Muttersbaugh v. Hyundai Motor Manufacturing of Alabama, LLC, No. 2:2017cv00746 - Document 58 (M.D. Ala. 2019)
Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER: it is ORDERED as follows: (1) Plf Christopher Muttersbaugh's 50 objections are sustained as to his ADA accommodation claim and are overruled in all other respects; (2) The 47 recommendation of the magistrate judge is re jected as to plf Muttersbaugh's ADA accommodation claim and is adopted in all other respects; (3) Dft Hyundai Motor Manufacturing of Alabama, LLC's 25 motion for summary judgment is denied as to plf Muttersbaugh's ADA accommodation c laim and is granted in all other respects; (4) Summary judgment is entered in favor of dft Hyundai Motor Manufacturing of Alabama, LLC on all of plf Muttersbaugh's claims except his ADA accommodation claim; (5) Plf Muttersbaugh's ADA accommodation will go to trial. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/24/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Appeals Checklist) (wcl, )
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Muttersbaugh v. Hyundai Motor Manufacturing of Alabama, LLC Doc. 58 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION CHRISTOPHER MUTTERSBAUGH, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Plaintiff, v. HYUNDAI MOTOR MANUFACTURING OF ALABAMA, LLC, Defendant. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:17cv746-MHT (WO) OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff lawsuit Act, as Christopher pursuant to amended the (ADA), Muttersbaugh Americans 42 U.S.C. brought with § this Disabilities 12101 et seq., against his former employer, defendant Hyundai Motor Manufacturing of Alabama, LLC. five claims: retaliatory termination, (1) failure (4) failure to Hyundai’s motion general for to accommodate, promote, discriminatory termination. is Muttersbaugh asserts (3) retaliation, (2) retaliatory and (5) Pending before the court summary judgment on all of Muttersbaugh’s claims. The magistrate judge recommends 1 Dockets.Justia.com granting summary judgment on all claims. After reviewing the record and holding oral argument on the magistrate judge’s recommendation, the court concludes, as follows, that the motion should be granted as to all claims except the failure-to-accommodate claim, which will go to trial: (1) Failure to Accommodate: The magistrate judge inappropriately claim. recommends summary judgment on this He concluded the claim was untimely, and that, even if timely, it would not survive summary judgment because Muttersbaugh was not denied an accommodation. For the reasons discussed below, the court finds that there is a factual dispute as to whether the claim is time-barred. Furthermore, there are disputes of material fact, precluding summary judgment, as to when Muttersbaugh’s supervisor prevented him from eating and whether any accommodation Muttersbaugh was provided with was effective. (2) Retaliatory Failure to Promote: The magistrate judge inappropriately applied 2 the discriminatory failure-to-promote one. test, rather than the retaliatory Applying the retaliatory failure-to-promote test, this claim should not survive summary judgment because Muttersbaugh showed no evidence, beyond impermissible hearsay statements, that raise a specter of retaliation. (3) Retaliatory Termination: The magistrate properly concluded that summary judge judgment was appropriate on this claim because Muttersbaugh failed to show sufficient pretext to rebut Hyundai’s legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for firing him. (4) Claim of Other Assertions of Retaliation: The magistrate judge properly concluded that this claim is time-barred. (5) Discriminatory judge properly Termination: concluded that The summary magistrate judgment was appropriate on this claim because Muttersbaugh failed to show sufficient pretext to rebut Hyundai’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing him. 3 I. “A SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense--or the part of each claim or defense--on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving reasonable inferences Matsushita Elec. in Indus. favor Co., party and of that Ltd. v. draw party. Zenith all See Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The alleged facts viewed in favor of Muttersbaugh are as follows. Muttersbaugh worked as a Warranty Reclaim Specialist at Hyundai from May 2010 to February 2013, when he was terminated. His position required him to 4 review warranty claims and handle payments or charge backs to Hyundai suppliers. His direct supervisor was Jennifer Bayless, and her supervisor was Mark Rylatt. Muttersbaugh requested for type 1 diabetes. reasonable accommodations Muttersbaugh has type 1 diabetes and needs to eat throughout the day to maintain his blood-sugar levels. If he experiences low or high blood-sugar events, the impact can range from momentary weakness to loss of consciousness. In order to manage his diabetes in the workplace, he requested reasonable accommodations from his supervisors Bayless and Rylatt shortly after he was hired. Specifically, he requested being allowed to eat meals and snacks on a routine basis, working consistent consistent start diabetes-related time) hours and doctors’ (including taking time appointments and having off a for diabetic episodes. Throughout Rylatt Muttersbaugh’s prevented him from employment, supervisor using reasonable his accommodations and made fun of his disability. 