USA V. TERRANCE BAKER, No. 20-50314 (9th Cir. 2023)
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One week after an armed robbery of a Sprint store in Los Angeles, Defendant was stopped and frisked by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). A handgun was recovered from the car and later introduced at Defendant’s trial as the weapon used in the Sprint store robbery. Defendant was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery and brandishing a firearm.
At issue on appeal is whether officers violated Defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by exceeding the scope of their patdown search and seizing the car key, and, if a constitutional violation occurred, whether the handgun evidence was nevertheless admissible because Defendant’s flight from officers attenuated the discovery of the handgun.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions for Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery and a sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. Section 3C1.1, reversed his conviction for brandishing a firearm, and remanded for a reduction of sentence or retrial on the Section 924(c) count. The court concluded that the handgun evidence was illegally obtained and should have been excluded at trial and that this error prejudiced Defendant as to the brandishing conviction but was harmless as to the convictions for Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the panel concluded that Defendant did not objectively demonstrate his intent to abandon the car key. The panel wrote that the exclusionary rule required suppression of the handgun evidence at Defendant’s trial unless an exception to the rule applies.
Court Description: Criminal Law The panel affirmed Terrance Baker’s convictions for Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) and a sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, reversed his conviction for brandishing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), and remanded for a reduction of sentence or retrial on the § 924(c) count. One week after an armed robbery of a Sprint store, Baker was stopped and frisked by the Los Angeles Police Department. Although no weapons or contraband were found on Baker, an officer removed a car key from his belt loop without his consent and walked to a nearby parking lot in search of the car associated with the key. Baker denied having a car. When officers located a red Buick whose flashing headlights responded to the key fob, Baker fled and was apprehended a short distance away. A handgun was recovered from the car and later introduced at Baker's trial as the weapon used in the Sprint store robbery. Baker contended that the evidence of the handgun resulted from an illegal search and seizure and should have been suppressed at trial. The panel held that even if officers had reasonable grounds to stop Baker, the search and seizure exceeded constitutional limits. The panel noted that the Government is unable to explain how the officers’ post- patdown detention and search for the car was intended to UNITED STATES V. BAKER 3 confirm or dispel their suspicions about a crime being committed or to secure the safety of anyone on the scene. The panel explained that had officers limited their Terry stop to a brief detention and protective patdown search of Baker, they would have had no occasion to search for a car in an adjoining parking lot that matched the key fob hanging from Baker’s belt loop. The Government argued that by stating he did not have a car, Baker abandoned the car key, eliminating his possessory interest in it and leaving him without standing to challenge its seizure or the resulting search of the car. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the panel concluded that Baker did not objectively demonstrate his intent to abandon the car key. The panel concluded that the discovery of the handgun was the product of illegal police conduct, whether that conduct is framed as exceeding the permissible scope of a Terry stop or as the warrantless seizure of the car key. The panel wrote that the exclusionary rule required suppression of the handgun evidence at Baker’s trial unless an exception to the rule applies. The Government argued that the attenuation doctrine applies based on Baker’s flight from officers. Rejecting this argument, the panel noted that where this court has found flight to satisfy the attenuation doctrine, the circumstances of that flight have provided independent grounds for discovering the challenged evidence such that the officer's prior illegal conduct was not the sole reason for the discovery of the evidence. The panel explained that here the officers’ illegal seizure of the key was the sole reason for the discovery of the car—Baker’s flight played no role in the identification of the red Buick or its eventual search, and therefore could not purge the taint of the illegal conduct. 4 UNITED STATES V. BAKER The panel concluded that the Government demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted Baker of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of § 1951(a) based on substantial independent evidence establishing Baker's involvement in the robbery. The panel concluded that there is, however, reasonable doubt whether the jury would have convicted Baker of brandishing a firearm in violation of § 924(c) absent the admission of the handgun. The panel therefore vacated Baker’s conviction on the § 924(c) count. The panel held that because the jury was adequately informed of the limitations of cell site location information, the district court’s decision to admit the testimony of the Government’s cell data mapping expert was not erroneous under any standard of review. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying admission of a report by the Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) on guidelines for mobile device forensics. Because none of the report’s stated purposes describes the activities of the NIST, the panel rejected Baker’s argument that public records exception to the hearsay rule applies. Baker contended that the trial testimony of Baker’s co- defendant was insufficient to support the factual finding that Baker threatened the co-defendant, and that the district court therefore erred in applying an obstruction of justice sentencing enhancement under § 3C1.1. Rejecting this contention, the panel held that the district court’s determination that Baker committed obstructive conduct was not clearly erroneous. UNITED STATES V. BAKER 5
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