Acevedo Granados v. Garland, No. 19-72381 (9th Cir. 2021)
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The Ninth Circuit granted in part and denied in part a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The petition is based on petitioner's fear that, if returned to El Salvador, he would face persecution or torture on account of his membership in a particular social group, defined based on his intellectual disability.
The panel concluded that the agency misunderstood petitioner's proposed social group, and thus granted the petition for review with respect to the claims for asylum and withholding of removal. The panel explained that the BIA and IJ treated the term "intellectual disability" as if it were applied to a layperson. However, that term as used in petitioner's application referred to an explicit medical diagnosis with several specific characteristics. Recognized that way, the panel reasoned that the clinical term "intellectual disability" may satisfy the "particularity" and "social distinction" requirements necessary to qualify for asylum and withholding of removal. However, because the IJ did not recognize the proposed social group before her, the panel must remand to the agency for fact-finding on an open record to determine if the group is cognizable. Finally, the panel concluded that denial of CAT relief by the agency was supported by substantial evidence.
Court Description: Immigration. The panel granted in part and denied in part Wilber Agustin Acevedo Granados’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision affirming an Immigration Judge’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, and remanded, holding that the Board erred in misunderstanding Acevedo’s proposed social group based on his intellectual disability for purposes of asylum and withholding relief, and that substantial evidence supported the denial of CAT protection. The Board held that Acevedo’s proposed social group comprised of “El Salvadoran men with intellectual disabilities who exhibit erratic behavior” was not cognizable because it lacked particularity and social distinction. The panel concluded that the agency misunderstood Acevedo’s proposed social group, explaining that the Board and IJ treated the term “intellectual disability” as if it were applied by a layperson, instead of recognizing that the term as used in Acevedo’s application referred to an explicit medical diagnosis with several specific characteristics. The panel wrote that recognized that way, the clinical term “intellectual disability” may satisfy the “particularity” and “social distinction” requirements necessary to qualify for asylum and withholding of removal. However, because the IJ did not recognize the proposed social group before her, the panel ACEVEDO GRANADOS V. GARLAND 3 remanded to the agency for fact-finding on an open record to determine if the group was cognizable. As to the particularity determination, the panel held that the Board and IJ erred by assuming that a determination of mental illness was a subjective one, to be carried out by a judge. The panel wrote that the particularity standard does not expect that IJs make independent diagnoses based on their observations in the courtroom. The panel noted that the record in this case contained professional evaluations conducted by recognized psychologists, retained by the government, who reported their findings in professional terms, and diagnosed Acevedo with an intellectual disability. The panel wrote that like finders of fact generally, the IJ was not required to accede to these expert opinions, but she was not entitled to disregard the terms of the psychologists’ diagnoses. The panel wrote that the fact that the average layperson may not be able to accurately identify an individual with an “intellectual disability” does not make the clinical definition subjective or amorphous, and that similarly, the possibility that individuals within the group may have sub- diagnoses or concurrent diagnoses does not make the group overbroad. As to the social distinction analysis, the panel concluded that the Board’s decision was flawed in two ways. First, the panel held that the Board erred in concluding that Acevedo’s proposed group did not meet the social distinction requirement because the record did not support the determination that El Salvadoran society in general perceives the group to be a meaningful social unit, distinct from the larger population of mentally ill individuals. The panel explained that the social distinction inquiry asks whether the society in general perceives, considers, or recognizes persons 4 ACEVEDO GRANADOS V. GARLAND sharing the particular characteristic to be a group, not whether the group is sufficiently distinguishable from other, similarly- persecuted groups, or whether the individual is a part of one group to the exclusion of other groups. The panel wrote that the possibility that individuals with intellectual disabilities are subsumed in a larger group of persecuted individuals with mental illnesses does not control the social distinction analysis, because the question is whether individuals with intellectual disabilities are singled out for greater persecution than the general population. Second, the panel held that the Board erred in concluding that evidence of discrimination or harassment of individuals exhibiting outward symptoms or behavioral manifestations of physical or mental illnesses was insufficient to establish social distinction. The panel wrote that if individuals are treated badly because they manifest a certain condition, that treatment by itself suggests that the group of people with that condition is viewed as socially distinct, because they have been singled out for mistreatment. The panel observed that the record established that Salvadoran society stigmatizes those with mental illness as “locos,” and that individuals with intellectual disabilities suffer abuse, neglect, and lack of services, and are periodically targeted and killed. The panel explained that this evidence of harassment and discrimination is an important factor in the determination of whether the group is sufficiently distinct in the society in question to establish a cognizable particular social group. Because the Board’s rejection of Acevedo’s alternative proposed social group comprised of “indigent El Salvadoran men, lacking familial support, suffering from severe mental disabilities and exhibiting erratic behavior” was premised entirely on its erroneous rejection of his first proposed group, ACEVEDO GRANADOS V. GARLAND 5 the panel concluded that its decision could not stand. Additionally, the panel observed that both the Board and IJ failed to meaningfully engage with the language of the alternative group, and emphasized that the Board and IJ are not free to ignore arguments raised by a party. The panel held that substantial evidence supported the denial of CAT protection because the record did not a compel a finding that police or medical workers at the National Public Hospital have the requisite specific intent to torture individuals with intellectual disabilities.
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