Smith v. The Healthcare Authority for Baptist Health, No. 2:2020cv00887 - Document 32 (M.D. Ala. 2022)
Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER: it is ORDERED that defendant Healthcare Authority for Baptist Health's 27 motion to dismiss is denied, as further set out in Order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/22/2022. (am, )
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Smith v. The Healthcare Authority for Baptist Health Doc. 32 Case 2:20-cv-00887-MHT-SRW Document 32 Filed 03/22/22 Page 1 of 20 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION VIRGINIA SMITH, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Plaintiff, v. THE HEALTHCARE AUTHORITY FOR BAPTIST HEALTH, an affiliate of UAB Health System, Defendant. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:20cv887-MHT (WO) OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Healthcare Virginia Authority Smith for has Baptist sued Health defendant under three federal statutes: (1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a and 2000e through 2000e-17; (2) Title I of the Americans with Disabilities through Act 12117; of and 1990 (3) (ADA), the 42 Age U.S.C. §§ 12111 Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 through 634. against She her claims by that firing Baptist her Health because of discriminated her race, in Dockets.Justia.com Case 2:20-cv-00887-MHT-SRW Document 32 Filed 03/22/22 Page 2 of 20 violation of Title VII; because of her disability, in violation of the ADA; violation of the ADEA. pursuant to 28 U.S.C. and because The § 1331 court of her has (federal age, in jurisdiction question) and § 1343 (civil rights); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Title VII) and § 12117 (ADA); and 29 U.S.C. § 626 (ADEA). This case is now before the court on Baptist Health’s motion to dismiss Smith’s Title VII and ADEA claims for failure to state a claim. (Baptist Health does not move to dismiss Smith’s ADA claim.) For the reasons that follow, the motion will be denied. I. Standard on Motion to Dismiss To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 2 Case 2:20-cv-00887-MHT-SRW Document 32 Filed 03/22/22 Page 3 of 20 The factual allegations in the complaint must be more than “‘merely liability.” consistent with’ a defendant’s Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). At the same time, “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement.’” Id. The court need only be able to “draw the reasonable inference that the alleged.” defendant is According the complaint, Smith, who Health the when the misconduct Factual Background to 2019, for Id. II. in liable factual is white, telemetry Baptist allegations worked department Health fired from her. in at the Baptist 1992 Baptist until Health informed Smith that it was firing her because she had refused to receive a flu vaccine. Smith takes a medication for psoriasis and psoriatic arthritis that can interact basis, her badly with physician had the flu vaccine. submitted 3 a On request that for a Case 2:20-cv-00887-MHT-SRW Document 32 Filed 03/22/22 Page 4 of 20 medical exemption from the requirement that she receive it, using a form supplied by Baptist Health. Whether Baptist Health formally denied the request, and what reasons it might have given for doing so, are unclear. During her nearly 28 years at Baptist Health, Smith, whose job did not require her to interact with patients, had never previously been required to receive a flu vaccine. written up, inappropriate Nor had she ever been reprimanded, or otherwise conduct or cautioned violation of about a policy any or procedure. At the time of her firing, Smith was 74 years old. Baptist Health replaced her with significantly younger, African-American employees. III. Title VII makes Discussion it generally illegal for an employer to discriminate against its employees on the basis of their race, and the ADEA makes it generally 4 Case 2:20-cv-00887-MHT-SRW Document 32 Filed 03/22/22 Page 5 of 20 illegal for an employer to discriminate employees on the basis of their age. § 2000e-2(a)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 623. and trial--as opposed to the against its See 42 U.S.C. At summary judgment motion-to-dismiss stage--claims under both statutes are often analyzed according to the three-part burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1324-25 (11th Cir. 2011); Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000). The first part of that framework requires the plaintiff to establish a prima-facie case of discrimination, which, once established, discrimination. Burdine, 450 raises a presumption of illegal See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. U.S. 248, 254 (1981). A burden of production is then put on the defendant to rebut the presumption by articulating at least one legitimate, non-discriminatory See id. reason for its challenged action. If the defendant fails to carry that burden, 5 Case 2:20-cv-00887-MHT-SRW Document 32 Filed 03/22/22 Page 6 of 20 the plaintiff wins; if it succeeds, the plaintiff must