RICHARD JOHNSON V. CHARLES RYAN, ET AL, No. 20-15293 (9th Cir. 2022)
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Plaintiff, an Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) inmate, is a validated member of a Security Threat Group (STG) and, pursuant to ADC’s policy, has been assigned to maximum custody confinement. Plaintiff first argued that ADC’s annual reviews of his maximum-security confinement are insufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, Defendant claimed that his removal from ADC’s Step-Down Program (SDP) violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court screened his complaint, dismissing his claim regarding ADC’s annual reviews for failure to state a claim. The district court later granted summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff’s claims regarding his removal from the SDP. Plaintiff appealed, challenging both orders.
The Ninth Circuit (1) affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Defendant’s claim ADC’s annual reviews of his maximum-security confinement were insufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) reversed the district court’s summary judgment for defendants and remanded on Defendant’s claims that his removal from the Department’s Step-Down Program.
The panel held that Plaintiff has a liberty interest in avoiding assignment to maximum custody as a consequence of his STG validation. Nevertheless, Plaintiff failed to state a claim for a due process violation under the three-prong framework set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge. However, because Plaintiff was not given a meaningful opportunity to learn of the factual basis for his transfer from close custody to maximum custody or to prepare a defense to the accusations, Plaintiff was likely denied due process in the procedures that resulted in his return to maximum custody.
Court Description: Prisoner Civil Rights In an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Arizona inmate Richard Johnson, the panel (1) affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Johnson’s claim that the Arizona Department of Corrections’s (“ADC’s”) annual reviews of his maximum security confinement were insufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) reversed the district court’s summary judgment for defendants and remanded on Johnson’s claims that his removal from the Department’s Step-Down Program—a program by which inmates may reintegrate into close custody confinement—violated his rights under the * The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. JOHNSON V. RYAN 3 First and Fourteenth Amendments. Johnson’s complaint alleged, in part, that after he was validated as a member of a Security Threat Group (“STG”), he was moved to maximum security confinement where he is confined to his cell for twenty-four hours per day, strip searched every time he leaves his cell, takes meals in his cell, and has limited access to rehabilitation programs. These conditions are substantially more restrictive than the general population from which he was moved. Johnson also alleges that he was denied the opportunity for restoration of lost earned release credits. Addressing Johnson’s claim that the ADC’s annual review process of his confinement status violates due process, the panel held that Johnson has a liberty interest in avoiding assignment to maximum custody as a consequence of his STG validation. Nevertheless, Johnson failed to state a claim for a due process violation under the three-prong framework set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Johnson did not challenge the procedures by which he was initially validated as an STG member. Instead, he argued that ADC’s annual reviews of his confinement status do not afford him adequate process because they are based solely on his alleged gang affiliation, without regard to his criminal history, propensity of violence, or disciplinary record within his past reclass review period or his disciplinary record overall. The panel held that ADC is entitled to substantial deference in its determination that an inmate’s STG membership and failure to renounce and debrief poses a continuing security threat. Although Johnson disagreed with ADC’s judgment, he failed to plausibly allege how that judgment created a risk that he will be erroneously classified as a security threat. 4 JOHNSON V. RYAN The panel next Johnson’s claim that his removal from the Step-Down Program (“SDP”) in 2018 violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The panel disagreed with the assertion that ADC has created a liberty interest in Johnson’s participation in the SDP, concluding rather that the SDP is a process by which Johnson can leave maximum custody and regain eligibility for good-time credit and parole. Although Johnson had no liberty interest created by the SDP, he adequately stated a liberty interest in avoiding a return to maximum custody from close custody. Thus, it was not Johnson’s removal from the SDP per se that created an atypical and significant hardship, but the change in Johnson’s underlying conditions of confinement when he was moved. Because Johnson was not given a meaningful opportunity to learn of the factual basis for his transfer from close custody to maximum custody or to prepare a defense to the accusations, Johnson was likely denied due process in the procedures that resulted in his return to maximum custody. At the very least, the district court should not have granted summary judgment to defendants on this claim. Addressing Johnson’s First Amendment retaliation claim that he was removed from the SDP and returned to maximum custody because of his lawsuit against various ADC defendants, the panel noted that Johnson had a pending appeal in this court when he was removed from the SDP and transferred back to maximum custody. The panel held that viewing the evidence, including Johnson’s declaration, in the light most favorable to Johnson, there was a genuine dispute of material fact with respect to whether Johnson’s removal from the SDP and return to maximum security confinement reasonably advanced a legitimate penological purpose. JOHNSON V. RYAN 5 Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Rakoff stated that while Arizona provides the mirage that a once validated member of an STG can later escape solitary confinement, the reality is that he will be kept there for the entire duration of his sentence. Believing that this is unconstitutional, as well as contrary to past holdings of this Court, Judge Rakoff dissented from the majority’s analysis in Part III.A of its opinion, pertaining to Johnson’s claim that Arizona’s refusal to consider factors other than his initial STG validation and his subsequent failure to debrief denies him due process. And while Judge Rakoff concurred in Part III.B of the majority’s opinion, which reverses and remands the district court’s entry of summary judgment against Johnson on his claim that his removal from the SDP program violated due process, he wrote separately to emphasize that his claim is validly broader than the majority contends. Finally, Judge Rakoff concurred fully in Part III.C of the majority opinion with respect to Johnson’s retaliation claim.
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