Ramirez-Medina v. Garland, No. 16-73325 (9th Cir. 2021)
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The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision dismissing petitioner's appeal of the IJ's order pretermitting his application for cancellation. The BIA held that petitioner failed to establish that he had not been convicted of offenses with an aggregate sentence of at least 5 years.
The panel concluded that the phrase "an offense" in 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C) includes the multiple criminal convictions described in 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(B) that render an alien inadmissible. The panel rejected petitioner's contention that because the statutory disqualification is phrased in the singular, his multiple offenses do not trigger ineligibility. The panel also rejected petitioner's contention that the BIA erred in finding that his multiple convictions resulted in aggregated sentences of at least five years because the agency relied on the 2013 judgment, a record not clearly related to petitioner. Rather, substantial evidence supports the agency's determination that petitioner did not satisfy his burden to show that he had not been convicted of the qualifying offenses.
Court Description: Immigration. Denying Jesus Ramirez-Medina’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the panel held that the phrase “an offense” in the cancellation of removal statute at 8 U.S.C § 1229b(b)(1)(C) includes the “[m]ultiple criminal convictions” described in § 1182(a)(2)(B). Under 8 U.S.C § 1229b(b)(1)(C), an alien who has been “been convicted of an offense under [8 U.S.C.] section 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3)” is ineligible for cancellation of removal. The BIA concluded that Ramirez was ineligible for cancellation because he was removable under § 1182(a)(2)(B), which covers aliens who have been “convicted of 2 or more offenses . . . for which the aggregate sentences to confinement were 5 years or more.” Ramirez contended that because the statutory disqualification in § 1229b(b)(1)(C) is phrased in the singular, his multiple offenses described in § 1182(a)(2)(B) did not trigger ineligibility for cancellation. The panel disagreed, relying on Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 649 (9th Cir. 2004), in which this court concluded that the most logical reading of § 1229b(b)(1)(C) was that the cancellation bar applies to each of the disqualifying events “described under” the cross-referenced provisions. The panel concluded that the same logic applied here and that § 1229b(b)(1)(C)’s use of the singular “offense” did not RAMIREZ-MEDINA V. GARLAND 3 require a different conclusion. The panel explained that the Dictionary Act generally instructs that “words importing the singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or things.” 1 U.S.C. § 1. The panel also observed that its interpretation accorded with that of the Fifth Circuit. Ramirez also argued that the BIA erred in finding that his multiple convictions resulted in aggregated sentences of at least five years because the agency relied on a criminal record that he alleged did not relate to him. The panel rejected that argument, explaining that the agency reasonably concluded that Ramirez did not satisfy his burden of showing that he had not been convicted of an offense that made him ineligible for cancellation.
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