ultimately prove that the defendant’s proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000). Smith appears to assume that a discrimination complaint is plausible on its face if it alleges facts sufficient to establish a prima-facie McDonnell Douglas and its progeny. case under In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., the Supreme Court held that, to defeat a motion to dismiss a discrimination complaint, it is not necessary to allege a prima-facie case. See 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002) (“The prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas ... is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.”). sufficient to But it did not decide whether it is do so, and since Iqbal and Twombly, several federal courts of appeals have held that it is. See Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404-05 (7th Cir. 2010); Sheppard v. Davis Evans & Assoc., 694 6 Case 2:20-cv-00887-MHT-SRW Document 32 Filed 03/22/22 Page 7 of 20 F.3d 1045, 1050 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012); Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2015); Castleberry v. STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 266 (3d Cir. 2017); N.A., see 436 also Fed. Henderson Appx. v. 935, JP Morgan 937-38 (11th Chase Cir. Bank, 2011); Patel v. Georgia Dept. BHDD, 485 Fed. Appx. 982, 983 (11th Cir. 2012); McCray v. Auburn Univ. Montgomery, 2011 WL 6140993 at *4 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (Albritton, J.). But see Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 589 (6th Cir. 2018); Austin v. Univ. of Oregon, the court 925 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 2019). For two discrimination reasons, complaint may agrees survive a dismiss if it alleges a prima-facie case. Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that motion a to First, the that a prima-facie case raises an inference of discrimination. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (“[T]he prima facie case ‘raises an inference of discrimination ... because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more 7 Case 2:20-cv-00887-MHT-SRW Document 32 Filed 03/22/22 Page 8 of 20 likely than not impermissible based factors.’” on the (quoting consideration Furnco of Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)); Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 875 (1984) (“A plaintiff discrimination justifying establishes an discrimination alleging a inference by showing one prima of that instance facie individual he of (1) case racial belongs to a racial minority, (2) applied and was qualified for a vacant position the employer was attempting to fill, (3) was rejected for the position, and (4) after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek qualifications.”); 491 U.S. establishes 164, a applicants Patterson 187 prima v. (1989) facie of the McLean (“Once case, an plaintiff's Credit the Union, plaintiff inference of discrimination arises.”); O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996) (“[T]he prima facie case requires ‘evidence 8 adequate to create an Case 2:20-cv-00887-MHT-SRW Document 32 Filed 03/22/22 Page 9 of 20 inference that an employment decision was based on an illegal discriminatory criterion.’”) (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977) (alterations and emphasis omitted)); Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510 (“[T]he prima facie case relates to the employee’s burden of presenting evidence that raises an inference of discrimination.”). Thus, by pleading a prima-facie case, a plaintiff bringing a discrimination suit may allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Second, given that a plaintiff bringing a discrimination suit can prevail on the merits simply by establishing a prima-facie case (if, that is, the defendant fails to meet its burden of articulating at least one legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its challenged action), it would not make sense to require her to plead anything more than a prima-facie case in order to proceed to the merits stage. 9 See Littlejohn, Case 2:20-cv-00887-MHT-SRW Document 32 Filed 03/22/22 Page 10 of 20 795 F.3d at 311 (“The plaintiff cannot reasonably be required to allege more facts in the complaint than the plaintiff would need to defeat a motion for summary judgment made prior to the defendant’s furnishing of a non-discriminatory justification.”); cf. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511-12 (“It ... seems incongruous to require a plaintiff, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, to plead more facts than he may ultimately need to prove to succeed on the merits if direct evidence of discrimination is discovered.”). That is not to imply that a discrimination complaint will always survive a motion to dismiss if it alleges a prima-facie case. “Courts may infer from the factual the allegations alternative in explanation[s],’ complaint which ‘obvious suggest lawful conduct rather than the unlawful conduct the plaintiff would ask the court to infer.” American Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682). 