REYNALDO CONDORI-QUIROZ V. MERRICK GARLAND, No. 19-70301 (9th Cir. 2022)
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED MAY 16 2022 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT REYNALDO JAIR ANDRE CONDORIQUIROZ, No. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 19-70301 Agency No. A209-421-644 Petitioner, MEMORANDUM* v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted May 12, 2022** San Francisco, California Before: WALLACE, W. FLETCHER, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges. Reynaldo Jair Andre Condori-Quiroz (Condori-Quiroz) petitions for review of an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) concurrence with a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) asylum officer’s negative reasonable fear determination, and of the * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). DHS’s decision to execute Condori-Quiroz’s reinstated removal order. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition. I. An alien seeking relief from a reinstated removal order must demonstrate “a reasonable possibility that he or she would be persecuted on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, or a reasonable possibility that he or she would be tortured in the country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(c) (2019); see also Bartolome v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 803, 807–09 (9th Cir. 2018). We review the IJ’s determination for substantial evidence, meaning that “[t]o reverse the [IJ], we must determine that the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it—and also compels the further conclusion that the petitioner meets the requisite standard for obtaining relief.” Sanjaa v. Sessions, 863 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that a protected ground was not a reason motivating the threats or threatened harms alleged by CondoriQuiroz. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2010) (denying petition for review where migrant “did not present evidence that the bandits targeted his family on account of a protected ground” but on account of the family’s “farm [being] on fertile land”); accord Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 2 F.3d 351, 359–60 (9th Cir. 2017). Furthermore, no evidence compels the conclusion that the Peruvian government was, or would be, unwilling or unable to stop Condori-Quiroz’s uncle from threatening or harming him, as he appeared to allege. See Truong v. Holder, 613 F.3d 938, 940–41 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Condori-Quiroz lacked a reasonable fear of persecution. For similar reasons, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Condori-Quiroz lacked a reasonable fear of torture, as torture must entail severe harm inflicted by or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official. See Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, 962 F.3d 1175, 1183, 1185–86 (9th Cir. 2020); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(1), 1208.18(a) (2019). II. Condori-Quiroz was removed before he petitioned our court. CondoriQuiroz argues his removal was unlawful because his reinstated removal order was not final or should have been stayed until the period for filing his petition had passed.1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to consider Condori-Quiroz’s challenge. See Garcia de Rincon v. DHS, 539 F.3d 1133, 1137–38 (9th Cir. 2008) 1 Condori-Quiroz does not challenge his prior removal order nor its reinstatement, and neither party questions our jurisdiction to hear his petition despite his removal. We have jurisdiction. See Del Cid Marroquin v. Lynch, 823 F.3d 933, 935–36 (9th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). 3 (explaining that § 1252(a)(2)(D) vests this court with jurisdiction to address questions of law raised in the context of reinstated removal orders); cf. Arce v. United States, 899 F.3d 796, 799–801 (9th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (holding § 1252(g) does not strip this court of jurisdiction where the government “lacks the discretion to effectuate a removal order”). Condori-Quiroz’s reinstated removal order was final. Where, as here, “the immigration judge concurs with the asylum officer’s determination that the alien does not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture, the case shall be returned to [DHS] for removal of the alien.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(g)(1) (2019). This completes the agency proceedings and makes the order final. See id.; OrtizAlfaro v. Holder, 694 F.3d 955, 958–60 (9th Cir. 2012). Further, no stay barred his order’s execution. Condori-Quiroz did not ask our court for a stay and no automatic stay applied. See Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 964 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). PETITION DENIED. 4
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