr- pfo pe-t*1, lrvra5s fluao'tc-, p.rroa.L'0 | ' 'T;*.3#*fi ilrirll.y:?fr,"r^i:ii,:,,t"i,,F".#ffifi* ?xiili\*p-e '"1n-1r&r,17 eelsoae,L l/We declare under pendlt! of perjury that the information b'rovided in this amendment it true jnd oateo trris I Y aav ot . ..-il * .zo ? correct:- lS f*t"a, /,--- Ez/rl Debtor Joint Debtor CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that I have this date served a true and correct copy of the above pleading electronically, or by placing it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, and properly addressed the United States Bankruptcy Administrator and Trustee, as well as all effected creditors and or parties in the above referenced case. Date 1.3 Debtor Joint Debtor Case 13-00819 Doc L5 Filed 05/15/13 Entered 05lL5lL31-4:02:01, Paqe 1, of 24 Desc Main IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA CASENo. Debtor(s): CUM U n-a0glq LATIVE S.TATEM ENT OF AMENDMENTS Comes now the debtor(s) in the above-referenced case and pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 1009 And Local Rule 1009-1 amends the schedules previously-filed as follows: Co*},,Y*J-; $c.tre- F ?.rrtO Ae6 ,o de fio,u K"f ,^ - A<-rt r a*1 o+ 4ttl' {'o r'"s 0w aL c.-alC r L k frU*L rYl,rh,r,n m<A- Trt aLJ, *, o il *o $ oh -Lo lq 4&J"L (*dle^o q u.t* t#to un bqrc d I ,l r r. l/We declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided in this amendment oateo 'n' tr'is I { dav ot /\ * t/ u,7 * "JJ**1- is true and correct; ,zo L3 fi*"^z t--- Ezr'--t Debtor Joint Debtor CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that I have this date served a true and correct copy of the above pleading electronically, or by placing it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, and properly addressed the United States Bankruptcy Administrator and Trustee, as well as all effected creditors and or parties in the above referenced case. oate lrJ*,/ 14, .As -----l---1- 13 #.'*" *" 8*l Debtor Joint Debtor Case 13-0081-9 Doc 15 Filed 05/15/13 Entered Paqe 2 of 24 051151L3 LA:OZ:OL Desc Main B 6F (Official F'orm 6F) ( l2l07) - Cont. In re Brenda Lee Bethel--AMENDED Case Debtor No. 13-00819 (if known) SCHEDULE F - CREDITORS HOLDING UNSECURED NONPRIORITY CLAIMS (Continuation Sheet) CREDITOR'S NAME, DATE CLAIM WAS AMOI.INT OF MAILING ADDRESS INCURREDAND CLAIM INCLUDING ZIP CODE. AND ACCOUNTNUMBER CONSIDERATTON FOR (See instructions above.) IF CLAIM IS SUBJECT TO CLAIM. SETOFF. SO STATE, Regions Bank P.O. Box 681 B'Ham, AL 35201 Jan. 23,2013 Kalim Muhammad 1043 County Rd. 306 Selma, Ala. 36703 Sheet no. 2 of-_a- continuation sheets attached to Schedule ofCreditors Holding Unsecured Nonpriority Claims Total> (Use only on last page ofthe completed Schedule F.) (Report also on Summary ofSchedules and, ifapplicable on the Statistical Summary of Certain Liabilities and Related Data.) Case 1-3-0081-9 Doc 15 Filed 05/1-5113 Entered 051L51L31,4:02:0I Desc Main Paqe L1,of24 B7 (t2/t2) n c. All debtors: List all payments made within one year immediately preceding the commencement of this case to or for the benefit of creditors who are or were insiders. (Married debtors filing under chapter I 2 or chapter I 3 must include payments by either or both spouses whether or not ajoint petition is filed, unless the spouses are separated and a joint petition is not filed.) NAME AND ADDRESS OF CREDITOR AND RELATIONSHIP TO DEBTOR DATE OF PAYMENT AMOIJNT PAID AMOLINT STILL OWINC 4. Suits and administretive proceedings, executions, garnishments and ettachments a. List all suits and administrative proceedings to which the debtor is or was a party within one year immediately preceding the filing of this bankruptcy case. (Manied debtors filing under chapter 12 or chapter 13 must include information concerning either or both spouses