10 (11th Cir. 2010) A plaintiff bringing Case 2:20-cv-00887-MHT-SRW Document 32 Filed 03/22/22 Page 11 of 20 a discharge-discrimination claim might therefore plead herself out of court if, in addition to pleading a prima-facie obvious, case, legitimate she alleges reason for facts her suggesting termination. an In general, however, it is not for the court to weigh competing, plausible motion-to-dismiss Spray-Rite inferences stage. Service Corp., See 465 at Monsanto U.S. 752, the Co. 766 & v. n.11 (1984) (the meaning of documents that are “subject to” divergent “reasonable ... interpret[ations]” either as “referring to an agreement or understanding that distributors and retailers would maintain prices” or instead as referring to unilateral and independent actions, is “properly left to the jury”); id. at 767 n.12 (“The choice between two reasonable interpretations of ... testimony properly [i]s left for the jury.”); Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 267 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[U]nder Rules 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6), at the pleading stage, the plaintiff is only 11 Case 2:20-cv-00887-MHT-SRW Document 32 Filed 03/22/22 Page 12 of 20 required to plead a plausible cause of action; we are not authorized or required to determine whether the plaintiff’s plausible inference of loss causation is equally or more inferences[.]” plausible (citing than Twombly, 550 other U.S. competing at 556)); Anderson News, L.L.C. v. American Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 185 (2d plausible Cir. 2012) inferences that (“The may choice be drawn between from two factual allegations is not a choice to be made by the court on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”); In re Bill of Lading Transmission and Processing System Patent Litigation, 681 F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Nothing in Twombly or its progeny allows a court to choose among competing inferences as long as there are sufficient facts alleged inferences to render plausible.”); the non-movant’s Evergreen asserted Partnering Grp., Inc. v. Practiv Corp., 720 F.3d 33, 45 (1st Cir. 2013) (“It is not for the court to decide, at the pleading stage, which inferences are more plausible than other 12 Case 2:20-cv-00887-MHT-SRW Document 32 Filed 03/22/22 Page 13 of 20 competing inferences, since those questions are properly left to the factfinder.”); McDonough v. Anoka Cty., 799 F.3d alternative 931, 946 (8th explanations Cir. are 2015) not (“If the sufficiently convincing, however, the complaint states a plausible claim for likely relief, reason because for the ‘[f]erreting defendants’ out the actions is most not appropriate at the pleadings stage.’” (quoting Watson Carpet & Floor Covering, Inc. v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 648 F.3d 452, 458 (6th Cir. 2011))); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(3) (“A party may state as many claims or defenses Thus, as it where has, the regardless factual of consistency.”). allegations in a discharge-discrimination complaint permit the inference that the reason, plaintiff in addition was to discharged the for inference a legitimate that she was discharged for a discriminatory reason, the complaint should generally be allowed to proceed unless the former inference is so strong as to render the latter 13 Case 2:20-cv-00887-MHT-SRW Document 32 Filed 03/22/22 Page 14 of 20 not just unlikely, but implausible. v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051, Compare Blomker 1060-61 (8th Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal of retaliatory-discharge complaint where an plaintiff eight-page was fired detailed because attachment of a showed years-long disciplinary history that included unwelcome physical contact with a supervisor, inappropriate language in the workplace, and failure to follow email protocol), with Wilson v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., 850 F.3d 368, 374 (8th Cir. 2017) (allowing retaliatory-discharge complaint to proceed despite the fact that complaint recited defendant’s proffered reason for plaintiff’s termination, namely, that she had performed her job poorly and incurred two warnings for poor performance); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (“If there are two alternative explanations, one advanced by defendant and the other advanced by plaintiff, both of which are plausible, plaintiff’s complaint survives a motion to 14 Case 2:20-cv-00887-MHT-SRW Document 32 Filed 03/22/22 Page 15 of 20 dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). be dismissed alternative only Plaintiff’s complaint may when explanation defendant’s is so plausible convincing that plaintiff’s explanation is implausible.”). Here, the court finds that Smith has alleged a prima-facie case of race and age discrimination, and that her complaint summary-judgment establish a stage should or prima-facie proceed trial. case A of to plaintiff race or