Holloway et al v. Health Services, Inc., No. 2:2019cv00119 - Document 26 (M.D. Ala. 2020)
Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER: It is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court that defendant Health Services, Inc.'s renewed motion to sever (doc. no. 21 ) is denied without prejudice as further set out in the order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/30/2020. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Appeals Checklist)(dmn, )
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Holloway et al v. Health Services, Inc. Doc. 26 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION L’TEISHA HOLLOWAY and BIANCA GRANGER, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Plaintiffs, v. HEALTH SERVICES, INC., Defendant. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:19cv119-MHT (WO) OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiffs L’Teisha Holloway and Bianca Granger brought this action against defendant Health Services, Inc. (HSI), asserting six counts of discrimination and retaliation against them during their employment with the company. alleges sex Count One of discrimination the amended against complaint Holloway in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 2000e-17. 42 U.S.C. Count Two §§ 1981a alleges and sexual 2000e through harassment of Holloway and creation of a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. Count Three alleges race Dockets.Justia.com discrimination against Granger in violation of Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Count Four alleges national origin discrimination against Granger in violation of Title VII and § 1981. Holloway Count Five alleges retaliation against under Title VII. Count Six alleges retaliation against Granger under Title VII and § 1981. This court has federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This lawsuit is now renewed motion to sever. before the court on HSI’s For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that the motion should be denied without prejudice. I. BACKGROUND a. Holloway’s Claims Holloway was hired at HSI in 2016. She was promoted several times, and by September 2017 she was in a salaried position reporting 2 directly to the company’s CEO, Gilbert Darrington. Holloway contends that Darrington would regularly send her inappropriate text messages and emails, flirt with her, and touch her without her consent. advances. to an Holloway did not respond to his In January 2018, Holloway was demoted back hourly position, which she says was in retaliation for her rejection of Darrington. Darrington’s inappropriate messages continued after Holloway was demoted. In April 2018, she formally reported the harassment to her supervisor, plaintiff Bianca Granger. However, Holloway says that the company never responded to her complaint and took no action to discipline Darrington or protect her from further discrimination. b. Granger’s Claims Granger was hired at HSI in 2007. During her time at the company, she was promoted several times and was eventually named Chief Operating 3 Officer. When Holloway was demoted after declining advances, Granger became her supervisor. it was Granger to whom Holloway Darrington’s As a result, formally reported Darrington’s sexual harassment, and it was Granger who relayed this information to HSI’s Compliance Officer and HSI’s attorney in April 2018. Less than a month after Granger reported Holloway’s claim, she was terminated by HSI. Granger notes that she had never received any prior disciplinary actions, and she contends that she was fired in retaliation for sharing Holloway’s allegations against Darrington with the company. In addition to her retaliation claim, Granger also says that HSI subjected her to discrimination based on her race and national origin. was born and raised in Granger is bi-racial and Germany. She alleges that during the final years of her employment at HSI, the Chief Medical Officer and the Chief Financial Officer made offensive comments about her German background and 4 bullied her for being bi-racial. nothing to prevent those She says that HSI did attacks or punish the offenders, and she reports that the comments continued even after she complained both verbally and in writing. She also alleges that her termination was based, at least in part, on this race and national origin discrimination. c. The Motion to Sever HSI moves to sever the claims of the two plaintiffs. It argues that the plaintiffs are mis-joined under Rule 20 of the their Federal claims Rules are of based Civil on Procedure different because factual circumstances and disparate theories of liability. In the alternative, HSI says that the court should draw on its discretion to sever the plaintiffs’ claims because allowing them to be tried prejudice to the company. 5 together would cause II. LEGAL STANDARDS Under Rule 20, multiple plaintiffs may join together in one action when two prerequisites are met: (1) their right to relief must arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, or the same series of transactions or occurrences, and (2) some question of law or fact must be common to all persons seeking to be joined. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1); see also Vanover v. NCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 857 F.3d 833, 839 (11th Cir. 2017). When assessing whether these requirements are satisfied, the court must accept allegations in the complaint as true. the factual See Deskovic v. City of Peekskill, 673 F. Supp. 2d 154, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (Karas, J.). improper joinder, against a party.” Rule 21 provides that to remedy the court may “sever Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. any claim Additionally, Rule 42(b) vests in the district court the discretion to order separate trials “[f]or convenience, to avoid 6 prejudice, or to expedite and economize.