whether or not a joint petition is filed, unless the spouses are separated and a joint petition is not filed.) CAPTION OF SUIT ANDCASENUMBER Muhammad 1 2:11-690-WS-B a None b. NATURE OF COURT OR AGENCY PROCEEDING AND LOCATION Civil filing Southern District of Alabama Court STATUS OR DISPOSITION Dropped Pending Describe all property that has been attached, gamished or seized under any legal or equitable process within one year immediately preceding the commencement of this case, (Married debtors filing under chapter 12 or chapter | 3 must include infiormation concerning property of either or both spouses whether or not a joint petition is filed, unless the spouses are separated and ajoint petition is not filed,) NAME AND ADDRESS DATE OF SEIZURE OF PERSON FOR WHOSE BENEFIT PROPERTY WAS SEIZED 5. DESCRIPTION AND VALUE OF PROPERTY Repossessions, foreclosures and returns List all property that has been repossessed by a creditol sold at a foreclosure sale, transferred through a deed in lieu of foreclosure or returned to the seller, within one year immediately preceding the commencement of this case. (Manied debtors filing under chapter l2 or chapter l3 must include information concerning property of either or both spouses whether or not ajoint petition is filed, unless the spouses are separated and ajoint petition is not filed.) NAME AND ADDRESS OF CREDITOR OR SELLER Case 1-3-00819 Doc 15 DATE OF REPOSSESSION. FORECLOSURE SALE, TRANSFER OR RETURN DESCRIPTION AND VALUE OF PROPERTY Filed 05/1-511-3 Entered 05/15/13 1"4:O2:OI Paqe t5 ot 24 Desc Main B 7 (12/t2) I declare under penalty of perjury that I have tead the answers contained in the foregoing statement of financial affairs and any attachments thereto and that they are true and correct, Signature 05109/0201 Date of Debtor Signature of Joint Debtor (if any) Date llf ampletetl on behalf of a purtnership or eorporation.l I declare under penalty ofperjury that I have read the answers contained in the foregoing statement offinancial affairs and any attachments thereto and that they are true and corlect to the best ofmy knowledge, information and beliefl Signature Print Name and Tide [An individual signing on behalfofa partnership or corporation must indicate position or relationship to debtor.] _continuation sheets attached I'enalty.formakinga.falsestotement: I;ineofupro!i500,000orimprisonment-forupto5ywrs,orhoth. I8 ILS.(:,sr.rl52arul 3571 DECLARATION AND SIGNATURE OF NON-ATTORNEY BANKRUPTCY PETITION PREPARER (see ldeclareunderpenaltyofperjurythat: (l) Iamabankruptcyp€titionpreparerasdefinedinllU.S.C.gll0;(2) 11 U.S.c. g 110) lpreparedthisdocumentfor compensation and have provided the debtor with a copy ofthis document and the notices and information required under I I U.S.C. gg I I 0(b), I I 0(h), and 342(b); and, (3) ifrules or guidelines have been promulgated pursuant to I I U.S.C. g I l0(h) setting a maximum fee for services chargeable by bankruptcy petition pr€parers, I have given lhe debtor notice ofthe maximum amounl before preparing any document for filing for a debtor or accepting any fee from the debtor, as required by that section. N/A Printed or Typed Name and Title, ifany, ofBankruptcy Petition Preparer Il lhe hankruPtcy petitbn preparer is nol an individual, $tute the name, ttile Social-Security No. (Required by I I U.S.C. S I10.) (fany), address, arul social-security'number oJ the of/icer, principa!, respontible person, or partner who signs lhis documenf. N/A Address N/A Signature ofBankruptcy Petition Preparer Names and Social-Security numbers not an individual: Date ofall other individuals who prepared or assisted in preparing this document unless the bankruptcy petition preparer is lfmore lhan one person prepared this documenl, attach additional signed A banknuptcy