Chapman v. State of Alabama, The et al, No. 7:2017cv01631 - Document 15 (N.D. Ala. 2018)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 5 MOTION to Dismiss and GRANTING Plaintiff's implied motion for leave to amend. Signed by Judge L Scott Coogler on 7/3/2018. (AFS)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Chapman v. State of Alabama, The et al Doc. 15 FILED 2018 Jul-03 AM 11:21 U.S. DISTRICT COURT N.D. OF ALABAMA IN T HE UNI T ED ST AT ES DIST RICT COURT FOR T HE NORT HERN DIST RICT OF ALABAMA SOUT HERN DIVISION MARQUETTE CHAPM AN, Plaintiff, vs. THE STATE OF ALABAMA, and THE ALABAM A DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT AT ION, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 7:17-cv-01631-LSC M EMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER brings suit alleging discrimination in violation of Title VII 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Before the Court is Alabama Department of Transportation L and the State of motion to dismiss. (Doc. 5.) Plaintiff, Marquette Chapman has timely filed her opposition. (Doc. 10.) The motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. For the 1 discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or race, color, religion, sex, or national 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a). Page 1 of 13 Dockets.Justia.com reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss is due to be denied, and Plaintiff should be granted leave to amend. I. BACKGROUND 2 Chapman, an African American resident of Cottondale, Alabama, was employed by ALDOT beginning in March of 2004. In December of 2015, Chapman took a test seeking a promotion to Transportation Technologist and was ranked number one in the state of Alabama. Thereafter, Plaintiff informed her , of her ranking and made an inquiry to the 5th Division Personnel M anager about the procedure to obtain the promotion. Following the release of her test results and her application for promotion, four Caucasian employees who scored lower than Plaintiff were promoted to the Transportation Technologist position. Two of the Caucasian employees actually took the promotional test on the same day as Chapman. All four employees who received the promotion were, according to Chapman, 2 Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, 823 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016). T he following facts are, therefore, taken the Complaint, and the Court makes no ruling on their veracity. Page 2 of 13 . 1 at 3.) Chapman continued to make inquiries as to why she had not yet received a promotion.3 In March of 2016, Defendants learned that P transferred her to an outside inspector position where she was to work on construction projects. The new position required her to possess According to Chapman, she competently performed her job duties in both her old office position and the new outside inspector position. However, ALDOT fired her a pretextual reason for her termination and the real reason was on account of her race. On February 23, 2017, she timely filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commiss ) alleging racial discrimination. (Doc. 5-1 at 3- 3 -1 at 3.) She lists November 2016 as the month in which she asked her supervisor, Kevin Williamson about her application for promotion and was told it was still under review. Subsequently, she made more formal requests for promotion and inquiries about her application. Page 3 of 13 4.) After receipt of her EEOC right-to-sue letter (doc. 5-1 at 1), which is dated June 22, 2017, Plaintiff brought suit in this Court on September 21, 2017.4 Because Plaintiff consented to dismissal of count two of her complaint,5 this smiss as to Opinion the only remaining claim, Count One, Title IIV claim for failure to promote and wrongful termination of employment. II. ST ANDARDS OF REVIEW Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, in order to withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a [for] relief that is plausible on Ray v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 836 F.3d 1340, 1347 48 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 (Doc. 5 at 1.) However, as evidenced in the docket on CM/ ECF, Plaintiff initiated her lawsuit on the 21st of September not the 22nd. 5 In their motion to dismiss, Defendants asserted an Eleventh Amendment immunity 1981 claim. See Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 n. 1.) Page 4 of 13 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Stated another way, the factual allegations in the complaint must be sufficient to Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010). will survive a motion to dismiss. , 495 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (internal quotation marks omitted). that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. [ Id. Review of the complaint is -specific task that requires [this Court] to draw on its judicial experience Id. of Indus. Orgs. v. City of Miami, 637 F.3d 1178, 1186 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Roe v. AwareWoman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 84 (11th Cir. 2001)). Page 5 of 13 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 15(a), a party may amend their complaint once as a matter of course within twenty-one days after service of a response by answer or motion. Otherwise, the party may amend their pleading Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Id. to amend, the discretion of the di Thomas v. Town of Davie, 847 F.2d 771, 773 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir. 1981)). Reasons for denying leave to amend include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party . . . , [and] futility of amendment. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). III. D ISCUSSION A. of the last discriminatory act her termination. Because Defendants lodged their jurisdictional challenge in their motion to dismiss before Plaintiff attempted to amend her complaint, the Court will first address the jurisdictional issue. Under Title VII, an aggrieved person must file an Page 6 of 13 EEOC charge 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 5(e). The limitations periods, while guaranteeing the protection of the civil rights laws to those who promptly assert their rights, also protect employers from the burden of defending claims arising from employment decisions that are long past. Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1980) (citing Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463 464, (1975)). Defendants assert that claim in Count One is due to be dismissed under FRCP Rule 12(b)(6) on account of it being untimely. In her EEOC charge, Chapman alleges the earliest date the discrimination took place was on March 1, 2016 and the latest was January 25, 2017.6 (Doc. 5-1 at 3-4.) Defendants argue that discriminated against on the basis of race concerning a promotion that occurred within 180 days of the filing of the EEOC charge in her complaint. (Doc. 5 at 6.) In addition, they argue that the only specific date Chapman provides to the Court is December of 2015 when the named comparators took the promotional test, which is well outside the 180 day time period. Chapman did not indicate on her EEOC 6 T he EEOC charge is central to the complaint and this Court may properly consider it on a motion to dismiss. Lambert v. Ala. Dept. of Youth Servs., 150 Fed. Appx. 990, 991- 992 (11th Cir. 2005). Page 7 of 13 charge that a continuing violation occurred. In her complaint Plaintiff alleges that she was persistent in her inquiries regarding promotion and continuously denied the promotion she sought between February of 2016 and January of 2017. Defendants cite Welty v. S.F. & G., Inc., termination cannot serve as the last discriminatory act. 605 F. Supp. 1548 (N.D. Ala. 1985). The Welty decision explained that when the notice of termination of employment is given, and termination of employment is the alleged discriminatory act, the 180-day time period begins on notice of termination. Id. at 1554-55 (citing Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981)); see also Ricks, 449 US. at 255 (holding that the time period for filing begins at notice of termination)). Both Ricks and Chardon establish that the date of notice of termination . . . is the operative date from which the 180- Elliott v. Grp. Med. & Surgical Serv., 714 F.2d 556, 565 (5th Cir. 1983); see also McWilliams v. Escambia Cty. Sch. Bd., 658 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Ricks as holding that when the challenged act is an individual employment decision, the discrimination occurs and the 180-day filing period begins when the employer communicates their decision). Though Plaintiff does not provide a specific date between when the discrimination began and when it ended regarding the failure to promote, she clearly claims that her termination in January of 2017 was due to her race and that Page 8 of 13 -textual reason for her firing. (Compl. ¶ 28, 31-33.) Construing the facts in a light most favorable to Chapman, her termination is a discriminatory act; and, because she filed her EEOC charge on February 23, 2017, less than two months after the last allegedly discriminatory act (termination), the Courts finds that her EEOC charge was not untimely. Defendants assert that the filing discriminatory acts, not [at] the time at which the consequences of the acts [become] most painful Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258. However, Ricks involved a termination of tenure decision that was communicated to the plaintiff, who was then offered a 1-year terminal contract while his grievance was pending. Id. at 255, 258. T he plaintiff did not file within 180 days of the notice of denial of tenure, which the university asserted was a final decision, but asserted that the date his grievance was denied was the start of the 180-day filing period. The court reasoned that the denial of tenure was the u 180-day timeframe began when the employer expressed its official position to the employee. Id. at 262. By contrast, in the present case, employer expressed its decision to terminate her in January 2017, which is well within 180 days of the filing of the EEOC charge, February 23, 2017. (Doc. 5-1 at 3.) Defendants have neither argued nor provided any evidence that they gave Page 9 of 13 Chapman notice of her impending termination at any time prior to her termination in January 2017. Plaintiff filed her EEOC charge within 180 days of the last alleged discriminatory act the termination7 of her employment therefore, motion to dismiss is due to be denied. As further detailed below, the amended complaint cures deficiencies surrounding the merits of Chapman s failure to promote claim as she clarified the over for promotion. As such, Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to survive a 12(b) motion to dismiss and her failure to promote claim may proceed. B. omplaint The Court will now address whether Chapman should be allowed to amend her complaint. Defendants assert that Plaintiff should not be permitted to amend because this Court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint, and amending the complaint would create jurisdiction where there is none. (Doc. 11. at 5-7.) However, as discussed above, the Court does possess jurisdiction because . 7 Indeed or adverse, employment action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Page 10 of 13 Allowing the amendment would not unduly prejudice Defendant; it has not been unduly delayed, and there is no evidence it was made in bad faith or with a dilatory motive. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. amended complaint was filed on February 1, 2018, dismiss (doc. 10-1), which was filed motion to dismiss on January 16, 2018. See may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within : . . . 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b) ). T herefore, the only remaining inquiry is whether the amendment would be futile. As explained above, in her complaint Plaintiff alleges that she was persistent in her inquiries regarding promotion and was continuously denied promotion between February of 2016 and January of 2017 and that her termination serves as a discriminatory act, which falls within the ambit of the 180 day timeframe. amendment adds specificity to her Title VII claim and drops the § 1981 claim as she conceded its dismissal in her response. Paragraphs 11-14 of the amended complaint include facts supporting her claim for non-promotion and clarify the promotional process. (Doc. 10-1 ¶ 11-14.) Additionally, paragraphs 16- Page 11 of 13 19 establish that Chapman was denied promotion8 after she made a formal request in November of 2016 (doc. 10-1 ¶ 16-19), which is within 180 days of filing of her EEOC charge. Other added paragraphs provide extra details supporting -textual to her claims and termination. In all, the additional paragraphs serve to clarify give Defendants additional notice of the claims against them jurisdiction where none existed. The Court finds no it does not confer substantial reason to disallow the amendment. Thomas, 847 F.2d at 773. IV. CONCLUSION qualifies as an act of discrimination which fell within the 180 day period making her claims timely, and conferring jurisdiction on this Court. Additionally, both Title VII failure to promote and termination claims may proceed on the merits. For the reasons stated above, denied, and implied motion for leave to amend is granted. 8 Failure to promote is a discrete act of discrimination. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002). Page 12 of 13 (doc. 5) is DONE and ORDERED on July 3, 2018. _____________________________ L. Scott Coogler United States District Judge 190685 Page 13 of 13
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