5 For example, in reaction in 2010, Muttersbaugh Hyundai’s parking had a lot, severe and a insulin coworker called for medical attention. The next day, Rylatt told either Muttersbaugh that he had heard or seen Muttersbaugh “flopping around like a fish out of water” either in an ambulance or on a stretcher. Declaration (doc. no. 31-3) at 3. Muttersbaugh Rylatt admitted that he heard about the incident in the parking lot but denied make derogatory comments about it. Furthermore, when Rylatt would see Muttersbaugh eating a meal or snack at his desk, Rylatt would criticize him for not working and tell him that he needed an assignment to be completed immediately. These interruptions forced Muttersbaugh to delay his meal or snack. Rylatt retaliated against Muttersbaugh, throughout his employment, accommodations and for requesting reporting Rylatt’s reasonable discriminatory behavior. Rylatt retaliated against Muttersbaugh in the following ways: 6 (1) Rylatt gave Muttersbaugh lower end-of-year performance reviews for the years 2010 and 2011. (2) Rylatt told Muttersbaugh he was required to use vacation time for doctor’s appointments, even though that is not Hyundai’s policy. (3) Rylatt subjected Muttersbaugh to heightened scrutiny. (4) Rylatt expressed frustration with Muttersbaugh when he was away from his desk for 20 minutes due to having an insulin reaction. (5) Rylatt reported false information to attempt to discipline Muttersbaugh. (6) Rylatt expressed frustration with Muttersbaugh that he met with Hyundai’s Human Resources and said he would not pay him overtime for the meeting. (7) Rylatt told the individual, who was in charge of hiring Muttersbaugh in a different department, not to choose him. 7 (8) Rylatt “forced” Muttersbaugh Bayless even to when discipline she found it led to inappropriate. (9) Rylatt’s discriminatory animus Muttersbaugh’s termination. Muttersbaugh’s job duties changed and his request to remain on his original schedule was denied. Beginning in early 2011, the Warranty Reclaim Group was informed that including it had driving involved moving to and perform quality vehicles from additional duties, evaluations. This one parking another during Muttersbaugh’s lunch hour. lot to Muttersbaugh requested to eat during that time, but Rylatt said he had to move the cars. In 2011, Muttersbaugh took his request for a regular lunch time to Human Resources at least twice. Human Resources Rylatt’s told him instructions and he was made required no further to follow steps to interact with Muttersbaugh regarding the provision of reasonable accommodations. Missing 8 lunch or eating lunch significantly later than normal caused Muttersbaugh to experience insulin reactions. After Muttersbaugh was approved for time away from work under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § efforts 2601 to et seq., for discriminate Muttersbaugh intensified. his and diabetes, Rylatt’s retaliate against Bayless told Muttersbaugh that Rylatt was looking for ways to get rid of him and advised him to apply for FMLA leave to protect his diabetes-related absences. Rylatt’s treatment of Muttersbaugh grew worse after he was approved for FMLA for his diabetes. Specifically, he interrupted Muttersbaugh’s use of reasonable accommodations (such as stopping work to eat a snack at his desk alleviate a diabetic event) on a weekly basis. to On February 10, 2012, Muttersbaugh requested to break for lunch, but Rylatt denied this request and Muttersbaugh continued to work; as a result, he suffered a severe insulin reaction. 