Johnson-Price Clemons v. Alabama Department of Human Resources, et al., No. 2:2007cv00568 - Document 163 (M.D. Ala. 2020)
Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER: it is ORDERED that dfts' 135 renewed motion to strike jury demand and requests for compensatory and punitive damages is granted. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/14/2020. (amf, )
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Johnson-Price Clemons v. Alabama Department of Human Resources, et al. Doc. 163 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION LAURA JOHNSON-PRICE CLEMONS, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Plaintiff, v. ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES and NANCY T. BUCKNER Defendants. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:07cv568-MHT (WO) OPINION AND ORDER This individual Crum case has been winnowed down to one issue: plaintiff Laura Johnson-Price Clemons claims that defendants Alabama Department of Human Resources (DHR) and DHR Commissioner Nancy T. Buckner retaliated against her in her employment, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (by and through 42 U.S.C. § 1983) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, 2000e to 2000e-17. jurisdiction over the This court has original claim under 42 U.S.C. Dockets.Justia.com § 2000e-5(f)(3) (as to § 1343 (as to § 1981). Title VII) and under U.S.C. The court has before it the defendants’ renewed motion to strike jury demand and requests for compensatory and punitive damages. For reasons that file, the motion will be granted. Context is critical motion to strike. to addressing the pending And, by context, the court means the events and understandings that led to the creation of this case. This case is one of the last two spin-offs of Crum et al v. State of Alabama, consolidated as In re Employment Discrimination Litigation Against the State of Alabama, civil action no. 94-354-N, otherwise known as the Crum litigation. The court created this case and numerous other Crum spin-off cases for purely administrative reasons, management only.” that is, for “judicial Order (doc. no. 1) (emphasis added). The court set up these individual cases, with separate numbers and separate dockets for filings, so that the individual-case filings would not get caught up in the continuing flurry of filings 2 in the main Crum litigation. In line with this management aim, the court also allowed the parties to go through a process by which to cull unnecessary parties and clarify claims. However, because the reason for this whole process was purely administrative, the court did not want any party (plaintiff or defendant) to enjoy any procedural or substantive advantage, or suffer any procedural or substantive disadvantage, as a result. The individual cases, all therefore, carried with them, that had occurred (filings, orders, understandings, etc.) in the Crum litigation. What occurred in the Crum litigation remained in binding the individual spin-off cases. What was filed in the individual spin-off cases would be considered litigation. as The if it had been constraints of filed Crum in the still Crum applied. Hence, the word spin-off cases. This plaintiffs, was for an they advantage would not for be the individual required to file completely separate and new lawsuits, totally unrelated 3 to the Crum time-barring litigation, defenses to and possibly their confront claims. Moreover, because the individual cases were mere extensions of Crum, no new-case filing fees were required. was an advantage continue to enjoy to the the defendants, benefits for of they the agreements reached in the Crum litigation. And it could orders and To be sure, class certification was denied in the Crum litigation, and that litigation has now been dismissed and terminated; however, that does not make a difference in this case. There were carrots for both plaintiffs and defendants in agreeing to this spin-off case process; and there were no sticks, explicit or hidden. It is against this background, in this context, that the defendants’ motion to strike must be considered. Here, Clemons knew, when she sought to intervene in the Crum litigation, that that litigation was restricted to injunctive relief; the Crum plaintiffs had abandoned jury trial as well as compensatory and 4 punitive damages. Indeed, notably, Clemons’s complain-in-intervention sought only injunctive relief, in conformity with the Crum litigation’s restrictions, and with what she understood were the litigation’s limits. Moreover, she expressly stated in a deposition that she was limiting her complaint-in-intervention to injunctive relief. Moreover, the court itself relied on these understandings in allowing intervention. Whether estoppel drives or both the doctrine waiver, the doctrines relied principle dictates upon of that is equitable fairness Clemons that not be allowed to pursue, at this time, the jury trial and the request for compensatory and punitive damages she forsook when she sought, and was allowed to, intervene in the Crum litigation. *** Accordingly, it is ORDERED that defendants’ renewed motion to strike jury demand 5 and requests for compensatory and punitive damages (doc. no. 135) granted. DONE, this the 14th day of January, 2020. /s/ Myron H. Thompson UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 6 is
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