Hughley v. United States of America (INMATE3), No. 3:2011cv00895 - Document 3 (M.D. Ala. 2011)
Court Description: OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/3/11. (djy, )
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA EASTERN DIVISION JOHNNY HUGHLEY, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Civil Action No. 3:11cv895-MHT (WO) OPINION Petitioner Johnny Hughley has filed a motion seeking relief pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 60(b)(6) and purporting to challenge this court s previous judgment denying a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion that he filed in April 2000.1 For the reasons that follow, this court concludes that Hughley is not entitled to any relief. In his motion, Hughley contends that this court, when denying his § 2255 motion in September 2002, neglected to address his claim asserting a violation of the antishuttling provision of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers ( IAD ). However, when ruling on Hughley s § 2255 motion in 2002, this court found that all substantive claims asserted in his motion were procedurally barred because they were either raised on direct appeal and consequently precluded from reconsideration in his § 2255 motion or were not raised on direct appeal and therefore defaulted. United States v. Hughley, 1. See United States v. Hughley, Case Nos. 3:98cr43-MHT & 3:98cr97-MHT. In his original § 2255 motion, Hughley challenged his 1998 conviction and sentence for possession of counterfeit currency; passing, uttering, and publishing counterfeit currency; and possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. Case Nos. 3:98cr43-MHT & 3:98cr97-MHT, Doc. No. 83 at 3 & 5. After noting that Hughley relied on ineffective assistance of counsel as cause to excuse his procedural default, id. at 5, this court then fully addressed his claim that his counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to raise the IAD issue on appeal. Id. at 17. The court then determined that Hughley s claim that his counsel was ineffective was meritless because his underlying substantive claim of an IAD violation was likewise meritless. Id. at 17-19. In light of the above, Hughley is incorrect in alleging that this court neglected to address his IAD claim when denying his § 2255 motion in September 2002. Accordingly, this court finds that Hughley is not entitled to any relief under FED.R.CIV.P. 60(b)(6).2 In his self-styled Rule 60 motion, Hughley is in effect reasserting a claim that he asserted in his original § 2255 motion and that was determined adversely to him by this court. To the extent that Hughley is reasserting a claim that has previously been adjudicated by this court, his claim is in substance part of a successive § 2255 motion.3 See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532 (2005). 2. Hughley fails to show that this court incorrectly applied a procedural bar in addressing his IAD claim or that this court neglected to address his IAD claim when ruling on his § 2255 motion. 3. In addition to his original § 2255 motion, Hughley has sought to challenge his convictions and sentence on at least four other occasions through pleadings that were ultimately determined to be successive § 2255 motions. In August 2004, Hughley filed a pleading styled as Request for a Nunc Pro Tunc Reconsideration and/or in the Alternative a Correction of Sentence, challenging his sentence. United States v. Hughley, Case Nos. 3:98cr43-MHT & 3:98cr97-MHT. Because that motion attacked the fundamental validity of (continued...) 2 Because Hughley has not received certification from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals authorizing this court to consider a successive § 2255 motion, this court lacks the jurisdiction to consider such a motion.4 See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532; Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003). XXX An appropriate judgment will be entered denying Hughley s motion for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) Done this 3rd day of November, 2011. /s/ MYRON H. THOMPSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 3. (...continued) Hughley s sentence, this court characterized the motion as a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under § 2255. Because Hughley had not received certification from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals authorizing this court to consider a successive § 2255 motion, this court summarily dismissed his § 2255 motion. Id.. In January 2006, Hughley filed what he styled as a Motion for New Trial Under Rule 60(B)(6). Hughley v. United States, Case No. 3:06cv28-MHT. This court ultimately determined that motion to be another successive § 2255 motion, which had been filed without approval from the Eleventh Circuit. Id. In April 2009, Hughley again filed what he styled as a motion for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Hughley v. United States, Case No. 3:09cv296-MHT. This court again determined that Hughley s motion was another successive § 2255 motion filed without approval from the Eleventh Circuit. Id. In December 2009, Hughley once more filed a self-styled Rule 60(b)(6) motion that was determined to be yet another successive § 2255 motion. Hughley v. United States, Case No. 3:09cv1110-MHT. 4. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ( AEDPA ) provides that, to file a second or successive § 2255 motion in the district court, a petitioner must first move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). The appellate court, in turn, must certify that the second or successive § 2255 motion contains (1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).