9 In February 2012, and as referenced above, Rylatt gave Muttersbaugh a negative performance review for the year 2011, causing Muttersbaugh to be put on a performance improvement plan and lose eligibility for a yearly raise. Rylatt also complained about Muttersbaugh’s use of reasonable accommodations. Theressa James, an Assistant Manager in the Quality Evaluation Department, overheard Susock, a the conversation between Director Quality, of Rylatt in and which Chris Rylatt complained about Muttersbaugh taking so many days of his FMLA for his diabetes. Specifically, she overheard Rylatt say that Muttersbaugh should be able to get his blood sugar in order and not take the entire day off, and that he was “going back to [Human Resources] to see what can be done.” James Declaration (doc. no. 31-4) at the 3. James felt conversation was “completely inappropriate” and wrote an email to Robert Clevenger, Manager for the Team Relations Department, about the conversation. Id. at 2. James met with Clevenger and 10 Sheron Rose, Team Relations Director, to discuss the conversation and tell them that Rylatt had claimed he was changing time sheets. Clevenger and Rose told James that they were investigating the incident. Rylatt December thwarted 2012, Muttersbaugh’s Muttersbaugh promotion. sought and In received confirmation from Human Resources that he was eligible for a job transfer or promotion. He interviewed for a position in a new department, but he was not chosen because Rylatt told the individual in charge of hiring not to choose him. Muttersbaugh Workplace Threats Misconduct Policy. was and terminated Violence for violating Policy and the Serious On the evening of January 29, 2013, Muttersbaugh had a blood-sugar event and, as a result, could not go to work on January 30. He permission to use FMLA for a diabetic event. received That day, Christina Blue, an employee, reported concerns about a conversation she had with Muttersbaugh on January 29 to Bayless that she had heard 11 Muttersbaugh say that everyone who administration breathe. works on building the was third not worth floor the of the air they When discussing drug screens, Muttersbaugh said he would curse at the person who administers drug tests if he was ever tested. Blue responded that, considering recent school shootings, he should not make comments like that. Muttersbaugh allegedly responded that he “wouldn’t come in to shoot someone [he] had a disagreement against, [he] would just plant a bomb and tie it to the phone and call in to detonate.” 30, 2013 Memo from Bayless to Clevenger January (doc. no. 27-10) at 2; Clevenger Declaration (doc. no. 27-1) at 5. According to a Team Relations Memo on the incident, another witness heard Muttersbaugh say “he would just walk in and shoot the person; he would place something like a device and then just phone the person.” February 1, 2013 Team Relations Memo (doc. no. 27-11) at 2. Robert Clevenger classified the incident as workplace violence and initiated an investigation in 12 which employees who had participated in the January 29 conversation were participate in interviewed. the January Rylatt, 29 who did conversation, not was interviewed but he does not remember what he said, and no notes were recorded from his interview. not interviewed. Bayless was Clevenger did not seek any opinions from supervisors about Blue’s general character or her credibility. On January 31, Muttersbaugh was escorted to the security office at work. Rylatt and Human Resources accused Muttersbaugh of threatening to plant explosives at Hyundai. deposition He for denied this the case, accusations. he further At his denied the accusations, but he did admit that he told an employee that people could get a bomb into security does not check backpacks. Muttersbaugh without pay. Hyundai because Hyundai suspended Muttersbaugh called Human Resources for an update following his suspension, and he was told that he was fired. On February 6, Human Resources sent Muttersbaugh a letter informing him of 13 the alleged reasons for termination, which included: (1) his comment “about potentially placing an explosive device at” Hyundai; and (2) “profane and hateful comments regarding other Team Members in a threatening and aggressive manner.” Termination Letter (doc. no. 27-16) at 2. Kelly Rucker, the head of the Workplace Violence Committee, relied on Team Relations to do a thorough investigation including looking at past disciplines and make recommendations. At his deposition, Rucker stated that, at the meeting with Team Relations, there were no discussions of Muttersbaugh’s medical condition and that he did not have any knowledge about his medical condition. Rucker Deposition (doc. no. 27-15) at 20. Muttersbaugh stated that he had “no definitive proof” that Rylatt had anything to do with his termination. Muttersbaugh Deposition (doc. no. 27-4) at 52. Muttersbaugh filed an EEOC Charge on June 6, 2013. His EEOC charge stated: “I was hired by the above named employer on May 3, 2010, as a Warranty Reclaim Specialist. I 14 have Type 1 diabetes, a disability that my employer was aware of. Because of my disability, I am required to eat meals frequently and regularly. I would remind my management staff that I needed to eat meals at specific times frequently, and was frequently denied by Mark Rylatt, the manager of Information. I complained to Sheron Rose, Human Resource Director about my unfair treatment from Mark Rylatt, and things became worse. I was retaliated against because of my complaint about my start times and finish times changing, which affected my eating schedule. On February 6, 2013 my employment was terminated by [Hyundai]. “I was terminated because I committed workplace violence, which I deny. [Hyundai] claims that I had been written up before for violence, which I also deny. [Hyundai] legal counsel Chris Whitehead claims that I had ‘redness in the face, and my hands were shaking.’ These are symptoms of low blood sugar, and had been explained to management. My direct supervisor Jennifer Bayless was aware of this, as a few days after the incident occurred, I had no recollection of the ‘incident’ and reminded her of my low blood sugar. She had witnessed a few insulin reactions at this point, and had assisted as necessary. “There have been several other incidents that I have documentation related too. I believe I was discriminated against because of my disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended.” EEOC Charge (doc. no. 27-27) at 2. 15 III. DISCUSSION A. The Failure-to-Accommodate Claim magistrate failure-to-accommodate judge claim concluded was untimely, that the and that, even if timely, it would not survive summary judgment because Muttersbaugh was not denied an accommodation. The court finds that the claim was not untimely, and that there are disputes of material fact as to when Muttersbaugh’s supervisor prevented him from eating and whether any accommodation Muttersbaugh was provided was effective. Therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate. i. The magistrate judge erred in concluding that Muttersbaugh’s failure-to-accommodate claim is time-barred. Hyundai argued failure-to-accommodate that claim magistrate judge agreed. is Muttersbaugh’s time-barred, and the The court disagrees and finds that the claim is timely. 16 A plaintiff raising a claim under Title I of the ADA must comply with the same procedural requirements articulated in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (incorporating the procedures set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5). As such, before filing suit in district court, the plaintiff must first file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 2001). For an EEOC charge to be timely, it must be filed within 180 days of when the alleged violation occurred. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Once the EEOC dismisses the charge and notifies the plaintiff of his right to sue, the plaintiff has 90 days in which to file suit on his claim in district court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Santini v. Cleveland Clinic Florida, 232 F.3d 823, 825 (11th Cir. 2000). Muttersbaugh filed his charge on June 6, 2013; thus, any incidents occurring prior to December 8, 2012 (180 days before) are time-barred. 17 Hyundai argued, and the magistrate judge agreed, that, because Muttersbaugh pointed to discrete and severable events that all occurred before December 8, 2012, in his deposition and interrogatory responses, he was not denied reasonable accommodations after December 8, 2012. However, the fact that Muttersbaugh provided these dates does not foreclose the possibility that accommodations at other times. he was also denied Muttersbaugh stated in both his interrogatory responses and declaration that he was denied accommodations throughout his employment, not only before Declaration December (doc. no. 8, 2012. 31-3) at See Muttersbaugh 3; Muttersbaugh Responses to Hyundai Interrogatories (doc. no. 27-18) at 10-11. Thus, the court finds that there is a factual dispute as to whether Muttersbaugh’s claim is time-barred. ii. The magistrate judge erred in concluding that summary judgment is appropriate, for disputes of material fact exist as to when Muttersbaugh’s supervisor prevented him from eating and whether any accommodation Muttersbaugh was provided with was effective. 18 There are disputed issues of fact on the merits, which preclude summary judgment: (1) whether Rylatt prevented Muttersbaugh from eating while moving cars or during other times in the day, and (2) whether such denials of food made his overall accommodation ineffective. A disabled employee is entitled to a reasonable accommodation, and an ineffective accommodation is not an accommodation. 535 U.S. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 391, 400 (2002) (“It word ‘reasonable,’ that not the conveys for effectiveness. the need word the ‘accommodation,’ is An ineffective ‘modification’ or ‘adjustment’ will not accommodate a disabled individual’s limitations.”) The magistrate received an judge concluded effective that Muttersbaugh accommodation, including opportunities to obtain food during his work day, such as food from the vending machine at nearly any point in the day except magistrate for judge when also he was noted 19 moving that, cars. “Despite The his complaint he was not given a ‘regular’ lunch break, Muttersbaugh could take his lunch either before after his driving duties were completed.” Recommendation (doc. Muttersbaugh contends “misunderstands the no. 47) that: nature and accommodation needs. at of or Report and 12. However, This conclusion Plaintiff’s disability With a larger meal like lunch Plaintiff may have some flexibility as to when he eats, but with snacks (smaller meals), he may not. Sometimes even minutes-long delays in consuming appropriate food or beverages can have hours-long adverse effects. ... As a result, the delays Rylatt often imposed on Plaintiff’s eating lunch and consuming snacks (separate from and in addition to when Muttersbaugh moved cars) effectively denied Plaintiff’s reasonable accommodations.” access to Plaintiff’s and use of Objections (doc. no. 50) at 4. Summary judgment is inappropriate at this stage because, with the record and reasonable inferences read in the light most favorable to Muttersbaugh, disputed 20 issues of material fact exist, including whether Rylatt prevented Muttersbaugh from eating while moving cars or during other times in the day, and whether such denials of food made his overall accommodation ineffective. B. Retaliatory Failure-to-Promote Claim Muttersbaugh alleged that, around December 2012, he was not selected for a promotion because of his disability and his requests for accommodations. He had applied for promotion to an Assistant Manager position in the Quality Evaluation Department. He interviewed for the position and was told that he was the most qualified for the position but he was ultimately not chosen. He was later told that Rylatt told the individual in charge of hiring him, Mark Radar, not to choose him. A failure-to-promote claim may be brought under two theories with different legal tests: (1) discriminatory failure to promote and (2) retaliatory failure to promote. discriminatory The magistrate judge applied the failure-to-promote 21 test, but Muttersbaugh brought this claim under the retaliatory failure-to-promote theory. See Plaintiff’s Response to Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. no. applying the the discriminatory magistrate judge 32) at 47. failure-to-promote concluded In test, that the failure-to-promote claim should be dismissed for two reasons: (1) Muttersbaugh failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; and (2) he failed to make out a prima-facie case. Regarding the first reason, the magistrate judge erred in concluding that Muttersbaugh did not exhaust his administrative failure-to-promote remedies. claim fits His squarely retaliatory within his initial EEOC charge, which alleged retaliation. With regard to the second reason, the magistrate erred in concluding that Muttersbaugh brought the failure-to-promote claim under a discriminatory theory, rather than a retaliatory theory. Nevertheless, applying the retaliatory failure-to-promote test, the court holds that summary judgment 22 is appropriate on this claim evidence, because beyond Muttersbaugh hearsay failed statements, to that present raised a specter of retaliation. i. The magistrate judge erred in concluding that Muttersbaugh did not exhaust his administrative remedies, for the failure-to-promote claim is like or related to, or growing out of the retaliation allegations contained in the EEOC charge. Muttersbaugh alleged in his EEOC charge that he engaged in statutorily protected activity by requesting accommodations and by complaining about discriminatory conduct. See EEOC Charge (doc. no. 27-27) at 2. In his charge, he stated that he was “retaliated against” and “There have been several other incidents that I have documentation related to[].” Id. Hyundai argued that Muttersbaugh did not exhaust his administrative remedies because he did not explicitly include the failure-to-promote claim as a basis for his retaliation claims in his charge. agreeing with The magistrate judge erred in Hyundai. A retaliatory failure-to-promote claim is a form of retaliation that 23 is like or related to Muttersbaugh’s allegations of retaliation in his EEOC charge. In order to make an ADA claim in federal district court, a plaintiff administrative remedies must by discrimination with the EEOC. first filing exhaust a his charge of See Batson v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2018). Judicial claims are allowed if they amplify, clarify, or more clearly focus the allegations in the EEOC complaint, but allegations inappropriate. of new See id. acts of discrimination are However, a court should be extremely reluctant to allow procedural technicalities to bar claims brought under discrimination statutes. See id. exhausted Thus, to determine whether a plaintiff has his administrative remedies, the proper inquiry is whether the plaintiff’s complaint is like or related to, or grew out of, the allegations contained in the EEOC charge. See id. at 1328. Muttersbaugh