Williams v. Enhanced Recovery Company, LLC et al, No. 2:2020cv00471 - Document 14 (M.D. Ala. 2020)
Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER: Accordingly, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court that plaintiff John Williams's motion to remand (doc. no. 4 ) is granted and that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1447(c), this cause is remanded to the Circuit Court of Elmore County, Alabama, for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. The clerk of the court is DIRECTED to take appropriate steps to effect the remand. This case is closed in this court. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/10/2020. (kh, )
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Williams v. Enhanced Recovery Company, LLC et al Doc. 14 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION JOHN WILLIAMS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, ) INC. and ENHANCED RECOVERY ) COMPANY, LLC, ) ) Defendants. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:20cv471-MHT (WO) OPINION AND ORDER The court question has presented removal is whether jurisdiction based this on federal ‘complete preemption’ under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. the court concludes For the reasons that follow, that it does not and that, therefore, the plaintiff's motion to remand should be granted. Plaintiff lawsuit in John state Williams court. initially He brought filed claims this for defamation and libel, asserting that defendants Charter Communications, Inc. and Enhanced Recovery Company, Dockets.Justia.com LLC, had falsely notified consumer reporting agencies that he had a delinquent account and had harmed his credit. Enhanced Recovery, with the consent of Charter Communications, filed a notice of removal to federal court based on federal-question jurisdiction. Williams responded with a motion to remand. While Enhanced Recovery acknowledges that Williams did not bring any federal claims on the face of his complaint, it jurisdiction contends based on that this court federal-question has removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Williams’s state claims are 'completely preempted' by FCRA. In light of the fact on that Enhanced Recovery relied a theory of complete preemption to remove this case, the question now before theory. the court is whether FCRA supports this As stated, the court concludes that it does not. In general, any civil action brought in state court may be removed by a defendant to federal court if it 2 could have been brought in federal court in the first instance. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The party seeking removal has the burden of establishing jurisdiction. See Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001). And, “[b]ecause removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns, federal courts [should] all construe doubts removal about statutes jurisdiction strictly. should favor of remand to state court.” be Indeed, resolved in Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Federal-question jurisdiction exists when the civil action arises under the Constitution, laws, treaties of the United States. federal-question See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. jurisdiction applies is Whether generally governed by the “well-pleaded complaint” rule, which provides that a case arises under federal law “only when the action plaintiff’s shows that statement it is of based 3 his upon own cause those of laws.” Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). However, there is an “independent corollary” to this rule known as the “complete preemption” doctrine. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987). Under this doctrine, a complaint that includes no federal-law claims on its face may nevertheless provide federal-question jurisdiction if it “raise[s] a select type of claim that has been singled out by Congress for federal preemption.” Pruitt v. Carpenters' Local Union No. 225, 893 F.2d 1216, 1218 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). This doctrine requires that the preemptive force of the statute be “so ‘extraordinary’ that it converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating well-pleaded a federal complaint claim rule.” for purposes Blab T.V. of of the Mobile, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Comm’ns, Inc., 182 F.3d 851, 854 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). The Eleventh interpreted Circuit complete Court preemption 4 of Appeals narrowly and has has cautioned that “broader and it should more preemption.” Id. not be familiar at confused doctrine 854. with of Ordinary the ordinary preemption “operates to dismiss state claims on the merits and may be invoked in either federal or state court,” while complete preemption “functions as a narrowly means of assessing federal removal jurisdiction.” drawn Id. at 854-55. A federal statute may preempt state causes of in action conferring ordinary terms federal-question complete preemption. without necessarily jurisdiction through See Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[O]ur conclusion that the complete preemption doctrine does not provide a basis for federal preclude the jurisdiction parties in from this action litigating does about not the preemptive effect, if any, of the FCC's orders or the Communications Act [47 U.S.C. § 151, et seq.] in any subsequent state court action.”). Whether there is ordinary preemption in this case is a close question. See Hamilton v. Midland Funding, 5 LLC., 2015 WL 5084234, at *6 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 27, 2015) (Kallon, J.) (“FCRA preemption of state law torts is an area of judges.”). little agreement among this district’s However, it is not a question this court need reach, because it is clear that FCRA does not exert the ‘extraordinary’ level of preemptive force necessary for this court to have removal jurisdiction. The Eleventh Circuit has observed that the complete preemption doctrine is limited in its application and has cautioned that courts should hesitate to extend it to new areas of law. See Blab T.V., 182 F.3d at 856 (“These cases reveal that, although the Supreme Court recognizes the existence of the complete preemption doctrine, the Court does so hesitatingly and displays no enthusiasm to extend the doctrine into areas of law beyond the LMRA [Labor Management Relations Act of 1948, 29 U.S.C. § 185] and ERISA [Employee Retirement Income Security determining most Act, whether important 29 U.S.C. complete factor for 6 a § 