the may age discrimination by showing (1) that she was a member of the protected class, which includes employees of any race in the context of a Title VII race-discrimination claim, and employees at least 40 years of age in the context of an ADEA age-discrimination claim; (2) that she was qualified for her position; (3) that she was terminated; and (4) that she was replaced by someone outside of the protected class--that is, a non-white individual, in the context of a Title VII race-discrimination claim brought by a white plaintiff, 15 Case 2:20-cv-00887-MHT-SRW Document 32 Filed 03/22/22 Page 16 of 20 or an individual significantly younger than the plaintiff, in the context of an ADEA age-discrimination claim. See Flowers v. Troup Cty., Ga., Sc. Dist., 803 F.3d 1327, 1336 (11th Cir. 2015) (listing the elements of a prima-facie case in the context of a Title VII race-discrimination claim); Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024 (listing the elements of a prima-facie case in the context of an ADEA age-discrimination claim); Smith, 644 F.3d at 1325 & n.15 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that the “protected class,” in the context of a Title VII race-discrimination claim, includes employees of any race); Keller v. Hyundai Motor Manufacturing, 513 F. Supp. 3d 1324, 1339 (M.D. Ala. 2021) (Thompson, J.) (supplemental opinion) (holding that the “protected class,” in the context of an ADEA age-discrimination claim, age). includes all employees at least 40 years of The facts alleged in Smith’s complaint, if true, would suffice to make each of these showings. She has alleged (1) that she is white, and over the age of 40; 16 Case 2:20-cv-00887-MHT-SRW Document 32 Filed 03/22/22 Page 17 of 20 (2) that she had ample experience in telemetry and had performed her job satisfactorily for nearly 28 years; (3) that replaced she by was terminated; non-white and (4) that individuals she who was were significantly younger than she. It is not problematic, as Baptist Health suggests, that Smith does not allege the names, races, and ages of each of her replacements. she was younger factual replaced than she by is allegation Smith’s allegation that African-Americans not a that legal must motion-to-dismiss stage as true. significantly conclusion, be taken but at a the Cf. Martinez v. UPMC Susquehanna, 986 F.3d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 2021) (“In an age discrimination suit, the legal conclusion that the plaintiff needs to win is that the employer took the adverse action because of the plaintiff’s age. replacements’ exact ages are not even legally mandated elements.”). ultimate issues The or While Smith must support this allegation with evidence concerning her 17 Case 2:20-cv-00887-MHT-SRW Document 32 Filed 03/22/22 Page 18 of 20 replacements’ identities, races, and ages if it is contested at the summary-judgment or trial stage, she need not do so now. It is also not necessary for Smith to allege facts suggesting that her replacements were similarly situated to her to allege a prima-facie case. requirement situated plaintiff that the comparators cannot plaintiff comes show that identify into play she was only The similarly when the terminated and replaced by someone outside of her protected class, in which case she can still establish a prima-facie case by showing that a similarly situated employee outside of her protected treatment than she. class received more favorable The plaintiff is not required to make both showings. See Flowers, 803 F.3d at 1336 (“[A] plaintiff makes out a prima facie case when he shows ... that he was replaced by someone outside of his protected class or received 18 less favorable Case 2:20-cv-00887-MHT-SRW Document 32 Filed 03/22/22 Page 19 of 20 treatment than a similarly situated person outside of his protected class.”) (emphasis added). Finally, Smith has not pleaded herself out of court by alleging that Baptist Health informed her that it was firing her because she had refused to receive a flu vaccine. This mere recitation of Baptist Health’s reason for firing her is not an “obvious alternative explanation” so compelling as to render the inference that Baptist Health fired her because of her race or age implausible. Cf. Wilson, 850 F.3d at 374 (“An employee’s one-sentence restatement of the employer’s basis for termination is not an ‘obvious alternative explanation’ to a retaliation charge.”). Moreover, Smith has alleged facts calling the veracity of Baptist Health’s proffered reason into doubt, namely, that she worked satisfactorily at Baptist Health for nearly 28 years without receiving a flu vaccine, and that she submitted a well-supported exemption. 19 request for a medical Case 2:20-cv-00887-MHT-SRW Document 32 Filed 03/22/22 Page 20 of 20 *** Accordingly, Healthcare it Authority is for ORDERED Baptist that Health’s defendant motion dismiss (Doc. 27) is denied. DONE, this the 22nd day of March, 2022. /s/ Myron H. Thompson UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 20 to
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