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). In determining whether multiple claims arise from the same whether claims. transaction a “logical or occurrence, relationship” courts exists look between to the Alexander v. Fulton Cty., 207 F.3d 1303, 1323 (11th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Manders v. Lee, Courts 338 F.3d generally evaluating whether 1304 (11th take a case-by-case a relationship such Cir. 2003) (en banc). approach exists. to See Miller v. Hygrade Food Prods. Corp., 202 F.R.D. 142, 144 (E.D. factors factual Pa. include or 2020) (Reed, whether legal the issues, J.). However, relevant claims involve the whether they could same be considered parts of the same basic controversy between the parties, and whether holding separate trials would involve duplicate evidence and effort. See Klimaski v. Parexel Int’l, No. Civ. A. 05-298, 2005 WL 857450 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 4., 2005) (Joyner, J.); see also Ulysse v. 7 Waste Mgmt., Inc. of Fla., 645 F. App’x 838, 839 (11th Cir. 2016). The second prong of Rule 20 requires only that there be some question of law or fact common to all parties, not that all claims be identical. the questions 20 does not by the See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1)(B); see also Alexander, 207 F.3d at 1324. Rule raised require that In other words, “common issues predominate over individual specific issues.” ... Fisher v. Ciba Specialty Chems. Corp., 245 F.R.D. 539, 542 (S.D. Ala. 2007) (Steele, J.). whether the defendant’s A shared question of conduct was indeed discriminatory is enough to satisfy this requirement. See Alexander, 207 F.3d at 1324; see also Blesedell v. Mobil Oil Co., 708 F. Supp. 1408, 1422 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Goettel, J.) discrimination (noting cases, that “courts in various have found employment that the discriminatory character of a defendant’s conduct is common to each plaintiff’s recovery”). 8 In addition to determining whether claims were properly joined under Rule 20, a court considering a motion to sever should take into account the interests of judicial economy and case management, prejudice to the parties, and fundamental fairness. See Potts v. B&R, LLC, No. 8:13cv2896, 2014 WL 1612364 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 21, 2014) (Whittemore, J.) (listing cases). general, joinder is “strongly encouraged,” and In the Supreme Court has urged that Rule 20 be construed to allow “the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties.” United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966). However, district courts have broad discretion to determine whether to sever parties or claims. See Swan v. Ray, 293 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir. 2002). III. DISCUSSION In its motion, HSI asks that the claims brought by Holloway be severed from those 9 brought by Granger. However, to warranted, evaluate the circumstances properly court of each must whether severance consider individual the claim, is factual not merely which plaintiff brought it. In Counts One, Two, Five, and Six, both plaintiffs allege discrimination and illegal retaliation stemming from the harassment logically same of underlying Holloway. relate, they occurrence: These Darrington’s claims overlap--Holloway not was only demoted because she rejected Darrington’s advances, and Granger was fired for reporting those advances to the company and its questions actions attorneys. of law, constituted And they including share whether discrimination and fundamental Darrington’s whether the events that occurred after the plaintiffs complained constitute unlawful retaliation. The suffered fact that different the plaintiffs forms of allege retaliation that does they not preclude a finding that their claims should be joined. 10 See Alexander, 207 F.3d at 1324. share both a logical These claims clearly relationship questions of fact and law. and underlying They need not be identical for joinder to be proper. The court has some concerns about Counts Three and Four, Granger’s race and national origin discrimination claims. The complaint is not clear about exactly what sort of adverse action Granger alleges resulted from this discrimination. even less The plaintiffs’ brief provides information. Indeed, it fails to specifically address these claims at all, or to explain how they relate to the rest of the case. point, it is unclear to the court At this whether the plaintiffs intend to continue pursuing these claims. The closest the brief comes to explaining why these counts should not be severed is a broad allegation that HSI may have employees, conduct “a taking towards practice no of action employees, 11 discriminating to and stop against discriminatory retaliating against employees when they complain or report the conduct of Darrington.” evidence However, that there is the plaintiffs any causal link present no between the different forms of discrimination they suffered and “a common and identifiable wrongful act on the part of the defendant.” Grayson v. K-Mart Corp., 849 F. Supp. 785, 788 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (Carnes, J.) (finding no common transaction or motive discriminate to occurrence despite and both statistical evidence of bias). the defendant’s anecdotal and Nor can they point to a standardized policy of discrimination or a pattern of discriminatory activity within HSI. F.2d at 1333 (finding that “a See Mosley, 497 company-wide policy purportedly designed to discriminate against blacks in employment” constituted a series of transactions or occurrences). Ultimately, requirements alleges that however, for her the joinder are termination 12 court finds satisfied. was based that the Granger on both retaliation sexual for reporting harassment and Holloway’s ongoing allegation discrimination her for her race and national origin. these claims arise out of a of against As a result, common occurrence, Granger’s termination, and share common questions of law and fact. Moreover, it would promote judicial efficiency to try all the claims together. They almost certainly share relevant evidence, and it would save time and resources to conduct discovery on all of them at once. Since the claims substantially overlap, the plaintiffs will call similar witnesses, and testimony that is relevant to one claim is likely to be equally relevant to all. Indeed, the plaintiffs have already indicated that they would testify on each other’s behalf if the court were to hold separate trials. claims in promotes one action judicial avoids efficiency, undue prejudice to HSI. 13 Maintaining these duplicative with effort minimal risk and of The court will deny the motion to sever without prejudice. It is possible that facts could arise during discovery to justify severance. If that is the case, motion HSI is free to file a appropriate time prior to trial. proceedings, however, the court new at an At this stage in the concludes that the motion to sever should be denied. * * * Accordingly, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court that defendant Health Services, Inc.’s renewed motion to sever (doc. no. 21) is denied without prejudice. DONE, this the 30th day of November, 2020. /s/ Myron H. Thompson UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 14
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