exhausted his administrative remedies on the failure-to-promote claim because he stated that 24 he was retaliated retaliatory against in failure-to-promote his claim charge. is His ‘like or related to’ or ‘grew out of’ the retaliation claims alleged in the EEOC charge. Thus, Hyundai’s argument is without merit, and the magistrate judge erred in agreeing with it. ii. Nevertheless, under a retaliatory failure-to-promote theory, Muttersbaugh’s claim does not survive summary judgment. Muttersbaugh alleges that Rylatt retaliated against him for engaging in statutorily protected conduct, including requesting reasonable accommodations. As a result of Rylatt retaliating against him, according to Muttersbaugh, he was not promoted. summary judgment should because Muttersbaugh be failed Hyundai argues that granted to on establish this claim a causal connection between his protected activities and being denied a promotion. The court agrees that the evidence presented is insufficient to survive summary judgment. 25 An employee may establish a prima-facie case of retaliation by showing that: (1) he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) he experienced an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal connection adverse between action. the See protected Batson, activity 897 F.3d and at the 1329. Muttersbaugh failed to establish a prime-facie case, specifically that there was a causal connection between his protected activities and being denied a promotion. Specifically, he alleges that he was told that he was the most qualified applicant for the job and that Rylatt told the decisionmaker, Mark Radar, not to hire him. Muttersbaugh combination with argues other that these evidence facts, of in Rylatt’s discriminatory animus and retaliation, could be seen by a reasonable juror as supportive of retaliatory failure to promote. The because court there finds is that Muttersbaugh’s no evidence of claim fails causation. Specifically, he failed to present any evidence, beyond 26 inadmissible hearsay statements in his that had impact the decision Rylatt any on declaration, not to promote Muttersbaugh. C. Retaliatory Termination Claim Muttersbaugh argues that Rylatt retaliated against him for his request for and use of accommodations by setting into motion a series of events that led to his termination. summary The magistrate judge recommended granting judgment on this claim because Muttersbaugh failed to refute Hyundai’s legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for termination. The court agrees. Again, an employee may establish a prima-facie case of retaliation by showing that: (1) he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) he experienced an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal connection between adverse action. employee has retaliation, the protected activity See Batson, 897 F.3d at 1329. established the burden a shifts 27 prima-facie to the and the Once an case employer of to articulate a legitimate reason for the adverse action. See id. If the employer meets this burden, the burden shifts back to the employee to demonstrate pretexr--that is, to present evidence “sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons given by the employer were not the real reasons for the adverse employment decision.” Id. The retaliatory-termination claim should be denied because Muttersbaugh has failed to sufficiently rebut Hyundai’s legitimate reason for terminating him. i. The magistrate judge properly concluded that Hyundai articulated a legitimate reason for terminating Muttersbaugh. The court will assume that Muttersbaugh established a prima facie case therefore, articulate challenged action. “However, the of retaliation. a See employer’s legitimate Chapman, burden Hyundai reason 229 is F.3d merely must, for at the 1024. one of production; it need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. 28 It is sufficient if the defendant’s evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff.” The Hyundai Id. magistrate judge articulated a properly concluded legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for terminating Muttersbaugh: Workplace Threats legitimate, and Violence non-retaliatory that he violated the Policy, reason which for is firing a an employee. Consistent with with potentially company serious procedures policy when dealing violations, Kelly Rucker, Hyundai’s Senior Manager of Human Resources, reviewed the investigation findings along with a few other managers. and reviewing The investigation included soliciting three eye-witness supported the allegations. with any evidence witnesses had retaliatory findings and a one. After which all The court was not presented suggesting motive accounts, to that lie--in reviewing Muttersbaugh’s 29 any of the particular, the disciplinary eye a investigation history, as well as having a