Patterson v. Van Arsdel, No. 15-35838 (9th Cir. 2018)
Annotate this CaseThe Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that a pretrial release officer improperly procured a warrant for plaintiff's arrest in violation of her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures. The panel held that the officer was not protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity for a defective arrest warrant where, given the similarities between his role and those of a parole officer and a law enforcement officer, his action in submitting the bare unsigned warrant should be seen as making a recommendation that the warrant be signed, just like a parole officer recommending revocation or like a police officer submitting documentation for an arrest warrant to a judge.
Court Description: Civil Rights. The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of a complaint in an action brought under 42 U.S.C § 1983 alleging that a pretrial release officer improperly procured a warrant for plaintiff’s arrest in violation of her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures, and remanded. The district court held that the defendant was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for the defective arrest warrant. In reversing the district court, the panel stated that the determinative question for absolute immunity was whether defendant was engaged in prosecutorial advocacy. The panel noted that pursuant to Oregon law and the relevant procedures followed in the Yamhill County Circuit Court, defendant had not been delegated authority to make release decisions. Rather, he was authorized only to make recommendations to a judge. The panel held that given the similarities between defendant’s role and those of a parole officer and a law enforcement officer, defendant’s action in submitting a bare unsigned warrant to the judge should be seen as making a recommendation that the warrant be signed, just like a parole officer recommending revocation, as in Swift v. California, 384 F.3d 1184, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004), or like a police officer submitting documentation for an arrest warrant to a judge, as in Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986). The panel concluded that defendant was not entitled PATTERSON V. VAN ARSDEL 3 to absolute prosecutorial immunity and remanded the case for further proceedings. Dissenting, Judge Fernandez stated that the majority’s determination that absolute prosecutorial immunity did not apply at all was waived by plaintiff. On the merits, Judge Fernandez stated that the panel should have adhered to the long established rule that once the court grants that the function in question is a prosecutorial function, it does not matter if the person performing that function lacks the title of “prosecutor.” Accordingly, Judge Fernandez believed that the defendant in this case should have been accorded absolute immunity for procuring the warrant.
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