petitlon preparer's tailure lo comply with intines orinryrisonmentor both. I8 U.S.C S 155. Case 13-00819 Doc 1-5 sheets conforming to the appropriate the prcvisions Official Form for each person oftitle I I and the Federal Rules of Banhaptcy Procedare qpy result Filed 05/1-511-3 Entered 05/1-5/L3 L4:O2:OL Desc Main Paqe 23 of 24 AMENDED CREDIT MATRIX RE: Brenda Bethel Case Number 13-00819 UAB Hospital Acct# 064220639-6073 619 19th St S. Birmingham, AL 35249 Sunrise Credit Services Attn: Col lections Department P,O, Box 9100 Farmingdale, NY 11735 McCormick and Russell 718 Alabama Ave. Selma, AIa.36701 Vonda K. Bonham 116 Mabry St. 5elma, A|a.36701 Regions Bank Acct #00700533000075885 101 Church St. Selma, Ala.36701 Kalim A. R. Muhammad 1043 County Rd. 306 Selma, AL 36703 Case 1-3-0081-9 Doc 15 Filed Entered 05/1-5/1-3 L4:O2:OL Desc Main Paqe 24 of 24 05/1-511-3 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF Debtor(s): Brenda Bethel ALABAFfA? '- '-' "{,'r :- rr:r ^ ..'Ji. * J ', Di , i". .jO CASE NO.13-00819 ..i CUMUTATTVE STATEMENT OF AMENDMENTS Comes now the debtor(s) in the above-referenced case and pursuant .,. I ','.i 't I to Bankruptcy Rule 1009 And Local Rule 1009-1 amends the schedules previously-filed as follows: 1) Form B, VA pension added and 2011 and20L2 Employment income added. 2) Schedule B : daughters assets removed 3) Schedule C: exemption and exemption laws changed. 4l 5) I schedule F: Dollar amount added for lawsuit, and attorney fees added. Matrix: Lawsuit plaintiff added to Matrix declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided in this amendment is true and correct: Dated this$! day of Mav, 2013. . CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 'nT. J /^xa'B Debtor certifu that I have this date served a true and correct copy of the above pleading electronically, or by placing it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, and properly addressed the United States I Bankruptcy Administrator and Trustee, as well as all effected creditors and or parties in the above referenced case. Darc rl&7,fi!_at ts Case 13-00819 Doc 20 Filed 06/03/1-3 Entered 06/03/13 Document Paqe 1 of 1-0 15:48:50 Desc Main B 6F (Oflicial Form 6F) (12107) - Conl. InreBre@ SCHEDULE Crse No. 1&00819 (if known) F. CREDITORS HOLDING UNSECURED NONPRIORITY CLAIMS (Continuation Sheet) CREDITOR'SNAME, MAILING ADDRESS INCLUDINC ZIP CODE, AMOUNTOF CLAIM DATECLAIM WAS CONSIDEMTION FOR CLAIM. IF CLAIM IS STIBJECTTO INCI.JRREDAND AND ACCOTJNTNUMBER (See instnrctions above.) SETOFF, SO STATE. May 23,2007 'Personal Loan' Regions Bank P.O. Box 681 B'Ham, AL 35201 Jan.23, 2013 'Lawsuif Kallm Muhammad 1043 Coun$ Rd. 306 Selma, A|a.36703 2 ot_?- conrinuationshoeranach€d shectno. to Schedulc ofCrcditors Holding Unsccured Nonpriority Claims SubtotalD Tobl> (Usc only on Iast paBe ofthc complc&d Schcdulc F.) (Report also on Summary ofSchedules end, ifapplicablc on thc Statistical Summary of Certain Liabilities and Relatcd Data ) Case 1-3-0081-9 Doc 20 Filed 06/03/13 Entered 06/03/1-3 Document Paqe 9 of 1-0 l-5:48:50 Desc Main AMENDED CREDIT MATRIX RE: Brenda Bethel Case Number 13-00819 UAB HosPital Acct# 064220639-6073 619 19th st s. Birmingham, AL 35249 Sunrise Credit Services Attn: Collections DePa rtment P.O. Box 9100 Farmingdale, NY 11735 McCormick and Russell 718 Alabama Ave. Selma, Ala. 36701 Vonda K. Bonham 116 Mabry St. Selma, Ala. 36701 Regions Bank Acct t100700533000075885 101 Church St. Selma, Aia.36701 Kalim A. R. Muhammad 1043 CountY Rd. 306 Selma, AL 36703 Case 1-3-0081-9 Doc 20 Filed 06/03/1-3 Entered 06/03/13 fS:4g:SO Desc Main Paqe 1-0 of 10 Document B18 (Official Form 18) (12107) United States Bankruptcy Court Southern District of Alabama Case No. 13-00819 Chapter 7 In re Debtor(s) (name(s) used by the debtor(s) in