Tekoh v. County of Los Angeles, No. 18-56414 (9th Cir. 2021)
Annotate this Case
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), which held that Miranda is a rule of constitutional law that could not be overruled by congressional action, the Ninth Circuit concluded that where the unMirandized statement has been used against the defendant in the prosecution's case in chief in a prior criminal proceeding, the defendant has been deprived of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and he may assert a claim against the state official who deprived him of that right under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
In this case, plaintiff alleged that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated when his un-Mirandized statement was used against him at his criminal trial. The panel concluded that plaintiff sufficiently demonstrated a Fifth Amendment violation caused by the officer under section 1983, such that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury on this claim. The panel explained that there is no question that plaintiff's statement was introduced into evidence in the failed state criminal prosecution of him. Furthermore, there is no question that the officer "caused" the introduction of the statements at plaintiff's criminal trial even though the officer himself was not the prosecutor. The panel also concluded that the error was not harmless. Accordingly, the panel vacated the district court's judgment on the jury's verdict; reversed the district court's judgment as to plaintiff's requested jury instruction; and remanded for a new trial.
Court Description: Civil Rights. The panel vacated the district court’s judgment on a jury’s verdict, reversed the district court’s judgment as to plaintiff’s requested jury instruction, and remanded for a new trial in an action alleging, in part, that plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated when his un-Mirandized statement was used against him at his criminal trial. The district court concluded that the use of the statement alone was insufficient to demonstrate a violation of the right against self-incrimination and, instead, instructed the jury that the plaintiff had to show that the interrogation that procured the statement was unconstitutionally coercive under the totality of the circumstances, with the Miranda violation only one factor to be considered. The panel held that in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), which held that Miranda is a rule of constitutional law that could not be overruled by congressional action, where the un-Mirandized statement has been used against the defendant in the prosecution’s case in chief in a prior criminal proceeding, the defendant has been deprived of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and he may assert a claim against the state official who deprived him of that right under § 1983. TEKOH V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 3 The panel held that the district court erred interpreting Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003), to stand for the proposition that a § 1983 claim can never be grounded on a Miranda violation. The panel stated Justice Thomas’s plurality opinion, which reasoned in dicta that damages were unavailable for Miranda violations, did not command support from five Justices and was based on a rationale significantly broader than those of the concurring Justices. Thus, contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the broad principles in Justice Thomas’s opinion in Chavez were not binding in this case. The panel held that while the question of liability was ultimately for the jury to decide, plaintiff sufficiently demonstrated a Fifth Amendment violation caused by Los Angeles Sheriff’s Deputy Carlos Vega under § 1983, such that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury on this claim. Moreover, there was also no question that Deputy Vega caused the introduction of the statements at plaintiff’s criminal trial even though Vega himself was not the prosecutor. The panel stated that it was not holding that taking an un- Mirandized statement always gives rise to a § 1983 action. The panel held only that where government officials introduce an un-Mirandized statement to prove a criminal charge at a criminal trial against a defendant, a § 1983 claim may lie against the officer who took the statement. By contrast, in cases like Chavez, where the suspect was never charged, or where police coerce a statement but do not rely on that statement to file formal charges, the Fifth Amendment is not implicated. Finally, the panel could not conclude that it was more probable than not that the jury would have reached the same 4 TEKOH V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES verdict had it been properly instructed. Accordingly, the error was not harmless. The panel thus vacated the judgment on the jury’s verdict and remanded the case for a new trial in which the jury must be properly instructed that the introduction of a defendant’s un-Mirandized statement at his criminal trial during the prosecution’s case in chief alone is sufficient to establish a Fifth Amendment violation.
The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on June 3, 2021.
The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on May 11, 2023.
The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on August 4, 2023.
The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on August 4, 2023.
The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on January 25, 2024.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.