United States v. Charley, No. 19-10133 (9th Cir. 2021)
Annotate this Case
The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction on one count of making false statements to a government official, vacated her convictions on two counts of assault within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, and remanded for a new trial on the assault counts and for resentencing on the false-statements count. Defendant's convictions stemmed from a physical altercation with her boyfriend. Defendant claimed self-defense at trial, testifying that she feared for her life when she swung the rebar and knocked her boyfriend unconscious. In its rebuttal case, the Government presented evidence that, roughly two years before the charged assault, defendant assaulted her stepmother and sister on separate occasions.
The panel concluded that sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for making false statements to a government official (Count 3) where a rational juror could infer from the circumstantial evidence presented that defendant knew it was unlawful to lie to the FBI at the time she lied. The panel also concluded that evidence of defendant's prior incidents was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404, thus entitling her to a new trial on Counts 1 and 2. The panel explained that, although defendant's testimony may have opened the door to general reputation or opinion testimony about her propensity for violence under Rule 405(a), she did not open the door to detailed descriptions of specific instances of conduct that were completely unrelated to her boyfriend to show that she has a propensity for violence under Rule 405(b). The panel also explained that evidence of a prior incident is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with character. Furthermore, the prior incidents do not establish either defendant's motive or intent to commit the charged assault. Finally, the admission of this erroneous "other acts" evidence was not harmless.
Court Description: Criminal Law. The panel affirmed Seraphina Charley’s conviction on one count of making false statements to a government official, vacated her convictions on two counts of assault within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, and remanded for a new trial on the assault counts and for resentencing on the false-statements count. The convictions stem from an incident with Charley’s boyfriend, Merle Begay, whom Charley hit in the head with a piece of rebar after, she claimed, he attacked her while he was drunk. As to the false-statements count, Charley admitted that she lied to the FBI but contended that the Government failed to prove that she knew her conduct—lying to the FBI—was unlawful. The panel held that a rational juror could infer from the circumstantial evidence that Charley knew that it was unlawful to lie to the FBI at the time she lied. As to the assault counts, Charley claimed self-defense. In its rebuttal case, the Government presented evidence that, roughly two years before the charged assault, Charley assaulted her stepmother and sister on separate occasions. The panel rejected the Government’s contention that evidence of these prior incidents was admissible under Fed. UNITED STATES V. CHARLEY 3 R. Evid. 404(a), which determines when character evidence may be admissible. The panel explained that although Charley’s testimony about Begay may have opened the door to general reputation or opinion testimony about her propensity for violence under Fed. R. Evid. 405(a), she did not open the door to detailed descriptions of “specific instances of conduct” that were completely unrelated to Begay to show that she has a propensity for violence under Fed. R. Evid. 405(b). The panel also rejected the Government’s contention that evidence of the prior incidents was admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), which governs “other acts” evidence. Under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1), evidence of a prior incident is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with character. Addressing Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2) regarding evidence offered to serve another purpose, the panel explained that the prior incidents do not establish either Charley’s motive or intent to commit the charged assault. The panel observed that there is no logical connection between the prior incidents and the charged assault other than the implication that Charley has a propensity for violence and was therefore the aggressor on the occasion here—an impermissible inference under Rule 404(b) and an improper consideration when determining whether self- defense was established. The panel concluded that in light of the Government’s potent evidence about Charley’s character during its rebuttal case and the implications it made during its closing argument, the erroneous admission of the “other acts” evidence was not harmless. Concurring, Judge Bumatay wrote separately to express his view that United States v. Bettencourt, 614 F.2d 214 (9th 4 UNITED STATES V. CHARLEY Cir. 1980), goes too far in suggesting that prior assaults may only rarely be used to prove intent under Rule 404(b).
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.