YURIE YAMANO V. STATE OF HAWAII JUDICIARY, No. 18-16359 (9th Cir. 2019)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED MAR 20 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT YURIE YAMANO, No. Plaintiff-Appellant, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 18-16359 D.C. No. 1:18-cv-00078-SOM-RLP v. MEMORANDUM* STATE OF HAWAII JUDICIARY; et al., Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii Susan O. Mollway, District Judge, Presiding Submitted March 12, 2019** Before: LEAVY, BEA, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges. Yurie Yamano appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Davidson v. Kimberly–Clark * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 2018). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Yamano’s claim against defendant State of Hawaii Judiciary because her claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Simmons v. Sacramento Cty. Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (state courts are “arms of the state” entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to states and their agencies or departments “regardless of the nature of the relief sought”). The district court properly dismissed Yamano’s claims against defendants Kobayashi and Huang for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the RookerFeldman doctrine because Yamano’s claims constitute a forbidden de facto appeal of a prior state court judgment. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163-65 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing proper application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiff’s claim because the relief sought “would require the district court to determine that the state court’s decision was wrong and thus void”). Contrary to Yamano’s contention, the extrinsic fraud exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to her claims. 2 18-16359 The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Yamano’s motion to appoint counsel because Yamano was not proceeding in forma pauperis (“IFP”). See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that the court may under “exceptional circumstances” appoint pro bono counsel to civil litigants with IFP status). The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Yamano’s request for appointment of a next friend because Yamano failed to demonstrate that a next friend was necessary to protect her interests. See Davis v. Walker, 745 F.3d 1303, 1310-11 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth standard of review and discussing the limited nature of next friend standing). We reject as without merit Yamano’s contention regarding judicial bias. AFFIRMED. 3 18-16359
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