discussion with other managers, Rucker determined that Muttersbaugh’s actions violated Hyundai’s Workplace Threats and Violence Policy. It is undisputed that other employees have been terminated for violating this policy. See Clevenger Declaration (doc. no. 27-1) at 7. ii. The magistrate judge properly concluded that Muttersbaugh failed to cast sufficient doubt that Hyundai did not fire him for violating a workplace policy. Because Hyundai has articulated a legitimate reason for terminating Muttersbaugh, the burden shifts back to Muttersbaugh to present evidence “sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons given by the employer were not the real reasons for the adverse employment decision.” Hurlbert, 439 F.3d at 1298. to If Muttersbaugh fails meet Hyundai is entitled to summary judgment. Plantation 1997). At Patterns, summary 106 F.3d judgment, 1519, this burden, See Combs v. 1538 (11th Muttersbaugh need Cir. not prove pretext; instead, he must only “cast sufficient 30 doubt” such that a jury could reasonably infer that Hyundai’s “proffered legitimate reasons were not what actually motivated its conduct.” Batson, 897 F.3d at 1331. The court finds that Muttersbaugh failed to cast sufficient doubt on Hyundai’s legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for firing him. Muttersbaugh’s evidence of pretext, that is, his own denial of making the statements at issue, is insufficient. The evidence reflects three eye-witness accounts, and there is no evidence that improper Hyundai reasons. relied See on these Alvarez witnesses for Royal Atl. v. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010) (“We do not sit as a ‘super-personnel department,’ and it is not our role to second-guess the wisdom of an employer's business decisions--indeed the wisdom of them is irrelevant--as long as those decisions were not made with a discriminatory motive.”). judgment is appropriate. 31 Thus, summary D. Other-Assertions-of-Retaliation Claim The magistrate judge properly concluded that Muttersbaugh’s remaining assertions of retaliation were time-barred. E. Discriminatory Termination Claim Muttersbaugh alleges that Rylatt was biased against him, based on accommodations his for disability his and related disability, and use that of Rylatt intentionally set into motion a chain of events that caused his recommended termination. summary The judgment on magistrate this claim, judge in part because Muttersbaugh did not make a sufficient showing of pretext to non-discriminatory rebut reason Hyundai’s for legitimate, terminating him. The court agrees. Assuming case of Muttersbaugh discrimination, legitimate, established Hyundai non-discriminatory a must reason prima-facie articulate for a the challenged action. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024. If 32 Hyundai articulates non-discriminatory one or reasons more for legitimate, terminating the plaintiff, “the burden shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that the ‘employer’s proffered reason was pretextual by presenting evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons given by the employer were not the real reasons for the adverse 1329 employment (quoting decision.’” Martin, 543 Batson, F.3d at 897 1268). F.3d If at the employee does not proffer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether each of the defendant pretextual, the employer’s employer is articulated entitled reasons to is summary judgment. See Combs, 106 F.3d at 1538. The court finds that Hyundai non-discriminatory reason is, violated Hyundai’s Policy. For he Violence retaliatory-termination concludes that to the 33 fire reasons legitimate, Threats discussed above, failed a Muttersbaugh--that Workplace claim Muttersbaugh had to the and in the court sufficiently rebut Hyundai’s reason for terminating him with pretext. *** Accordingly, for the above reasons, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) Plaintiff Christopher Muttersbaugh’s objections (doc. no. 50) are sustained as to his ADA accommodation claim and are overruled in all other respects. (2) The (doc. no. recommendation 47) is of the rejected magistrate as to judge plaintiff Muttersbaugh’s ADA accommodation claim and is adopted in all other respects. (3) Defendant Hyundai Motor Manufacturing of Alabama, LLC’s motion for summary judgment (doc. no. 25) is denied accommodation as claim to plaintiff and is Muttersbaugh’s granted in all ADA other respects. (4) Summary judgment is entered in favor of defendant Hyundai Motor Manufacturing of Alabama, LLC 34 on all of plaintiff Muttersbaugh’s claims except his ADA accommodation claim. (5) Plaintiff Muttersbaugh’s ADA accommodation will go to trial. DONE, this the 24th day of May, 2019. /s/ Myron H. Thompson UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 35
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