MISTY SMARTT V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, No. 21-16009 (9th Cir. 2022)
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Claimant an Arizona woman in her forties filed an application for Social Security disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. The agency repeatedly denied the claimant’s claims. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision, concluding that the ALJ reached a reasonable determination based on substantial evidence in the record. On appeal, the claimant argues that the ALJ erred by insufficiently supporting his analysis, failing to account for the claimant’s symptoms and limitations in the residual functional capacity (RFC) assessment, improperly discounting the opinion of one medical provider while giving undue weight to the opinion of another, and failing to satisfy the “clear and convincing” standard for rejecting subjective symptom testimony.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the ALJ did not err in discounting the opinion of the claimant’s treating physician because the “extreme limitations” described by the physician were incompatible with the rest of the objective medical evidence. Likewise, the ALJ did not err in giving significant weight to the opinion of the consultative examiner because the examiner’s determination that the claimant could perform light-exertion work was consistent with the objective medical evidence. Finally, the ALJ provided “clear and convincing” reasons for discounting Claimant’s subjective pain testimony. The claimant’s self-reported limitations were inconsistent with (1) the objective medical evidence, (2) her self-reported daily activities, and (3) her generally conservative treatment plan.
Court Description: The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment affirming the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of claimant’s application for Social Security disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income; and concluded that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. The panel held that the ALJ did not err in discounting the opinion of claimant’s treating physician, Dr. Karandish, because the “extreme limitations” described by the physician were incompatible with the rest of the objective medical evidence. First, claimant’s treating physician was not really her treating physician as that title would normally be understood. Dr. Karandish functioned like a consultative examiner, not a treating physician. Second, the ALJ identified specific conflicts between Dr. Karandish’s opinion and the clinical evidence. The ALJ permissibly concluded that Dr. Karandish’s assessments were “overly restrictive.” In addition, the ALJ did not err in giving significant weight to the opinion of the consultative examiner, Dr. Gordon, because the examiner’s determination that claimant could perform light-exertion work was consistent with the objective medical evidence. Finally, the panel held that the ALJ provided “clear and convincing” reasons for discounting claimant’s subjective pain testimony. Claimant’s self-reported limitations were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence, claimant’s self- reported daily activities, and claimant’s generally conservative treatment plan.
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