1132].”). preemption court to exists, consider In the is Congress’s intent. whether Congress, “grant a Id. at 857. in defendant Courts must determine fashioning the the ability law, to meant remove to the adjudication of the cause of action to a federal court by transforming federal one.” the state cause of action into a Id. (brackets, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Here, court’s the defendants review has not have not found, shown, any and this indication that Congress intended FCRA to completely preempt state law so as to district grant court removal that has jurisdiction. Nearly addressed question come to the same conclusion. this every has See, e.g., Watkins v. Trans Union, LLC, 118 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (N.D. Ala. 2000) (Acker, J.); Swecker v. Trans Union Corp., 31 F. Supp. 2d 536 (E.D. Va. Private Issue by 1998) (Brinkema, Discover, a Div. J.); of Sherron Novus v. Servs., Inc., 977 F. Supp. 804 (N.D. Miss. 1997) (Davison, J.); 7 Harper v. TRW, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 294 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (Rosen, J.).1 Indeed, the jurisdictional language of the statute indicates that Congress did not craft FCRA to preempt completely all preemptive statutes exclusive state federal claims. such as While LMRA jurisdiction, or the completely ERISA grant jurisdictional grant under FCRA allows for concurrent jurisdiction. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681p (“An action to enforce any liability created under this subchapter may be brought in an appropriate United States district court without regard to the amount in controversy, or in any other court The of competent Eleventh jurisdiction.”) Circuit has explained (emphasis that added). provisions which demonstrate a “broad policy of preserving state authority except in areas in which the exercise of this 1. In the two cases in which district courts found complete preemption under FCRA, Crump v. Bank of Am., 2016 WL 4926425 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2016) (Hillman, J.); Williams v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1994 WL 529880 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 1994) (Haight, J.), the discussion of jurisdiction seemed to conflate ordinary and complete preemption. 8 authority would be inconsistent with federal law,” such as concurrent jurisdiction provisions, counsel against a finding of complete preemption because “[t]hese provisions contemplate the application of state-law and the exercise degree.” of state-court jurisdiction Blab T.V., 182 F.3d at 857-58. to some The grant of concurrent jurisdiction in FCRA suggests that Congress did not intend it to have the same “unique preemptive force” as the LMRA and ERISA, undermining the idea that FCRA should be read as completely preemptive. Id. at 858; see also Harper, 881 F. Supp. at 299 (holding that FCRA’s grant of concurrent jurisdiction “weighs heavily against preemption”). The two FCRA preemption sections are also narrowly drawn. Section 1681h(e) creates an exception to its preemptive effect for state law claims where malice or willful intent to injure the consumer is involved. See 15 any U.S.C. action or § 1681h(e) proceeding (“[N]o in the consumer nature may of bring defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence with respect to the 9 reporting of information ... except as to false information furnished with malice or willful intent to injure such consumer.”) 1681t(b)(1)(F) is more (emphasis added). expansive, Section preempting any “requirement or prohibition ... imposed under the laws of any State with respect to any regulated under section 1681s-2.” subject matter However, it still sets forth only a discrete preemption that “in no way resembles Congress’ grant of complete preemption” under completely preemptive statutes. King v. Retailers Nat. Bank, 388 F. Supp. 2d 913, 916 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (St. Eve, J.); see also Watkins, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 1222. Nor is there any evidence in the legislative history that Congress intended to make preempted state law claims removable to federal court. See Watkins, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 1222; see also Sherron, 977 F. Supp. at 808 (“There is nothing in the legislative history or the FCRA itself to establish that Congress intended that state law causes of action ... be removable.”). The absence of any mention of what would have been a 10 significant jurisdictional decision is further strong evidence that Congress completely preemptive. (“We view the never meant FCRA to be See Blab T.V., 182 F.3d at 857 absence of such a statement in the legislative history to be a persuasive argument against finding complete preemption.”). Because it appears on the because FCRA is clear face does of not that no federal Williams’s completely question complaint, preempt the and state claims for the purposes of removal, this court lacks jurisdiction Company’s to hear removal this of case.2 this Enhanced action was Recovery therefore 2. In his motion to remand, Williams raises two separate issues. First, despite the fact that Enhanced Recovery removed based on federal-question jurisdiction, Williams notes that the court lacks diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because his state complaint requested only $ 20,000 in damages. Because the defendants do not assert diversity jurisdiction, the court need not address this issue. Second, he points out that neither Enhanced Recovery nor Charter Communications is itself a credit reporting agency, nor are his claims based on required disclosures to such agencies. As a result, he argues, FCRA is inapplicable. Whether FRCA is applicable and whether there is ordinary preemption are 11 improper, and Williams's motion to remand should be granted. * * * Accordingly, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court that plaintiff John Williams’s motion to remand (doc. no. 4) is granted and that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), this cause is remanded to the Circuit Court of Elmore County, Alabama, for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. The clerk of the court is DIRECTED to take appropriate steps to effect the remand. This case is closed in this court. DONE, this the 10th day of November, 2020. /s/ Myron H. Thompson UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE issues left for resolution by the state court after remand. 12
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