the last 8 years, including married, maiden, trade, and address): Brenda Lee Bethe] 1208 Memorial Ave. Selma. AL36703 Social Security / Individual Taxpayer ID No.: xxx-xx-3538 Employer Tax ID / Other nos.: DISCHARGE OF DEBTOR It appearing that the debtor is entitled to a discharge, IT IS ORDERED: The debtor is granted a discharge under sectionT2T of title 11, United States Code, (the Bankruptcy Code). BY THE COURT Dated: 6l17lI3 MARGARET A. MAHONEY United States Bankruptcy Judge SEE THE BACK OF THIS ORDER FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION. Case 1-3-00819 Doc 27 Filed 06/1711-3 Entered 06lL7lI3 05:00:1-l- Desc 7 Individual or Joint (both Paqe Iof2 de 818 (Official Form 18) (12107) - Cont. EXPLANATION OF BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE INACHAPTERTCASE This court order grants a discharge to the person named as the debtor. It is not a dismissal of the case and does not determine how much money, if any, the trustee it will pay to creditors. Collection of Discharged Debts Prohibited The discharge prohibits any attempt to collect from the debtor a debt that has been discharged. For example, a creditor is not permitted to contact a debtor by mail, phone, or otherwise, to file or continue a lawsuit, to attach wages or other property, or to take any other action to collect a discharged debt from the debtor. [In a case involving community property: There are also special rules that protect certain community property owned by the debtor's spouse, even if that spouse did not file a bankruptcy case.l A creditor who violates this order can be required to pay damages and attorney's fees to the debtor. However, a creditor may have the right to enforce a valid lien, such as a mortgage or security interest, against the debtor's property after the bankruptcy, if that lien was not avoided or eliminated in the bankruptcy case. Also, a debtor may voluntarily pay any debt that has been discharged. Debts That are Discharged The chapter 7 discharge order eliminates a debtor's legal obligation to pay a debt that is discharged. Most, but not all, types of debts are discharged if the debt existed on the date the bankruptcy case was filed. (If this case was begun under a different chapter of the Bankruptcy Code and converted to chapter 7, the discharge applies to debts owed when the bankruptcy case was converted.) Debts That are Not Discharged Some of the common types of debts which are not discharged in a chapter 7 bankruptcy case are: a. Debts for most taxes: b. Debts incurred to pay nondischargeable taxes; c. Debts that are domestic support obligations; d. Debts for most student loans: e. Debts for most fines, penalties, forfeitures, or criminal restitution obligations; f. Debts for personal injuries or death caused by the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle, vessel, or aircraft while intoxicated; g. Some debts which were not properly listed by the debtor; h. Debts that the bankruptcy court specifically has decided or discharged; will decide in this bankruptcy case are not i. Debts for which the debtor has given up the discharge protections by signing a reaffirmation agreement in compliance with the Bankruptcy Code requirements for reaffirmation of debts; and j. Debts owed to certain pension, profit sharing, stock bonus, other retirement plans, or to the Thrift Savings Plan for federal employees for certain types of loans from these plans. This information is only a general summary of the bankruptcy discharge. There are exceptions to these general rules. Because the law is complicated, you may want to consult an attorney to determine the exact effect of the discharse in this case. Case l-3-0081-9 Doc 27 Filed 06/171L3 Entered 06f-7113 05:00:11- Desc Paqe 2of2 Individual or Joint (both de 7