United States v. Sierra Pacific Industries, Inc., No. 15-15799 (9th Cir. 2017)
Annotate this CaseThe United States brought a civil action against private forestry operators and other individuals to recover damages for a forest fire that broke out on private property near the Plumas National Forest in northern California (The Moonlight Fire). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendants' motion for relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3). The panel held that the district court properly concluded that Sierra Pacific could not demonstrate fraud on the court regarding any of the alleged fraud it discovered before settlement. Nor do the instances of alleged fraud discovered after settlement constitute actionable fraud on the court warranting Rule 60 relief. Furthermore, there was no appearance of bias created by the instances of alleged conduct in this case -- the judge's action in tweeting the link to an allegedly erroneous news article, so retroactive recusal was not warranted.
Court Description: Fraud on the Court / Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3). The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of defendants’ motion for relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3) based on allegations of fraud, following a settlement in a civil action brought by the United States against private forestry operators and individuals to recover damages for the Moonlight Fire that burned portions of the Plumas and Lassen National Forests in 2007. The defendants argued that the government’s alleged misrepresentations throughout the investigation and litigation constituted fraud on the court. The defendants also alleged newly-discovered fraud after the settlement. The panel held that a finding of fraud on the court is reserved for material, intentional misrepresentations that could not have been discovered earlier, even through due 4 UNITED STATES V. SIERRA PACIFIC INDUS. diligence. The panel held that the district court properly concluded that Sierra Pacific Industries, Inc. did not demonstrate fraud on the court regarding any of the alleged fraud it discovered before settlement. The panel further held that none of the allegations of after-discovered fraud, either individually or as a whole, established that the government committed fraud on the court within the meaning of Rule 60. The panel rejected defendants’ argument that the district court judge was required to recuse himself under Canon 3C of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges and 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) because of an appearance of bias created by activity on a Twitter account that did not bear the judge’s name, but was allegedly controlled by him. The panel reviewed the allegations for plain error because defendants failed to first raise the issue before the district court. Specifically, the panel held that the claim – that an unknown Twitter account, not identified with a judge or the judiciary, followed a public Twitter account maintained by the U.S. Attorney – did not provide a basis for recusal. The panel further held that the fact that the Twitter account followed the U.S. Attorney did not mean that the public tweets published by the U.S. Attorney constituted improper ex parte communications. Finally, the panel rejected defendants’ allegation that the judge’s action in tweeting the link to an allegedly erroneous news article required reversal. The panel concluded that retroactive recusal of the district court judge was not warranted, and vacatur of the district court’s order was also unwarranted. UNITED STATES V. SIERRA PACIFIC INDUS. 5
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