FREDDIE CRESPIN V. CHARLES RYAN, No. 18-15073 (9th Cir. 2022)
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Petitioner was charged in Arizona with first-degree murder. The crime was committed when Petitioner was sixteen years old, but the Supreme Court had not yet held that the death penalty could not be imposed on defendants younger than eighteen when the crime occurred. To avoid that possibility, he entered into a plea agreement under which he agreed to a sentence of life without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”).
After the Supreme Court decided in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), that the imposition of LWOP for those convicted of a crime committed while under the age of eighteen violated the Eighth Amendment under some circumstances, Petitioner unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief (“PCR”) in Arizona state court. He then filed a 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 habeas corpus petition, and the district court granted a conditional writ.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of a conditional writ of habeas corpus. The panel held that the plea agreement did not waive Petitioner’s right to pursue a PCR challenge of his sentence. The panel further explained, that under Miller, a sentencer must have discretion to impose a lesser sentence than LWOP. Here, the trial judge made it clear that he did not have this discretion. Because the judge correctly recognized that his only sentencing option was LWOP, Petitioner’s sentencing violated the Eighth Amendment. The panel concluded that there was at least a reasonable possibility that a sentencing proceeding conducted in accordance with Miller’s requirements would result in a non-LWOP sentence.
Court Description: Habeas Corpus. The panel affirmed the district court’s grant of a conditional writ of habeas corpus to Freddie Crespin, who in 1995 was charged in Arizona with first-degree murder committed when he was sixteen years old. Because the Supreme Court had not yet held that the death penalty could not be imposed on defendants younger than eighteen when the crime occurred, Crespin faced a possible capital sentence if convicted. To avoid that possibility, he entered into a plea agreement under which he agreed to a sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), the Supreme Court held that the imposition of LWOP for those convicted of a crime committed while under the age of eighteen violated the Eighth Amendment under some circumstances. Crespin unsuccessfully sought post- conviction relief (PCR) in Arizona state court. He then filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition. While that petition was pending, the Supreme Court held in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), that the Miller rule was retroactive. The district court then granted the conditional writ. The panel held that the plea agreement, in which Crespin waived the right to appeal “the judgment and sentence to a higher court,” did not waive Crespin’s right to pursue a PCR challenge of his sentence. Nor did Crespin’s guilty plea CRESPIN V. RYAN 3 waive his ability to collaterally attack the constitutionality of his LWOP sentence, as Crespin was unaware of the Eighth Amendment right announced in Miller when he entered into the plea agreement, let alone that he could not be sentenced to death under the not-yet announced rule in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). The panel therefore turned to the merits of Crespin’s Miller claim. The Arizona Court of Appeals found that because the trial court had the discretion to reject the plea agreement if it found the stipulated sentence inappropriate, and the judge was aware of Crespin’s youth and the circumstances of the crime before accepting the agreement, Crespin’s Miller rights were not violated. The panel held that this was an unreasonable application of Miller. The panel explained that under Miller, a sentencer must have discretion to impose a lesser sentence than LWOP. Here, the trial judge made it clear that he did not have this discretion. Because the judge correctly recognized that his only sentencing option was LWOP, Crespin’s sentencing violated the Eighth Amendment. The panel concluded that there was at least a reasonable possibility that a sentencing proceeding conducted in accordance with Miller’s requirements would result in a non-LWOP sentence.
The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on October 20, 2022.
The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on January 3, 2023.
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