Cheneau v. Garland, No. 15-70636 (9th Cir. 2021)
Annotate this Case
The en banc court held that the second clause of the derivative citizenship statute set out at former 8 U.S.C. 1432(a)(5) does not require that the child have been granted lawful permanent residency prior to the age of eighteen in order to derive citizenship from a parent who naturalized, but the child must have demonstrated an objective official manifestation of permanent residence.
The en banc court concluded that the Cheneau panel properly concluded that it was bound under circuit precedent by Romero-Ruiz v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2008). Furthermore, the panel properly highlighted the problems in applying the Romero-Ruiz analysis of section 1432(a)(5) in the present context. In reconsidering Romero-Ruiz, the en banc court agreed with Judge Bennett's concurring opinion that Romero-Ruiz must be overruled to the extent that it interpreted "reside permanently" to require lawful permanent resident status. The en banc court remanded to the three-judge panel so that the panel may, in its discretion, apply the revised rule to this case.
Court Description: Immigration. Remanding to the three-judge panel that previously denied Monssef Cheneau’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the en banc court held that the second clause of the derivative citizenship statute set out at former 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(5) does not require that the child have been granted lawful permanent residency prior to the age of eighteen in order to derive citizenship from a parent who naturalized, but the child must have demonstrated an objective official manifestation of permanent residence. Former 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(5) (1994) (repealed 2000) provides two different pathways to child of a naturalized parent to derive U.S. citizenship: 1) a child “residing in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence at the time of the naturalization of the parent” is eligible; and 2) a child is eligible who “thereafter begins to reside permanently in the United States while under the age of eighteen years.” Cheneau entered the United states lawfully at age thirteen under a non-immigrant student visa. His mother naturalized in 1999, he applied for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident at age fifteen in 2000, and was granted adjustment of status in 2003, after he turned eighteen. After theft convictions, removal proceedings were initiated, and Cheneau moved to terminate, asserting a claim of derivative CHENEAU V. GARLAND 3 citizenship. The three-judge panel in this case held that it was required to hold that Cheneau was not a derivative citizen under either pathway because this court, in Romero-Ruiz v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2008), had held that both pathways required the child to have lawful permanent resident status. Reconsidering Romero-Ruiz in the present context, the en banc court concluded that Congress did not intend to require lawful permanent residency for the second pathway. First, the en banc court observed that Congress chose to use two different terms in the statute, creating a presumption that the terms have different meanings. Second, the en banc court explained that the two terms have different meanings in the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Third, the en banc court concluded that construing the second pathway to derivative citizenship as not requiring lawful permanent residence does not render either provision superfluous, as the court suggested in Romero-Ruiz. Rather, each pathway applies distinct requirements to distinct categories of children with distinct timing, and does so with logical reason. Finally, the en banc court explained that Congress’s decision to eliminate the “reside permanently” pathway and narrow the availability of derivative citizenship in 2000 indicates that the previous version of the statute was broader. The en banc court also explained that the history of the INA (which was enacted in 1952 and established lawful permanent residency as a term of art) and earlier naturalization statutes further buttressed its conclusion that Congress intended “reside permanently” and “lawful admission for permanent residence” to have different meanings. Further, the en banc court concluded that the tenet of statutory construction that repetition of the same language 4 CHENEAU V. GARLAND in a new statute generally indicates the intent to incorporate its administrative and judicial interpretations as well did not apply, because none of the administrative or judicial interpretations preceding the INA had “settled” whether “reside permanently” could mean lawfully residing on a temporary visa with the intent to remain permanently. Finally, the en banc court agreed with the Second Circuit that, to satisfy the “reside permanently” requirement in the second pathway, an individual must demonstrate “some objective official manifestation of the child’s permanent residence.” Here, the en banc court explained, Cheneau filed an application for adjustment of status after his mother naturalized, expressing such intent to reside permanently. Dissenting, Judge Bress, joined by Judges Hunsaker, Bumatay, and VanDyke, wrote that the en banc court’s decision adopted the very “unreasonable” reading of the statute that Romero-Ruiz had rejected. Judge Bress concluded that the new interpretation: 1) is an untenable construction of the statutory text; 2) fails to account for decades of statutory history in which derivative citizenship necessarily required lawful permission to reside permanently in the United States—the legal backdrop against which the statutory language “reside permanently” has long existed in our immigration law: and 3) produces significant problems of practical administration, creating confusion as to who qualifies for derivative citizenship while extending derivative citizenship without authorization to a potentially wide range of additional people—including people like the petitioner in this case, who committed crimes in this country and who might otherwise be removable. CHENEAU V. GARLAND 5
This opinion or order relates to an opinion or order originally issued on August 19, 2020.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.